



Thinking about ultimate reality is becoming increasingly transreligious. This 
transreligious turn follows inevitably from the discovery of divine truths in 
multiple traditions. Global communications bring the full range of religious 
ideas and practices to anyone with access to the internet. Moreover, the 
growth of the “nones” and those who describe themselves as “spiritual but 
not religious” creates a pressing need for theological thinking not bound by 
prescribed doctrines and fixed rituals. This book responds to this vital need. 
The chapters in this volume each examine the claim that if the aim of 
theology is to know and articulate all we can about the divine reality, and if 
revelations, enlightenments, and insights into that reality are not limited to 
a single tradition, then what is called for is a theology without confessional 
restrictions. In other words, a Theology Without Walls. To ground the 
project in examples, the volume provides emerging models of transreligious 
inquiry. It also includes sympathetic critics who raise valid concerns that 
such a theology must face. 
This is a book that will be of urgent interest to theologians, religious 
studies scholars, and philosophers of religion. It will be especially suitable 
for those interested in comparative theology, interreligious and interfaith 
understanding, new trends in constructive theology, normative religious 
studies, and the global philosophy of religion. 
Jerry L. Martin has served as Chair of the National Endowment for 
the Humanities and of the Philosophy Department at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder and has also taught at Georgetown University and the 
Catholic University of America. He has published on issues in epistemology, 
philosophy of mind, phenomenology, transreligious theology, and public 
policy. In 2014, he founded the Theology Without Walls project, which 
meets with the American Academy of Religion. He is the author of God: An 
Autobiography, as Told to a Philosopher (2016). 
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Jerry L. Martin 
The coming wave of thinking about ultimate reality is transreligious. The 
transreligious turn follows ineluctably from the discovery, profound in its 
depth and implications, of divine or ultimate truth in multiple traditions. 
At the forefront of this turn are scholars associated with Theology With­
out Walls. This approach is based on the following syllogism: If the aim of 
theology is to know and articulate all we can about the divine or ultimate 
reality, and if revelations, enlightenments, and insights into that reality are 
not limited to a single tradition, then what is called for is a theology without 
confessional restrictions, a Theology Without Walls (TWW). Any approach 
that omits the insights of traditions other than one’s own falls short of being 
adequate to the ultimate reality. Any approach that insists on translating 
those insights into the terms of one’s own tradition risks narrowness, distor­
tion, and misappropriation. 
It is a question of subject matter. The subject matter of theology is ulti­
mate reality, not one’s own tradition. One way to put it is that, in addition 
to Christian theology, Hindu theology, Islamic theology, etc., there is just 
Theology, the logos of theos, of ultimacy. It is not that we do not stand 
somewhere, but our sense of our goal is not limited to where we stand at 
the outset. All available terms, including “divine or ultimate reality” and 
“theology” itself, must be provisional, giving a sense of direction to thought 
without precluding surprising advances and revisions. In TWW, works of 
literature, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and the natural and social 
sciences, as well as personal experience, may become important sources of 
theological insight. A major achievement of the past half-century has been 
the development of increasingly adequate concepts and methods for com­
parison and dialogue conducive to theologizing across traditions. 
Is TWW a form of religious pluralism? No, pluralism is a concept within 
confessional theology of religions. It is a thesis about the religions, not 
about ultimate reality. It is an answer to the question that arises within a 
tradition about the status – particularly the soteriological effectiveness – of 
other traditions, about whether they can deliver what “our” religion does. 
















2 Jerry L. Martin 
be? What is the fundamental human predicament that soteriology should 
address? Indeed, is soteriology even the central concept in our relationship 
with ultimacy? 
Is TWW a form of comparative theology? Yes, if it is understood as
a Comparative Theology Without Walls. But it is an alternative to those
forms of comparative theology that are essentially confessional, seeking
to enhance one’s own theology by studying another tradition. The most
natural mode of TWW may not involve comparison or side-by-side read­
ing. Whereas comparative theology tends to anchor studies in the religions,
TWW is open to taking evidences wherever they are found, including
sources quite outside religion as historically defined. Its theologians can
look to literature or to psychology or to evolutionary biology for insight
into the human condition and, from there, into the soteriological solution
to that condition. The familiar metaphor for comparative theology in a
confessional mode is “passing over” and “returning home.” For TWW,
“returning home” is a possibility, not a necessity. Any place truth can be
found is home. 
Is the aim to find what is common among all the major religions? No, 
noting commonalities may make a useful contribution, but the aim is to 
understand what is truly ultimate and, hence, in the end, to be selective. 
There is no guarantee that every religion dubbed as “major” is, even in 
essential aspects, right on target with regard to ultimate reality. Or that 
those religions not identified as major lack evidential value. We have to 
use spiritual discernment, philosophical reflection, personal experience, and 
transreligious insight to sort that out. 
Is it possible to sort out or evaluate insights from traditions not our own? 
In fact, we do this already. When we seriously study other traditions, we 
frequently find deep insights there. We do not find them in every aspect 
of every tradition, but in certain texts, practices, spiritual disciplines, and 
iconic figures that strike us as revelatory or evidential. However accounted 
for, this is a human spiritual capability, without which religion itself would 
hardly be possible. 
Is the aim of TWW to arrive at a single, encompassing theological world-
view? No more than any other field of inquiry. Disagreement is fruitful. 
Is engaging in TWW compatible with a commitment to one’s own confes­
sion? Yes, just as a Jungian psychotherapist can take in insight from other 
thinkers and acknowledge that psychology itself is a wider field of inquiry, 
one can, like Huston Smith, be a participating Presbyterian while holding a 
much wider religious worldview. Some essays in this volume discuss how the 
spiritual life might be lived in a transreligious context. 
TWW might, however, have an impact on religious traditions. They might 
come to regard themselves as offering truth, but not the only truth. Partici­
pants may become willing and interested to learn from other traditions. The 




That Theology Without Walls is necessary – if theology is to live up to 
its goal of explicating ultimate reality as fully as possible – does not ensure 
that it is achievable. Theology as we know it has been, almost by definition, 
the articulation of religious truths as held by a particular tradition. It is that 
tradition that provides the canonical texts, hermeneutical strategies, theo­
logical questions, proffered answers, methods for assessing and modifying 
them, and even institutional authorities for ruling certain answers in or out. 
In addition, such traditions provide the full-bodied religious life that their 
theologies serve. 
What are, for TWW, the theological issues, debates, and methods of inter­
pretation and of resolution? These issues are already being sorted out in 
interreligious scholarship and discussion of such matters as the role of mys­
tical and other religious experience, the role of religious authorities, which 
spiritual practices are effective and what they achieve, alternative ontolo­
gies, and rival hermeneutical strategies. More fundamentally, theologies 
must address the enduring questions of human life and death, felicity and 
suffering, love and compassion, justice and mercy, and so on. 
This volume explains and argues for this new approach to theology. It 
includes scholars from a range of religions and spiritual orientations and 
of disciplines whose research clarifies the scope and conditions of valid reli­
gious theorizing. Some contributors make the case for transreligious theolo­
gizing or for their own approaches to it. Some discuss particular issues, such 
as dual religious belonging or the relation of TWW to confessional commit­
ment. The volume includes sympathetic critics whose serious concerns indi­
cate challenges TWW must face. Finally, to ground the project in examples, 
the volume includes emerging models of transreligious inquiry. 
TWW presents an obvious challenge to traditional theology, but its 
importance is not limited to scholars, or even to religious professionals. 
The wider public is involved. We no longer live in villages or neighborhoods 
where everybody has the same religion. There are ashrams and mosques in 
the same towns as churches and synagogues. Global communications bring 
the full range of religious ideas and practices into our homes and offices. 
Moreover, the growth of the “nones” and those who describe themselves as 
“spiritual but not religious” creates a pressing need for theological think­
ing not bounded by prescribed doctrines and fixed rituals, yet subject to the 
rigor of a search for truth. TWW responds to this vital need. 
At the outset, transreligious theology should be considered an exploratory 
program, at best a “research programme” in Imre Lakatos’s sense. “One 
must treat budding programmes leniently,” he writes, since, early on, the 
obstacles will be more obvious than their fruitfulness. Meanwhile, we must 
exercise “methodological tolerance.” We cannot allow procedural worries 
to block the path of inquiry. Models are beginning to emerge. Concepts for 
transreligious discourse are increasingly well-developed. We will learn the 
best methods by engaging in the process. 
4 Jerry L. Martin 
TWW calls upon each theologian to seek truth, wherever it can be found, 
and to articulate it even when methods and concepts are still in the process 
of being developed and are not, or not yet, ready at hand. Consider these 
essays forays into ultimacy. Gandhi named his autobiography, The Story of 
My Experiments with Truth. That is what all our lives are, including our 




Why Theology Without Walls?
 
Introduction 
Jerry L. Martin 
The most comprehensive systematic transreligious theology is presented in 
Robert Cummings Neville’s three-volume Philosophical Theology. The first 
volume is called Ultimates and contains a précis of the whole. Neville estab­
lishes a metaphysical structure within which the various “ultimates” rep­
resented by or symbolized through various traditions find their place. His 
accomplishment, requiring a philosophical sophistication and cross-cultural 
erudition few possess, can be daunting, rather than empowering, for emerg­
ing theologians. For that reason, he was asked to reflect on “how to become 
the next Robert Neville.” He does that by telling his own story, which goes 
back to the age of four and is still ongoing. 
Why Theology Without Walls (TWW)? Because, says Neville, there are 
inescapable questions about “what is ultimate and how it is ultimate” with 
respect to the “problematic” aspects of life and the universe. “No one really 
trusts walled-in answers to them.” In fact, “theologies with walls reduce 
to sociological claims” – this is what my tradition “believes.” In spite of 
his own metaphysical grounding and comprehensive interreligious scope, 
Neville reminds us that “theologians need to make their own decisions.” He 
recognizes that, in spite of powerful arguments on its behalf, his way is not 
the only way to engage in Theology Without Walls. Other ways, some quite 
different, are also represented in this volume. 
For theologians to make thoughtful choices based on years of study is 
one thing; for everyone to shop casually among religious and nonreligious 
offerings is quite another. Scholars from Robert Bellah to Christopher Smith 
have lamented the rise of the loosely affiliated “Sheila” as a cultural type. 
For Christopher Denny, teaching Catholic theology in a Catholic university, 
it came as a shock to realize to what extent we live in an age of casual shop­
pers in the spiritual supermarket. But the shock prompted an insight that, 
contrary to the concerns of Bellah and Smith, in religious as well as secular 
life, “there is a human agent making the choice.” The great religions them­
selves resulted from human choices and, in our more democratic and egali­
tarian times, these choices are open to a larger population. He concludes 
that “the recognition of preferences provides theology with a new starting 
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phenomenon of choice does not imply relativism. He quotes Kurt Richard­
son: “The self as the locus of truth does not mean the self as the source of 
truth.” Not every choice, Denny says, will be “intellectually coherent, mor­
ally defensible, or spiritually attractive to others.” This is true whether we 
choose a traditional path or a personal one. “Whatever mistakes we make, 
they will be our own,” he concludes. “In that sense, we are all Sheilas.” 
As radical as Denny’s argument may seem, Richard Oxenberg argues that 
a transreligious thrust is implied by the theological project itself and, sur­
prisingly, “forecast by Jesus himself.” He begins by exploring the reasons 
for theology within walls. He answers that “faith requires understanding in 
order simply to fulfill itself as faith.” He quotes Jesus’s warning about hear­
ing the message but failing to understand it. Oxenberg argues that TWW 
“also has its basis in revelatory experience; a revelatory experience more 
and more of us are having in the context of the global encounter of the 
world religions with one another.” We are seeing “divine truth” outside 
our home traditions. Dogmatic faith gives way to “Socratic faith,” which 
requires humility rather than claims of infallibility. It involves the dialectical 
examination of the revelations themselves. He goes further: TWW “itself
betokens a new revelation of the divine,” one that has its own soteriological 
power, namely, to overcome tribalistic rivalries and “thereby bring us closer 
to a recognition of the divine as One.” 
In place of a world of fixed religions, maintaining their own stable doc­
trines and devotions, we face a world of contending, unpredictable individ­
ual choices. In such a world, Kurt Anders Richardson argues, TWW creates 
a hermeneutical space for “open-field” theology, a meta-discourse about 
theological practices and their contexts in relation. It seeks to “coordinate 
discursive spaces with no theological limitations” while respecting “the 
inviolate mind, conscience and body of every human being.” Thus “any 
discursive handling of divine or ultimate topics . . . qualify as kinds of the­
ology.” TWW as a hermeneutic open-field theology creates a “community 
field of discourse where multiple rationalities and theological priorities can 
find concourse” without having to agree to “common ground” or “common 
problems.” Put simply, it provides the “working space” for theology suit­
















1 Paideias and programs for 
Theology Without Walls 
Robert Cummings Neville 
Editor Jerry L. Martin asked me to explain how I became the kind of theo­
logian without walls that I am. The first thing to say about that is that there 
are many kinds of theologians without walls, not just mine. Many differ­
ent starting points exist, and there are many different kinds of theological 
problems in which to be interested. I myself am a systematic philosophical 
theologian, and I take myself to be accountable to any thinker in any tradi­
tion, religious or secular, who has an interest in the outcome of my inquiry. 
My inquiry has a number of parts, and at the beginning of my career I could 
not develop any of them very well. But I kept working on them all together 
and gradually became more sophisticated. It would be great to be deeply 
and evenly sophisticated, although I do not expect that! Here are some of 
the parts of my systematic philosophical inquiry. Note that this is the first 
time I have been asked to write in an avuncular voice: if I wobble between 
braggadocio and patronizing, remember it is a first attempt. 
Knowledge of religion 
I was born in 1939 in St. Louis, Missouri, and raised there through public 
schools until I left for college in 1956.1 My family was active in a rather 
liberal Methodist church. Most of our neighbors and my classmates were 
Roman Catholic; the more established German and Irish Catholics were 
resentful of the newly arrived Italians. When I was about 14, I edited our 
congregation’s weekly newsletter and decided to write a series of 500-word 
columns about world religions. Based on encyclopedia articles, my columns 
dealt sequentially with Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Daoism, 
Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam (in alphabetical order). This was not high 
scholarship and certainly had no peer review. Notice that Christianity was 
presented as one religion among many. No one gave me any grief for that. 
I’m proud that my first “publications” were about world religions. 
In college I roomed with a Greek Orthodox and a Jew, never having met 
representatives of those religions before (my St. Louis neighborhood was 
rather homogeneous). I majored in philosophy, but we studied only West­
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at Fordham University did I begin to study non-Western philosophies and 
religions, under the prodding of Thomas Berry. He taught me Sanskrit and 
arranged for me to learn a little Chinese; moreover he arranged for me to 
teach both Indian and Chinese philosophy, which I have done ever since 
until I retired in the spring of 2018. Although I cannot keep up with a 
well-trained historian of any religion, I am literate in frontline research in 
those fields and can talk with scholars from most religious traditions. I’m 
recognized as a contemporary progressive Confucian philosopher (Neville 
2000). I think it is possible for a theologian without walls to grow slowly 
from a position of naiveté and bias about religions to enough erudition to 
be conversant with thinkers from most traditions and to be relatively expert 
in those of personal interest. 
Systematic thinking 
In college I was taught that system in philosophy means the development 
of a group of connected categories in terms of which everything can be 
represented as a specification. Hegel, Peirce, and Whitehead were the model 
systematic thinkers, and I thought a lot about Whitehead’s criteria for a 
philosophical system: consistency, coherence, adequacy, and applicability 
(Whitehead 1978). At my college, Yale, systematic thinking was encour­
aged, not discouraged, as would have happened at nearly any other college 
in those days. My senior thesis on interpretation and nature was my first 
attempt at a system. 
Nevertheless, systems are based on core ideas, and my first core
philosophical-theological idea came when I was in kindergarten. One of 
my classmates told me that God is a person. I checked with my father who 
said that, although Jesus was a person, God is more like light or electric­
ity. I understood that idea at a five-year-old level and began working on it. 
My current theological naturalism is a more sophisticated version of my 
father’s hypothesis. I never had a serious commitment to a personal God 
that I would have to get over in order to deal with Brahman or the Dao. 
About the time I was editing the church newsletter, one of my high school 
teachers said to me, “You know, Bob, that God is not in space or time.” 
I understood immediately what he meant and agreed with it. I also immedi­
ately knew that understanding that idea was an unusual kind of thinking, to 
which I decided to dedicate my life. So my systematic theology of creation 
ex nihilo began in high school and became the topic of my PhD disserta­
tion (1963), which was revised and published in 1968 as God the Creator
(Neville 1968, 1992). That is a real systematic book, although not half as 
sophisticated as my recent systematic statement, Ultimates: Philosophical 
Theology Volume One (Neville 2013).2 
The moral I draw about this part of my inquiry is that it is important to 
begin as soon as possible with systematic thinking and grow from naïve 
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mastered everything that systems need and then try to put them together. 
People I’ve known who waited until old age to put things together in a sys­
tematic way simply did not develop the tastes and skill of system making. 
Good systems have multiple layers, and really good ones allow you to see 
through many layers and interconnections at once. So I think you have to 
start young, duck your head when critics cry “juvenile,” and just make your 
system more complex and transparently simple. 
Comparative theology 
It is one thing to learn a lot about many religions and another to be able to 
compare them. Comparison usually begins by noting some at least surface 
similarities between the religious positions and then inquiring into just how 
similar and different they are. Progress in comparison, however, requires 
hard work identifying exactly the respects in which the comparison is being 
made. Comparison is always “with respect to something.” The respects in 
which things can be compared are comparative categories, and they are 
astonishingly hard to develop. Often what looks like a similarity between 
two positions turns out to be thinking at cross purposes. Some years ago, 
for instance, some comparativists got excited about the similarities between 
sunyata in Buddhism and kenosis in Christianity. But upon examination, 
the similarities boiled down to the fact that both translate as “emptiness” 
in English: Buddhist sunyata is a metaphysical characteristic of things as 
experienced by enlightened people, and Christian kenosis is Christ’s or a 
person’s taking on a humble station. There was no respect in which they 
can be compared except the accident of translation into English. The ques­
tion of gods is an interesting comparative one. But in what respects is it 
important to compare them? Whether religions believe in one, several, or 
thousands? How many are male, female, both, ungendered? Do the gods 
squabble in ways that affect humans? Are there divine hierarchies? What 
is at stake in these comparisons, all of which can be made? I suspect that 
continued reflection on gods gives rise to the comparative category of what 
is ultimate and how is it ultimate. Monotheisms identify the ultimate with 
one God, however differently that God might be understood among and 
within monotheisms. Polytheisms, even those with a top God in a hierarchy, 
do not consider the ultimate to be a god with intentional agency, but some 
deeper principle. Some religions like Buddhism, many forms of Hinduism, 
Confucianism, and Daoism in their early forms believed that the world is 
populated with many kinds of supernatural beings but that they were not 
ultimate at all. Confucianism and Daoism do not use many personalistic 
metaphors for ultimacy, but rather look to metaphors of spontaneous emer­
gence. The important categories for comparing theological positions emerge 
only slowly with the process of learning and systematizing. 
In my own experience, the categories that emerge as important for theo­
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positions, turn out to be the categories that are important for the system in 
philosophical theology. I think that there are five problematics that any seri­
ously developed theological tradition must address: why there is something 
rather than nothing; how human choice determines not only what happens 
sometimes but also the character of the chooser; how to have a good self; 
how to relate to other people, institutions, and nature on their own terms; 
and what the meaning of life and existence is. These are extremely compli­
cated problematics, and religions say many different things about them. But 
the problematics can be sorted through to develop important categories for 
comparative theology. Of course, the religious positions are often in wild 
disagreement.3 Theologians without walls need to make their own decisions 
about how to evaluate the positions compared. 
The moral here is that the development of important comparative catego­
ries for theology is a long, evolving, and critical process. It is not that the 
theologian can first get categories for comparison and then work for years 
filling in how the theological positions compare. Rather, every comparative 
category is itself an hypothesis about the important respects in which to 
compare theological positions and should be kept vulnerable to correction 
throughout a comparative theologian’s continuing inquiry. Start young and 
correct yourself. 
Programs of teaching 
I assume that most theologians without walls are teachers at the high school, 
undergraduate, or perhaps graduate levels. Some of us are retired from all 
that, and it is possible to be a serious theologian without walls without an 
academic career at all. Nevertheless, teaching helps one become a better 
theologian without walls. We all know that trying to explain something to 
students who do not know it makes you figure out just what you understand 
and what you do not. 
I recommend that, to as great an extent as circumstances allow, we should 
teach courses about the three topics I have already mentioned, namely 
courses on different religions, courses on systematic theology aiming to say 
what you think is true, and courses in comparison where you lead students 
to understand both the nature of religion and what should be said about the 
most important theological topics. I have been fortunate that in my 57 years 
of teaching I have taught all three kinds of courses. Some people, of course, 
teach in religious schools where discussion of other religions is discouraged 
or forbidden. Some teach in schools where it is forbidden to say what you 
think is true on theological topics or admit to having a theological system. 
Some teach in places where there is no leisure for complicated discussions 
about the nature of comparison. But we should hope to teach the elements 
of theology without walls to as great an extent as possible. 
Furthermore, we should teach these courses again and again, revising
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changing nature of the students. Here I am advocating repetitive improve­
ments based on what can be learned from teaching. In my 31 years at Bos­
ton University, I have been fortunate to teach a sequence of three advanced
systematic courses nine times. Each sequence is a little different from the one
before, and sometimes there are radical changes in the readings. Teaching
this sequence again and again has led me to the publication of my three-
volume philosophical theology based on some comparative erudition and
aimed at an audience of anyone interested in the outcome of the inquiry.
Teaching for many years is a great good fortune. I personally could have
stopped grading papers 15 or 20 years ago, but the classroom is always fresh. 
Professional colleagues 
Another crucial part of the ongoing paideia for a theologian without walls 
is the cultivation of professional contacts. This is not likely to be done by 
having a whole department of theologians without walls, although Wesley 
Wildman advocates “academic theology” in colleges and universities as the­
ology without walls (Wildman 2010). More likely is the possibility of devel­
oping collaborative friendships and close involvements with professional 
societies that are relevant to the many parts of theology without walls. 
The professional societies can be of many sorts. For the sake of developing 
a philosophical system, I have been fortunate to be part of the Metaphysi­
cal Society of America from my graduate school days. It was founded by 
Paul Weiss, who was on my dissertation committee and who published my 
first professional philosophy paper in The Review of Metaphysics, which he 
founded and edited for many years. My own kind of philosophical herit­
age owes very much to American pragmatism, and I have long belonged 
to the Institute for American Religious and Philosophical Thought. More 
recently I have been involved with the Charles S. Peirce Society. For com­
parative work, my main interest has been in Confucianism, and I have been 
a multidecade member of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy. 
Theology without walls has flourished mainly in the American Academy of 
Religion to which I have belonged for most of my career. I have frequently 
given papers at these groups and have commented on others. They pro­
vide long-term communities of critics and encouragers. I have been involved 
with their administrations and have served as the president of each of them, 
engaging as a Confucian scholar-official. 
Friends are perhaps the most important collaborators in developing a rich 
theology without walls over the long haul. Some friends come from special 
projects with which we can become involved. Others become the special 
friends that grow with you over the years. I myself have been greatly fortu­
nate in friendships and am convinced that philosophical friendships, rather 
than the philosophical rush to refutation in which I was raised by analytic 
philosophers, are the proper venues for cultivating the openings into the 
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Publication 
As Boston’s Mayor Curley said about voting, publish early and often. Do 
not wait until you have a perfectly polished piece of theology before you 
submit it for publication. Do not be afraid to grow in the press, publishing 
improved renditions of your ideas as they come to you. Find the publishing 
venues amenable to your work and pursue them. If the peer-review process 
elicits good criticisms, figure out where they are coming from and accept 
them selectively. 
The more original your work, the less likely it is to be understood by 
reviewers and editors. When I first started out, my first book was rejected by 
a number of publishers before it was finally accepted after three years by the 
University of Chicago Press. During that dry period all of my articles were 
rejected as well. In frustration, I sent the rejected articles to Wilfrid Sellars, 
one of my graduate professors, and asked what to do. He wrote back that 
the philosophy I was doing was different from what was recognized in the 
assorted philosophical Balkans and that when my book was finally pub­
lished, it would establish an audience for my work. That is pretty much 
what happened. 
Theology without walls will not be recognized as legitimate theology by 
people who think theology is always based within some faith community. 
It will also not be recognized by most philosophers who do not like theol­
ogy because they think it is always apologetic for some faith community. So 
we need to be patient in developing venues for the publication of theology 
without walls. Keep up the courage to sustain many rejections. 
Two principal reasons exist for hope for the paideia and programs of 
theology without walls. First, theologies with walls reduce to sociological 
claims: this is what Thomists, Advaita Vedantins, and Confucians “believe” 
in their theologies. Most theologians cannot be satisfied with that and want 
their claims to be true, not just part of the grammar of a select group. Sec­
ond, the world, especially colleges and universities, needs disciplined people 
to address the big theological questions: Why is there something rather than 
nothing? Why are human beings obligated and how? What is the nature of 
an ideal self, and how can that be achieved? How can we relate to others 
while respecting their perspectives? What is the meaning of life and exist­
ence? Many other first-order questions have rung the bells for centuries. 
Those questions cut across all religions and the assorted secularities. No one 
really trusts theologically walled-in answers to them. Colleges and universi­
ties need to make places for theology without walls, because those are the 
most basic and important questions. 
I am a philosophical realist and believer that we get feedback from real­
ity on ultimate theological questions, particularly, the feedback that says, 
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Notes 
1 You will find an account of my childhood at www.robertcummingsneville.com, 
including embellishments of some of the stories I tell here. 
2 That is part of the now larger system that includes Neville (2014) and Neville 
(2015). 
3 See Neville (2014, 2015) to track some of these wild differences. 
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2 In spirit and truth 




Introduction: spirit and truth 
In the Gospel of John, we are told the story of a Samaritan woman who 
asks Jesus whether the proper place of worship is on the holy mountain of 
Samaria or in the Temple of Jerusalem. These were the centers of two rival, 
antagonistic religious institutions. Jesus responds: 
Woman, believe Me, an hour is coming when neither in this mountain 
nor in Jerusalem will you worship the Father . . . an hour is coming, and 
now is, when the true worshippers will worship in spirit and truth; for 
such people the Father seeks to be His worshippers. God is spirit, and 
those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth. 
(Jn 4:21–24) 
“Spirit and truth,” of course, are neither places nor institutions. “Spirit” –
pneuma in New Testament Greek – refers to that which animates life and 
gives it meaning. “Truth” – aletheia in Greek – might better be rendered as 
“truthfulness.” It refers here not to the correctness of abstract propositions, 
but to the earnestness that is the mark of the true spiritual aspirant. Jesus is 
saying that the true worshiper of God is not one whose primary allegiance 
is to one or another religious institution, but one who genuinely seeks the 
divine in heart and mind. Whether on the Samaritan mountain or in the 
Jerusalem Temple, the one who worships in “spirit and truth” worships 
rightly. 
Those of us pursuing a “theology without walls” aspire to do theology 
in “spirit and truth”; that is, in a manner not confined to any particular 
religious institution or tradition, but grounded simply in an earnest search 
for the divine. This aspiration constitutes a new and distinctive way of 
approaching theological pursuits; one forecast by Jesus in the earlier pas­
sage but fully realizable only in our time. 
To make this clear, it will be helpful, first of all, to consider why theology 
has traditionally been done within walls and then to consider why and how 
some of us now feel called upon to pass beyond such walls in pursuit of a 
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Theology within walls 
We might begin by considering the peculiar relationship of theology to reli­
gion. Religions do not arise in response to theological reflection; rather, the­
ology arises as an attempt to understand and apply religious experience.
Religion as a communal and spiritual practice is prior to theology as an intel­
lectual discipline. This priority of religion to theology is reflected in the clas­
sical designation of theology as “faith seeking understanding.” If we say that
faith seeks understanding, we imply that faith exists prior to understanding.
Theology is not the basis of faith; rather, faith is the basis of theology. 
What, then, is the basis of faith? The religions of the world have emerged 
not from theological reflection, but from an encounter or, anyway, a per­
ceived encounter, with the divine. I use the word “divine” here to refer to 
that which is ultimate in meaning and value – what Paul Tillich calls our 
“ultimate concern.” This might be a personal God, as in the Abrahamic 
religions, or it might be an exalted or awakened state of being, as in Bud­
dhism. Nevertheless, whether we think of divine reality as a highest person 
or as a supernal state of awareness, religions have their origin in some direct 
encounter, or purported encounter, with this divine reality. Theology, then, 
emerges as the endeavor to reflect upon this encounter, to appropriate it cog­
nitively and work out its implications for ordinary life. This, indeed, is what 
distinguishes theology from philosophy. Philosophy begins with mundane 
experience and seeks to arrive at universal truths through rational reflec­
tion, extrapolation, and generalization. Theology begins with an experience 
of the divine, or reports of such experience, and seeks to make sense of that 
experience at the cognitive level. 
In this regard, theology is rooted in what John Thatamanil has called 
“first-order knowledge” of the divine. First-order knowledge is direct knowl­
edge, experiential knowledge; it is “knowledge of” rather than “knowledge 
about.” As Thatamanil puts it, a person who never swims can nevertheless 
acquire a great deal of information (i.e., “second-order knowledge”) about
swimming, but only the swimmer can have first-order knowledge of what it 
is to swim (Thatamanil 2016). 
It is such first-order knowledge, reflected in a particular body of revela­
tion – as recorded in scripture and/or passed down by tradition – that con­
stitutes the primary source material for theology. The theologian who takes 
up the task of interpreting a given body of revelation does so, presumably, 
because he or she has had a taste of such first-order knowledge with respect 
to it. In Tillich’s language, the theologian is “grasped” by an ultimate con­
cern and feels called to the task of making cognitive sense of that by which 
he or she is grasped. In this respect, theology is “hermeneutical” in the most 
basic, etymological sense of the word: Just as the messenger-god Hermes 
was charged with the task of communicating divine messages to human 
beings, so the theologian seeks to “hear” the divine message and translate it 
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This makes it clear why theology has traditionally been done “within 
walls.” It emerges in response to a particular body of revelation and thus, 
quite naturally, confines itself to that body. Theology is done within the 
walls of a given revelatory tradition because it is born within those walls 
and within those walls has its meaning and function. 
But one thing more needs to be added. We might ask why faith seeks 
understanding. Why isn’t faith content with itself, sans understanding? 
There is, of course, an important practical reason for this. Encounter with 
the divine seems never, or rarely, to be an experience whose purpose is fully 
consummated in itself. The divine makes demands concerning how we are 
to live, what we are to value, and how we are to relate to one another. The­
ology is needed to understand the tenor of these demands and to apply them 
to the concrete circumstances of life. 
But beyond this, faith requires understanding in order simply to fulfill 
itself as faith. In the Gospel of John, Jesus says to his disciples, “I no longer 
call you servants because a servant does not know his master’s business. 
Instead, I have called you friends, for everything I have learned from my 
Father I have made known to you” (Jn 15:14–15, my emphasis). Consum­
mated relation with the divine – “friendship” with the divine – requires 
some understanding of the divine purpose, or telos. Indeed, flawed under­
standing can imperil faith itself. Again, in the words of Jesus: “Whenever 
someone hears the message about the kingdom and fails to understand it, 
the evil one comes and snatches away the word that was sewn in his heart” 
(Mt. 13:19). 
Faith seeks understanding, then, in order to secure itself and fulfill itself 
as faith. Faith sans understanding is half-formed, inchoate, immature, and 
subject to distortion and error. 
Theology without walls 
If this is an accurate account of the roots and purposes of traditional theology –
theology within walls – we might next ask: What are the roots and purposes 
of a theology without walls? Does theology without walls also have its roots 
in an encounter with the divine, a revelatory experience, or is it more like 
philosophy, examining the particular religions as they appear to mundane 
experience and, through comparative analysis, extrapolation, and generali­
zation, seeking to extract from them something of universal import? 
I suggest that theology without walls also has its basis in revelatory expe­
rience; a revelatory experience more and more of us are having in the con­
text of the global encounter of the world religions with one another. What 
many of us are seeing – and I do believe “seeing” is the right word here – is 
that divine truth is to be found outside the bounds of our home tradition. In 
some cases, we see that the revelations of another tradition shed a light on 
our own that allows us to understand our own more fully. In other cases, we 
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a dimension of ourselves – of our “ultimate concern” – that our home tradi­
tion does not touch upon or speak to as profoundly. In still other cases, we 
see corrections for the distortions and limitations of our home tradition in 
the traditions of others. In all these cases, we see that our encounter with 
other traditions helps us to broaden, deepen, and solidify our experience 
and understanding of the divine. 
I use the word “see” here because I do not believe these recognitions are 
the result of a purely intellectual calculus. They do not arise from a simple, 
conceptual, contrast and compare. On the contrary, at the strictly conceptual 
level many of the world religions seem to have very little in common. Steven 
Prothero makes this point in his book God Is Not One. There is nothing, or 
very little, that would allow us to conceptually identify the attributes of the 
God of Abraham as presented in the Bible, for instance, with the attributes 
of the state of Nirvana as presented in Buddhist tradition. When we confine 
our thought to this level, we find more differences than commonalities, even 
apparently irreconcilable differences. 
But many of us – more and more of us – have sensed, or intuited, or
directly experienced that at the level of encounter, at the level of first-order
knowledge, there are similarities, complementarities, and correspondences
between the spiritual state one enters when one feels oneself in touch with
the God of Abraham and the spiritual state of the Hindu bhaktic or the
Buddhist arhat. This is not to say that such states are identical, but rather
that they bear a meaningful correspondence to one another, such that we
are led to believe, or perhaps, stated more cautiously, to suspect, that all
these experiences of the divine have their roots in a common ontological
ground. 
This is an exciting thought. The religious pluralist John Hick analogizes it 
to the excitement Newton must have felt when he suddenly recognized that 
the same force that makes an apple fall to the ground also makes the planets 
revolve around the sun. The excitement itself, I would say, has a certain rev­
elatory import and power. It calls us forth, it bids us on, it impels us to seek 
to make sense of these correspondences and commonalities, not merely for 
the sake of promoting religious tolerance, but much more fundamentally, as 
a way of more fully apprehending the divine ground from which the diverse 
religions spring. In this respect, it is the spiritual drive itself that calls us to 
do theology without walls. 
Of course, a planet revolving around the sun and an apple falling to the 
ground are not the same thing. That they are both manifestations of the 
same force, or of the same natural law, does not make them identical, nor 
does it imply that apples should “convert” to planets or planets to apples, 
nor that both apples and planets should somehow, impossibly, become 
gravity. These correspondences, in other words, do not imply that religions 
should shed their distinctions and merge into one. But they do give us a new 
understanding of the relationship of the religions to one another and to the 
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brethren rather than rivals and are able to recognize the commonality of 
purpose – of “spirit and truth” – underlying all genuine religious pursuits. 
Thus, theology without walls entails a new understanding of the relation­
ship of the religions to one another and to the divine ground from which 
they spring. We can further explore the nature of this new understanding by 
examining what I will call “the three suspicions” of theology without walls. 
Three suspicions 
Theology Without Walls (or what has also been called “transreligious 
theology”) is, as I see it, predicated upon three assumptions, or what we 
might better call three “suspicions,” about the nature of the religions to one 
another and to the divine. 
The first suspicion is that there is indeed a singular divine reality to which 
human beings respond and have responded variously throughout their his­
tory. As noted earlier, we mean by “divine reality” that which is ultimate 
in meaning and value – in Paul Tillich’s terminology, that which presents 
itself to us as the object of our “ultimate concern.” This divine reality is 
conceived, and indeed experienced, differently in different cultures, different 
religions, and different historical epochs. Indeed, as even a superficial review 
of the world’s religions makes clear, profound differences are to be found 
even within the same religious tradition: Protestant and Catholic Christians, 
Mahayanist and Theravadin Buddhists, Sunni and Shia Muslims, each have 
distinctive, and often conflicting, views of the meaning and import of their 
common religious heritage. It seems to be the very nature of the divine to 
become refracted upon entering human experience, somewhat as white light 
is refracted when passing through a prism. Some will see the light as blue, 
some as red, some as yellow – but all are experiencing aspects of the same 
white light. 
This observation leads us to our second suspicion: that the divine real­
ity expresses itself, for the most part, through human beings, rather than 
directly to human beings. Thus, what we see when we look at the scrip­
ture, creeds, and practices of any given religious tradition are products of 
the divine–human encounter, not the divine as it is in and of itself. If you 
pour the ocean into a vial, the ocean will, of necessity, take upon itself the 
shape of the vial. Similarly, the religions of the world are manifestations of 
the divine as “poured into” a particular people at a particular historical 
moment, shaped by the specific concerns and conditions that characterize 
that people at that moment. This is what accounts for the great diversity we 
see across religious traditions, and, indeed, within them. 
The third suspicion, a correlate of the second, is that the various reli­
gions of the world are imperfect products of this divine–human encounter –
“imperfect” in the sense that they do not afford us an unmediated and 
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and limited ways, what we might call “evidences” of the divine, evidences 
that we must tease out, sort through, and make sense of in order to achieve 
a fuller understanding. 
This way of thinking about religion stands in decided contrast to the view 
that some one religion has been directly, and uniquely, revealed by God and 
that, therefore, all other religions are, at best, pale reflections, or, at worst, 
demonic imposters, of the one and only true religion.1 Our suspicion is that 
this exclusivist view is itself but one way of experiencing the divine – a 
way shaped by the particular interests and concerns of the people who have 
adopted it. 
I believe that strong arguments can be made for these three suspicions, 
arguments that appeal not only to religious phenomena as they have 
appeared throughout the centuries but also to the authoritative writings of 
many of the traditional religions themselves when we read them with dis­
cernment. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and other religious pluralists 
have cogently presented such arguments, and so I won’t rehearse them here. 
What we might next consider, however, are the implications that acceptance 
of these suspicions has for the practice of theology. How do we engage in a 
“theology without walls?” 
The practice of theology without walls 
The purpose of theology in general is to provide the cognitive framework for 
our spiritual pursuits. If, again, we understand spiritual life as the endeavor 
to put us in touch with the object of our “ultimate concern,” then we turn 
to theology in order to answer three basic questions regarding this endeavor. 
First: What is the true character of our “ultimate concern,” that is, what is it 
we seek when we seek “the divine?” Second: What is the true nature of the 
object of our ultimate concern? What is “the divine?” Third: In what way 
(or ways) can genuine communion with the divine be achieved? How can 
our ultimate concern be satisfied? Clearly, the purpose of answering the first 
two questions is for the sake of answering the third. 
As we have discussed, the way these questions have been traditionally 
approached is through appeal to the authoritative teachings of whatever 
religious tradition one happens to subscribe to. Thus, Theravadin Buddhists, 
appealing to the Four Noble Truths, will identify our ultimate concern with 
the need to overcome the suffering (dukkha) that arises from clinging to the 
ephemeral; they will identify the object of ultimate concern with the nirva­
nic state in which such clinging is eradicated; and they will identify the way 
to communion with the object of ultimate concern (in this case, the way to 
nirvana) as the Eightfold Path. 
Likewise, Christians, appealing to Scripture, will identify our ultimate 
concern with the desire for eternal life; they will identify the object of ulti­
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identify the way to communion with that object as faith in Christ, however 
this may be envisioned. 
The underlying assumption of these theological approaches is that the 
authoritative teachings and writings of one’s particular tradition are, 
indeed, legitimately authoritative. This is an assumption that is, for the most 
part, accepted on the basis of faith. The theologian’s aim is not so much to 
question, or even evaluate, the legitimacy of these authoritative teachings 
and writings, but to interpret them cogently and apply them effectively. Of 
course, one may also question their legitimacy, but to do so is generally 
to step outside the theological circle of one’s own tradition and risk being 
labeled a heretic or apostate. 
But if the suspicions of theology without walls are correct, this approach, 
though appropriate within its limits, will tend to obscure the greater picture 
of the divine–human encounter. What is needed, then, is a sea change – 
or what John Hick has called a “Copernican revolution” – in the way we 
think about religion and approach theology. As Hick expresses it, tradi­
tionally each religion has tended to see itself at the center of the religious 
universe. The Copernican revolution he calls for involves recognizing that 
the divine itself is at the center and that each religion revolves around this 
center, receiving what light it does in a manner accordant with its distinctive 
orientation to it. 
When we take the assumptions, or suspicions, of theology without walls 
seriously, we realize that we must change our understanding of both the 
locus and the weight of religious authority. These changes entail a shift from 
what might be called “dogmatic faith” to what I have come to think of as 
“Socratic faith.” Let’s take a closer look at the nature of this shift. 
The locus and weight of religious authority: 
toward a “Socratic faith” 
Let’s first consider the weight of religious authority. If religious scrip­
ture is now understood as the imperfect product of the divine–human
encounter, we must abandon doctrines that claim the inerrancy or infal­
libility of scripture. A theology without walls must advance a doctrine
of scriptural and doctrinal fallibility. This does not mean that we must
cease to regard scripture as inspired in some sense. But we must recog­
nize that inspired scripture will partake of the flaws and limitations of
the inspired human beings who produce it. Such a doctrine would lead
to what might be called a dialectical, as opposed to a dogmatic, engage­
ment with scripture. 
In a dialectical approach we wrestle with scripture, question scripture, 
challenge scripture, and allow what we find in scripture to challenge and 
question us. The aim of the dialectic is not to finally reconcile ourselves to 
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conduct us into a fuller communion with the divine. Perhaps, in the course 
of this, we will find passages that we must reject as inadequate, or even 
perverse. We may reject such passages after due consideration, understand­
ing that our final allegiance is to the divine and not to this or that imperfect 
reflection of the divine. 
Such an approach naturally opens one to engagement with religious tra­
ditions beyond one’s own, through which one can expand and enrich one’s 
dialectical practice. Thus, one might consider the relationship between the 
Buddhist idea of tanha (craving, clinging) and the Christian idea of concu­
piscence, or the relationship between nirvana and eternal life as spiritual 
aspirations. 
The purpose of such comparisons is not merely to promote understand­
ing between religions, but, more fundamentally, to seek the nugget of divine 
truth that may be contained in these different traditions and thereby achieve 
a more complete apprehension of that truth. 
But it may be asked: Where are we to find the locus of authority in
such an approach? How are we to know, what criteria are we to bring to
bear in deciding, whether or not we are moving closer to truth or further
away? 
This question, it might be noted, is as salient for traditional theol­
ogy as for theology without walls. How does the traditional theologian
know that his or her theological interpretations are apt? Even the dedi­
cated dogmatist will have to give an account, if she is at all reflective,
of the grounds upon which she accepts what dogma she does. Such an
account, if it is to avoid tautology, cannot simply appeal to dogma for
its justification. Ultimately, then, it is we who must function as the locus
of authority for the truth claims we accept; that is, our intuitions, our
discernment, our analyses, our honest assessments of what is true and
good – which, ideally, we do not adhere to uncritically, but submit to the
dialectical process through which we hope to make them progressively
better. 
But it may be asked: How can we trust to our fallible selves what is of 
utmost importance, of ultimate concern? 
It is here, I would say, that something like faith comes in. Just as the­
ology without walls entails a particular understanding of the locus and
weight of religious authority, so it entails a particular kind of faith. The
faith demanded by a theology without walls is what I have come to think
of as Socratic faith. At his trial, Socrates was accused of denying the
gods of Athens, a charge leveled against him in response to his skeptical
questioning of traditional Athenian beliefs. But he disputes this charge.
He responds, “I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense
than that in which any of my accusers believe in them” (Plato 1973,
464–465). But what can this mean? Are there higher and lower ways to
believe in the gods? 
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I suggest that the “higher sense of belief” to which Socrates here refers 
is not belief as affirmation of this or that propositional claim, but belief as 
dedication to what is ultimately true and good; a dedication that entails, at 
the same time, the humble admission that one’s apprehension of the true 
and the good, at any given moment, is incomplete and fallible and therefore 
in constant need of critical evaluation and correction. 
At his trial, Socrates tells the famous story of being designated the wisest 
man in Athens by the Oracle at Delphi, but only because he is the only one 
who “knows that he doesn’t know.” Socrates says, “The truth is, O men of 
Athens, that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the 
wisdom of men is little or nothing” (Plato 1973, 452). 
But it must be immediately pointed out that this conclusion does not lead 
Socrates to a resigned skepticism or nihilism. On the contrary, for Socrates, 
the continual pursuit of a wisdom that can never be perfectly seized is itself 
a form of worship, a sublime mode of engagement with the divine. And 
indeed, he does admit to having what he calls “a certain sort of wisdom . . . 
If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable 
by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise” (Plato 
1973, 450). 
The sort of wisdom attainable by human beings is approximate wisdom, 
tentative wisdom, wisdom that must be ever open to review, reevaluation, 
supplementation, and correction. For Socrates, this confession of uncer­
tainty does not make one less but more open to the divine, for it frees us 
from the idolatry of taking our own limited representations of the divine as 
sacrosanct. 
Socrates thus takes it to be his divinely ordained mission to probe and
question, critique and scrutinize: “For this is the command of God, as
I would have you know, and I believe that to this day no greater good has
happened to the state than my service to the God” (Plato 1973, 459). His
faith is that the divine endorses this (necessarily) error-prone approach
and accepts us in our limitations and fallibilities. Its demand of us is not
that we cling to this or that dogmatic formula in denial of our limita­
tions, but that we humbly pursue the true and the good in an honest and
genuine way. 
Finally, it might be noted that this mode of faith does not at all exclude 
full-fledged involvement and investment in one particular religious path. To 
recognize that there are many paths is not at all to imply that one should 
abandon the path one is on. But it does entail a new understanding of the 
status of one’s path, especially in its relation to others. Should this new 
understanding gain acceptance, should the religions of the world come to 
see themselves as different movements in response to the same divine real­
ity, this itself would have a transformative effect upon religion in general. 
It would bring us that much closer to an appreciation of the universality of 
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Conclusion: in spirit and truth 
Let us conclude then by recalling the story of the Samaritan woman who 
asks Jesus whether the proper place of worship is in Samaria or Jerusalem. 
The Samaritans and the Jews were hostile religious antagonists, each group 
claiming exclusive possession of the divine truth bequeathed to the ancient 
Israelites at Sinai, each accusing the other of distortion, corruption, error, 
and bad faith. Of course, the rivalry between the Samaritans and the Jews is 
but one instance of a great legion of such religious rivalries – rivalries that 
have plagued humanity over the long course of its religious history. 
But if we posit that divine truth is One, at least in in its ultimate
nature, then these antagonistic schisms between (and within) the different
religions – violent antagonisms that have led such critics as Christopher 
Hitchens to deem religion itself “poisonous” – must be seen as some indica­
tion of revelatory failure, that is, the failure of revelation to communicate 
itself effectively to human beings. Such religious rivalries and antagonisms 
appear symptomatic of our failure to orient ourselves rightly to the divine. 
From this perspective, theology without walls may be seen as inspired by
a new revelatory moment, a moment that calls us to abandon our narrow
parochialism and open ourselves to the wide expanse of the divine–human
encounter. My suggestion, in other words, is that theology without walls
as a practice and, indeed, as a commitment itself betokens a new revelation
of the divine, one that, like all such revelations when they are authentic,
has its own soteriological power: in this case, the power to resolve the
tribalistic rivalries and chauvinistic hostilities that have plagued religious
humanity for so long and thereby bring us closer to a recognition of the
divine as One. 
And, as we have seen, we can find the seeds of this new moment already 
embedded within the traditional religions themselves: “An hour is com­
ing when neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem will you worship the 
Father,” says Jesus, “An hour is coming, and now is, when the true worship­
pers will worship in spirit and truth; for such people the Father seeks to be 
His worshippers. God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship 
in spirit and truth.” 
To worship in spirit and truth is to transcend the boundaries that condi­
tion religious hostility. Those who do so, Jesus suggests, will come to see the 
contingent nature of such boundaries and will rise above them to a fuller 
and more genuine encounter with the God who would be “All in All.” 
Note 
1 Karl Barth writes, for instance, that only Christianity has the authority “to con­
front the world of religions as the one true religion, with absolute self-confidence 
to invite and challenge it to abandon its ways and to start on the Christian ways” 
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3 Revisiting Bellah’s Sheila in a 
religiously pluralist century 
Christopher Denny 
Scholars of religion only know her by her first name, Sheila, which is
just as well because Sheila is a pseudonym, a cipher, a symbol for a phe­
nomenon that has been described in different terms since Sheila came to
the attention of readers over 30 years ago. For scholars influenced by
the work of Philip Rieff (1987), Sheila’s worldview may be judged to
encapsulate “the triumph of the therapeutic” in which psychology sub­
verts the older strictures of religiosity. Sheila probably qualifies as one
of the baby-boomer seekers profiled in the writings of Wade Clark Roof
(1993, 1999). Then again, with her fusion of spirituality and individual­
ism Sheila would be amenable to being typecast as one of those who are
“spiritual but not religious” analyzed in the work of sociologist Robert
Fuller (2001). Finally, even though she predates the advent of the mil­
lennial generation, Sheila certainty seems like one of the “nones,” that
growing cohort of young adults who in the early twenty-first century
self-consciously decline to affiliate themselves with organized religion
(Drescher 2016). 
To know Sheila Larson is to judge her, because that is how Robert Bel­
lah and his co-authors presented her to readers in their influential 1985 
book Habits of the Heart – as a person to be judged and found wanting. 
Recounting the presentation in Chapter 9 of the book, readers are given 
the following information. Sheila states that she believes in God but can­
not remember when she last went to church. She has faith in her own little 
voice, an internal guide that tells her to love herself and to be gentle with 
herself. Sheila’s little voice urges her to remember that we are supposed to 
“take care of each other.” Sheila describes her faith in the most individual­
ized and self-centered term possible – Sheilaism. In Bellah’s telling, Sheila is 
“sufficiently paradigmatic” to be employed as a composite sketch for the 
privatization of religion in the United States in the latter half of the twenti­
eth century. Moreover, Bellah asserted that many churchgoing Protestants 
and Catholics are “Sheilaists” who do not see either the Christian Bible or 
church traditions as normative and authoritative in the way in which they 
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“How do we, in a pluralist society,” Bellah asked an audience in 1986, 
“avoid the radical individualism expressed by Sheila?” For Bellah, individu­
alism is a problem, especially for religion: 
Just the notion that religious belief ought to be a purely internal thing, 
and then you go to the church or synagogue of your choice, shows how 
deeply ingrained a kind of religious privatism is, which turns the church 
into something like the Kiwanis Club or some other kind of voluntary 
association that you go to or not if you feel comfortable with it – but 
which has no organic claim upon you. 
(Bellah 1986) 
What is interesting is that in Habits of the Heart Bellah and his co-authors 
came to a mixed appraisal of individualism in American life, recognizing 
it as a social force that had shaped American religion since its founding. 
For the authors, individualism, with its exaltation of self-reliance and hard 
work, had a place in our country so long as it is checked by offsetting social 
trajectories that nurture the afflicted while providing civic unity. In this line 
of thought, the “biblical tradition” and the religious communities that have 
fostered it are tasked with orienting their members towards a transcendent 
reality that gives a moral justification for our national experiment in ordered 
liberty. The authors of Habits of the Heart, then, prescribed a specific cul­
tural role for religion in late twentieth-century American life, and Sheila 
did not help religion perform that necessary pedagogical role of counterbal­
ancing the rough-and-tumble world of individualistic capitalist acquisition. 
Given these expectations for religion, Bellah was correct in sensing a threat 
to the biblical tradition’s place in our national social fabric. 
Every crisis presents itself simultaneously as a problem and as an oppor­
tunity. Rather than joining in the chorus of those who see religious individu­
alism and the decline of churches’ social influence primarily as a problem, 
I choose to see the Sheilas of the world as providing contemporary societies 
with opportunities as well, and the Theology Without Walls (TWW) initia­
tive outlined in this present book’s contributions seconds that hope. It does 
adherents of traditional religion little good to complain about the rise of 
individualism if they hope to change this state of affairs in the future. In 
what follows I offer two personal anecdotes and accompanying theological 
reflection that illustrate how religious individualism can manifest itself in 
ways that point groups to a different type of unity than the “civil religion” 
outlined in Bellah’s (1967) work. In each case my encounter with a student 
upset cherished scholarly approaches to categorizing religious differences 
and enabled me to see pluralism in new ways for which I was unprepared. 
First encounter: moving beyond positions to people 
Years ago during my first year in graduate studies I worked as a research 
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the recent history of ecumenical dialogue in the United States between repre­
sentatives of the Roman Catholic Church and a mainline Protestant denom­
ination that I will not name now in order to keep the dissertation’s author 
anonymous. Over the course of hundreds of pages, the author detailed the 
times, places, delegation members, and program titles of successive meetings 
between the theologians designated to carry out a particular rapprochement 
in the years immediately succeeding the Second Vatican Council’s close in 
1965. In workmanlike prose, the dissertation included details about hotel 
venues, meeting schedules, and alternating responses to conference prompts. 
After reading halfway through the dissertation, I noticed that many of the 
Catholic participants in these meetings either left the priesthood or the 
Catholic Church over the years during which the dialogue proceeded in
the 1960s and 1970s, to be replaced by other representatives. I began to ask 
myself why in this dissertation there was no direct reference to this trend 
and no examination of the reasons for the systemic departure of many of the 
Catholic participants in this series of ecumenical dialogues. 
To fault the student for this omission would be short sighted, for both the 
genre of the dissertation itself and the assumptions undergirding most inter-
religious dialogues justified this caesura. The dominant framework of most 
formal ecumenical and interreligious dialogues conducted since the start of 
the ecumenical era in the early twentieth century posits the stable exist­
ence of two or more reified religious communities whose goal is to achieve 
at least tolerance, hopefully respect, and maybe – if the dialogue is really 
ambitious – intercommunion or an institutional merger. Each side in these 
dialogues comes to the table in order to reconcile past traditions and norma­
tive doctrines, assumed as a given, with openness to new developments and 
the experiences of others outside the home church. The participation of dia­
logue partners is sanctioned by authorities within their respective communi­
ties. When seen in this manner, interreligious dialogue is basically analogous 
to a summit meeting between leaders and ambassadors of two sovereign 
nations, with a heavy dollop of public relations and face-saving techniques 
required. When one or more of the dialogue groups in such activity is Chris­
tian, ecclesiocentric interpretations of religious and theological traditions 
are privileged as a matter of course. As an example of this “summit” under­
standing of interreligious dialogue, consider Roman Catholic magisterial 
documents such as Dialogue and Mission and Dialogue and Promulgation, 
published in 1984 and 1991 by the Secretariat for Non-Christians, which 
promote interreligious dialogue. These texts, however, are mostly focused 
upon developing the Catholic Church’s own self-understanding. When the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published Dominus Jesus: On 
the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church in 2000, 
this inward-looking ecclesial trend became even more apparent (Pontifical 
Council for Interreligious Dialogue 1984, 1991; Congregation for the Doc­
trine of the Faith 2000; Denny 2017). 
An examination of dialogue from the standpoints of the existential
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would yield a very different account of such dialogues. Granted, such dia­
logues would no longer qualify as official ecumenical conversations, given
that the Sheilas of the world generally abjure representing any spiritual
view other than their own. Structuring dialogues instead around the axes
of individual persons’ search for truth and ultimacy, deliberately subordi­
nating concerns about institutional boundaries and doctrinal consistency
with the past, removes the need to save face. Or to put the matter in a dif­
ferent frame of reference, dialogue in a TWW does not begin by presum­
ing the theological stability of competing doctrinal boundary markers as
a priori obstacles that need to be reconciled through logical consistency.
This is not because the TWW initiative shuns logic or the need for clear
thought. Rather, the issue that TWW chooses to begin with is relevance,
not consistency. In a world marked by religious individualism, ensuring
that ecumenical and interreligious dialogue is relevant to the lives of peo­
ple today must be the initial issue in learning to converse across religious
boundaries. Not to begin with the concrete existential situations of con­
temporary people risks creating more dialogues like the one I encountered
in the dissertation draft decades ago: officially structured formal conversa­
tions whose value becomes less compelling, even to those taking part in
the dialogue. 
Kurt Richardson has identified the necessity within our current interreli­
gious situation very well. He writes: 
Heightened by our current deinstitutionalized situation, a central place 
is taken by religious experience – the experience of faith disengaging 
more than ever from institutional forms and ritual structures in favor 
of authenticity – something approaching “first-order” experience of 
God . . . This situation of disaffiliation is a hermeneutical condition for 
“theology without walls” or “trans-religious” theology. 
(Richardson 2016, 508) 
Much of the impulse for beginning interreligious dialogue with doctrines 
and institutional prerogatives stems from the Enlightenment-era develop­
ment, termed confessionalization by historians, by which different Christian 
churches distinguished themselves from one another by developing creedal 
formulations and competing structures of ecclesial authority. Within the 
milieu of early modern Europe, uniform definitions of belief were the intel­
lectual currency of the age, and personal religious experience was denigrated 
as idiosyncratic, superstitious, and backward. When Gotthold Lessing 
(1956, 53; emphasis in original) could levy his famous charge, “accidental 
truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason,” 
the unrepeatable singularity of personal experience was discredited as well, 
as post-Cartesian Western religion sought to pattern itself after the recur­
ring standardized proofs of mathematics and the measurable laws of natural 
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spiritual worldview, but there are others who haven’t given up hope that 
religious experience may be something more than a noncognitive realm. 
Richardson asserts, “The self as locus of truth is not of necessity relativistic 
at all,” and he makes this claim in light of his additional position: “The self 
as locus of truth does not mean the self as the source of truth” (Richardson 
2016, 511, 512). Perhaps Sheila’s personal credo emanates from a source 
outside her? Adjudicating this issue leads me to the next turning point in my 
religious conversion. 
Second encounter: embracing one’s inner  
religious consumer 
The second major turning point in my spiritual journey involving an 
encounter outside my home tradition was at first glance a very prosaic one 
and didn’t involve any famous thinkers or profound world-historical trans­
formation. In fact, it did not entail an encounter with another religious tra­
dition in the familiar sense, but rather an experience that I think marks a 
challenge to all religious traditions as we have known them. The year was 
2004, and I was in my first semester teaching at St. John’s University in 
New York City. I had been assigned to teach Theology 2210: Perspectives 
on the Church before my arrival, and as a freshly minted PhD I came armed 
with a detailed lesson plan for the course. Much of our time was devoted 
to examining the role of the Church in salvation and ecumenism. Towards 
the semester’s end we studied different soteriological typologies along the 
lines of the now well-known schema set forth by Alan Race and followed 
by many others in the theology of religions – exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism (Race 1983). Those familiar with the Roman Catholic magisterial 
approach to these paths since Vatican II know that its overall judgment on 
these positions is exclusivism, bad though dominant through most of the 
Church’s history; inclusivism, good; pluralism, very, very bad, especially if 
you are a Catholic theologian teaching at a Catholic university. Eager to 
have students weigh in on this debate in the latter half of the course, I gave 
them the following assignment: 
Vatican II’s Decree on Ecumenism states that division among Christians 
should be a cause for scandal, as it is a contradiction of God’s plan of 
salvation. For your final paper I would like you to enunciate what you 
yourself identify as the principal causes of religious division, not merely 
among Christians, but among all peoples. Do you think that the mul­
tiplicity of churches and religions is a good thing? Or do you perceive 
it to be a stumbling block that we must overcome? Do you have any 
concrete ideas as to how religious divisions can be healed? As a student 
in New York City three years after September 11, in what ways do you 
think greater cooperation and harmony between peoples of different 




















30 Christopher Denny 
There was a student in this course whom I will call Derek (not his real 
name). Derek was, by conventional standards, anything but a model
student – his attendance was sporadic, he failed exams, and his essays were 
poor. During most classes he sat by himself near a window with his feet 
propped up on an adjacent chair. He ended up failing the course. Yet Derek 
transformed the trajectory of the class through his participation in our dis­
cussions on this assigned topic. Not having applied the insights I gleaned 
from my reflections on the very long dissertation on ecumenical dialogue 
I’ve already mentioned, I burst onto the teaching scene in my new academic 
home expecting students to have a personal stake in arguments pitting inclu­
sivism against pluralism. I expected the students to assess the ecumenical 
landscape from the well-worn perspective of institutional unity vs. diversity. 
Rahner vs. Hick. Robert Bellarmine vs. Paul Knitter (Bellarmine 2016; Rah­
ner 1966, 1976, 1979; Hick 1982; Knitter 1985). Derek, and the students 
whom he managed to persuade in the course of the semester, torpedoed my 
assumptions about ecumenical and interreligious relations and convinced 
me that much of the scholarship on the theology of religions from the 1970s 
and 1980s was not only dated but also obsolete. 
So, what was Derek’s trailblazing contribution to Theology 2210? Derek 
didn’t see the unity or diversity of religions or their soteriological efficacy as 
an issue. That is not simply to say that he didn’t understand religious unity 
or religious pluralism as the primary issue in interreligious dialogue. Rather, 
Derek judged that this issue was downright irrelevant; what mattered 
instead according to Derek was each individual’s preferences in religious 
belief and practice, nothing more. Ecumenical efforts to achieve religious 
unity were a waste of time for him and those peers adopting his articulated 
stance. If everyone wanted the same religion, so be it. If no one preferred a 
religious path, hey, who was to judge anyone else? Prodding the class in our 
final few weeks of the semester, I asked them if such a stance reduced reli­
gion to the level of a commodity or a consumer good, and I hoped that by 
phrasing the issue in this way they might reconsider. But, lo and behold, they 
seized upon this analogy, which I had intended to be derogatory, and agreed 
enthusiastically with this comparison: yes, professor, that’s it, religion is a 
lifestyle choice just like that. 
Now for those familiar with the sociological work of Christian Smith,
whose recent work has traced the path by which Protestant Christianity
in the United States has moved from post-Reformation denunciations of
works-righteousness to what Smith calls “moralistic therapeutic deism,”
Derek’s assertion will be familiar. Smith, along with William Cavanaugh
and others, have derided this development over the past two decades
(Miller 2003; Smith and Denton 2005; Cavanaugh 2008). There are
many Dereks now, and the consumerist approach to religion calls into
question basic assumptions about religious unity and diversity that gov­
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It may be offensive to religious studies scholars and practitioners of religion 
to suggest that there is a positive side to the marriage between consumerist 
ideology and interreligious dialogue. I understand that, and I emphatically 
reject any necessary connections between this recognition – and the near-
inevitable trajectory of this development in secular capitalist postmodern 
societies – and prescriptive consequences for political and economic prac­
tice. But I ask you, doesn’t Derek have a point? If we are to appreciate 
the value of individual autonomy in religious inquiry, shouldn’t we recog­
nize that there is a common denominator between choosing a religion and 
choosing a brand of cereal – namely, that in both cases there is a human 
agent making the choice? This is the point at the heart of the rational-choice 
theory of religion offered by scholars such as Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, 
and Laurence Iannaccone (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 1996; Iannaccone 
1998; Finke and Stark 2005). And if we acknowledge the inescapable real­
ity of agency and transformative constructions of religious worldviews in 
light of human choice, might the turn to the consumer in late modernity 
prompt us to invert the ordo of much comparative theology? Why do peo­
ple who are able to do so choose one spiritual path over another? Why 
do they choose to follow one route on their spiritual map and not others 
that might lead to the same destination? Sincere guardians of tradition like 
Smith and Cavanaugh bemoan this consumerist development, but we must 
recognize that all the so-called great religious traditions are in large part the 
result of choices made by influential leaders and their followers. Now more 
democratic forms of politics and more egalitarian social structures make 
these choices less constricted for a wider segment of the human population, 
including people like Robert Bellah’s eponymous Sheila. 
Unlike relativism, TWW need not concede that all religious preferences 
are equal in existential value or, if we choose to introduce this framework, 
soteriological efficacy. Participants in a theology without walls can come to 
think that certain theological options are dead-ends or meandering one-lane 
roads that are unhelpful or inefficient in spiritual journeys. By not preclud­
ing the possibility that a participant in religious dialogue can come to the 
table without representing any group or institution beyond himself or her­
self, however, TWW need not be threatened by the metaphor of the spiritual 
marketplace. We can see the marketplace as a place of possibility, not as a 
prison governed by ironclad rules of determinism or economic efficacy. In a 
1974 address, “Map Is Not Territory,” the late Jonathan Z. Smith called for 
a critical reassessment of reified notions of sacred space, claiming that an 
earlier generation of scholars in the history of religion had often uncritically 
conflated experience and interpretation (Smith 1978). A map may be all we 
have to find our way, Smith said, but all maps are necessarily interpretive 
documents. 
If this is so in the realm of geography, it is all the truer in matters of 
religious agency. No religion has ever existed upon earth without religious 
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divine or superhuman origins for such facets of religion does not obviate 
this assertion, as whatever origin to which religious practitioners appeal is 
inevitably mediated through human interpretation. Adapting Richardson’s 
formulation noted earlier, the self is a locus of truth even when the source of 
truth may lie elsewhere. To formulate a theology of religions without fore­
grounding human choice is to regress to a naïve religious era in which the 
role of human subjectivity was often passed over in silence and in which reli­
gious traditions were reified without an appreciation of historical conscious­
ness and the processes of sociological change. Because one’s “spiritual map” 
is not composed from a God’s-eye perspective surveying the whole of reality, 
the recognition of preferences provides theology with a new starting place 
from which to engage the bewildering array of religious options available to 
us as we push our existential shopping carts through the aisles of reality. We 
can even, to extend the metaphor, push our carts through the walls of exist­
ing traditions. In doing so, there is no guarantee our spiritual choices will be 
intellectually coherent, morally defensible, or spiritually attractive to others. 
My metaphor of the shopping cart is not designed to defend the content of 
our spiritual choices, but rather to acknowledge that the spiritualities we 
carry forth in our lives are there because we placed them in our carts. This 
is true whether we choose to adopt a classic religious tradition or forge a 
new idiosyncratic path. Whatever mistakes we make, they will be our own. 
In that sense, we are all Sheilas. 
Note 
1 For an argument that identifies diminishing theological returns on the strategy of 
confessionalization, see Buckley (2004). 
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4 Theology Without Walls as 
open-field theology1 
Kurt Anders Richardson 
Although all theologies are perspectival, “hermeneutical theology” intends 
a meta-discourse about theological practices and their contexts in rela­
tion. Theology Without Walls (TWW) seeks simultaneously to coordinate 
discursive spaces with no theological limitations while at the same time 
tolerating no intrusions upon the natural “walls” of the inviolate mind, 
conscience, and body of every human being, of every theologian. I regard 
TWW as a hermeneutical space or field of discourse that explores twenty­
first-century conditions of doing theology where Christian “religion” and 
particularly “denomination” (of institutions, creeds, and canons) was his­
torically enlisted to define and to implement theological sovereignty over 
other connected institutions as government, particularly over the fields of 
law and science. This hermeneutical space “without walls” makes possi­
ble something like open-field theology (OFT) to indicate the constructive 
hermeneutical project of “theology” as a comprehensive, nonprescriptive 
association of theologians. TWW/OFT, in contrast to theological programs 
of “openness,” “process,” “naturalistic” or “traditional,” etc., presupposes 
only that theologians might find “theology as an open field” a helpful and 
ultimately fruitful way to do any kind of theology: apophatic or cataphatic, 
theist or atheist, exclusivist or pluralist. By contrast, historic theologies 
imagine, through cultural memory, nostalgia, and various “traditionalisms” 
and “fundamentalisms” a recovery of such sovereignty as best for faith 
and religious life. TWW would come to the aid of many theologians from 
such backgrounds (there are many parallels of sovereign theology through­
out the “world religions”) who wish either to be free of such ambitions or 
at least wish to develop strategies of constructive theological engagement 
with contemporary theological conditions and trajectories. For some time 
TWW/OFT has been explored as a descriptive title, along with others such 
as “transreligious theology.” Here, OFT is offered as a way that respects the 
very problem of “religion” as an increasingly inadequate term for all the 
ways that humans devote themselves to the divine or to the ultimate and to 
one another, often expressed through rational and systematic constructions 
as “theology” in the broadest possible terms. In this context, any discur­
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and denials – qualify as kinds of theology. The theological commitments of 
the present author include TWW/OFT as an advantageous way of pursuing 
those commitments, confessional and otherwise. 
One impetus to TWW/OFT is that many theological traditionalists argue 
for some fundamental reestablishment of these historic sovereignties and 
theologically reimagined “historic norms.” This sovereign role of theology 
was, and for some still is, the canonically controlled mediation of divine rev­
elation in the world. But such perspectives discount the long development of 
the principle of reform for theological flourishing that respects the irreduc­
ible diversity communities (denominations) of each of the religions. The rea­
sons for hankering for sovereignty seem to be obvious, because government, 
law, and science are such powerful regulatory institutions that once included 
concepts of authority that included infallibility and absolute certitude of 
religious knowledge. But what happens when meta-discourses of science 
and law are forced to incorporate fallibility as essential to cognitive develop­
ment and applied success? How are all theological practices to incorporate 
fallibility in their hermeneutical and conceptual models? TWW/OFT would 
propose theologies find their best environment in something like an open 
field of reflective anthropology where human perceptions and traditions of 
divinity and ultimacy can advance the work of those within traditions, as 
well as those who claim no religion. 
The present author approaches its subject from the standpoint of a “lived 
theology” that is “ecumenically evangelical,” “comparative,” “Abrahamic,” 
“postcolonial,” and global in the pluralistic sense. TWW/OFT is open-
ended and amenable to the challenge of rival interests and contrary opinions 
on the way to realizing benefits to any individual or collective theological 
endeavor. The very eclectic theological practices indicated in TWW/OFT are 
areas of serious exploration and learning for me. Each point of engagement 
in some way enriches the other and the “theological-self-in-community”: 
interactive exposure, rational interchange, and imaginative engagement can 
take place with one’s own tradition and in conversation with theologians of 
other or no traditions. I would add that the historical-theological frame of 
reference in this chapter is one aspect that TWW/OFT practitioners need to 
heed. Realizations as to the creative and influential futures of theology come 
by means of noticing how ancient TWW/OFT is. Trajectories in earlier theo­
logical movements provide us with plotlines that continue to contemporary 
construction.2 Lived theology is more and more a matter of incorporating a 
spectrum of theological sources and goals. Hence, the hermeneutical desir­
ability for a community field of discourse where multiple rationalities and 
theological priorities can find concourse, with no prescription for identify­
ing “common ground,” let alone solving “common problems.” Within the 
religious liberty environments of the world, theology no longer provides a 
sovereign or regulative function for sociopolitical majorities through state-
sponsored, privileged religions. Instead, the plural reality that began with the 
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is now giving way to the irreducible external diversity of religions, each with 
its own internal theological diversity. TWW/OFT proposes that “external” 
theological learning is incumbent upon all theologians who would speak 
intelligibly about their own theological practices but also those of proxi­
mate others. TWW/OFT provides the working space for that proximity. 
One helpful starting point for TWW/OFT is the nearly undefinable word 
“religion,” from its Latin root “religio” (“to bind together”) and the conse­
quent boundaries constructed by religious belief, practice, identity, and state 
sponsorship. Theology is a form of discourse that specializes in discern­
ing complex conceptualities that would “bind together” the divine and the 
human, the human and the human, the human and the nonhuman. Whereas 
theologies’ deities are the transcendent, infinite being or real [p]3resence, all 
theology is human, from first to last a human enterprise. The very human­
ness of religions and their theologies subjects the history of human discourse 
on the divine with the problematic charge of anthropomorphizing and 
hypostatizing the infinite [m]ystery or being or existence. 
Most of the participants currently in TWW/OFT are Western, mostly 
“Christian” in terms of theological traditions and their institutions of learn­
ing, quite “Western” in terms of sociopolitical models of human and com­
munal ethics – insofar as the latter reflect theological reasoning. One of the 
most interesting and earliest of the boundary crossings of ancient Christian 
and Jewish theologies consisted of assertions against classical theologies of 
being and “supreme Being” and raises the issue of the divine as capable of 
novelty, rejecting the rejection of novelty according to its absolutely immu­
table “perfections.”4 Another boundary to be deconstructed in late antiq­
uity (ca. fifth century BCE to the eighth century CE) was the Aristotelian 
categorization of the human female as ontologically inferior to the human 
male. Yet another dimension, still contested,5 is the reality of divine and 
human volition – human decision making and the reality of choice as over 
and against any model of determinism. Finally, the eschatological assertion 
that the cosmos is on a pathway of amelioration rather than sheer annihila­
tion is afforded helpful space by TWW/OFT. 
The history of sovereign theologies for the regulation of legal and scien­
tific reasoning is a massive legacy of the Christianized Roman Empire that 
exercises continuous, if much diminished, influence in theology. This was 
the original context for “political theology” – a theology for the polity and 
often mirroring the polity of religious majorities. Similar trends are visible in 
many different religious contexts. Certainly, one of the most seriously limit­
ing walls in the history of Christian theology was its polemical theologies 
aimed at bringing the highly diversified Christian, Jewish, and other religious 
theological movements of late antiquity into “catholic order” of “ortho­
dox” insiders and heterodox outsiders. By the sixth century, very intentional 
boundaries barred “interrituality” in order to separate Christians from all 
Jewish ritual observances as asserted on pain of excommunication. Creat­
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defined charge of “deicide” was certainly the nadir of the entire theological 
heritage of so-called “religious crimes” defined by Roman law on behalf 
of its religio licita (“legal religion”). What began with antiheretical (con­
tra haereticos) literature for the early construction of anti-Jewish theology 
(tractates known as “Contra Iudaios”) was part of and yet distinct from the 
larger branch of polemical theology known as “Contra Gentes (/Gentiles)” –
which included multiple tractates opposed to and condemning the religion 
of Islam. The religious monotheism adopted by Rome, as well as other poli­
ties, that constitutionally established Christianity endures into the twenty-
first century.6 This heritage of sovereign theology (Yelle 2018), along with 
many other dimensions of the “world’s largest religion,” presents multiple 
ongoing barriers to critical and constructive theological practices. 
Political, legal, and scientific boundaries not only define but also plague 
most theologies, internally and externally. Although the deities, anthropolo­
gies, and cosmologies of the religions betray striking differences, many of 
their hermeneutical moves, especially as each interacts with other religions 
and theologies, are quite similar, as comparative theology has shown. As 
a Hindu or Jewish scripture scholar works with a constellation of beliefs 
about the divine origin of a sacred text, the humanity of the reader/listener, 
and the relation between human cognition and its “divine” or “ultimate” 
referent, one must ask about the critical and constructive purpose of theol­
ogy. Crucial to this assessment is the recognition of the radical resources 
that the history of theology can hint at. But these efforts are moot if the 
expansive and varied potentialities of theology are curtailed through the 
imposition of constrictive, even destructive, boundaries preventing genu­
inely liberative and life-enhancing theological construction. 
“Revelation,” legal and scientific walls, and OFT 
The history of every theology begins with a revelation claim of some sort – 
the deity has conveyed its presence through some natural mediation, usu­
ally oracular or prophetic, the presence of the divine, and the divine word 
and image. Conveying “divine revelation” and epistemologies that included 
“revelation claims” correlates very closely with transcendent philosophi­
cal claims of illumination and higher-order perceptions and knowledges. 
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave”7 is a kind of narrative theology of revelation 
and revelatory experience. In Scripture, “prophets” narratives, via multiple 
genres but all metaphorically and stylistically rich, have become “inscriptur­
ated” forms of the immediately revealed word and image. Revealed word 
and image, regarded as captured in sacred scriptures and ritual objects, 
required constant interpretation in reinterpretation in successive genera­
tions of believing communities. The history of “modern theology” of the 
last five centuries globally displays hermeneutical and even substantive 
learning and borrowing across religious and cultural boundaries. One of 
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of these commonalities, however they have made themselves apparent – in 
my case, particularly in monotheisms and messianisms in the Abrahamic 
and non-Abrahamic religions and their theologies. Time and again, how­
ever, the larger and more complex theological systems are found to have 
reified claims of a complete and perfect revelation, a revelatory “deposit” 
in sacred histories inseparable from the sacred texts and objects themselves, 
preserved by a perfect community. In Western Christian traditions, these 
sacred histories come most often by means of an “originalist” hermeneutic: 
reconstructions of the original revelatory events and first-generation com­
munity, or “medievalist” or other authoritative “scholastic” hermeneutic – 
reconstructions of a golden age of religious achievement in every aspect 
of communal life. Each of these traditions is distinguished by strategies of 
“repristination”: theology as an exercise in recovery of a “pristine” religious 
condition of communication and practice. Theology becomes an exercise as 
much in historical imagination as one of engaging theologically one’s own 
audience in real time. 
In many ways, theology as a “science” (scientia as in “way of knowl­
edge”) reflects an ancient oracular or mystical dimension as well as the 
knowledge of law. Whether theorizing based upon experimental insight 
regarding “natural law” or “human law” on the way toward the “rule of 
law,” the penchant for believing in the authoritative perception of an idea or 
argument for some exclusive claim stems from the ancient monotheism that 
refuses to relativize truth claims that regulate nature or human beings. With 
scriptures, especially in view of earlier predictions and later “fulfillments” 
often relayed through obscure texts, every word of the text could poten­
tially contain truths to be distilled into authoritative propositions, whether 
legal or scientific. The stakes became exceedingly high early on. Internally, 
the texts and their adherents established bodies of knowledge and tests for 
“good law” and “good science.” As early as Origen in the third and Augus­
tine in the fourth to fifth centuries, appeal against naïve interpretations of, 
say, the creation narratives of Genesis were already rather well argued. 
Ancient scriptures are sui generis – they are neither law nor science nor 
a broad range of literary conventions. Although their genres were very 
familiar to their original audiences, their purposive and traditional recep­
tions were always distinct. Often, the scriptures are sui generis in relation to 
one another. The conception of Christianity as a sect of Judaism and Islam 
as inseparable from both unites their scriptures in a unique fashion and 
gives much credence to the Abrahamic studies projects that have emerged 
in recent years, tapping into centuries of “Abrahamic” reasoning among 
the three. When we consider non-Abrahamic scriptures and their traditions,
particularly in ethics, there is much commonality and probably cross-
fertilization. There is much overlap in the way in which they reason theo­
logically, liturgically, ethically, scientifically, and juridically – particularly 
through the massive migration of scriptures and methods of interpretation 
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sacred, bridges the immanent and transcendent worlds and brings their 
audiences into binding relationships that they would not otherwise express. 
Their texts and their genius are such that they produce an unabated history 
of interpretation and application. Theological literature in the last 50 years 
has burgeoned in forms and complexity. This is reason enough to suggest 
that theology might best be done according to an “open field” principle. 
Their potential has proven to be almost unlimited, and although they pro­
vide no more detail than fundamental distinctions for law (protecting per­
sons but not defining virtue) and science (the intelligibility of the cosmos), 
their greater aid is narrating the mixed bag that is human life and behavior. 
Externally, however, once an ecclesial ruling in law or science had become 
“incorrigible” according to institutional claims of historical authority and 
unreformability, rejecting extra-theological criteria resulted in retrograde 
“science” or no science at all. In this and other ways, the problem of an 
account of revelation as supplying the purest distillation of truth about God 
and the world, and the resulting history of interpretation and its errors, 
sometimes of the worst sort, plague the history of theology. Even worse is 
the conceit of correcting, if not eliminating, other revelation claims and the­
ologies. In virtually all the major Christian traditions, the commitments to 
compatibility between the Graeco-Roman and biblical cosmologies always 
leaves the neutral reader with a sense that the exercise is more one of apolo­
getics than a theological reasoning that follows an unbiased path. 
One of the greatest points of reference for Christian theologians in general 
is undoubtedly the theology of Vatican II and constructive engagement with 
it. The council adopted of the doctrine of religious liberty8 – that without 
freedom from all religious sovereignties, the necessary exercise of the liberty 
of conscience and deep persuasion in faith is undermined and the necessary 
condition of religious decision making by each human being is blocked. 
These ideas were rooted in the ideas of the early American theologian, 
Roger Williams, and updated by the Jesuit theologian, John Courtney Mur­
ray. The historic shock over precisely this canon from Vatican II, qualifying 
definitively as “development of doctrine” (Newman 1845), becomes a fasci­
nating movement of theological aggiornamento – a theological “opening,” 
a key trajectory toward TWW/OFT. Parallel to this opening were a series 
of papal addresses to the United Nations at least once during the papacy 
of each pope since 1948. The speeches have reflected a theology opening a 
field of learning beyond the confines of tradition and institution, seeking to 
embrace new insights without contradicting tradition and institution. John 
Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis I have each in their own way kept Vatican 
II as their frame of reference (United Nations Headquarters 2015). Most 
importantly, all the Christian denominations were regarded as “instruments 
of salvation,” despite the claim to being “the one true church,” an inclusive 
statement long in coming but definitive (Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, 2007).9 The multiple religious “ends” of the theologies among the 
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the diversity of necessary or ultimate doctrines among the religions. What 
we see from the Roman Catholic example of theological development is its 
own gradual moving to a place where boundaries and open spaces are quite 
compatible, even “normative.” 
The earliest expressions of theological openness within communal bound­
aries is quite ancient. The fascinating history of the Hellenization of Judaism 
through the first translation of any scripture signaled an intentional engage­
ment with Greek culture and cosmology after the sixth century BCE – 
something which had already happened in Babylon and the Jewish Persian 
academies that would develop there. Due largely to Christian persecution, 
Medieval (Masoretic) Judaism attempted to consign Hellenistic Judaism 
and its traditions to heresy, apostasy, and oblivion. Indeed, it will require 
the first critical edition of the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible), which is currently 
in production, to reveal crucial knowledge about its textual traditions in 
times where, even among the strictest Jewish communities such as Qumran, 
Tanakh and Septuagint were read side by side. Although the Athenian Acad­
emy had long abandoned the theologies of Plato and Aristotle, their argu­
ments are revived by Hellenistic Judaism and Christianity in marshalling 
precedents for their perceived monotheisms considered entirely compatible 
with the biblical accounts of the divine being – especially the locus classicus
of the Bible, Exodus 3:14, the self-determining, noncontingent deity, the 
“I am that I am.” The great advancement and problem is that the mean­
ings captured in the Greek translation are highly constructive extrapolations 
of the Hebrew/Aramaic texts. Scripture translation is a constructive and 
comparative theological process in itself. One telling example is the radical 
extraction of Christological “facts” from highly metaphorical gospel narra­
tives. By the end of the seventh century, virtually nothing from the “life of 
Jesus” remained in the ontological paradigm of “divine and human” in the 
two-natures doctrine. Doctrinal theology is utterly rooted in this tradition 
and is difficult to reconcile with narrative gospel interpretation. TWW/OFT 
provides an open field that yields new possibilities for reconciling doctrine 
with neglected narratives. 
TWW/OFT in some ways has been a descriptive rather than a construc­
tive hermeneutical exercise. As an American project TWW/OFT begins with 
Protestant and Catholic theologians as constructive educators and takes 
stock of the ever-expanding diversity of theological schools and approaches. 
It then encompasses theological interactions with the historical churches: 
Catholic, Orthodox, Oriental, African, and contacts with the quarter bil­
lion Christians of new churches and movements with no denominational 
connections at all. In all, the salvation history narratives of scripture and the 
normative creeds arising from particular theologies of modernity up to our 
moment follow traditional patterns but also construct new pathways. Theol­
ogy is primarily expositional, responding to “revelation” or “knowledge of 
the ultimate,” correcting or rendering more persuasive inherited theological 
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multiple contexts of learning and faith practices. Theology grounds the con­
stant pursuit of human and planetary flourishing but ultimately articulates 
human hopes and visions of redemption, even when cosmology is under­
stood from a religious naturalism perspective, agnostically or even atheisti­
cally. TWW can encompass even a theology of religious atheism. “There is 
no God” or “The God of religion is nonexistent” can be heard theologically 
according to the personal confession of God as unknown, unknowable, or 
unexperienced, or critically as inescapably tied to violence – although one 
wonders if “religious entanglements” were somehow genetically removed, 
any appreciable decrease in human violence would result. 
Theology when it fully flowers is a divine or ultimate cosmological narra­
tive or model: Creator–creation; God–world–-humanity; continuum (with 
or without a beginning). Communication in such forms, even the natural­
istic with no deity, is theological and speculative, following, for example, 
apophatic or cataphatic hermeneutical trajectories: one is characteristic of 
the unknowability of God and the other of the divinity of all things. What is 
important is the comprehensibility of all theological discourses (even athe­
istic theologies) in OFT. In the apophatic direction, by the end of the first 
millennium of Christian theology, the best theologians had concluded that 
the being of God and its infinite attributes, “God of God,” were unknow­
able, because what can be known is entirely determined by the character­
istics of human cognition. From the apophatic angle, the unknowability of 
God could cover the widest possible range of agnostic or atheistic modeling. 
Indeed, there is little difference between the speculative knowledge claim 
of God’s nonexistence and the apophatic cognitive impossibility of know­
ing the being of the God that is known by revelation. From the cataphatic 
angle, however, theology follows the affirmations of its diverse traditions 
and trajectories, but in common context where the diversity that was once, 
at most, intrareligious is now interreligious, due to the global nearness of 
every theologian to every other. 
We can now see “perfect being theology” from a new hermeneutical 
perspective. Based in part upon mathematical ideals, the perfect being was 
subjected to “infinity modelling” with regard to divine (fore)knowledge (as 
“exhaustive”), eternal existence, ultimacy as “source” of all things, “perfec­
tion” as a moral quality, and desperate strategies for grounding ethics and 
law, as well as the coherence and intelligibility of the universe – explanatory 
of the derivation of all things. These ideals are also reflected in naturalistic 
models as “grand unified theory” agendas – some kind of “system” that 
gives integration or unity to everything. Perfect Being Theology in any sys­
tem begins with a certain perfection of either the law of noncontradiction 
or even tautology (the most “perfect” formulation) and extrapolates from 
there. Historically, various “perfect” forms, numbers, or proportionalities 
become nodes of reasoning about the [p]erfect “exhaustively,” as in divine 
foreknowledge. The implied qualifier “at least” is constantly begging the 
question of the models of divinity – even the Platonic or Hindu originals. 
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Either the systems of perfection beg questions as to the narratives of revela­
tion where such models are not offered or the patent inappropriateness of 
the models to begin with, trying to generate a model that is implied by near-
infinite multiplications of physical conditions in some cosmologies founded 
upon replicating behaviors in the quantum world. Given the complexity of 
the quantum world, even the catchphrase, “infinite in all directions” doesn’t 
catch, doesn’t capture a set of coordinates by which a satisfactory model 
of the infinite perfections of divinity can be represented. Atheism protests 
the models of the divine being – none even approach being satisfactory 
from their starting points, let alone their teloi, or “ends.” Perfect being as 
infinite being becomes “optative” – an “if–only” plea for the knowledge 
of infinite being identical to the models of revelation. Acknowledging the 
inadequacy of models of the divine being does not remove the warrant for 
affirming the infinite reality of Anselm’s “that than which nothing greater 
can be thought,” but it reminds us this concept is a contentless placeholder 
for the infinite existent and real ultimacy, yet unknowable as such by finite 
knowers, however reflective of the divine being of revelation they may be, 
yet always not reflective of [the] being that is nothing other than infinite. 
“Open-field” and theological trajectories 
Hermeneutical theology that would foster the open field of theological 
practice asks no questions of pluralism, inclusivism, or exclusivism, because 
technically, it would only provide warrant for their coexistence within 
the same field. TWW/OFT places theological communities in some kind 
of coexistence in theological space. Theological commitments other than 
hermeneutical privilege some particular religious aspect, even purported 
general or pluralistic ones: traditional, confessional, ecumenical, mystical, 
“religious belonging,” naturalist, “the Real,” etc. Each is better pursued 
in something of a “democratic,” “universal,” “level playing field”–based 
hermeneutical theological community than being performed on separated 
(“separatist”) bases. Even exclusivist theologies are better formulated under 
the conditions of TWW/OFT. 
What is the range or register of “open field” in terms of theology? There 
are perspectives that offer something that are similar: “open and relational 
theology” or “open theology”; “process” and “naturalistic” models of [g] 
od or the [r]eal or naturalist/materialist models. The point about “field” 
is that it pursues a kind of “level playing field” approach to what are his­
torically rival exclusivisms in religious doctrine and practice. But such a 
“field” approach, while not only removing the possibility of privilege and 
ranking among the theologies and a-theologies, is much more about discur­
sive and hermeneutical conditions of the freedom of inquiry, reconstructing 
and reframing theologies through encounter, inclusive of the “postcon­
fessional,” “postreligious,” “postsecular” world. By orienting theology 
according to field of inquiry rather than a particular tradition that has 
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opened its boundaries or a model of God in relation, TWW can do its work 
theologically as an anthropological exercise of many related disciplines and 
perspectives. 
Post-Constantinian, postdenominational and postconfessional trends 
in theology already present in the nineteenth century were represented by 
some of the greatest modern theological minds: Soren Kierkegaard and 
Franz Overbeck can be seen as on the way to Bonhoeffer’s “religion-less 
Christianity.” The institutional dominance of theology, let alone institu­
tions of government, law, or science, are replaced by theological engage­
ment and dimensionality for a “lived theology” in the context of multiple 
voices and irreducible diversity. Most moderate to liberal academic thinking 
has been gesturing toward TWW for some time. The student is free to pur­
sue relatively unbounded inquiry apart from those courses of study leading 
to ordination. Theologies in the developing world are especially needful of 
TWW/OFT because so many new movements do not have any connections 
to creedal denominations. Missional theology must respond more and more 
to “insider movements” which syncretically absorb Christian orientations 
within non-Christian communities, often with highly expressive forms of 
spirituality. Indeed, “spirituality” has become part of the taxonomy of 
human wellness and flourishing, no matter how secular or postreligious the 
context. 
At the same time, hyper-politicization can be detected in branches of Jew­
ish, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist communities. The already 
massively stressed “ultra-orthodox” subgroups vie in their claims for infal­
libility in knowledge and perfection in practice. It is sometimes difficult to 
locate the boundary between a zealotry that begets religious violence and 
a zealotry that foreswears it. Examples include American evangelical theo­
logians with no theological critique of the new nationalism and racism in 
its midst, Al Azhar University of Cairo refusing to condemn the teaching 
of ISIS, Modi of India refusing to condemn Hindutva ideology, Aung San 
Suu Kyi refusing to condemn her government’s genocide of the Muslim 
Rohingya in Rakhine, and even China’s absolutist president Xi refusing to 
acknowledge the massive internment camps for Muslims. These and many 
similar examples reflect the aggressive and often violent instrumentalization 
of religion. 
Through the previous century, theological schools moved toward shed­
ding strict denominational boundaries (although in Germany, Catholic and 
Protestant PhD students are not allowed cross-denominational supervisors). 
These predominantly Christian institutions have accommodated different 
kinds of Christian identity and constructed new forms centered on ethics 
and critical biblical studies decoupled from creedal controls in the interest 
of contextual understanding and innovative applications. 
One of the highest levels of literacy is religious, for example, being able 
to perceive theological meanings across the range of literatures and the 
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liturgy; music, visual and other performative arts. Theologizing is a capacity 
among readers and writers to communicate about the divine/human ref­
erents in religious discourse and to discern assertions and arguments with 
focused religious intention and advocacy. Indeed, to be a theologian without 
walls implies a capacity to make informed theological judgements outside, 
although not necessarily antithetical to, any particular religion or denomi­
nation. TWW grapples with the best of the heritage through comparative 
practice and multiple religious interactions, involving dialogue, composi­
tion, and literacy. Student and faculty expectations and formulations are 
already reflecting this postconfessional reality. 
If we look closely at the twenty-first-century developments and those just
prior, we see the final retreat of a dogmatic world where the common prop­
erty of the Abrahamic tradition’s best legacies can be accessed, weighed, and
applied in new forms and venues, such as comparative scripture/theological
study across the interreligious frontiers. A crucial development is the “postmet­
aphysical” trend in modern theology – but this must be understood in a precise
way. Theological texts are also texts of metaphysics. But the characteristic of
“objective science” going back to the axial age (fifth century BCE) of proph­
ets, scriptures, and sages are the constructions of cosmology based political
systems. The origins of the meta-narrative are both humanistic and scientific.
Indeed, the best way to read natural theology and speculations of “natural
religion” (from Spinoza to Hick) is as some primal religion – an ancient idea. 
We need to take seriously postdenominational yet postsecular trends to 
recognize how new expressions of theology are arising through nontradi­
tional avenues of scripture study and spirituality. Why this deference to 
scriptures? They represent the inspired sources of sources. Theologically, 
there are many “sources,” and one can certainly begin from the history of 
a tradition or a critical or reductionistic, even atheistic response, because 
a-theology is still dealing with the transcendent/ultimate category of reflec­
tion. What is characteristic across the board is the distancing from “reli­
gious authority” as institutionalized through fellow human mediation. The 
“without walls” of this theology is the resistance to any connection between 
spiritual truths and any appropriation by political, historical, and cultural 
authorities to justify privilege or exclusion. In their place, an unbounded/ 
un-walled theological conversation has broken upon us and our world of 
many human and nonhuman lives. 
Although early twenty-first-century developments in Western religious­
ness are marked by a “postsecular” trend, this is matched by a “postreli­
gious” trend as well. Both terms require vagueness and wide applicability 
to be serviceable as well as linked together. Indeed, in a postdogmatic age – 
dogma meaning the religious bases in legal reasoning that once sustained 
the protection of religious institutions through the legislation and execution 
of religious laws and the punishment of religious crimes – this world of reli­
gious law no longer exists among Christians and Jews and many Muslims; 
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The import of “confession-less” Christian theology as a key trajectory 
behind TWW/OFT correlates with the “subjective turn” in the history of 
theology. Earlier models of God in many, if not all, of these traditions had 
to be replaced, for example, divine presence with divine “design,” divine 
subjectivity and activity in some form of “relational” model of [g]od. The 
by-product has been personal individuation and identity formation. 
TWW/OFT responds to the gradual abandonment of sovereign religion 
and the recognition of irreducible multiplicity. Boundaries there always will 
be, but these are, more than ever, the boundaries of voluntary association 
(e.g., denominations of religions, local communities, often connected but 
not wholly defining any “religion”) and ultimately the inviolability of the 
individual person, religious or not. Indeed, in the radical period of the Ref­
ormation and ever after, a particular gospel verse and its interpretation as 
“church” was programmatically condemned by the traditionalists: “wher­
ever two or more are gathered in my name” (Mt 18:20). Today, two or more 
in community is a “church” or spiritual community of any religion and yet 
not at all. Such community is not discounted by a wide variety of theologi­
cal reasoners. There is a sense in which the multiplication of communities 
is finally a diversification down to the individual theologian, hopefully in 
conversation and constructive productivity, if nowhere else than in a TWW/ 




2 One immensely helpful comparative historical treatment: Stroumsa (2016).
 
3 The use of [] (e.g., [B]eing) in this chapter is meant to convey the alternating 

capital/lowercase letter depending upon use: the varying registers in theological 
discourse for such terms. 
4 Otherwise known as “eternity of the world” cosmology and its consistent rejec­
tion by the vast majority of Abrahamic theologians; e.g., Philoponus, Maimon­
ides, Avicenna, Bonaventure, and Aquinas. 
5 Brilliantly debated by Hannah Arendt in her posthumously published Willing
(1978). 
6 Some 16 countries have constitutionally established national Christian churches, 
or “Christianity”: Argentina, Armenia, Tuvalu, Tonga, Costa Rica, Kingdom of 
Denmark, England, Greece, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Vat­
ican City, Papua New Guinea, and Zambia. 
7 Republic, 514a – 520a.
 
8 Not to mention its theology of religions.
 
9 It includes a very clear affirmation of Vatican II as normative.
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Jerry L. Martin 
Theology Without Walls encourages a greater emphasis on religious expe­
riences and the transformations they engender. “Ultimate reality,” John 
Thatamanil argues, “cannot be corralled or confined within the bounda­
ries of . . . ‘the religions.’” In Christian terms, “if God is the God of the 
whole world, traces of divinity will surely be found anywhere one thinks 
to look.” The goal is interreligious wisdom, engaging not only the claims 
of other traditions but their ends and their means as well. This engagement 
requires “the pursuit of truth gained through the theologian’s own transfor­
mation.” The goal is to know God, not merely about God. “This knowledge 
of rather than knowledge about is driven by soteriological desire.” “To be 
religious . . . is to search for comprehensive qualitative orientation.” It seeks 
to order human desiring in ways true to the nature of reality. Interreligous 
wisdom requires “embodied knowing of reality as understood by means of 
the therapeutic regimes of more than one tradition.” If the ultimate reality 
is “a multiplicity not an undifferentiated simplicity,” then interreligious wis­
dom reveals “more than one dimension of ultimate reality.” 
Paul Knitter’s book, Without Buddha I Couldn’t Be a Christian, created 
something of a sensation. Here was a learned Catholic theologian immers­
ing himself in Buddhism so much that he became rather equally committed 
to both traditions. If theology is, as he says, “spiritual experience trying to 
make sense of itself,” how was he to make sense of his dual belonging? He 
starts with the difficult question, “Just how does Jesus save me?” Finding 
atonement theory unsatisfactory, he looked to a “functional analogy” in the 
Buddhist tradition: the saving role of Jesus is that of Guru Yoga, or “spir­
itual benefactor.” The participant must “visualize and truly feel the presence 
of the Benefactor. The final phase is to let the images dissolve and merge 
non-conceptually into, in Buddhist language, the Essence Love. Or, as St. 
Paul puts it, ‘It is now no longer I who lives; it is Christ living in/as me.’” 
This, Knitter says, is salvation – “not as an atoning process that takes place 
outside of oneself but as a transformative unitive experience.” In another 
functional analogy, “both Buddha and Jesus can be considered ‘liberators.’” 
Knitter explores what Buddhists can teach Christians and what Christians 
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can teach Buddhists about efforts at liberation and social justice. He con­
cludes, “by realizing my Buddha-nature, I have been able to understand and 
to live my Christ-nature.” 
Questioning a “smorgasbord” approach to religion, Huston Smith once 
quoted a teacher in India, “If you are drilling for water, it’s better to drill 
one 60-foot well than ten 6-foot wells.” Peter Savastano reports from his 
own life a deep involvement with multiple traditions, reaching the level of 
a spiritual master in several. He has studied theology but, he says, “theory 
eventually hits the wall of personal experience.” Seeking “knowledge of 
and through the heart,” he engaged in a wide range of spiritual practices 
from multiple traditions. “By engaging these non-Christian practices,” he 
says, “I have expanded my understanding and experience of the Abrahamic 
God.” Is ultimate reality personal or impersonal? Sometimes one, some­
times the other, sometimes both at the same time, in his experience. “I con­
tinue to immerse myself more deeply in Christ-oriented experience although 
I do so ‘interspiritually.’” There is a further movement “when my experi­
ence of the Divine surpasses all concepts and metaphors . . . an experience 
of the apophatic nature of The Great Mystery which I describe as ‘the scaf­
folding falling away.’” The experience is “both elating and troubling.” It 
is perhaps, he concludes, the prelude to what a Sufi psychologist calls the 
“final integration.” 
Rory McEntee begins with his experiences with Fr. Thomas Keating and 
the Snowmass Dialogues, which provided remarkably rich opportunities to 
study interspirituality. McEntee was influenced by Wayne Teasdale’s belief 
that interspirituality could create “a continuing community among the reli­
gions that is substantial, vital, and creative.” It would “make available to 
everyone all the forms the spiritual journey assumes.” In the Snowmass dis­
cussions, theological disagreements would arise. “At the level of doctrine we 
find (perhaps) incommensurable ‘accounts of reality.’ However, in ‘the reli­
gious quest as transformative journey,’ we have found what Raimon Panik­
kar called ‘homeomorphic equivalence.’” The interspiritual approach might 
be particularly valuable for the spiritual but not religious. Though coming 
from a particular tradition, he now finds that the interspiritual community 
is his home. 
No philosopher has paid more nuanced attention to religious experience 
than William James. Jonathan Weidenbaum explores doing theology, to use 
James’s phrase, “with open doors and windows,” open to the full range of 
human experience. “Intuitions that are pathological, paranormal, and even 
drug-induced join religious experiences in possessing revelatory value for 
James.” The encounter with another person that shatters our “prejudices 
and assumptions,” can, James said, cause a “complete re-ordering of our 
inner lives.” Reflection is important but should not erase “the freshness 
and immediacy of concrete experience.” He finds mystical experiences to 
have a seemingly noetic quality as “states of insight into the depths of truth 
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unplumbed by the discursive intellect.” Indeed, the “overcoming of all the 
usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic 
achievement.” At the same time, James celebrates diversity. If all religions 
were seen as, at some level, saying the same thing, “the total human con­
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Theology Without Walls (TWW) is not a single, highly integrated, and uni­
form research program but rather a family of kindred research projects. 
As TWW gains greater traction and more voices join in, the methodologi­
cal diversity within TWW will only continue to expand. What binds these 
diverse projects together is the core conviction that theological truth is avail­
able, and therefore must be pursued, beyond the walls of any single religion. 
If there is (at least one) ultimate reality, there is no reason to suspect –
confessional claims notwithstanding – that ultimate reality is accessible
through a single tradition alone. Indeed, even exclusivist confessional thinkers
typically insist that knowledge of God, even if to an inferior degree, is avail­
able to those outside the tradition, for example, in the book of nature and not
just in the book of scripture. If such truth is, indeed, available, and if what is
so available does not replicate what is already known within a single tradition,
then theologians must commend investment in transreligious learning. 
TWW investigators may seek knowledge of ultimate reality in literature, 
in the work of scientific cosmologists and evolutionary biologists, in com­
parative theology, or by way of experimentation with mind-altering psilo­
cybin. Ultimate reality cannot be corralled within the boundaries of those 
domains of cultural life that some modern communities have taken to call­
ing “the religions.” What sort of self-respecting ultimate reality would that 
be? Speaking in traditional Christian theological terms, as God is the God 
of the whole world, traces of divinity will be found anywhere one thinks to 
look. Hence, a diversity of approaches and methods is inevitable for TWW. 
In this chapter, I propose one particular conception of TWW that has for 
its goal interreligious wisdom gained by means of engagement with not just 
the claims of other traditions but also their ends and the means to those 
ends. I hold that at least some who engage in TWW will do so by way of 
multiple religious participation, that is by taking up practices drawn from 
the repertoire of more than one religious tradition, practices that provide 
access to the spiritual ends prized by the traditions in question. In what 
follows, I offer a rudimentary sketch of this version of TWW, commend its 
desirability and importance, and describe some of the unique conceptual and 
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its superiority to other modes of TWW. Not all will be drawn to the appeals 
and demands of this style of theological engagement. Nonetheless, I com­
mend this account of TWW because it affords access to what I call interre­
ligious wisdom, first-order knowledge of ultimate reality gained by drawing 
from the resources of more than one religious tradition. 
Theology is more than making claims: on theological 
ends and means 
Theological reflection within many contemporary forms of Christianity 
remains a resolutely cognitivist enterprise wedded to the labor of making 
and assessing claims about God and God’s relation to the world and human 
beings.1 There is nothing misguided about such a project. Theological work 
quite naturally seeks to think about how best to construe ultimacy. Is God 
a being among beings or rather the ground of being? Is ultimate reality 
personal, transpersonal, or perhaps even both in different respects? Is the 
relation between ultimacy and the world best understood within a pan­
theist, panentheistic, nondualist, or dualist metaphysics? Of course, these 
questions might also be taken up within the framework of philosophy of 
religion. What customarily renders these questions distinctively theological 
is the constraint that they are taken up with reference to the sources and 
norms of a particular tradition, a constraint that TWW rejects. 
Might we entertain another conception of what makes thinking theologi­
cal, a conception that hinges not on exclusivity – “Work within the param­
eters of this tradition alone!” – but instead understands theology as marked 
by existential commitment to the pursuit of religious truth gained through 
the theologian’s own transformation, a transformation brought about by 
taking up the spiritual disciplines that serve as the means for reaching the 
distinctive spiritual ends of the tradition in question? True, Pierre Hadot 
has shown that within the history of the West, philosophy, too, was once 
understood to require spiritual discipline, but this particular conception of 
philosophy has largely fallen by the wayside (Hadot 1995). In this histori­
cal moment, theology seems better suited as the rubric for committed truth 
seeking gained through spiritual transformation. 
Such theology would be attentive to far more than theological claim 
assessment but would instead seek to understand claims within the broader 
spiritual matrix from which they are often isolated for the sake of delibera­
tion. Even within Christian circles, theology has not always been focused 
on claims to the exclusion of religious ends and the means by which those 
ends were reached. Recall one of the tradition’s earliest definitions of the 
theologian by the fourth-century desert father, Evagrius: “The one who 
prays truly is the theologian; the theologian is one who prays truly” (Ponti­
cus 1972, 65). For Evagrius, prayer makes the theologian, not the proposal 
and defense of this or that set of theological claims. The theologian is one 
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discipline of prayer, which is itself a gift of God. The theologian is the one 
who knows God, not merely knows about God. This knowledge of rather 
than knowledge about is driven by soteriological desire. The end of Chris­
tian life is knowledge, and love of God that sets human beings free from sin, 
death, and the devil, and that knowledge is to be gained by means of the 
spiritual discipline of prayer. 
In the kind of TWW I am proposing herein, the theologian rejects denom­
inational or traditional exclusivity but embraces Evagrius’s insistence on the 
centrality of the religious means that aim at transformative truth. Evagrius’s 
maxim reminds us that ancient Christian traditions affirmed an intimate 
and inseparable bond between religious ends and the means by which those 
ends are attained. The theologian’s vocation and identity are secured, within 
such a framework, by commitment to spiritual disciplines and not by way of 
conceptual assessment alone. 
What if, borrowing from and riffing on Evagrius, we proposed the fol­
lowing contemporary maxim: the interreligious theologian is one who prays 
and meditates truly; the one who prays and meditates truly is the interreli­
gious theologian. Here, of course, “meditation” is a placeholder, a token for 
some specific set of disciplines for religious knowing commended by a non-
Christian tradition. Theologians without walls, in my account, are those 
who seek to know ultimate reality not by rejecting the spiritual disciplines 
of their home tradition but by supplementing those disciplines with oth­
ers responsibly borrowed from another tradition. Actually, this provisional 
definition needs further nuance because there is no reason to assume, from 
the first, that the theologian without walls has a single home tradition, let 
alone the Christian one. Religious affiliations, in our time, defy any predict­
able pattern. A theologian without walls or the transrreligious theologian is 
one who seeks to know the truth of ultimate reality by faithfully engaging in 
the spiritual disciplines of more than one religious tradition. 
Some key terms, definitions, and operative assumptions 
What are the fundamental assumptions that render such a definition of trans-
religious theology meaningful and desirable? I would like to lay out here a 
number of central terms, definitions, and operative assumptions that I bring 
to the work of transreligious theology. To begin with the basics, just what 
do we mean by the terms “religious” and “religions?” How can care with 
definitions correct for the doctrinal preoccupations of much contemporary 
theology? How can we strive to ensure that our definitions of religion do not 
build into themselves expectations that render singular religious belonging 
normative and multiple religious participation aberrant? 
To be religious, in my account, is to search for comprehensive qualitative 
orientation. Religious persons and communities seek to take their place with 
respect to the whole of things, the nature of reality as such, in an affective 
key. Religious orientation, as opposed to, say, scientific orientation, seeks 
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to order human desiring such that human desires are rendered true to the 
nature of reality. How should human desiring be ordered if reality is marked 
by impermanence and insubstantiality? What if, beyond all the finite goods 
given in experience, there is an infinite good upon whom all finite things 
depend? What would that entail for how desire is ordered? If reality is 
marked by radical interdependence, such that my well-being is inseparable 
from yours, then what should I do about deeply entrenched habits of self-
seeking that presently mar my life with others? What are we to do about 
market-based regimes of shaping desire that teach that the collective good 
spontaneously emerges by maximizing individualistic acquisitive impulses? 
All of these questions about what to do with our desiring, when desires are 
situated within some account of the way things are, count as religious. 
Nothing about this project to render human desiring true to the real 
implies an understanding of the religious as passive rather than activist in 
character. In order to render human desiring true to the nature of the real as 
such, one might well have to undo social orders that are marked by falsity, 
triviality, and destructivity. Religious comportment can and routinely does 
take on the work of world transformation. 
The religious work of orienting desire within a cosmic frame has histori­
cally taken place within local and translocal communities whose lives have 
been shaped by a variety of traditions that we have taken recently to calling 
“religions” or “world religions.” In much of the globe for much of human 
history, any given local community was informed by a variety of religious 
traditions. That such religious diversity marked East Asian and South Asian 
life is well known. Less well known is the presence of enduring multiplicity 
in “Christian lands.” The presence of various indigenous and pagan cus­
toms and practices has diversely colored the Christianities of Ireland, Brazil, 
and even Italy. That is why even European Christianities have distinctive 
local flavors, flavors as distinctive as their respective cuisines. The work of 
comprehensive qualitative orientation thus routinely draws upon the reper­
toires of more than one religious tradition. 
Religious traditions are historically deep repertoires of myths, rituals, 
practices, symbols, sacred objects, sacred sites, scriptures, institutions, 
norms, experiences, and intuitions. More precisely, traditions are arguments 
about what ought to be in a given tradition’s repertoire and how that reper­
toire ought to be employed in the work of generating interpretive schemes 
and therapeutic regimes. Interpretive schemes are the means by which reli­
gious thinkers and their communities give an account of the nature of real­
ity. Therapeutic regimes are the means by which personal and communal 
desiring is attuned to the nature of the real as depicted by an interpretive 
scheme. Therapeutic regimes include rituals, practices of worship, spiritual 
exercises, pilgrimages, and the like by which personal and communal lives 
are tutored and shaped so as to be rendered true to and true for the real. 
Religious traditions are not interpretive schemes; they contain a pleth­
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to generate and debate a host of interpretive schemes. There is neither a 
single Christian nor Buddhist take on reality. There are historically fluid 
and geographically diverse Christian and Buddhist repertoires, which are 
then deployed in contested fashion by religious intellectuals and their 
communities. 
The ingredients contained within a given religious repertoire are malle­
able and constantly subject to growth and subtraction, but not infinitely so. 
Certain items have historic staying power and come to be seen as essential 
to that repertoire because of symbolic power, entrenched habit, the backing 
of institutional elites, sheer antiquity, and a host of other reasons. It is just as 
difficult to imagine a Christian interpretive scheme that does not make use 
of the cross, baptism, or some account of the resurrection as it would be to 
imagine South Indian cuisine without cumin, coriander, turmeric, mustard 
seeds, or coconut milk. Not every ingredient is found in all curries, but there 
are recognizable continuities. Likewise, not every ingredient from the Chris­
tian repertoire is found in any particular Christian theological vision, but 
there are recognizable continuities that mark a Christian dish as Christian 
or a Buddhist dish as Buddhist. It is difficult to imagine a Christian thera­
peutic regime that takes leave altogether of prayer of some kind (interces­
sory, contemplative, etc.), although even so “central” an ingredient as the 
Eucharist is relatively marginal in some ecclesial families. 
Not every Buddhist meditates or chants mantras – there is a vast differ­
ence between monastic and lay practice, for example – but, again, one rec­
ognizes important material historical continuities. A theory of the religious 
traditions must strike the right balance between continuity and creativity, a 
task well beyond the scope of this chapter. Emphasize continuity alone, and 
agency is stripped from religious actors; emphasize creativity alone, and the 
historical depth, heft, and binding power of traditions might be forgotten. 
The appeal to the example of cooking in this context is not random. No 
two Kerala fish curries are identical, even when prepared by members of a 
single family. But you do generally know when you are having a Kerala fish 
curry. If the dish doesn’t have some combination of tamarind, coconut milk, 
mustard seeds, curry leaves, turmeric, garlic, and a good many chilies, what 
you’ve concocted may taste good, but it is unlikely to be a Kerala fish curry. 
Tradition imposes constraints, but those constraints can themselves serve as 
the material basis for improvisational creativity. 
For the purposes of this chapter, what must be reemphasized is that the 
work of comprehensive qualitative orientation cannot be accomplished by 
appeal to an interpretive scheme alone, no more than reading the ingredients 
from a recipe will satisfy hunger. Desires are configured in healing and life-
giving fashion when they are shaped by means of the specific spiritual disci­
plines that enable human beings to accomplish the religious ends celebrated 
by the tradition in question. Human flourishing requires truing oneself to 
the nature of the real; religious orientation is, hence, a matter of comport­
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For most religious traditions, right comportment requires that human 
beings are rightly attuned to certain feature or features of reality that are 
taken to be ultimate. I speak of “features” in this context rather than a sin­
gular ultimate reality because it is not clear that all religious traditions main­
tain that a single ultimate reality exists. A given tradition might celebrate 
a plurality of Orishas or instead point to the fact that everything in reality 
whatsoever is empty (sunya) of self-existence (svabhava). The former is not 
a singular ultimate, and the latter is not easily characterized as an ultimate 
reality in the way that either God or Brahman might be. 
Comportment requires that human beings are in right accord with ulti­
macy rather than merely know about ultimacy. Here, one might speak about 
first-order knowledge, knowledge of, rather than second-order knowledge, 
knowledge about. Consider, for example, the knowledge that Michael 
Phelps has of water as opposed to the nonswimmer who happens to be 
expert in fluid mechanics. The latter knows a very great deal about water, 
far more than Phelps, in fact, but as a nonswimmer, she would not be long 
for the world if she should happen to fall into the deep end of a pool. 
First-order religious knowing, the kind that Evagrius commends, is 
acquired only by means of spiritual disciplines such as prayer and medita­
tion. Without proper comportment, there is no true knowledge of the real. 
This is why generations of students in the nation’s “Introduction to Bud­
dhism” classes have not spontaneously awakened to wisdom upon a first 
hearing or reading of the Four Noble Truths. Enlightenment experiences are 
not recurring features of collegiate lecture halls even when staffed by bril­
liant lecturers. Reading the recipe is not cooking, let alone eating the dish. 
Buddhist traditions customarily insist on the priority of spiritual disci­
plines. Zen students do not receive lectures on Dogen but are instead com­
pelled to sit in Zazen. What there is to know about Zen is learned, first and 
foremost, by taking on a particular therapeutic regime that tutors the body 
to see as Zen what teachers want the student to see. Even dharma talks are 
not so much about the transmission of doctrinal or propositional informa­
tion but are instead meant to elicit and evoke transformation. The upshot: if 
you want to know as Buddhists know, you must do as Buddhists do. There 
are no shortcuts. 
Multiple religious participation as the precondition 
for interreligious wisdom 
With these preliminary terms and definitions in place, we are now able to 
say just why multiple religious participation is necessary for one modality 
of TWW, namely that which strives at interreligious wisdom. But first, one 
additional definition is necessary, that of interreligious wisdom. Religious 
traditions account persons to be wise when they have, by means of right 
comportment, arrived at embodied knowing of ultimate reality as under­
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they have arrived at intimate first-order knowledge of ultimate reality by 
means of spiritual disciplines that have rightly attuned human desiring. It 
would follow that interreligious wisdom arises when human beings come 
into an embodied knowing of reality as understood by means of the thera­
peutic regimes of more than one tradition. In so doing, these persons will 
have inscribed into their bodies first-order knowledge of ultimate reality or 
ultimate features of reality as articulated by the interpretative schemes of 
traditions whose therapeutic regimes they have taken up. I have elsewhere 
spoken of such wisdom as a kind of binocular vision – the capacity to see 
the world through more than one set of religious lenses and to integrate 
what is seen thereby. I wish to argue that at least some theologians without 
walls must set themselves to the pursuit of such binocular vision by way of 
multiple religious participation. 
But is such interreligious wisdom possible? What are the conditions for 
the possibility of such wisdom? And, if possible, is it desirable? What obsta­
cles, if any, stand in the way of such wisdom? Who might interreligious 
wisdom be for? What communities might it serve? These are the questions 
that I take up in the remainder of this chapter. Let’s address these questions 
in turn. 
Proof of actuality is, of course, proof of possibility. We know that inter-
religious wisdom is possible precisely because we know of a host of religious 
luminaries who have successfully committed themselves to the cultivation 
of such wisdom. Consider, for example, Buddhist-Christian figures such as 
Ruben Habito, Maria Reis Habito, Sallie King, and Paul Knitter.2 These 
thinkers are, in each case, not merely speculative students of Buddhist and 
Christian interpretive schemes considered in isolation from Buddhist thera­
peutic regimes. Each is grounded in years, even decades, of multiple religious 
participation, with recognized teachers in Buddhist traditions. In the case of 
Ruben Habito, his immersion in Buddhist practice is so thoroughgoing that 
he has received dharma transmission and is now a Buddhist teacher within 
a Zen lineage while remaining a Christian. These figures are Christians who 
have remained Christian even as they came to be deeply steeped in Buddhist 
traditions. 
On the Hindu-Christian front, one can readily think of figures such as
Raimon Panikkar, Swami Abhishiktananda, and Bede Griffiths, among oth­
ers.3 Particularly in the case of Abhishiktananada and Bede Griffiths, we have
figures who immersed themselves in contemplative practice in the Advaitic
strand of Hindu traditions. Their theological writings followed only after tak­
ing up the contemplative therapeutic regimen of Advaita Vedanta. The goal
of such writing is to integrate, so far as possible, nondual wisdom with Chris­
tian devotional practice and wisdom, a meeting between wisdoms that takes
place in “the cave of the heart.” Questions about the Christian trinity and
nonduality are taken up as they are illumined by the interspiritual experiences
generated by practice and are not driven solely by a penchant for speculative
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intensity and rigor that, at least in the case of Abhishiktananda, proved to be
soul-wrenching. It is no simple matter to integrate into one’s life experience
the competing appeals of nondualism and devotionalism when both have had
an integral place within one’s own spiritual life and orientation.4 
No treatment of what these figures have come to know about ultimacy is 
possible herein, but a careful study of them would be an integral component 
in a research program that sought to think through the nature and possibili­
ties for interreligious wisdom. What have such figures learned? What chal­
lenges have they faced? What is the relationship between their interreligious 
wisdom and wisdom as conventionally understood by each of the single tra­
ditions to which these figures made appeal? Such research would, I suspect, 
not just show that interreligious wisdom is a meaningful notion but also go 
a considerable way toward elucidating what interreligious wisdom is. 
Let us turn now to the question, “What are the conditions for the possi­
bility of interreligious wisdom, and why might such wisdom be desirable?” 
To answer that question, I posit the following propositions: 
1 What we know of ultimate reality is intimately tied to how we come to 
know ultimate reality. The knower must become transformed so as to 
come into a knowing of ultimate reality in the respect that the seeker 
seeks to know it. 
2 Ultimate reality is a multiplicity, not an undifferentiated simplicity. 
3 Therefore, it follows that if different dimensions of the ultimate reality 
are to be known, they must be accessed by means of the specific spiritual 
disciplines that afford such access. 
4 The bearer of interreligious wisdom, therefore, is one who has come to 
know more than one dimension of ultimate reality and has begun to 
integrate what has been so learned. 
Interreligious wisdom is possible if these propositions hold. 
First, we have already argued that first-order knowing of ultimate reality 
can be gained by means of the specific disciplines, the therapeutic regimes 
that make just such knowledge possible. Just as Michael Phelps undertakes 
the specific training regimens that create in his body the complex habitus 
that makes possible excellence in swimming, so, too, those who seek to 
know ultimate reality – not merely know about ultimate reality – must 
undertake specific disciplines. If no such disciplines exist, then there is no 
comportment to ultimate reality. 
With that basic first presupposition in place, the possibility of interre­
ligious wisdom requires the second supposition: that ultimate reality is 
a multiplicity and not just an undifferentiated simplicity.5 Without that 
hypothesis, there is no reason to suppose that the various distinct disciplines 
of our religious traditions can augment and enrich knowledge gained by 
some primary practice. There must be more dimensions to the divine life 
that can be diversely accessed through diverse disciplines. 
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One other logical counterpossibility must be broached, namely that our 
various spiritual disciplines may be reduplicative. Remaining with the anal­
ogy of the swimmer, one might argue that nothing new is learned about 
water when a swimmer masters, in turn, the backstroke, the butterfly, and 
the breaststroke. What gain there is rests in the swimmer’s fitness as differ­
ent muscle groups are mobilized by way of these different strokes, but no 
new knowledge of water is gained. Water just is water. By extension, one 
might suggest that Zen practice grants no new knowledge of ultimacy that 
the Eucharist does not. The practitioner is spiritually fitter but has learned 
nothing more by spiritual cross-training. 
This possibility must be entertained as a hypothesis, but if it holds without 
exception for all spiritual disciplines, then I do not see how a robust con­
ception of interreligious wisdom can be defended. The different therapeutic 
regimes of our traditions would open no new vistas of vision, and the con­
nection between religious means and the noetic ends that those means strive 
to access would be severed. In this account, the various spiritual disciplines 
would all be reduplicative, all paths up the same mountain but affording no 
new knowledge of it. The variety of disciplines may just be attributed to the 
contingent cultural-linguistic matrices from which the disciplines arise and 
yield no distinctive truth-bearing power. 
Now, although it is certainly true that spiritual cross-training may well 
generate in practitioners a variety of spiritual excellences that are not 
directly tied to distinct dimensions of the divine life, there is every reason 
to believe that at least some disciplines are so connected. Some so shape 
persons and communities that distinctive insights are gained by means of 
diverse practices. We have reason to believe this because the traditions 
themselves tell us so. Christian life requires becoming the Kingdom-bringing 
egalitarian social body of the Christ. If you seek to become that body, you 
must eat that body’s food; you must participate in the egalitarian sharing of 
the one bread and one cup, where Christians, in all their differences, come 
together and become one community of reconciled love-in-difference. In so 
doing, Christians become the Love that they are called to be. The discipline 
of Dzogchen, by contrast, is meant and employed for other purposes. The 
practice calls practitioners into recognition of the nature of mind itself as 
nondual, marked by spacelike clarity, unbounded, and intrinsically com­
passionate. Practice stabilizes in the practitioner this truth about their own 
nature; moreover, there is an inseparable connection between path and goal. 
What one practices is what one comes to know. 
Those who seek interreligious wisdom need not posit that the practice of 
Eucharist and its goal are identical with the practice and goal of Dzogchen. 
Such assertions seem both implausible and unnecessary. Dzogchen practice 
operates within another ontological imaginary, one grounded in affirma­
tion of the Buddha-nature of all beings and so operates within a different 
horizon of intelligibility. And it is precisely that difference which lends it 
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possibility of complementarity if one refuses to posit sameness – one must if 
interreligious wisdom is to be a cherished goal. 
Christian Eucharistic practice, by contrast, is not rooted in nondual met­
aphysical commitments. Difference matters. The uniqueness of the many 
gathered is affirmed in the singularity of each one, a singularity that is 
drawn without reduction or elimination into relation and community. And, 
of course and most obviously, the Eucharist is an act of worship of One 
who is not in every sense identical to those who worship. Here, of course, 
it is all too easy to become ontologically reductive. Christian theologies of 
God are all, without exception, aware that God is not a finite and countable 
object. To affirm that God is infinite is immediately to complicate every con­
ventional depiction of the God–world relation as flatly akin to the relation 
between finite objects. 
One need only remember, for example, Nicholas of Cusa’s insistence that
God is best understood as non-aliud, Not-Other, to realize that Christian the­
ological imagination cannot be narrowly confined to a dialogical frame that
is taken precisely to mirror dialogue as it takes place between two human
interlocutors. Beginning with St. Paul, Christians have affirmed that the “dia-
logical structure” of prayer is most peculiar. “Likewise the Spirit helps us in
our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but that very
Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words” (Rom 8:26: NRSV). God
prays to God in and through us; this is surely not dialogue as usual. Still,
devotional life is marked by a longing for One who is not just or simply me,
even if my longing for God is always already God’s longing in me. 
With these differences between Eucharist and Dzogchen sketched, albeit 
hastily, we are able to posit that the transreligious theologian might take up 
both practices with faithfulness, integrity, and some enduring continuity so 
as to be formed in depth by both practices and the matrices within which 
those practices are embedded. The wager is that differences matter, that 
there is an intimate noetic relation between the practices and what they seek 
to illuminate, and that each grants access to dimensions of ultimate reality 
that the other does not. The questions guiding the transreligious theolo­
gian might include these: 1) Might there be dimensions of ultimate reality 
that correlate to the nondualism of Dzogchen and the complicated logic 
of singularity and relation present in Eucharist? 2) Might ultimate reality 
contain dimensions that are, on the one hand, nondually related to world 
and self and also dimensions that cannot be characterized as nondual and 
might even be meaningfully encountered as personal? 3) If so, how might 
one become maximally attuned, insofar as possible, to both dimensions and 
features of ultimate reality? 4) What kind of theological living and writing 
might follow from such transreligious living? 
These questions, when taken together, point to the novelty and promise of 
transreligious theology as a quest for interreligious wisdom. What is sought 
is a practical braiding of spiritual disciplines, first, in the life of the practi­
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life. Textual writing follows only after a writing into a flesh of the therapeu­
tic regimes of specific traditions, which creates in the practitioner the long 
training that opens angles of vision that cannot be opened otherwise. The 
practitioner’s primary goal is to arrive at a “sense and taste” for dimensions 
of ultimate reality by means of just these practices and then just this second 
set of practices. First-order intimacy is the cherished goal. The transformed 
theologian is the first product of transreligious theology imagined in this 
practical key; textual production follows next as an expression of what has 
been so learned. 
Notes 
1 The charge against a narrowly cognitivist-propositional account of theology was 
perhaps most famously made in contemporary theology by George Lindbeck in 
his brilliantly argued, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-
liberal Age (1984). My project is unlikely to be mistaken for his, but we do share 
a conviction that theological life is embedded within larger cultural-linguistic 
milieus. But there agreement ends. With other thinkers, most especially Kathryn 
Tanner in Theories of Culture, I reject the notion that religious traditions are uni­
tary, tightly integrated, cultural-linguistic schemes with transhistorically enduring 
deep grammars. There are no nonporous boundaries between Christian meta-
narratives and non-Christian language games anywhere to be found because they 
do not exist. Human beings, Christians being no exception, live at the intersection 
of and navigate between multiple porous traditions, sacred and secular. We are,
all of us, always already multiple; the question is only whether we are intention­
ally or accidentally so. On all these matters, it is impossible to exceed Tanner’s 
work. See Tanner (1997). 
2 For a discussion of these exemplary dual belongers, see Drew (2011). 
3 For more about these figures, see Ulrich (2011) and (2004) 
4 For a brief but illuminating account of the intensity of Swamiji’s struggle, see 
Amaladoss (2016). 
5 There is, of course, also the possibility that there may be more than one ulti­
mate reality. This option has been proposed by a variety of thinkers, including, 
most prominently, David Ray Griffin and John Cobb. Griffin also points to Mark 
Heim as a kindred spirit and ally. For Griffin and Cobb, there are at least three: 
God, a personal ultimate; creativity, a transpersonal ultimate; and the world itself. 
Together, these three can account for personal religious experience, the transper­
sonal experiences of Hindu and Buddhist traditions, and the cosmic/naturalistic 
religiosities. See Griffin (2005). 
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Although any statement that is supposed to apply to all religions is risky, 
I do believe that a case can be made that all wisdom traditions recognize, in 
one form or another, that religions really don’t know what they are talking 
about! All of them insist that what they are seeking or what they believe 
they have come to experience, what many of them call ultimate reality, is 
beyond all human comprehension. No human being, and no human com­
munity of spiritual seekers, can grasp the fullness of God, or Tao, or Brah­
man, or Wakan Tanka. As a tee-shirt that someone gave me – and which 
would make an ideal gift for all theologians – puts it: “God is too big to fit 
into any one religion.” 
In my theology classes, I have used the image of ultimate reality or Truth 
as a universe surrounding us that, in its vastness and richness, is beyond all 
human sight. To see it, we need telescopes. But all such telescopes – in their 
varying power and specializations – do two things: they enable us to see 
more of the Truth that otherwise would be beyond our visual capacity; but 
they also limit what we can see, for focusing on one part of the universe of 
truth leaves out others. So in order to see more of the universe than what my 
telescope allows me to see, I need to look through other telescopes that are 
different in their abilities and specificities than mine. 
The analogy is clear. If followers of the different wisdom traditions are
convinced that they have encountered and come to know a Truth that has
given meaning to their lives, they also know that there is more to the Truth
than what they know. They know, but they also know that they don’t know.
What more and more followers of the religions are coming to realize in our
interconnected, intercommunicating contemporary world is that they can
discover and come to know more of the Sacred by using, as it were, the
telescopes of other religions. In order to learn more of the Sacred, in order
to overcome the limitations of one’s own religion, one must engage the
teachings and practices of other religious paths. As Raimon Panikkar put
it with his typical edgy insightfulness: “To answer the question ‘Who/what
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That is a question posed in interreligious dialogue. To be authentic, dia­
logue requires much more than “tolerant conversation” in which partici­
pants are “nice” to each other. It is also more than a sincere conversation 
in which all parties seek to learn more about each other. Anyone who truly 
commits herself to real dialogue commits herself to the possibility and to the 
expectation of learning from the other. And insofar as one learns something 
new or different from another, one is also learning something new about 
oneself. The goal is not just information but also transformation. One might 
have to change not only one’s ideas but also one’s religious identity, one’s 
way of being religious. 
I’m going to write out of my own personal search for a spirituality that 
can be experientially meaningful, intellectually coherent, and ethically 
responsible. My reflections as a theologian will, in other words, be based on 
my spiritual practices and experience. I hope that these reflections will be 
an example of theology as “fides quaerens intellectum” – spiritual experi­
ence trying to make sense of itself. I will be following the age-old Christian 
directive that the “lex credendi” (how we believe) should flow from the 
“lex orandi” (how we pray). Doctrine should be grounded in and tested by 
spirituality. 
I will begin with some of the difficulties or stumbling blocks that I and – 
from my experience as a teacher and a preacher – many Christians have 
with what they have been told to believe about Jesus the Christ. If Christians 
no longer believe that “outside the church there is no salvation,” many now 
struggle with the related claim “outside of Jesus there is no salvation.” 
Many Christians sense a discomforting ambiguity when they ask them­
selves: “Just how does Jesus save me? How is he my savior?” There is 
increasing dissatisfaction with the atonement theory – that Jesus’s death 
somehow paid the price that satisfied God’s wrath or demand for justice 
after the “original sin.” 
But what is to take the place of atonement? I want to suggest that our 
conversation with Buddhism can provide some very welcome help. 
I will be using the notion of “functional analogy” as it is developed by my 
co-author, Roger Haight, in our recent book Jesus and Buddha: Friends in 
Conversation (Haight and Knitter 2015). Functional analogies between two 
differing traditions would be those teachings or symbols that, despite their 
profound differences, serve similar purposes or respond to similar concerns 
and thus can offer possibilities of comparison that illumine and enrich each 
other. 
The Tibetan Buddhist practice from which I would like to suggest some 
functional analogies with the saving role of Jesus is that of Guru Yoga, 
particularly as taught by my teacher, Lama John Makransky, as “benefactor 
practice.”1 Tibetan teachers recognize the need for embodiments or visual 
representations of the ultimate reality that is beyond conceptual comprehen­
sion. These are our “spiritual benefactors,” who have embodied and so can 
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benefactor will be Buddha, or Tara, or one of the vast team of bodhisattvas. 
Makransky encourages Christians to welcome Jesus, as well as Mary, as 
their spiritual benefactors. 
Crucial for this practice is to visualize and truly feel the presence of the 
spiritual benefactor. Visualizations of the benefactor are intense, particular, 
contextual, and set in the vivid colors of what St. Ignatius in the Jesuit Spir­
itual Exercises might call the “compositio loci.” The practitioner is encour­
aged to feel the energy of the benefactor’s love that embraces and holds her 
fully and penetrates, as Makransky puts it, into every cell of one’s body. 
After having received the love of the benefactor into one’s total being, the 
practitioner, in the second step of this practice, extends the love to all sen­
tient beings. 
The final phase is to let the images of the benefactor dissolve and allow 
oneself to merge nonconceptually into the Essence Love that was manifest 
and communicated through the benefactor. This is the “nonconceptual” 
goal of the practice. We grow in awareness that there is a nondual oneness 
between the spiritual benefactor and ourselves and also between the teacher 
and student, between benefactor and recipient, between savior and saved, 
within the vast cognizant, compassionate space that contains and animates 
us all. 
When Christians visualize Jesus as their spiritual benefactor, they can dis­
cover deeper ways of understanding and experiencing Jesus. Seventy times 
St. Paul uses the phrase “en Christo einei” – to be in Christ Jesus. The Bud­
dhist benefactor practice functions analogously for the Christian as a way 
of waking up to what it means or how it feels “to be in Christ Jesus,” or to 
“put on the mind of Christ” (Phil 2:5), or to be the body of Christ (I Cor 
12:27). Having gone through the visualization of Christ, having received of 
the love of Christ, having extended that love to all the others that make up 
his body, and finally having let the image go in order to fuse into the mystery 
of the risen Christ-Spirit, the Christian can pronounce, with clarity, “It is 
now no longer I who lives; it is Christ living in/as me” (Gal 2:20). 
This is salvation – not as an atoning process that takes place outside of 
oneself but as a transformative unitive experience. Jesus saves in essentially 
the same way that the transcendent Buddha saves: not by constituting the 
nature of mind or God’s saving love, but by revealing and so making it effec­
tively present. With Christ, one is a recipient and a conduit of the Essence 
Love that Jesus called Abba. To be saved, therefore, is the nondual experi­
ence of being in Christ Jesus. In this experience, Jesus certainly plays a very 
unique role. But it is a uniqueness that is, by its very nature, larger than 
Jesus and so shareable with other unique embodiments of Essence Love or 
Spirit. 
In another functional analogy, both Buddha and Jesus can be considered
“liberators” – as bearers of a message that can enable humans to achieve
the well-being of what Buddha called enlightenment and of what Jesus
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preaching: the sufferings that all humans (though some more than oth­
ers) have to face: the inadequacies, the perplexities, the insufficiencies, the
diminishments, the pains and disappointments that darken human exist­
ence. Both teachers began their missions out of a concern for the sufferings
of their fellow human beings. 
As indicated in the Second of the Four Noble Truths, for Buddhists, the 
fundamental cause of suffering is found in the tanha, or self-centered greed, 
that all humans have to deal with. This selfishness is caused by the ignorance 
that human beings are born into. Hence, the importance of enlightening, 
or transforming our sense of who and what we are. What we really are, 
according to the teachings of the Dharma, is anatta – not-selves – beings 
who exist as interbeings with others. Our own well-being consists in foster­
ing the well-being of others. Enlightenment is to wake up to that truth, that 
reality. 
At this point, liberationist Christians will remind Buddhists that the
results of ignorance go beyond the individual. The actions that follow
upon my lack of awareness of my nature as anatta/not-self are not only
my actions; they become, slowly but inevitably, society’s actions. My own
ego-centered attitudes and acts become embodied in social forms; they
incarnate themselves, as it were, in the way society works. If Buddhists
understand karma to be the unavoidable results that follow every action or
choice we make, Christians will point out that individual karma becomes
social karma. 
Sinful or greedy structures remain even after individuals have been 
enlightened. Liberationist Christians insist on the reality of social sin, which 
can remain even after individual sin has been removed. To transform the 
structures of one’s awareness and thinking does not necessarily change the 
structures of society. One can be enlightened and full of compassion for all 
sentient beings without realizing that one remains a part of an economic 
system that continues to cause suffering to others. 
So Christians remind Buddhists that transforming oneself is different 
from – and should not become a substitute for – transforming society. This 
implies that compassion, though necessary, is insufficient. Justice is also nec­
essary. If compassion calls us to feed the hungry, justice urges us to ask why 
they are hungry. Mindfulness is necessary for living a life of inner peace, but 
we also need social mindfulness of how our reified, ego-centric thoughts and 
fears become reified social or political systems. 
If Buddhists are to effectively extend their practice of personal mindfulness 
to include social mindfulness, they will also have to take seriously the Chris­
tian liberationists’ call for a “preferential option for the oppressed.” This 
preference calls upon all spiritual seekers to be sure that their quest includes, 
as an integral element, the effort to become aware of the experience of those 
who have been pushed aside, those who don’t have a meaningful voice in the 
decisions of state or school or neighborhood. Our “mindfulness” must also 
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This is what the liberation theologians mean by the “hermeneutical privi­
lege of the poor.” From their position of suffering and exploitation, the 
oppressed can see the world in ways that the powerful or the comfortable 
cannot. The mindfulness we practice on our cushions or in our pews must 
be balanced and expanded by the mindfulness gained on the streets. 
If Christians remind Buddhists that personal transformation is incomplete
without social transformation, Buddhists in turn will remind Christians that 
social transformation is impossible without personal transformation. For 
Buddhists, I believe, inner transformation of consciousness has a certain 
priority over social transformation. 
One can carry out the task of being a bodhisattva only if one has expe­
rienced the wisdom that produces compassion. Prajna, or wisdom, is what 
one knows when one begins to wake up to the interconnectedness or the 
interbeing of all reality. Realizing that one’s very being or self is not one’s 
own but the being of all other selves, one will necessarily feel compassion 
for all sentient beings. 
Buddhists are calling Christians to recognize (or reaffirm) the subtle, but 
real, primacy of contemplation over action and of compassion over justice. 
The primacy of contemplation over action 
There is a Buddhist conviction that we must undergo a profound personal 
transformation before we can “wisely” interact with the world around us. 
We are born into a fundamental ignorance that we must deal with before 
we can begin to truly know who and what we and the world really are.
If we don’t overcome this ignorance before fixing the world’s problems, 
we’re probably only going to cause more problems. Although Buddhists 
have much to learn from Christians about what kind of action must arise 
out of contemplation (that is, socially transformative action), Christians 
need to learn from Buddhists why action without contemplation is unsus­
tainable and dangerous. 
Buddhist contemplation aims at a nondual experience of our interbeing 
or reciprocal interdependence with what is ultimate (the nature of mind/ 
spirit). This is what establishes in us an inner peace; it is also what sustains 
us in working for the Reign of God. No matter what happens, no matter 
how much failure or opposition, if we are peace, we will continue to try to 
make peace (Hanh 1992). Such inner peace and groundedness is a protector 
or an antidote to the danger of burnout that threatens all social and peace 
activists. Working for peace and justice is hard, often frustrating, work. 
The primacy of compassion over justice 
But contemplation manifests its priority not only by sustaining action but 
also by guiding it. Thich Nhat Hanh challenges the Christian insistence on 
the “preferential option for the oppressed.” God, he declares, doesn’t have 
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preferences. God – or Essence Love – embraces all beings – poor and rich, 
oppressed and oppressor – equally (Hanh 1995). 
Christians remind Buddhists that compassion without justice – that is, 
without reform of structural injustice – is not enough to relieve suffering; 
Buddhists remind Christians that, just as there can be no peace without jus­
tice, there can also be no justice without compassion. 
This Buddhist challenge reminds us of what Jesus himself taught. People 
will know who Jesus’s disciples are not by their work for justice, but by 
their love for each other. Jesus’s “first commandment” is love, not justice (Jn 
13: 35). And Jesus called on us to love our enemies as much as we love our 
friends, which means loving the oppressor as much as we love the oppressed. 
This doesn’t mean we will not confront our enemies and oppressors. But our 
primary motivation for doing so will not be the demand of justice, but the 
demand of love. We will confront oppressors with what Makransky calls “a 
fierce compassion” (Makransky 2014). 
Thich Nhat Hanh, in his little book on Living Buddha, Living Christ, 
informs Christians that, for a Buddhist, God doesn’t have favorites. He is 
thus reminding Christians that just as there is a relationship of nonduality 
between emptiness and form, or between Abba-Mystery and us, so there 
is a nonduality between oppressed and oppressor. Both are expressions of 
interbeing and Abba-Mystery. The actions of oppressor or oppressed are 
clearly different. But their identities are the same. And that means that my 
own identity is linked to both oppressed and oppressors. 
Therefore, we do not respond to the oppressed out of compassion and 
to the oppressor out of justice. No, we respond to both out of compassion! 
Compassion for both the oppressed and the oppressor. So, yes, we want to 
liberate the oppressed. But just as much, we want to liberate the oppressors. 
Compassion for the oppressor will be expressed differently than compassion 
for the oppressed. But just as much, we want to free the oppressors from the 
illusions that drive them to greed and to the exploitation of others. Such a 
nonpreferential option for compassion that extends equally and clearly to 
both oppressed and oppressors will be the foundation on which justice can 
be built, on which structures can be changed. 
Some kind of a spiritual practice that will foster and sustain our inner 
transformation and resources is imperative. To have begun the process of 
awakening to oneness with Christ and to what Jesus experienced as the 
unconditional love of the Abba-Mystery can assure us that our efforts are 
not just our own efforts. Once we begin to wake up to the wisdom that 
reveals to us that all our efforts are grounded in and expressions of the 
Abba-Mystery that is active in and as us, once we begin to realize that in 
working for peace and justice we are doing what our Christ-nature neces­
sarily calls us to do – then we will also realize that, as the Bhagavad Gita
tells us, the value of our actions are not determined by their fruits. The value 
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This deeper experience of the nonduality between the Abba-Mystery and 
the world, or between the future and the present Reign of God, assures 
Christians that even though their efforts to bring the world closer to the 
Reign of God fail, Abba and the Reign are still present and available. In 
both success and failure, the Reign of God is both already/not yet. 
The Buddhist experience of “enlightenment,” of waking up to what 
Mahayana Buddhists term our “Buddha-nature,” is, I believe, a prompt for 
Christians to enter more profoundly into the unitive experience signaled in 
John’s description of Jesus as “one with the Father” and “one with us” (Jn 14),
or in Paul’s description (I would dare say “definition”) of a Christian as 
someone who exists “in Christ.” I am suggesting that the nondual unity 
that Mahayana Buddhists affirm between emptiness and form, or between 
Nirvana and Samsara, or (in Thich Nhat Hanh’s terminology) between 
interbeing and all finite beings, is analogous to, if not the same as, the unity 
between Jesus and Abba or between Christ and us. The divine and the finite, 
the creator and the created are, like emptiness and form, distinct but insepa­
rable. They co-inhere. They “inter-are.” 
When we begin to “awaken” to our oneness with Christ in the Father, 
when we begin to feel that “it is no longer I who live but Christ who lives 
in me” (Gal 3: 21), we are awakening to what Buddhists call prajna, or 
wisdom – the awareness of the fundamental, all pervasive interconnected­
ness of all reality. We are all truly “one in the Spirit.” And this realization 
that we are interlinked in the Divine Mystery will naturally bring forth in us 
what Buddhists call karuna, compassion, for all our fellow human beings – 
indeed, for all sentient beings. To love our neighbor is not a commandment; 
it is a natural necessity. 
Here Buddhists are offering us Christians an opportunity to clarify, per­
haps reform, our soteriology – our doctrine on how Jesus brings about “sal­
vation.” The cross can save a world wracked by the sufferings caused by 
greed and hatred and violence by embodying and making clear the power of 
nonviolent love. Jesus died on the cross not because the Father willed it, but 
because he refused, as the Dhammapada counsels, to answer hatred with 
hatred. Rather than answering the violence of the colonizing Romans and 
their local collaborators with his own violence, rather than abandoning his 
mission of proclaiming the Reign of God, he responded with love and trust, 
and, as the Latin American martyrs express it, he was “disappeared.” 
And the power of this embodiment of nonviolent love was such that, 
after he died, his followers, gathered around the table to break bread and 
remember him, realized that he was still with them. His example of love 
confronting hatred, of nonviolence responding to violence, transformed 
their lives with the power to go and do likewise. To be so transformed is to 
be redeemed and saved. His followers share in his “Christ-nature,” just as 
the followers of Buddha continue to realize their “Buddha-nature.” And by 
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Note 
1 This benefactor practice is laid out clearly and practically in Makransky’s Awak­
ening through Love (2007). 
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7 “Why not ten 60-foot 
wells?”1 
Peter Savastano 
Religious book knowledge and the heart’s  
religious experiences 
William C. Chittick, the scholar of Islamic philosophy and Sufism, dis­
tinguishes between two kinds of spiritual knowledge: “transmitted” and
“intellectual.” We acquire transmitted knowledge by studying theories
about religion constructed by acknowledged experts such as theologi­
ans, religious scholars and the custodians of orthodoxy (Chittick 2007).2 
Transmitted knowledge, therefore, is that which we take for granted
based on the claims of authority and expertise. Such received knowl­
edge, religion based on theories, doctrines, and dogmas, has a venerable
history, because the transmission of ancient traditions from master to
student and from past communities to new generations is paramount in
educating human beings. We learn the rules so as to conform our experi­
ences to align with our received traditions that socialize us into the reli­
gious communities into which we are born. But this book knowledge and
accumulation of theories is not enough. Inevitably, theories are never
enough: theory eventually hits the wall of personal experiences. For
those whose religious knowledge limits a genuine spiritual journey or
quest, a breaking out of traditional and received forms, Chittick claims
the acquisition of “intellectual knowledge” becomes crucial, although
his term is counter to what Westerners would understand by this term as
knowledge gained by reasoning and processes of abstraction. However,
in the Islamic mystical tradition and in its particular emphases employed
by the Sufis (Muslim mystics), intelligence is not acquired solely by the
ratiocinative functions of the mind alone. “Intellectual knowledge” is
learning by and through the heart (qalb), a knowledge formed in the
crucible of one’s experiences “on the ground” as opposed to the nontur­
bulent flights of personally untested theories. Grounding spiritual expe­
riences are attained (hopefully) by practices through which we write our
own books. In Islamic mysticism, the intellect is the “heart,” the core of
a person’s religious and spiritual self where experiences override theories
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I am an academic, an anthropologist of religion and consciousness by 
training, forced by my guild to teach my students traditional concepts and 
theories rather than to transmit what I have learned about being human 
and religious through my life’s actual experiences. I know how to write and 
speak about the Great Mystery (God) conventionally in ways all scholars 
in my field would approve. It has taken me years to realize that I teach my 
students best as I learned best. I help them to trust their own experiences so 
that they can confidently test for themselves the theories we discuss in class. 
They must not regurgitate for me what has been written and said. Instead, 
they learn best when they are free to explore the viability of theories within 
the context of their own lives and experiences. As the Quaker saying goes: 
“Jesus said this, Paul said that, George Fox says this, but what do you say?” 
In the light of these received traditions, who are you? Let your “heart” be 
critical. What’s your perspective on these theories from where you actually 
stand? My students must learn, as I have struggled to learn, that in the face 
of religious traditions I must “hold my ground” and realize that, in the end, 
as Thomas Merton wrote, “only experience counts.” 
A foremost scholar of world religious traditions, Huston Smith, during 
an interview in the 1990s with NPR’s Terry Gross, referred to the personal 
path he found and made through his encounter with various religious tradi­
tions. He learned he knew these traditions best when he practiced what they 
preached: 
Mine has been a rather peculiar history, and I don’t want to leave the 
impression that one is in any way spiritually ahead because of this kind 
of incorporation. I liked what a teacher in India once said to me. If you 
are drilling for water, it’s better to drill one 60-foot well than ten 6-foot 
wells. And generally speaking, I think a kind of smorgasbord cafeteria, 
choosing from here and there is not productive. So I would not at all put 
what’s happened, I feel, to be feasible for me in any way ahead of where 
I might be if I had devoted my entire spiritual exercises to Christianity. 
The authenticity of Smith’s scholarship, however, is that he did dig ten 
6-foot wells, metaphorically speaking, rather than one 60-foot well. The 
map he charted through his own spiritual journey was uniquely informa­
tive. We would not hold his career in such esteem had he not explored and 
been transformed by the many practices he utilized from religious traditions 
other than his received Christianity. 
Over the course of my own 49-year spiritual journey, I, too, have heard 
exhortations similar to the one given to Smith by the Indian teacher. In my 
case the warnings to me that I should stick with one religious tradition only 
and not “dig ten 6-foot wells instead of one 60-foot well” has been sug­
gested to me by a number of spiritual teachers from whom I have sought 
enlightenment. Over the course of my life, I have sat at the feet of teachers of 
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with the Quakers, with a Qalandar Sufi Shaykh from Kashmir, with a Zen 
Buddhist teacher, with a Tibetan Buddhist Lama, and with a Tibetan Bon 
Lama. At first, I tried to follow their instructions but, ultimately, another 
deeper urge took over. Their exhortations often contradicted my life’s expe­
riences. At the same time, I have always been aware that relying on per­
sonal experience risks delusion, so for over 20 years I have maintained a 
relationship with a spiritual director. My spiritual guide has helped me to 
discern and adhere to a personal spiritual path that can ground and critique 
all my “inner promptings.” But like Huston Smith, my spiritual journey 
has plumbed heights and depths. My heart knowledge has been expanded 
through my immersion in religious traditions other than the Christian tradi­
tion into which I was baptized and first nurtured. 
I self-identify as an Episcopalian Christian who is also an ordained Epis­
copal Clergyperson. But I acknowledge that my being grounded in my Epis­
copalian tradition has been given more solid ground by my practices in 
various religious traditions that include the Tibetan, Zen and Bon-Buddhist, 
the universal Sufi tradition, strands of Native American sacred healing tradi­
tions, and diverse forms of Western Esotericism.3 
In choosing to follow my inner guide, I have found it beneficial to dig 
many 6-foot wells rather than only one 60-foot shaft. I have allowed “the 
Spirit” through my experiences with other religious traditions to disclose its 
presence to and within me. I have engaged “the Spirit” and have become 
more in touch with the Divine Presence within by going outside the circle of 
Christian concepts, symbols, and narratives that I still must acknowledge as 
my native tongue, religiously speaking. 
The importance of practice 
In my experience, spiritual exercises have been the agents of my spiritual 
transformation and growth. More than my studies of doctrine and dogmas, 
it is practice that facilitates actual spiritual experience. Yet I am also an aca­
demic, an anthropologist, and a scholar of religious studies. As an anthro­
pologist I conduct research by doing fieldwork, learning a society’s culture 
by participating in it as comprehensively as possible rather than observing 
it from afar. I consider spiritual exercises drawn from various religious tra­
ditions as a form of doing inner fieldwork. I have learned less about “the 
Spirit” alive in religious traditions by hearing and so much more by tasting 
and feeling. 
I cannot name every practice from every spiritual tradition I have engaged 
in and found fruitful, but it might be illustrative to list at least a few. 
Christian exercises 
I have practiced Centering Prayer as developed by Fr. Thomas Keating, Cyn­
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icons and practice “prayer of the heart” as inspired by the collection of texts 
from the early fourth century CE to the eighteenth century known as the 
Philokalia. The English translation of this Greek and Slavic compendium 
exposes the hesychastic practice of continually reciting “the Jesus prayer,” 
its most complete form being “Jesus, Son of God, have mercy on me a sin­
ner.” The recitation of this prayer involves bodily postures, often in the form 
of prostrations that accompany the recitation of the prayer. One of the aims 
of this practice is to redirect one’s consciousness away from its traditional 
Western orientation in the head and place one’s awareness into the heart. 
The prayer is usually synchronized with the inhalation and exhalation of 
the breath while using a prayer rope to count the number of repetitions
of the prayer (and also as a way of engaging the body). The greatest propo­
nent of the hesychastic method of prayer is Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) 
in his classic The Triads (Palamas 1983). 
From the Quaker tradition, I have incorporated the practice of sitting in 
silent, expectant waiting on The Inner Light of Christ, or The Light Within, 
as more universalist Quakers refer to the divine presence immanent in 
human beings. 
Sufism 
From the Sufi tradition, I have participated in the Dances of Universal Peace 
and by the “turning” of the Mevlevi lineage of Sufis, popularly known as 
“whirling dervishes.” The Mevlevi regard Rumi as their primary sheikh
(master) and founder. I have practiced the Zikr (Remembrance) of the 
Divine Names, of which there are traditionally 99, identified in the Qur’an. 
I have prayed the formula La ill Allah illallahu recited in synchronization 
with the breath, both in a group and individually.5 
Buddhism 
From the Vajrayana Buddhist tradition, I have practiced the Tersar Ngondro, 
translated as “Preliminary Practices.” These meditations involve the body 
(postures), speech (recitation of mantras), and mind (visualizations), all of 
which are done simultaneously and draw on the various yogas (stages of 
development toward enlightenment) of the rich tantric repertoire of sadha­
nas (meditation practices).6 
My involvement with Bon-Buddhism7 also required the practice of a 
Ngondro. However, since my engagement with Bon-Buddhism was approx­
imately five years, I did not do as much practice in that tradition as I did 
in Vajrayana Buddhism. In both lineages of Bon-Buddhism and Vajrayana 
Buddhism, I received many empowerments (Wongs), which are direct trans­
missions of the Buddha-mind of Enlightenment from the teacher to the stu­
dent, and initiations (Lungs), which authorized me to engage in various 
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My encounters with Zen Buddhism included sitting practice (shikan taza, 
which means “just sitting” in English) under the guidance of a Zen teacher. 
I received instructions during sessiens (intensive sitting and walking medita­
tion retreats) and koan study, that is, meditation upon a series of paradoxi­
cal sayings and their commentaries, of which the most famous is “What is 
the sound of one hand clapping?” (Yuasa 1981). 
Shamanism 
I have engaged with “shamanism,” a troubled term from the perspective 
of the many Indigenous peoples whose sacred ritual and healing traditions 
have been so labeled by Western scholars. I have taken workshops and vari­
ous trainings in what I would term “neo-shamanic” techniques and rituals. 
From neo-shamanism I have similarly employed journeying techniques as 
I had been taught them to engage Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and many of 
the saints to whom I am devoted. In as much as Tibetan Buddhism has 
shamanistic components, I have used Vajrayana Buddhist “visualization” 
techniques to visualize Christian holy personages, like Jesus, the angels, or 
particular Christian saints to whom I am devoted. 
There are also times when my experience of the divine surpasses all con­
cepts and metaphors. This is an experience of the apophatic nature of The 
Great Mystery which I describe as “the scaffolding falling away.” 
To realize the divine in nonanthropomorphic terms and more as dynamic, 
verb-like qualities or attributes, such as “The Real” (al-Haqq) or as Mercy 
or Compassion (ar-Rahman or ar-Rahim), liberates me from thinking of God
as a white male with long hair and a beard. This practice of visualizing the 
divine or ultimate reality as energies or qualities facilitates an experience of 
The Great Mystery that is vibrant and active rather than as static or noun-
like. To switch modes of perception in this way facilitates an encounter with 
ultimate reality (holy wisdom) as a way of being that is greater than one 
limited by human characteristics. I am also able to plummet the depths of 
my being where I can encounter such divine attributes or qualities as bub­
bling up from deep within the recesses of my consciousness. These qualities 
are reflections to me of what Thomas Merton referred to as Le Point Vierge, 
that place in our consciousness which intimately unites us to the Divine 
Presence, making it difficult to make distinctions between the divine and 
the human.8 
In describing the divine as the real, as ultimate reality, and as my personal 
favorite, The Great Mystery,9 I am describing the personal, relational God 
of the Abrahamic traditions, but not anthropomorphically. It might seem 
that I am describing some impersonal force or entity much more in align­
ment with the nontheistic traditions such as Taoism or Buddhism, but that is 
not at all what I am doing. But by engaging in these non-Christian practices, 
I have expanded my understanding and experience of the Abrahamic God. 















78 Peter Savastano 
a personal encounter with the Great Mystery informed by contemporary 
physics.10 
Some years ago, I had a conversation with my spiritual director about 
whether or not God, ultimate reality, or The Great Mystery is personal or 
impersonal. We agreed that ultimate reality or God manifests in both per­
sonal and impersonal modes (or sometimes simultaneously as both), analo­
gous to particle and wave theory in contemporary physics. We agreed that 
we humans do not control the mode in which the “divine” is disclosed to us; 
nor can we control how and when such disclosure happens. Manifesting in 
personal mode is analogous to particle mode in physics, while manifesting 
in impersonal mode is akin to wave mode. It is difficult to measure or prove 
a subjective experience of the Great Mystery, but at various times in my life 
I have experienced the divine both as a deeply personal and relational pres­
ence (I/Thou) and/or as an impersonal ground or force (I/It) that is animat­
ing my own consciousness and that of all of creation simultaneously. 
The downward spiral 
No doubt I leave the impression that I have engaged in a rather meander­
ing assortment of traditions in one lifetime (the very cafeteria or smorgas­
bord experiences Huston Smith describes and cautions against). However, 
my practice of the contemplative traditions of many religions has not been 
superficial or casual. I have studied and practiced in these various traditions 
over extended periods, sometimes up to 15 or 20 years consecutively. Tak­
ing this approach has prepared me for doing Theology Without Walls. 
The pattern that best illustrates my inclusive religious experiences and 
spiritual exercises is that of a downward spiral initiated in my life as a youth 
of 15. Each time I have engaged with one of these traditions, I have practiced 
their exercises for several years at a time before moving on to another tra­
dition. However, re-engagement does not occur with a previously engaged 
tradition until I have received inner instructions to do so. Each time I have 
engaged in another spiritual practice, I have gone deeper into it, thus mak­
ing the pattern downward spiral–like. As I have spiraled down through vari­
ous practices from other traditions, I have also maintained my engagement 
with my original Christian tradition simultaneously and interspiritually. 
My engagements with various spiritual exercises have always included the 
study of sacred texts by drawing on many different academic disciplines; an 
encounter with living teachers of these traditions with whom I have studied; 
and an adopting of the ritual, devotional, and meditative practices that each 
tradition offers to the spiritual seeker. 
My interspiritual approach has allowed me to learn not only the trans­
mitted knowledge of these religious traditions but also their devotional and 
ethical practices that are their beating heart. Interspirituality has provided 
the field site by which I test a religious tradition’s transmitted knowledge 
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as to taste the intellectual knowledge that is rooted in my heart and not only 
in my books. I have touched the kernel beyond the shell of each tradition. 
Aided by my spiritual director, I have discerned what spiritual practices have 
worked for me by years of testing and experimentation. 
The scaffolding falls away 
I now explore one of the most important features of this downward spiral 
pattern of living interspiritually. It can be identified as the experience of hav­
ing “the scaffolding fall away,” where all structure momentarily disappears 
as one realizes one knows nothing of the divine. It is an utterly apophatic 
moment when one enters a “cloud of unknowing.” This consciousness of 
a void surpasses and defies all symbols, concepts, and sacred narratives, all 
of the predetermined givens of any particular religious tradition.11 Living 
under this “cloud of unknowing” is basically an inexpressible experience as 
one “free-falls” when all the structures fall away. 
In Participation in the Mystery, Transpersonal Essays in Psychology, 
Education and Religion, Jorge N. Ferrer writes that “Participatory enac­
tion entails a model of spiritual engagement that does not simply reproduce 
certain tropes according to a given historical a priori, but rather embarks 
upon the adventure of openness to the novelty and creativity of nature or 
the mystery” (Ferrer 2017, 15). By participatory enaction, I understand Fer­
rer to mean that the mystery is capable of unfolding in unpredictable ways. 
There are no predetermined maps for navigating the experience. One enters 
a seemingly vast wilderness of thick trees. As Sarah Coakley so astutely 
points out, 
A love affair with a blank, such as contemplation is, is a strange subver­
sion of all certainties, a stripping, often painful, of what one previously 
took for granted [. . .] The act of contemplation involves a willed sus­
pension of one’s rational agendas, a silent waiting. 
(Coakley 2013, 342, emphasis added) 
One becomes a co-creator (through participatory enaction) in the novelty 
of the mystery’s unfolding. To be a co-creator, as I read Ferrer, means that 
I am not separate from The Great Mystery or the cosmos, but rather, I have 
participatory agency in the process of novel, revelatory unfoldings. As such, 
I bring to the process of this novel cosmic unfoldment my bodily, instinc­
tive, sexual, emotional, intellectual, and intuitive intelligence, all of which 
become the media for the manifestation (and embodiment) of The Great 
Mystery in ways unique and particular to me. 
Ferrer goes on to write: 
Hence, the participatory perspective does not contend that there are 
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rather that the radical openness, interrelatedness, and creativity of the 
mystery or the cosmos allows for the participatory co-creation of an 
indefinite number of ultimate self-disclosures of reality and correspond­
ing religious worlds. 
(Coakley 2013, 16–17) 
Reading Ferrer helps me to name this experience of “the scaffolding fall­
ing away.” I am momentarily lost in The Great Mystery. I am an active 
participant in the radiance of the Mystery’s disclosure. I realize that I am a 
part of the unfolding, multiple possibilities of reality. I experience a world of 
possibilities in which I am, simultaneously, a co-creator and a total stranger. 
My task or “fate” is to explore the novelty of this experience in the hope 
that, as I assimilate it, I might be able to articulate it by making this “void” 
visible to myself and possibly for others. 
When the epiphany of The Great Mystery within my consciousness 
reveals itself, I am stripped of all points of reference. In my experience, these 
periods of “the scaffolding falling away” coincides with the moment when 
my immersion in a particular religious tradition exhausts itself, when all ele­
ments of a tradition lose agency to help one’s searching. As much as I might 
cling to it, warning myself that I must remain faithful to the tradition engag­
ing me, the reality is that I have no agency that mediates my relationship 
with ultimate reality or the divine. 
In trying to make sense of this experience on a theoretical level, John 
Caputo’s exposition of Jacque Derrida’s work has been most helpful: “The 
point of view of Derrida’s work as an author is religious – but without reli­
gion and without religion’s God – and no one understands a thing about 
this alliance,” Caputo writes (Caputo 1997, xviii). I have been in the place 
Caputo describes here, especially in the last 15 to 20 years. I make no claims 
of being finished with this process. I am not in control when it happens. 
This space/place/state with no scaffolding is both elating and troubling. 
I am elated because it is a life-enhancing adventure to lose the path of each 
religious tradition regarding prayer and meditation, with nothing to rely on 
or to guide me in the process. It is troubling because this loss of something 
to rely on leaves me having to face The Great Mystery alone and uncertain 
of the novelty which may emerge. In dealing with this uncertainty, not only 
have Caputo and Derrida provided guideposts along the way, but so have 
some Sufi traditions which acknowledge that there is a station in the spir­
itual quest when one transcends (or descends from) any religious structure 
as every crutch falls away. 
Lessons from Thomas Merton and Sufism 
The twentieth-century Catholic monk, mystic, poet, and social justice activ­
ist Thomas Merton, knew this too. Being very much aware of this part 
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provide support or succor, one must come face to face with The Great Mys­
tery on its terms. Here, Merton presciently anticipated thinkers such as Der­
rida, Caputo, and Ferrer. He did not have the opportunity to do very much 
subsequent writing about his own experience of what I name as having the 
scaffolding fall away, due to his sudden death on December 10, 1968. He 
was, however, able to recognize his own experience when he read a book 
that matched his own experience, Final Integration of the Adult Personality
by A. Reza Arasteh (1965a). 
Arasteh was an Iranian American psychologist who explored, through a 
Sufi lens, the process by which certain human beings undergo final spiritual 
integration. As the penultimate step in this final stage of adult integration, 
Arasteh emphasizes a phase by which a person is stripped of all cultural 
references and constructs, but most specifically those cultural references and 
constructs that are provided by her or his religion. He presents his case 
studies of ordinary twentieth-century persons experiencing this process. 
He also names well-known historical figures whom he identifies as having 
experienced final integration, among whom are the twelfth-century Persian 
Sufi Rumi and the eighteenth-century German poet, naturalist, and mystic 
Goethe. 
In Final Integration of the Adult Personality and his subsequent books 
(Arasteh 1965b, 1980), Arasteh proposes a series of necessary steps or “sta­
tions” in final integration by which one is stripped of one’s religious con­
ditioning and traditions. This results in what he calls an “anxious search.” 
The result of this anxious searching is the ultimate experience of returning 
to the religious tradition of one’s cultural heritage,12 free of its doctrinal 
and dogmatic constraints. Now integrated, according to Arasteh, one’s own 
inner guide engages with the divine. But in light of Ferrer’s ideas briefly 
outlined earlier, there may, in fact, be no need to return to one’s religious 
tradition, given the novel and pluralistic ways that “The Great Mystery” 
may choose to disclose itself. “The future of religion,” writes Ferrer, “will 
be shaped by spiritually individuated persons engaged in processes of cos­
mological hybridization in the context of a common spiritual family that 
honors a global order of respect and civility” (Ferrer 2017, 37, original 
emphasis). Thomas Merton, quoting Arasteh, sums up this state of final 
integration: 
The man (sic) who has final integration is no longer limited by the cul­
ture in which he has grown up. “He has embraced all of life. . . . He 
has experienced qualities of every type of life”: ordinary human exist­
ence, intellectual life, artistic creation, human love, religious life. He 
passes beyond all these limiting forms while retaining all that is best 
and most universal in them, “finally giving birth to a fully comprehen­
sive self.” He accepts not only his own society, his own community, his 
own friends, his own culture but all mankind (sic). He does not remain 
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aggressively or defensively to others. He is fully “Catholic” in the best 
sense of the word. He has a unified vision and experience of the one 
truth shining out in all its various manifestations, some clearer than oth­
ers. He does not set these partial views up in opposition to each other 
but unifies them in a dialectic or an insight of complementarity. With 
this view of life he is able to bring perspective, liberty and spontaneity 
into the lives of others. The finally integrated man (sic) is a peacemaker. 
That is why there is such a desperate need for our leaders to become 
such men of insight. 
(Merton 1998, 207)13 
Arasteh believed that such a final integration of the adult personality was 
achieved by only an exemplary few because of the suffering and anxiety 
required to attain this state. “Many are called, few chosen.” I do not claim 
that my experiences of “the scaffolding falling away” is a prelude to my 
attaining final integration. About such possibilities, it is best to remain 
speechless. If the end all spiritual exercises is the revelation of one’s igno­
rance, perhaps this is the only outcome to which I can authentically aspire. 
I realize I am no longer the teacher, only a novice always needing to begin 
again and again. 
Notes 
1 I am deeply grateful to my friend and colleague, Jonathan Montaldo, Thomas 
Merton scholar and of all things mystical extraordinaire, for his helpful sugges­
tions in improving this chapter. 
2 See especially Chapter 2. 
3 About Native American sacred traditions, I have just finished editing a collection 
of essays on the Roman Catholic monk, mystic, social activist, and poet Thomas 
Merton’s engagement with such traditions entitled Merton & Indigenous Wis­
dom (2019). 
4 See especially, Keating (2012), Bourgeault (2016), and Frenette (2012). 
5 See especially, Helminski (2000). La illaha illallahu is usually translated as 
“There is no God but God” with the addition of the Hu. Sufis often interpret 
La illaha illallahu as “There is nothing but God,” and the Hu on the end of the 
formula suggests the vibratory or energetic nature of God’s presence much in the 
same way that Om does in Hinduism. 
6 Unfortunately, time and space constraints do not permit me to go into any 
greater detail about the nature of Tibetan Buddhist practices, nor does the prom­
ises one makes when being initiated into these practices to not reveal their details 
any more than I have. For those who are curious or would like to explore these 
practices for themselves, the internet offers a rich resource of possible connec­
tions to teachers and Dharma Centers. 
7 The Bon tradition of Buddhism in Tibet claims to be an older, more ancient form 
of Buddhism than that brought from Nepal to Tibet by Padmasambhava in the 
eighth century CE. In fact, the lore is that the founder of Bon was a Buddha 
who lived at least 2,000 to 8,000 years before the historical Buddha that most 
of us are familiar with. It is also believed that Bon embodies much more the pre-
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8 For more on Le Point Vierge, see Shannon (2002, 363–364). 
9 As previously noted, to refer to the sacred as The Great Mystery is the way that 
seems to best approximate my own first-hand personal experience. I should also 
note that I am indebted to the First Nation Indigenous peoples of the Americas 
sacred ritual and healing traditions for this way of addressing the sacred. 
10 There is a vast literature on the intersection of religion, science, and physics – 
too much to elaborate on here. However, one deeply personal source by one 
of the leading thinkers of contemporary physics is Heisenberg (1971). Another 
much more current is Lightman (2018). For ways in which the Abrahamic tradi­
tions are enriched and expanded through engagement with the sacred ritual and 
healing traditions of the First Nation Indigenous peoples of the Americas, see 
Charleston (2015). Charleston is a citizen of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma 
and also a retired Bishop of the Episcopal Church. 
11 Although there is a wealth of writings on the apophatic dimension of mystical 
experience, among the best, though not easy reading, is Sells (1994). One of the 
interesting aspects of Sells’s book is that it addresses apophatic experience from 
within the context of many religious traditions rather than only the Christian 
tradition. Another is Keller (2015). 
12 And, by extension I would add, to any religious tradition in which one has 
immersed oneself. 
13 See especially Essay XIII. 
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8 Theology Without Walls 
An interspiritual approach 
Rory McEntee 
[C]ommunity cannot feed for long on itself; it can only flourish where always 
the boundaries are giving way to the coming of others from beyond them – 
unknown and undiscovered brothers [and sisters]. 
– Howard Thurman, The Search for Common
Ground (Thurman 1986)1 
Introduction: embodying TWW, the  
Snowmass Dialogues 
In 1984, Father Thomas Keating, a Roman Catholic monk in the Order of 
Cistercians of the Strict Observance (also known as “Trappists”), convened 
a group of advanced contemplatives from differing religious traditions, 
including Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Islamic, Native American, Russian 
Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic participants. The idea was to 
engage one another in intimate dialogue over five days in a private retreat 
setting. Its primary purpose was not “interreligious” dialogue, in the sense 
of learning about the doctrines and practices of religious traditions other 
than one’s own. Rather, as Keating describes it, he invited the participants to 
“meditate together in silence, and to share our personal spiritual journeys, 
especially those elements in our respective traditions that have proved most 
helpful to us along the way” (Miles-Yepez 2006, xvii). Participants were 
not meant to speak for their tradition – as representatives – but first and 
foremost as human beings engaged in spiritually transformative processes, 
processes informed and inflected by religious and cultural traditions. 
Keating, who has been my most formative spiritual mentor and who 
passed away just a few months ago (at the ripe old age of 95), was a pow­
erful figure in the renewal of the Christian contemplative tradition. He 
helped develop the now widespread silent meditation technique of Center­
ing Prayer and pioneered experiments in interreligious exchange as abbot 
of St. Joseph’s monastery in Spencer, Massachusetts. Over decades of par­
ticipating in interreligious dialogues, Keating began to realize that the most 
interesting “dialogue” always seemed to happen at the margins of events, in 
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Once participants found themselves on stage, however, a different dynamic 
ensued. They spoke to the audience, not to each other, and often felt they 
had to represent their religious tradition, limiting what they felt comfortable 
saying. What would happen, Keating wondered, if we simply shared our 
spiritual journeys as human beings, learning from one another, and discov­
ering together our experiences of ultimacy? 
Keating’s insight was an auspicious one. The group he convened in 1984 
continued to meet once a year for five-day retreats over the next 30+ years, 
ending in 2015. For the first 20 years the group kept no records and pub­
lished no reports. They decided on complete privacy so they could speak 
freely about their experiences of spiritual transformation – without worry­
ing that some “heresy” might get back to their religious communities where 
many were leaders. It was not a static group, as members came and went 
throughout the years, but a handful also remained for all 31 years. Even­
tually, a book was published recounting the first 20 years of their work, 
and later a documentary was produced (Miles-Yepez 2006; Olsson 2013). 
The group became known as “The Snowmass Interreligious Conference,” 
often referred to simply as “The Snowmass Conference,” since they held 
the majority of their yearly retreats at Keating’s monastery in Snowmass, 
Colorado. During the final ten years, as members began inviting “mentees” 
to guide and pass on their accumulated wisdom, the name changed to the 
“Snowmass InterSpiritual Dialogue Fellowship” (SISD). 
I personally participated in SISD as Keating’s mentee in 2010, and subse­
quently became its administrator and a participant for the final five years. 
I now carry forward the work they began through a new dialogue series, 
known as “The Future of Religion & Interspirituality (1986).”2 I introduce 
this because I intend to use it as a fulcrum for a broader exploration of the 
Theology Without Walls (TWW) project. The experience of intimate dia­
logue among diverse and committed spiritual practitioners yields insights, 
as we will see later, that can be difficult to discern through textual analysis 
or philosophical reflection. Such “interspiritual” dialogues are imbued with 
a humanizing ambience, where TWW is pursued as an embodied, existen­
tially potent affair – one with germane consequences for a new generation 
of spiritual seekers. 
An interspiritual approach to TWW 
Wayne Teasdale introduced the term “interspiritual” in his 1999 book The 
Mystic Heart (Teasdale 1999). He used the word to denote a new type of spir­
itual search emerging from the increasing phenomena of religious traditions 
sharing with one another from the depths of their experiences of ultimacy 
(Teasdale 1999, 10, 26). Teasdale spoke of a new interspiritual paradigm 
for the religious quest, one “that permits people from various traditions, 
or from no tradition, to explore the spiritual dimensions of any religion” 
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interspirituality: 1) experiences of ultimacy, especially experiences occurring 
within the context of long-term commitments to contemplative practice; 
and 2) the sharing of such experiences in collaborative ways, where the rev­
elatory experiences of others affect our own religious quest. 
Teasdale believed interspirituality could pave the way for an enlightened 
global culture by helping to create a “continuing community among the 
religions that is substantial, vital, and creative.” Interspirituality was not 
meant to subsume or surpass the world’s religious and spiritual traditions 
or to form a “homogenous superspirituality,” but rather to “make available 
to everyone all the forms the spiritual journey assumes.” What makes inter-
spirituality possible is the “openness of people who have a viable spiritual 
life” and who develop a “determination, capacity, and commitment to the 
inner search across traditions.” Teasdale envisioned the world’s religious 
traditions as spiritually interdependent, “because an essential interconnect­
edness in being and reality exists” (Teasdale 1999, 26, 27). Such an interde­
pendence of life is often proclaimed by traditions themselves. 
The context for an interspiritual approach, then, is one in which ulti­
macy is explored from multiple perspectives within a collaborative mode 
of inquiry, with an emphasis on potential transformative possibilities of 
a spiritual or religious nature. This makes an interspiritual approach an 
inherently contemplative endeavor that includes both personal experience 
and the teachings of traditions, and highlights a dialogical methodology as 
a vital aspect of its repertoire. An interspiritual approach to TWW there­
fore embraces “the religious quest as transformative journey” (see later). Of 
course, religion is many things and can be studied just as any other human 
endeavor might. These include sociological, historical, economic, psycho­
logical, and scientific perspectives, to name just a few. TWW, I would argue, 
should include these perspectives in its endeavor. However, TWW is first 
and foremost theology – the logos of theos, “to know and articulate” what 
we can of ultimate reality. 
Theology must ultimately be concerned with that which is irreducibly 
“religious” in human life. Elsewhere I have argued that this irreducible com­
ponent involves “the religious quest as transformative journey” (McEntee 
2017, 618). That is, religion, for everything else that it is, is in essence con­
cerned with a transformative journey that aligns, transmutes, awakens, and 
orients one in various degrees of harmony with God, Buddha-nature, Dao, 
Allah, Yahweh, Great Spirit, Heaven, Brahman, “the axiological depths of 
nature,” etc.3 I use the term “ultimate reality” for all this as a vague com­
parative category of family resemblances, without equating any of them. 
My aim here is to show some of the consequences and possibilities of this 
trajectory as a locus of reflection. 
For instance, from this perspective one might regard sacred texts as only 
secondarily concerned with dogmatic or metaphysical formulations of a 
confessional nature. The primary context of sacred texts would be inter­
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metaphysical frameworks, narrative stories, and commitments function so 
as to affect varying textures of transformative possibilities hidden in human­
ity’s entanglement with ultimacy. 
As an example, consider the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism. John
Thatamanil makes a distinction between understanding the Four Noble
Truths and an experience of satori, or enlightenment. An intellectual
understanding of the Four Noble Truths Thatamanil calls “second-order
knowledge,” while experiencing satori gives “first-order knowledge” of
ultimacy (which Thatamanil also refers to as “practical knowledge of ulti­
mate reality”). Without denying the importance of a confessional stance
towards the Four Noble Truths – after all, being Buddhist assumes one
takes “refuge” in the Three Jewels of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the
Sangha, at least until one reaches enlightenment – we may nevertheless
proclaim that the finger pointing to the moon is not the moon. It is an
embodied, existential experience of satori that ultimately brings about the
“comprehensive transformation” hinted at and articulated by the Four
Noble Truths (Thatamanil 2016, 357). Thus, the Four Noble Truths might
be interpreted not only on a dogmatic level of their metaphysical agree­
ment or incommensurability with other theological frameworks but also
as a functional means of transformative possibility. That is, one might ask
what underlying orientations are contained within the Four Noble Truths
that serve to prepare and initiate one into transformative processes that are
undergirded by ultimacy. 
Incommensurability or homeomorphic equivalent? 
Let me offer an example from our aforementioned Snowmass Conference. 
In the dialogues, a Tibetan Buddhist posed the following question to a 
Christian contemplative (paraphrasing): “If there remains a concept of the 
self, how does one deal with the problem of egotism that emerges from pro­
gressing along one’s spiritual path?” 
The question alludes to an apparent “incommensurability” between the 
Buddhist doctrines of anātman (“no-self,” or literally, “no ātman,” ātman 
being the “self” or “soul” within various schools of Hinduism) and the 
Christian doctrine of a personal soul. The answer, from a Christian perspec­
tive, is that all progress happens only through grace. One is never “good,” 
only blessed. When someone referred to Jesus as “good,” he admonished 
them: “Why do you call me good? No one is good – except God alone.”4 
At a level of doctrine we find (perhaps) incommensurable “accounts of 
reality.” However, I would suggest that in considering “the religious quest as 
transformative journey,” we have found what Raimon Panikkar referred to 
as a “homeomorphic equivalence.”5 Viewed from a functional level of con­
templative transformation, we might rephrase the question as, “How does 
one deal with the problem of human selfishness and ego aggrandizement, 
especially concerning so-called ‘progress’ along a contemplative path, which 
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is meant to transform and transmute, rather than aggregate, this quality 
within human beings?” 
For Buddhists, an account of (perhaps even “an experience of”) reality 
that emphasizes the illusionary nature of any substantial sense of self and 
that includes numerous practices that aim to deconstruct such a concretized 
notion of self function to combat ego aggrandizement as one progresses on 
a path, leaving no foothold whatsoever for an ego (or sense of self) to grasp 
onto. For Christians, an account of (and “experiences of”) reality that sees 
human nature as utterly and completely dependent upon God for its own 
process of sanctification and that ultimately lays all “good” not in the hands 
of one’s self but to God alone functions in a similar way. 
In terms of how each of these conceptualizations and/or experiences oper­
ate at the level of “transformative journey,” within their respective soterio­
logical and theological frameworks, one can see that both work to induce 
a humble state of mind and to uproot the temptation to attribute to oneself 
fruits that may arise from walking a contemplative path. Although this may 
not be the only thing (or even the most important thing) that these concepts 
work to achieve within their respective frameworks, it can be acknowledged 
that, whatever else they do, they serve to accomplish in particular ways cer­
tain similar functions in the interiority of practitioners. 
What once appeared incommensurable now finds consonance, at least in 
certain respects. 
A tale of difference 
One of the long-term participants in the Snowmass Dialogues was a highly 
respected senior monk in the Ramakrishna Order. I’ll call him Swami. 
The Ramakrishna Order is a Hindu monastic order established by Swami 
Vivekananda, a famous disciple of the Indian sage Sri Ramakrishna (Vive­
kananda took the first Parliament of World’s Religions in Chicago in 1893 
by storm, leading to an influx of Hindu thought and teachings in the West). 
The Ramakrishna Order generally follows the teachings of Vedanta Hindu­
ism, and its branches in the West are often known as “Vedanta Societies.” 
If you were to walk into Swami’s monastery you would find four pictures 
of venerated teachers on the wall (a scene repeated in many Ramakrishna 
monasteries throughout the United States), which include Ramakrishna, 
Sarada Devi (Ramakrishna’s wife and spiritual counterpart, often referred 
to as the “Holy Mother”), Jesus, and the Buddha. According to the teach­
ings of the Ramakrishna Order, at various periods throughout cosmic ages 
the divine reality appears as a human being in order to guide and teach 
others. Such human beings are called “avatars,” which means “descent of 
the divine.” Jesus, the Buddha, Ramakrishna, and Sarada Devi are all con­
sidered avatars, or divine incarnations, within the Ramakrishna Order. Each 
avatar is seen to carry specific messages for humanity appropriate to the 
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the same truth” and have come to “reestablish the one eternal religion” 
(Vedanta Society of Southern California 2019). Because Swami accepted 
and experienced Jesus as a divine incarnation, and venerated him as such, he 
felt that he mostly understood the Christian contemplative path and shared 
their experience of Jesus. 
Swami brought this outlook with him as he began to participate in the 
Snowmass Dialogues. Over the years, however, he began to realize that his 
experience of Jesus as a divine avatar from the perspective of Vedanta Hin­
duism was not the same experience of Jesus that Christians seemed to be 
having in the depths of their contemplative life. This forced Swami to recon­
sider his position on both Jesus and Christianity. The differences Swami was 
registering were not the obvious ones on a doctrinal level or ones that might 
be proposed as the result of immaturity on a spiritual path. Christian prac­
titioners who Swami considered very advanced in the spiritual life simply 
did not encounter Jesus in the same way as one among many avatars. There 
was a type of phenomenological variance in the experience of Jesus that 
affected the transformative journeys of those who experienced him in this 
way, opening up the possibility that perhaps the revelation of Jesus could 
not be circumscribed within a Hindu doctrine of avatars. 
This was a joyous discovery for Swami, as he now realized he had much
to learn and discover about the experience of Jesus that was not present in
his own tradition. These kinds of nuanced differences are often better dis­
covered in person, dialogically, where one can triangulate around anoth­
er’s experience – and others can triangulate around one’s own experience.
A dialogical methodology enhances the ability to home in on both differ­
ences and similarities that might be extremely difficult (or even impossible)
to discover through the reading of texts or the lens of theological frame­
works abstracted from the religious quest as transformative journey. Dif­
ferences such as these speak to the need for a discerning openness to the
experience of others and to a willingness to discover unrealized aspects of
our own journey, as well as undiscovered possibilities in the journeys of
others. 
An interspiritual approach to TWW insists that we remain open to these 
differences. There are an abundance of reasons for such humble openness, 
including to more fully discover aspects of ultimacy; to contextualize our 
own spiritual journeys and experiences of ultimacy in ever more nuanced 
ways; to discover unknown transformative possibilities for our own reli­
gious or spiritual path; to develop reverence for the transformative possibili­
ties we discern in others; to know that there exist transformative possibilities 
undergirded by ultimacy that are not, and perhaps never will be, part of our 
path, and that is okay; and finally to help incarnate an ever-growing soli­
darity that thickens through difference. The participants of the Snowmass 
Dialogues report they bonded more through discussing their disagreements 
than they had in discovering their points of agreement. As differences were 
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to convince others, they simply offered their understanding as “a gift to the 
group” (Miles-Yepez 2006, xix). 
The importance of contemplative traditions 
for TWW 
What does it mean to “know” or “articulate” ultimate reality? For some, 
this may refer to an interpretive meaning of a sacred text. However, for 
contemplative traditions, to “know” ultimate reality has always meant in 
some sense to embody it. To “articulate” ultimate reality is to live it, to 
manifest it in some way, to harmoniously align one’s self with it, or even in 
some sense to identify with it. Knowing and articulating ultimate reality, for 
these traditions, is always correlated with a transformation of one’s being­
in-the-world, a transformative journey of the “head, heart, and hands,” as 
Teasdale put it. 
From an interspiritual perspective, a transformative journey of the head 
includes a sculpting of the intellect through the active shaping of the theo­
logical frameworks we construct (“interpretive schemes” in Thatamanil’s 
language), as well as a “striving to understand the specific, subtle meanings 
of religious concepts and how the traditions relate to each other” (Teasdale 
1999, 29). A transformative journey of the heart occurs in the depths of 
spiritual practice and the applications of spiritual teachings to daily life (this 
is similar to Thatamanil’s “therapeutic regimes”). The journey of the heart 
reflects an embodiment of one’s spirituality and serves as both the offspring 
of one’s commitments and a reciprocal source of information that informs 
them (that is, transformations of the heart do more than “install” interpre­
tive schemes into the “body, mind, and heart,” as Thatamanil describes, but 
also, from an interspiritual perspective, change and inform such schemes in 
a reciprocal manner; Thatamanil 2016, 357). Finally, a transformative jour­
ney of the hands involves the collaborative projects we engage in with oth­
ers of differing beliefs and practices for the common good, especially with 
regard to issues of social and environmental justice (Teasdale 1999, 29). 
Louis Komjathy, a leading scholar in the field of contemplative studies, 
has taken care to emphasize that contemplative traditions are unique; are 
rooted in particular cultures, practices, and soteriological frameworks; and 
can appear incommensurable in certain respects (for instance, Komjathy 
finds that diverse religious and contemplative traditions offer “mutually 
exclusive, equally convincing accounts of ‘reality’”; Komjathy 2015, 39). 
At the same time, one tends to find “recurring patterns and parallel practices 
across traditions” (Komjathy 2018, 137). These include sustained commit­
ment to contemplative practices and “recognition of the value of interiority, 
presence, seclusion, silence, stillness, and so forth” (Komjathy 2018, 142). 
Komjathy goes on to describe contemplative traditions as ultimately about 
“transformed existential and ontological modes,” utilizing what he calls 
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2018, 108). Of particular interest for TWW is Komjathy’s suggestion that 
contemplative traditions are engaged in the mapping of “more ‘advanced’ 
ontological conditions” through “committed and prolonged contemplative 
practice” (Komjathy 2015, 54), which must be distinguished from “medita­
tive dilettantism” (Komjathy 2018, 128). From this point of view, we might 
come to appreciate advanced contemplatives as “professionals,” in a sense 
of religiously inflected ontological exploration. It is important to note that 
these transformed modes of being can, and often do, include sociopolitical 
concerns, as seen, for instance, in the life and writings of Thomas Merton, 
Dorothy Soelle, Abraham Heschel, Mahatma Gandhi, Dorothy Day, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Thich Nhat Hahn, and Howard Thurman. 
Advanced contemplatives, thus, can be valued as professionals with 
expertise, as it were, of experimentation with the practices and modes of 
being-in-the-world that accomplish transformative possibilities undergirded 
by ultimacy to varying degrees. A contemplative tradition, then, is a com­
munity of inquiry that forms around such experimentation and accomplish­
ments, and includes the collected magisteria of the community – the sacred 
texts, stories, theologies, practices, and practitioners. Different traditions 
define transformative processes in various ways, giving birth to potentials 
hidden in the human heart. One experience does not necessarily equate to 
another. A Christian experience of mystical union with God or Jesus may 
be different from a Buddhist experience of the “fundamental nature of the 
mind.” I say “may be” because I do not wish to prejudge these matters and 
do not believe that inquiry into them has progressed to a point where we can 
be sure of the differences and overlap in experiences of ultimacy. Such ques­
tions rather compose an existentially significant and potent field of explora­
tion into matters of ultimate importance and should be approached with an 
open mind – and an open heart. 
Contemplative life, then, can (and should) be seen in some sense as a
professional area of expertise of human encounter with ultimate reality 
(not necessarily the professional area). It is not that other forms of encoun­
ter with ultimate reality need be circumscribed or considered more or less 
important. Rather, it is to note the uniqueness of contemplative experience 
and the shared “family resemblances” of contemplative traditions, and 
hence their importance for TWW. Another way to think of contemplative 
traditions is as communities of inquiry into ultimate reality that tend to 
manifest predictable, embodied divine “traits,” to use a term from the aca­
demic field of contemplative studies, or what I have called elsewhere “divine 
adornments.”6 Such traits, such as bodhichitta in the Buddhist tradition or 
caritas in the Christian tradition, need not be equated and can be seen as 
uniquely embodied results attained to varying degrees within particular con­
templative traditions. 
From this perspective, the importance of contemplative life for TWW 
becomes radiantly apparent. If TWW wishes to consider all relevant “rev­
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consulting those for whom this is an area of expertise, mainly advanced con­
templatives, would seem to be a sine qua non of such an undertaking. Given 
the uniqueness of individual contemplative traditions, it becomes equally 
important for TWW to consider the particularities of varying contemplative 
traditions, including possible differences in resulting “divine adornments” 
or “traits,” without a trenchant need for simplification or generalization. 
TWW as theological milieu for the “spiritual 
but not religious” 
The interspiritual approach to TWW explored here would be of benefit to
the growing, but inchoate, spirituality of the “spiritual but not religious”
(SBNR). For instance, TWW can help provide a locus of thought for SBNRs
to consider as they survey an ever-growing, and perhaps confusing, land­
scape of potential spiritual practices they might adopt. TWW does this
by engaging a discursive community to reflect upon traditional contem­
plative practices, the possible transformative effects of such practices, and
the strengths and weaknesses of various practices. These analyses should
include sociological, religious, and political perspectives, as well as address
what it might mean to extract such practices from their cultural and theo­
logical frameworks. It is not hard to see how such a discourse might be of
immense benefit to SBNRs as they attempt to navigate their own unique,
individualized paths amidst a smorgasbord of spiritual practices and reli­
gious frameworks, some of which are authentic, others which are commer­
cialized, and still others which are downright dangerous.7 Knowing some
of the pitfalls and dangers, as well as how to cultivate discernment among
such diverse spiritualities, would contribute to the efficacy of an SBNR’s
spiritual quest. 
TWW can help as well to provide various conceptions of ultimacy that
transgress confessional boundaries. This serves SBNRs in developing more
sophisticated frameworks for understanding their own spiritual paths.
TWW also provides a discursive community for SBNRs to hone and shape
their understandings through academic exchange. One might imagine
future scholars working on theological frameworks and philosophical or
political theologies from ever-deepening interspiritual perspectives. Such a
development would also be of benefit to those in religious traditions as well
as to the SBNR movement, as it would naturally continue to deepen reflec­
tion on questions of difference and individuality, discernment of spiritual
maturity, the relationship of religious traditions to one another and to their
own institutionalized forms, and the very concept of what it means to be
“religious.” 
Who is to say that SBNRs will not eventually be regarded as forerunners 
of a new religious spirit, a religious spirit that sees the religious quest as a 
transformative journey, embraces democratization of the spiritual life, and 
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Interspirituality as a religious path 
Over the first few years of the Snowmass Conference participants worked 
through difficulties in trying to formulate some common points of agree­
ment. They eventually produced a document, which became known as “The 
Points of Agreement” (yet remained out of the public eye for decades). 
Choosing “ultimate reality” as their reference word for ultimacy, the points 
consist of eight statements about ultimate reality and the human condition, 
such as a recognition that the world religions “bear witness to the experi­
ence of ultimate reality”; that ultimate reality cannot be limited by names or 
concepts; that it is the ground of actuality and potentiality; that all human 
beings have a potential for transformation, wholeness, enlightenment, tran­
scendence; etc.; that “disciplined practice is essential to the spiritual life,” 
yet nevertheless all spiritual attainment is, in the end. “not the result of one’s 
efforts” but instead dependent upon ultimacy itself; and that ultimacy may 
be experienced outside of religious practices, such as “through nature, art, 
human relationships, and service to others” (Miles-Yepez 2006, xvii).8 
One point of agreement in particular, however, interests me here. It
reads, “Faith is opening, accepting, and responding to Ultimate Reality.
Faith in this sense precedes every belief system” (Miles-Yepez 2006, xvii,
emphasis mine). 
To see faith as something that exists prior to every belief system is to turn 
on its head a more widespread, pedestrian understanding of faith, where 
“faith” exhibits a “belief” in something that perhaps cannot be proven, 
like the trinitarian nature of God, for instance. If, on the other hand, faith 
precedes any belief system, then it stems not from assent to some humanly 
constructed religious framework, but rather exists as an intrinsic aspect of 
humanity’s entanglement with ultimacy. Faith, in this sense, is inherent to 
the human condition. One might choose not to explore it or to refuse its 
quiet, constant nudging. Or one may nurture it, and this would seem to be 
the purpose of belonging to a religious tradition. However, if one’s faith 
exists before one’s tradition does, then the tradition itself becomes a vehicle 
for the nurturing of an intrinsic human capacity. Distinctive “nurturings” of 
this capacity contribute to differing substantiations of ultimacy. It is worth 
noting again that committed practitioners from different religious traditions 
were able to affirm this statement on faith. 
All human beings have a capacity for transformative growth that aligns 
them in increasing degrees with ultimacy. This capacity exists outside of any 
religious tradition. An interspiritual approach further affirms the diversity 
of such approaches and entertains the possibility that diversity in mani­
festation is at the heart of ultimacy, and that therefore the many ways of 
nurturing our “faith” is a consequence, or reflection, of such multiplicity. 
Each particular way will inevitably have strengths and weaknesses, bringing 
unique insights into the nature of ultimacy and the transformative possibili­
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are not preordained ways, mapped out prior to their manifestation, but 
rather are birthed within spontaneous and creative impulses at the heart of 
manifestation. These differences are but a flowering of life itself and com­
pose a reflection of ultimacy. 
Given this, spiritual impulses that look to give rise to new types of religi­
osity, such as we see today in the West among multiple religious belongers, 
SBNR, and interspiritual folks, need not be seen as disconnected from ulti­
macy just because they are not embedded in traditional religious forms. 
A better question would be: Are they responding to their “faith” in the sense 
given earlier? One might consider the possibility that, for these individuals, 
nurturing their faith – that is opening and responding to ultimacy – crea­
tively manifests in nontraditional religious ways. Certainly it is not hard to 
see some of the qualities we often associate with these nontraditional spir­
itualities as undergirded by ultimacy, such as a spiritual longing for trans­
formation; questioning unhealthy institutional and hierarchical religious 
structures; naming and addressing problems of embedded patriarchies, colo­
nialisms, and racism that exist in all of our religious traditions; emphases 
on issues of social and ecological justice; democratic sensibilities in explor­
ing differences among spiritual orientations; and the freedom to follow and 
embody one’s sense of the sacred – that is, to nurture one’s “faith.” 
To nurture one’s faith requires commitments. Such commitments lie at 
the root of an interspiritual path, which is where I delineate between an 
ambiguous use of the term “spiritual” and what it means to be “religious.” 
Spirituality is not a mere component of our lives. The spiritual is a kind of 
intrinsic quality to life itself, part of the ground of actuality and potential­
ity and the ever-present possibility of opening and responding to ultimacy. 
The spiritual overflows into all of life, its ambiguity pointing towards its 
ever-present nature as ground. To be “religious” involves an active cultiva­
tion of this spiritually transformative capacity, which opens up a vast terri­
tory for discernment. This in turn implies a need for theological reflection 
and practical experimentation regarding concepts of spiritual maturity and 
the efficacies of various spiritual practices and orientations. It is a religious
practice to bring one’s religious and spiritual commitments into the reflec­
tive light of the intellect and to make oneself aware of one’s orientations 
towards ultimacy so that they may continually be (re)evaluated and evolve 
as one’s journey proceeds. 
Further, as religious denotes, in the terms of this chapter, commitments 
to a transformative journey – that is, a spiritual path that attempts to con­
tinually orient and reorient one towards ultimacy in ever clearer and more 
transparent ways with greater faith, hope, love, service, compassion, and 
wisdom, and confidence in the ameliorating potency of one’s quest – then 
an interspiritual religious path would be one where one’s religious identity
is primarily predicated upon such commitments. This could obviously occur 
both within and without religious traditions. That is, an interspiritual reli­
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walked in such a way that is not embedded in any singular religious tradi­
tion. Interspirituality imparts a sense of solidarity with all those who walk 
committed paths of a spiritually efficacious nature. 
I’d like to conclude on a personal note, with a closing story from the last 
day of the final Snowmass Dialogue. As practitioners from many of the 
world’s different religious traditions sat in a circle in the meditation hall at 
St. Benedict’s monastery, looking out onto the vast landscape of the Rocky 
Mountains through the wall-length, cathedral-like windows surrounding 
us, we began to go around the circle, offering thoughts on our experience 
and what we might take back to our religious traditions and communi­
ties as a result. As various responses were given and one after another told 
of insights – some difficult, others joyous – that they would endeavor to 
offer back to their communities, I was overcome with the coalescence of an 
incipient, but growing, awareness. As it happened, I was the last to speak, 
and when I did my voice stammered with emotion. 
“It is wonderful to hear about all of the myriad things you will be bring­
ing back to your home traditions,” I told them. 
It brings me joy, but I would be lying if I did not admit to a hint of sad­
ness. I do not have a tradition to “return” to, for it exists here, among 
you. This is my tradition. My spiritual (and religious) home is to be 
found amidst the spaces you have created, in that which has come into 
being through your willingness to open yourselves, and your traditions, 
to one another, without defensiveness and in love. It exists within the 
interchange and synergy of spiritual energies that entwine when you 
come together. And amidst the silence we share. And the personal, inti­
mate testimonies of those who have dedicated themselves – in endear­
ing, instructive, and inspirational ways, to their own transformative 
journeys. 
This tradition, my tradition, is what I have called “interspiritual.” I have 
come to know, through friends, colleagues, and mentors across the globe, 
that I am far from alone in claiming it. I have no doubts that though youth­
ful, it is also undergirded by ultimacy, as all authentic religious traditions 
are. Its story has only begun to be told. 
Notes 
1 Citation refers to Friends United edition. 
2 The new dialogue series, known as FRIS for short, is an invitation-only dialogue 
held at contemplative centers around the country, run by The Foundation for 
New Monasticism & Interspirituality, of which I am a founding member. For 
more, see Foundation for New Monasticism & InterSpirituality, founded in 2015. 
3 For “axiological depths of nature,” see Wildman (2016), in reference to a reli­
gious naturalist perspective. 
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5 See Panikkar (1981) and Panikkar (2014), among other Panikkar books as well. 
6 For “traits,” see Komjathy (2018); for “divine adornments,” see McEntee (2017). 
7 “Authenticity” here is a matter of discernment, often practiced within discur­
sive communities of practitioners. These communities can, and perhaps should, 
exceed the boundaries of one’s own tradition and/or spiritual commitments. 
TWW, broadly understood, would constitute one such diverse community. 
8 An interesting tidbit here I know from personal knowledge is the difficulty the 
participants had in even choosing a term for ultimacy. For example, the Christians 
preferred “ultimate mystery,” but Buddhists could not assent to “mystery,” as 
they felt this disputed their viewpoint that ultimacy can be directly awakened to. 
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Introduction: concrete experience 
In a last essay published just before his death, William James concedes that 
the early work of Benjamin Paul Blood, a self-styled philosopher and fel­
low experimenter in nitrous oxide, manages to “charm the monist in me 
unreservedly” (James 1978). Despite this brief confession of sympathy for 
a picture of the universe as constituting a single unity, the article is largely 
a celebration of an eccentric and unsung thinker’s turn away from monism 
and a confirmation, by way of direct religious experience, of James’s own 
metaphysical pluralism. 
Titled “A Pluralistic Mystic,” James’s final essay encapsulates much of the 
distinctive spirit of his approach toward different philosophical and theo­
logical frameworks. This includes, first, a search after rich and pronounced 
experiences wherever and whenever they may be found. Intuitions that are 
pathological, paranormal, and even drug-induced join religious experiences 
in possessing revelatory value for James and are presented as disclosing 
truths otherwise obscured from our more routine and ordinary forms of 
being. While never eschewing the importance of rational reflection upon our 
first-hand perceptions, a receptivity toward the freshness and immediacy of 
concrete experience is front and central for James. “Philosophy, like life,” 
he affirms in Some Problems of Philosophy, “must keep the doors and win­
dows open” (James 1996b, Ch. 4). Indeed, the analogy of open doors and 
windows as our proper orientation toward the world is found in numerous 
places throughout James’s authorship.1 
Second, James’s exhibition of Blood demonstrates his almost uncanny
ability to grasp the vital core of any religious or philosophical point of
view and from what always seems like an insider’s perspective. Continu­
ally arguing that beneath even the most rarefied theoretical constructs is
a preconceptual feel for the way things are, James’s capacity for entering
into and articulating the living kernel beneath different worldviews is
very likely connected with the beauty of his prose. It is one reason why
a careful analysis of lived human experience is such a central preoccupa­
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Third, James is a seminal contributor to the philosophy of religion, one 
whose ruminations are often focused on the justification of the spiritual 
life. “I feel now,” James writes triumphantly in his article on Blood, “as 
if my own pluralism were not without the kind of support which mystical 
corroboration may confer” (James 1978). Whether championing the right 
to believe ahead of all evidence or assessing the extent to which mystical 
experience may validate our philosophical convictions, the thought of James 
possesses endless resources for assessing theological positions in the face 
of what is arguably the single, most far-reaching development of the mod­
ern world: namely the ascendancy of the empirical attitude and the natural 
sciences. 
But James’s essay on Blood reveals one more tendency of his orientation 
toward different philosophies and religions. Even while keeping his doors 
and windows wide open to the full spectrum of human experience, James 
was never shy of making evaluative judgements with regard to different 
visions of the real. With regard to the contest between accepting a universe 
in which salvation is assured for all and one in which it isn’t, James asks: “Is 
all ‘yes, yes’ in the universe?” Doesn’t the fact of ‘no’ stand at the very core 
of life?” (James 1975a, 141). No matter how much his inner monist may 
reverberate when reading the earlier writing of Blood, a support for a more 
baroque and pluralistic cosmos over the pristine One of the idealists so pre­
dominate in his time remains an implacable theme of James’s philosophical 
work. “A Pluralistic Mystic” is his last affirmation of such a commitment. 
James’s thoughts on religion are sufficiently abundant to allow for 
multiple voyages beyond the barriers of denomination. What follows is 
merely one creative attempt to articulate the relevance of his thought for 
just such an adventure. Our main strategy is to press a few of James’s most 
essential themes into a two-storied methodology. While our first step argues 
for the necessity of opening our windows and doors as broadly as possible 
to the depth of experiences that animate different theological sensibilities, 
the second digs further into the thought of James in order to ascertain one 
of the standards we may use to evaluate between religious philosophies. 
Both sections begin with episodes weaned from my involvement with The­
ology Without Walls, debates in which Jamesean themes have proven their 
relevance. 
Because Theology Without Walls is in its infancy, it is the perspective of 
the author that a concentration on methodology is more essential at this 
early stage than any finished or even tentative theological picture. And yet 
James’s theological positions – his “over-beliefs” as he calls them in the 
Varieties – are not without their place.2 A penultimate section therefore 
introduces us to James’s mature theological statement – mainly as a demon­
stration of our methodological principles at work. Our brief conclusion will 
ride the spirit of James beyond the assumptions underlying his method and 
will point the way toward a few topics well worth exploring in the future of 
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Varieties 
In more than one discussion with my colleagues in Theology Without Walls 
I have met with disapproval for speaking against philosophies in which the 
summum bonum of the spiritual life is the understanding of all things, sen­
tient beings and galaxies alike, as manifestations of a single and perfect 
divine ground. One well-known philosophy of religion that sees this realiza­
tion as the common goal of every authentic spiritual tradition – despite the 
outer doctrinal and ritual differences between faith communities – is the 
“perennial philosophy.” Popularized by Aldous Huxley in The Perennial 
Philosophy, and defended by a number of authors known as the Traditional­
ists, the identification of our deepest selves with a formless and all-inclusive 
ultimate reality is here deemed as a higher plane of awareness than that of a 
relationship to a transcendent and personal deity. As this unitary insight is 
often provided by the contemplative and meditative traditions of the world 
East and West, monistic systems of thought like Advaita Vedanta and Neo-
Platonist mystics like Meister Eckhart are therefore favorites among peren­
nialist writers. 
Skimming through portions of the chapter of mysticism in The Varie­
ties of Religious Experience, proponents of such a perennialist-type theol­
ogy would find much to delight in James’s well-known study of the topic.
Among the defining feature of mystical experiences for James are their
seemingly noetic, or knowledge-bearing, quality, for they are felt “as states
of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect” (James
2004, 329). In one section, James quotes and refers to a myriad of con­
templative authors – Eckhart, Silesius, Boehme, the Upanishads, and many
others – and declares that the “overcoming of all the usual barriers between
the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement” (James
2004, 362). 
But even here, within James’s survey of mysticism, we are made aware of 
the radically different theological perspectives surrounding mystical experi­
ence. The precise reason why mystical experiences are not binding upon 
those who haven’t undergone them is the sheer range of their interpretation: 
“It is dualistic in Sankhya, and monistic in Vedanta philosophy. I called 
it pantheistic; but the great Spanish mystics are anything but pantheists” 
(James 2004, 368). And stepping back to view The Varieties of Religious 
Experience as a whole, we see how it truly earns the beginning of its title 
as a varieties. For in it we are treated to testimonies ranging from those of 
grounded inner peace to moments of near-hallucinatory horror; from the 
spiritually inspired overcoming of addiction to God-intoxicated flights of 
ecstasy; from the confident joy and optimism of the “healthy-minded” for 
whom dwelling on evil is but a vice, to a concentration on the problems of 
existence which is the “sick soul.” One of James’s lengthiest descriptions is 
his account of the sudden reconfiguring of the self after its own inner ten­
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VIII-IX). Although James later asserts that “the faith-state and mystic state 
are practically convertible terms,” this is a religious experience more akin 
to what is found at a Protestant tent revival than the full self-transcendence 
of a Sufi dervish or contemplative, a sensibility articulated theologically by 
Luther, Kierkegaard, and the Neo-Orthodox theologians of the twentieth 
century (James 2004, 367).3 
Doing Theology Without Walls in the spirit of James means being recep­
tive to religious experiences of all kinds. It also means perceiving the mean­
ing within all forms of experience, even those not explicitly religious. In 
“On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” James writes of the manner in 
which our encounters with people unlike ourselves may serve as a kind of 
epiphany, as not only a necessary shattering of our prejudices and assump­
tions but also as a complete re-centering of our inner lives.4 We let our guard 
down before the other, and “then the whole scheme of our customary values 
gets confounded, then our self is riven and its narrow interests fly to pieces, 
then a new centre and a new perspective must be found.” This is an insight 
akin to the I–Thou relationships of Martin Buber or our heeding of the face 
of our neighbor as described by Emmanuel Levinas – philosophies focused 
not a mystical descent within our consciousness at all, but in our active and 
moral comportment towards others.5 
Finding nondual spiritual experiences within and across different tradi­
tions, the adherents of perennialist-type theologies interpret such experi­
ences as more fundamental than other forms of intuition, religious and 
otherwise. But this comes with the cost of either ignoring or trivializing 
equally transformative experiences, including those which speak of an 
unbridgeable distance felt between the self and the other and I and a Thou. 
For the Jamesean involved in Theology Without Walls, a compelling reason 
must be found to justify prioritizing one form of intuition over another. 
Moreover, because nondual religious philosophies tend to lean toward a 
monism or quasi-pantheism in which the divine is understood as the sole or 
most basic reality, negative and tragic sorts of experiences are often deemed 
by them as either derivative or illusory. There are philosophical problems 
with this kind of denial, but this is a theme to which we must return later. 
Moral strenuousness 
Keeping our doors and windows open does not guarantee that every idea 
is of equal value in navigating what drafts may come through. This point 
is not always well taken. I recall a meeting of Theology Without Walls in 
which the very idea of using principles to discern the worth of different the­
ological positions was seen as arrogant and arbitrary – the imposition of our 
inherited prejudices and assumptions. Isn’t this a betrayal of the very pur­
pose of a Theology Without Walls, it was asked. For isn’t the practice of dis­
criminating between theological visions just a placing up of more walls? To 
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is implied by the very title of a Theology Without Walls: namely, to not have 
walls. We do not, for instance, ignore a religious tradition because it rejects 
theism (i.e., Jainism and Buddhism). 
But the other side of the argument is not without a few important con­
cerns. We certainly must not shun thinkers or insights, for instance, that
do not fit our a priori religious convictions. In a private letter to his fel­
low perennialist Huston Smith, Frithjof Schuon lambasts the thought of
Kierkegaard for, among other things, its nonconformity to several of the
more official and acceptable metaphysical systems as seen from a Tradi­
tionalist perspective. The religious thinker who pitted the risk-filled com­
mitments of faith against the abstract certainties of reason and flouted the
theological orthodoxies of his time must, in Schuon’s recommendation, “be
rejected without pity, I will even say: with horror” (Schuon 1975). No atti­
tude can be more anathema to those who heed James’s contention that in
demanding conformity between different religious figures and directions
of the spirit, “the total human consciousness of the divine would suffer”
(James 2004, 420). 
To explore theological perspectives in the spirit of William James is to 
employ principles of evaluation that are neither arbitrary nor smuggled 
in by way of our prior theological commitments. Early on in the Varie­
ties James argues that the veridicality, or truth-bearing status, of a religious 
experience must be judged using the same standards as any form of experi­
ence: the sheer force by which it grips us, how well it fits in with our other 
beliefs, and finally its influence upon our ethical life (James 2004, 28).6 It is 
the last of these criteria that take us to the very heart of James’s philosophi­
cal anthropology – his take on human nature. 
In an early and key essay, James offers a description of rationality as the 
felt transition from a state of puzzle and unrest to one of contentment, ease, 
and sense of normal mental functioning. Philosophies that help to bring 
about this feeling of rationality must meet a number of conditions, one of 
which is to not disappoint or fail to engage our “active propensities,” or “to 
give them no object whatsoever to press against” (James 2004, 82). Time 
and again in his writings, James argues in favor of those worldviews that 
speak not only to our spiritual intuitions but also our practical and ethical 
ones – those that draw upon the morally “strenuous mood” (James 2004, 
211). The yearning for the unique satisfactions and rigors of the ethical life 
are, for James, built into our very makeup as human beings. 
In another of his early essays, our cognitive and intellectual faculty is 
depicted as a kind of second department – one which, following our imme­
diate sensory experience, exists primarily for the purpose of guiding our 
behaviors (James 2004, 113–114). For James, we are not minds in isolation, 
subjects cleaved off from a separate realm of objects, but whole and embod­
ied organisms existing in and through an environment. Judging between 
worldviews with a concern for how they link with a few of “our deepest 
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therefore no arbitrary move for James but follows from his observations as 
a pragmatist and consummate phenomenologist (James 2004, 82). 
In his letter to Smith, Schuon complains that Kierkegaard has no con­
ception of the intellect – what for the Traditionalists is not our faculty for 
discursive reasoning but our organ of direct illumination from the divine, 
even a spark of the Absolute within (Schuon 1975). To do theology in the 
spirit of William James is to be receptive to this feature common to many of 
the most refined spiritual philosophies, as James has done in his chapter on 
mysticism in The Varieties. But it is not to remain there, for we are practical 
and moral creatures as well as contemplative ones. Returning to his triadic 
picture of the human being, James diagnoses the gnostical urge to realize the 
completeness of our identity with the divine as an illegitimate swallowing 
up of our active and practical nature into our contemplative one, a disap­
pearance of the third department of our being into the second (James 1956, 
138–140). It is for these reasons that James writes sympathetically of the 
ascetic tendencies of the saint in the Varieties, what for him is only a more 
extreme representation of those for whom “passive happiness is slack and 
insipid, and soon grows mawkish and intolerable” (James 2004, 263). 
In short, one standard employed by a Jamesean in order to discern 
between theological positions – a principle found directly within our experi­
ence rather than invoked arbitrarily – is to favor those perspectives that cul­
tivate the morally strenuous life in addition to our yearning for communion 
with an ultimate reality. 
A finite god 
To summarize a Jamesean approach toward a Theology Without Walls, we 
should, first, be open not only to the deeper intuitions which fuel and moti­
vate other theological positions but equally to experiences of all kinds – even 
those that don’t sit so easily within our prior and cherished philosophical 
and religious assumptions. And second, we have the right to accede value to 
those theological positions that draw upon, and enhance, our moral ener­
gies over those that do not. 
For the project of a Theology Without Walls, James’s own theological 
conclusions are of ancillary importance to his methods. And yet James’s 
mature speculations are a good demonstration of these principles at work. 
To do philosophy and theology in the spirit of James means to acknowl­
edge what so many monistic- and pantheistic-type perspectives so often 
trivialize or even deny: the unrefined edges of life, the phenomena of pain 
and suffering, the gaping holes which beset the universe. It is in the inter­
est of being inclusive that in the Varieties James prefers the more complex 
universe of the sick soul rather than the simpler and happier metaphysics 
of the healthy minded. As “a rectilinear or one-storied affair,” what the lat­
ter ignores “may after all be the best key to life’s significance, and possibly 
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148, 151). Moreover, and as we saw in the previous section, philosophies 
which claim that all is undergirded by a transcendental perfection too eas­
ily allow our propensities for worldly activity to atrophy, and are therefore 
inadequate. James’s approach toward assessing different theologies leans 
toward the recognition of a partly precarious cosmos, a melioristic universe, 
as James labels it in Pragmatism, in which our efforts may play a role (James 
1975b, lecture VIII). 
We should recognize even how self-defeating the denial or trivializing of 
evil is when analyzed more carefully. For as James points out toward the 
end of his first lecture in A Pluralistic Universe (what is partly an expan­
sion of his over-beliefs in the Varieties), to push for an acosmistic universe 
in which all pain and finitude are understood as a kind of primal ignorance, 
a veil blocking us from a nondual state of awareness or ultimate reality, is 
only to land ourselves within yet another duality. This is between the per­
spective of the Absolute in which all such limitations are overcome and the 
grittier vantage point of our own existence – one seemingly hemmed in by 
limitations of all kinds. In this way, to envision a perfect and all-inclusive 
ultimate reality would be every bit as alienating as looking upward from 
our lowly plane toward an all-powerful creator deity (James 1996a, 38–40). 
This theological picture is not only an insult to the human condition, but it 
deflates all motivation to rely upon our own efforts to help make the cosmos 
a better place. 
For these reasons, the god defended by James is finite, a being limited “in 
power or in knowledge, or in both at once” (James 1996a, conclusions or 
lecture VIII). This notion of a finite deity, a god for whom we are partners 
with the gradual perfecting of the world rather than as passive subjects, 
can appeal to the ethicist in us.7 And yet because his deity is also a greater 
consciousness in which our smaller selves are a part, this model can appeal 
somewhat to the mystic’s sense of union with a greater and more expansive 
divine reality.8 
Conclusion: many doors and windows 
Throughout the preceding pages we have unpacked the relevance of William 
James for the project of a Theology Without Walls. In no small part, this 
is the method of including as much of the full range of human experience, 
particularly religious experience, as we can. Even the standard of promoting 
the morally strenuous life is a principle found within our living engagement 
with things and is not imposed from without. Or so I have argued. 
Since James’s time, however, there has been some fruitful reflection on the 
nature and character of religious experiences. Although James’s Protestant 
upbringing and influence may have helped bias his investigations toward 
the experiences of gifted individuals and against the role and mediation of 
institutions, the social nature of the spiritual life should never be left out of 
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Josiah Royce, that authentic religious experience, at least for Christianity, 
must be social (Royce 2001, 40–41). But social it may be. Charles Tay­
lor offers an example of how his exultation at watching the victory of his 
hockey team is heightened by the fact that he rejoices with an entire city 
(Taylor 2003, 28). There are also some who argue for the necessity of rec­
ognizing how background beliefs and inherited dogmas infiltrate even the 
most ecstatic and rarefied of our experiences. Hence, it may not be just the 
interpretation or felt intensity of our intuitions that are shaped through cul­
ture and historical context, but their very content.9 
A Jamesean approach to a Theology Without Walls is always ready to 
draw upon the unique experiential insights of individuals as they have sur­
faced in different places and times – whether such heights of awareness 
are achieved through meditation, discovered in the throngs of a personal 
crisis, or even induced through chemicals. But a contemporary Jamesean 
methodology must equally be attentive to experiences forged through entire 
communities, as well as the shared social and theological tenets in which 
the most defining of our spiritual intuitions have been fermented and culti­
vated. This may be a bit of a departure from James’s own preoccupations, 
particularly in the Varieties. And yet peering out upon the world’s divergent 
theological visions, it is keeping well within his spirit to open as many of our 
doors and windows as possible. 
Notes 
1 Richard Gale provides a list of James’s references to open windows and doors in 
the introduction to The Divided Self of William James (Gale 1999, 4). 
2 See the conclusion for his discussion on over-beliefs. 
3 D.S. Browning affirms that “the Niebuhrs, Tillichs, and Bultmanns of the neo­
orthodox period could have turned to James as easily as to Kierkegaard or Hei­
degger” (Browning 1980). 
4 Found in Talks to Teachers (James 1962). 
5 For Buber’s (1970) and Levinas’s (1969) most definite and well-known statements 
on our relationships to others, see I and Thou and Totality and Infinity (Buber 
1970), respectively. 
6 After refuting the idea that religious experiences can be dismissed as mere prod­
ucts of physical disorder, what he labels “medical materialism,” James suggests 
that “Immediate luminousness, in short, philosophical reasonableness, and moral 
helpfulness are the only available criteria.” 
7 Some may appreciate the similarity of this idea with several notions found in Luri­
anic Kabbalah, including the mission of human beings to enact tikkun olam, or 
the reparation of the cosmos. See the seventh lecture in Gershom Scholem’s Major 
Trends in Jewish Mysticism, the landmark introduction to this topic. 
8 Whether or not James has completely resolved all of the tensions between the ethi­
cal and the mystical facets within his own work, let alone for theology in general, 
is too large a topic for this chapter. See Gale (1999) and Weidenbaum (2013). 
9 The idea that our background beliefs at least partly constitute our experiences is 
called constructivism. One scholar who draws our attention to James’s overlook­
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Challenges and possibilities 
Introduction 
Jerry L. Martin 
Sympathetic critics are invaluable, because they articulate the challenges a 
new way of thinking must face. Peter Feldmeier explores the potential of 
Theology Without Walls (TWW). He begins with the Vatican’s evolution 
toward inclusivism. He shows how seeing the parable of the Pharisee and 
the tax collector through Buddhist eyes can temper our own judgmentalism, 
and how Taoist attitudes could prevent a pastor’s manipulative behavior. 
In this mode, TWW is a kind of comparative theology. The alternative is 
simply “to think theologically utilizing the vast array of insights from the 
world’s great depositories of wisdom and insight.” Ask “what is love or 
compassion?” and “draw insights from the widest net possible.” 
On the other hand, Feldmeier sees a danger in a kind of “theological 
free-for-all” that ignores consistency. Christianity and Daoism, for example, 
each has its own metaphysics. Religious insights are “tied to structures of 
thought that can be incommensurable.” Perhaps there can be no “meta­
narrative” that accounts for everything. Moreover, any theology must reflect 
a “living faith.” Feldmeier concludes by asking what TWW would look like 
“in its most robust expression.” 
One approach to method is offered by Wesley J. Wildman and Jerry L. 
Martin. The transreligious theologian faces choices between “theological 
possibilities that cut across the religions.” Three of the most plausible mod­
els of ultimate reality are an agential being, the ground of being, and a sub­
ordinate god within a more fundamental ultimate reality. Each has its own 
appeal. Agential being models are best fitted to “the human tendency to see 
intentionality in events.” “Reality as a whole is invested with personality 
and purpose, meaning and intelligibility, goodness and beauty.” Subordi­
nate god models have a “two-tiered” view, with God having the appealing 
properties of an agential being, without the difficulties posed by trying to 
have a personal being account for the whole of reality. Ground-of-being 
models avoid anthropomorphism and best express the limits to human cog­
nition that point toward apophaticism. 
The models can be tested against what we know from “cognitive science, 
evolutionary psychology, comparative religion and other sources.” Each 
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adequacy, coherence, consistency, and pragmatic considerations such as eth­
ical consequences, aesthetic quality, social potency, and spiritual appeal.” 
Choices that fit well with one criterion may fit poorly with another. Hence, 
there are “conceptual stresses” within each model. “Fortunately, compara­
tive religion and comparative theology have prepared an array of fruitful 
cross-cultural concepts, issues to be addressed, and theological options to 
consider.” 
Among the resources that can now be brought to bear on theology is 
the cognitive science of religions (CSR). Johan De Smedt and Helen De 
Cruz ask “what theologians can learn” from CSR and “what it identifies 
as commonalities across religions.” They connect their approach to “Hick’s 
religious pluralism, Ramakrishna’s realization of God through multiple 
spiritual paths, and Gellman’s exhaustible plentitude.” The authors begin 
with a wide-ranging survey of accounts, religious and nonreligious, of the 
“origins of religious belief.” Those views that begin with a natural or innate 
knowledge of God have had the challenge of explaining religious ignorance 
and religious diversity. Here, “CSR can shed new light.” “A unifying theme 
throughout this literature” is that “religion is natural” and that religious 
beliefs result from cognitive processes that “operate in everyday life, such 
as discerning teleology, detecting agency, and thinking about other people’s 
minds.” The authors explore CSR research with regard to “belief in super­
natural agents and its connection to cooperation, teleological thinking, and 
afterlife beliefs.” They argue that “the dispositions outlined by CSR do give 
us some insight into the divine” and that insight is pluralistic. 
Wesley J. Wildman draws on cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, 
and biology to explore the theologically salient topic of love and desire. He 
wants to understand “why these concepts, and the corresponding experi­
ences, are so powerful for us, and why we feel they take us so deeply into the 
nature of the reality we receive, create, and inhabit.” For him, as a religious 
naturalist, divine love does not refer to the thoughts, feelings, intentions, 
or actions of a divine being, but to “the valuational depth structures and 
dynamic possibilities of the natural world.” 
The story of human love begins with the “neutral-behavioral love sys­
tems” of the primates evolving into humans. “There are at least four rela­
tively distinct brain and behavioral love-and-desire systems, three of which 
are directly related to what we human beings call romantic love.” 
These systems need not be taken as normative. “Just as it is tempting to
derive moral norms from descriptive information about nature (the natu­
ralistic fallacy), so it is all too easy to impute to the depths of nature what
we find emerging in human moral worlds (the projection fallacy).” For the
religious naturalist, “love and desire have cosmic significance,” not because
they were “always there,” but because they emerge within the biocultural
realm as “a sign and an instance of the potent axiological possibilities in
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workable? 
Yes, no, maybe 
Peter Feldmeier 
Yes 
The concept of Theology Without Walls is not only an intriguing project, it’s 
one that already aligns with my theological tendencies. I write as a Roman 
Catholic theologian who has been fascinated by other religions and the 
potential value they have in informing my own religious sensibilities. As 
a religious studies major in college (almost four decades ago), I gained an 
appreciation for other ways of being religious that were quite different from 
my own. I allowed myself to be open to the religious other, enough so that 
I subsequently utilized non-Christian classical texts for spiritual reading, 
including the Upanishads, the Dao De Jing, and classic Zen texts. Much 
later, in doctoral studies, I wrote my dissertation on comparing the teach­
ings of the Catholic John of the Cross to the Buddhist Buddhaghosa for the 
purpose of seeing how Buddhist practices might be incorporated into the 
Christian life without compromising Christian theology; no small project 
there. 
Since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Catholicism has taken a 
respectful stance toward the religious other, even proclaiming that, through 
the grace of God, God’s saving presence was active in other religious tradi­
tions. In no way was this imagined to be some version of relativism. The 
Church was clear: although God was present and active in other traditions, 
nonetheless “she proclaims and is in duty bound to proclaim without fail, 
Christ who is the way, the truth and the life. In him, in whom God recon­
ciled all things to himself, men find the fullness of their religious life” (Nos­
tra Aetate, #2). 
In the theological discipline of theology of religions, this position became 
known as inclusivism. Here one’s home religion is believed to be absolutely 
true, even while recognizing God’s presence in the religious other. There is 
a kind of imperialism in inclusivism, as other religions are not imagined to 
be on par with one’s own. Vatican II saw the truths articulated in others as 
“a preparation for the Gospel” (Lumen Gentium, #16). One of the great 
liabilities in the inclusivism position is that it tends to look for and affirm 
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has the fullness of truth, then the religious other could only have partial 
truths, something that reflects one’s own whole truth. It is difficult for the 
inclusivist to see any unique quality in the religious other, something valu­
able in its own right. 
Since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has added something of a wrinkle 
in its promotion to dialogue with other religions. In 1984, the Vatican’s 
Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue published a document titled 
The Attitude of the Church toward Other Religions. Here it outlined vari­
ous forms of dialogue. These were 1) Dialogue of Life, focusing on com­
mon humanity; 2) Dialogue of Collaboration, focusing on humanitarian 
issues; 3) Theological Dialogue, seeking greater mutual understanding; and 
4) Dialogue of Religious Experience, including sharing one’s spiritual life 
and religious practices. Dialogue here is described as “not only discussion, 
but also includes all positive and constructive relations with individuals and 
communities of other faiths which are directed at mutual understanding and 
enrichment” (#3). The religious other is presumed to have spiritual truths or 
insights that the Church can learn from. The document goes on to say that 
“a person discovers that he does not possess the truth in a perfect and total 
way but can walk together with others toward that goal. Mutual affirma­
tion, reciprocal correction, and fraternal exchange lead the partners in dia­
logue to a greater maturity.” It is an engagement with other religious faiths 
for “mutual enrichment” (#21). The text concludes that there may be great 
differences between various religions, but “[t]he sometimes profound differ­
ences between faiths do not prevent this dialogue. Those differences, rather, 
must be referred back in humility and confidence to God who ‘is greater 
than our heart’ (1 Jn 3:20)” (#35). 
This document became for some Catholic theologians a game-changer. It 
seems to argue that both the non-Christian tradition and Christianity can 
be reciprocally corrected, that non-Christian insights can lead the Christian 
toward a greater maturity, and that both traditions can be mutually enriched 
by his encounter. Thus, the non-Christian tradition has religious goods the 
Church does not. Further, where there are differences, the document appeals 
to God who transcends what our hearts (or minds) can imagine. 
While secure in one’s primary faith commitments, seeking insights through 
mutual learning is nothing new to some expressions of Catholicism, even at 
the formal level. Already in 1974 the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Confer­
ence in Taiwan declared, 
How then can we not give them [the other religions] reverence and 
honor? And how can we not acknowledge that God has drawn all peo­
ples to Himself through them? . . . The great religions of Asia with their 
respective creeds, cults and codes reveal to us diverse ways of respond­
ing to God whose Spirit is active in all peoples and cultures.1 
Theologians have taken up this call as well. The renowned David Tracy 
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it will not be possible to attempt a Christian systematic theology except in 
serious conversation with the other great ways” (Tracy 1990, xi). Tracy’s 
insight has borne fruit in what is known as comparative theology. Compara­
tive theologians attempt to do systematic theology in light of dialogue with 
other religious traditions. Here one engages the texts, theologies, practices, 
and religious imagination of another religious tradition. This encounter 
gives one insight from a broader religious context to do Christian theol­
ogy. Not only does such a procedure widen one’s theological imagination, 
it also facilitates a more authentic sympathy for the religious other. What 
is attempted by comparative theology is not a syncretistic unification of all 
religions, but rather a fresh set of eyes and resources to rethink one’s own 
tradition in new ways. 
Let me provide a couple of examples of how this might work. Consider 
Jesus’s parable in Luke 18 of two men who went to the temple to pray. One 
was a Pharisee and the other a tax collector. 
The Pharisee, standing by himself, was praying thus, “God, I thank you 
that I am not like other people: thieves, rogues, adulterers, or even like 
this tax collector. I fast twice a week; I give a tenth of all my income.” 
But the tax collector, standing far off, would not even look up to heaven, 
but was beating his breast and saying, “God, be merciful to me, a sin­
ner!” I tell you, this man went down to his home justified rather than 
the other; for all who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who 
humble themselves will be exalted. 
Jesus’s point is obvious: do not be self-righteous or judgmental but humble, 
as this is the truly authentic religious posture before God and others. Let us, 
however, consider this parable through the lens of Buddhism. According to 
Buddhism, all unskillful thinking, particularly that which inflates the ego, is 
an expression of delusion and suffering. And the fact that the Pharisee does 
not see this demonstrates just how unaware he is of the situation. He is suf­
fering but does not know it. Let us take this a further step: almost certainly 
most readers (you and I) have found ourselves in disdain of the Pharisee (I 
hate people like that!). Ironically, we are tempted to judge the judgmental 
Pharisee and take on his same toxic mental state. Buddhist wisdom guides 
us away from such tendencies with its incisive assessment of how a con­
ditioned mind works and how to become free from such unskillful, con­
ditioned reactivity. One last step: Buddhist wisdom neither condemns the 
Pharisee nor us, but instead invites us to see how delusion and suffering 
work in the psyche. Buddhist wisdom allows one to embrace the parable 
more fully and to cultivate compassion toward all who suffer – the Pharisee, 
the tax collector, and oneself alike. In short, listening to Buddhism can help 
us understand our own religious predicament more clearly, and this without 
compromising our own religious faith. 
Let us consider an additional example. In Daoism, there is something 
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prefix. Wu-wei (no-action) refers to the value of nonimposing activity. One 
does not force something, but instead learns to work with the possibilities 
at hand. Wu-zhi (no-knowing) refers to letting go of any artificial constructs 
that would blind one from the uniqueness of the new moment. Wu-yu (no-
desire) refers to letting go of one’s neurotic need to be attached to some 
static agenda. In Daoism, the universe is an evolving mystery unfolding 
before one. The best experience is to participate in it as it is. The wu-forms
dispose the soul to embrace life as art and optimize creative possibilities 
without trying to manipulate one’s experience. The wu-forms can teach 
one to cultivate an open, spacious mind and heart, respectful of the reality 
unfolding before one. 
A great temptation in pastoral ministry is to impose an agenda on others. 
Perhaps the congregation is not vibrant at, say, a wedding. The pastor might 
want to pump up the energy. But all this guarantees is that the minister 
and congregation are out of sync. Wu-wei suggests entering the energy that 
exists and working skillfully with it, not against it. Or perhaps the pastor 
meets a parishioner in crisis. He or she may be uncomfortable with the pain 
or ambiguity of the situation. The principle of wu-yu can help the pastor 
to stop seeking a personal agenda and to be present as the suffering person 
needs one to be present. For the minister, this does not mean that “I must 
get rid of this pain.” One does not come to the situation imagining that its 
conclusion ought to be joy, surety, or healing. Although these are laudable 
goals, they are imposed goals. Indeed, someone may need to grieve or be 
in doubt a long time. One ought not to force anything. In both these cases, 
insights from religious others can actually help one’s own religious sensibili­
ties and even pastoral presence (Feldmeier 2013, 192–197). 
Theology Without Walls seems to me the kind of project that can draw 
on the uniqueness of various traditions and show how, in dialogue, new 
insights might emerge. If utilized in the earlier sense, Theology Without 
Walls would take on a kind of post–Vatican II inclusivistic perspective. Here 
one would have a starting point with a home tradition that seeks to invig­
orate itself with the myriad of insights available from other religious tradi­
tions. They could provide complementary insights that might create a more 
robust version of one’s own tradition or stretch one’s traditional boundaries. 
I see it as potentially a version of comparative theology. 
This is not the only way Theology Without Walls might work. It could 
take on the presuppositions that belong to a more pluralist camp. Some the­
ologians imagine the great religious traditions as proceeding along the same 
trajectory, fundamentally doing the same thing. These are broadly known as 
pluralists. Typically, pluralists rely on several reasonable principles. The first 
is that God as God transcends all conceptuality. Concepts, they argue, are 
what humans do, how humans think. They exist to help us negotiate the cre­
ated world. But God radically transcends the world. Thus, any God talk can 
only correspond to human ways of imagining or making sense of God for 
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ask, “What’s in a name?” If there is one Transcendent Absolute, and if that 
Absolute transcends conceptuality, then it matters little whether we call that 
Absolute God, Brahman, Eternal Dao, and so on. Of course, religions do 
have their uniqueness, they concede. Still, all authentic religions are dealing 
with the same reality in different ways. 
Pluralists also tend to see religions as not only pointing to the same divine 
Reality, but also looking much like each other. They share many of the same 
ethical perspectives, and it is uncanny how similar they are in terms of the 
kinds of transformation they describe, and even what union with God is like 
according to their various exemplars. In many traditions, the ordinary self 
seems to get discarded, while the true self finds a kind of oneness or even 
quasi-identity with the divine. One literally re-centers oneself in God. As 
Marianne Moyaert notes, 
Pluralists are determined to promote real openness, real reciprocity, 
and real transformation. They argue for a paradigm shift that would 
enable Christians to move away from their millennia-long insistence 
on the superiority and finality of their way, whether in its exclusivist or 
inclusivist version, and to recognize the independent validity of other 
religions. 
(Moyaert 2014, 120) 
That other religions are fundamentally doing the same thing allows for a 
kind of sharing of resources and insights that seem to go far beyond what 
any other theology of religions could offer, and it is the most likely perspec­
tive one would hold for a Theology Without Walls project. If most or all 
religions are not fundamentally doing the same thing, then one wonders 
from where one would start, that is, which first principles would ground 
one’s theology and how one might negotiate competing perspectives? 
Thus, I think that Theology Without Walls could proceed as some form of 
pluralism. 
One must recognize, however, that so far my framing of Theology With­
out Walls has been contextualized through some form of a theology of reli­
gions. Jerry L. Martin, both privately and in conference forums, insists that 
this is utterly unnecessary. He argues: Why not simply proceed to think the­
ologically, utilizing the vast array of insights from the world’s great deposi­
tories of wisdom and insight? What is love or compassion? How does one 
become holy? How ought the Divine Absolute be understood? To attempt to 
answer such questions, why not draw insights with the widest net possible? 
Surely, we might want to start with our own natural operating paradigm, be 
that Christianity or Hinduism, etc., but Theology Without Walls does not 
need a theology of religions to do this. While acknowledging that everyone 
comes to texts or teachings with what Gadamer calls pre-understanding,2 
one could attempt a kind of tabla rasa (clean slate). What is compassion? 
Let’s see what Christians say, what Buddhists say, what Muslims say, and 
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so on to come up with a larger and more holistic view of it, informed by 
its many expressions in various traditions. What is holiness? Again, let’s 
consult broadly. 
In affirming the possibilities of Theology Without Walls we might also 
recognize that it commends itself to a larger public. Young and middle-age 
adults in the United States are increasingly identifying with being a “none,” 
that is, not identifying with a given religious tradition but refusing to self-
identify as either agnostic or atheist. Progressively, Americans are skeptical 
about exclusive religious claims, decidedly rejecting fundamentalist reli­
gious framings and imagining religions as about the same agenda. They also 
eschew what they think is the typical politicization of religion.3 Thus, Theol­
ogy Without Walls seems to fit the zeitgeist or spirit of the time. Responding 
to such a spirit, Julius-Kei Kato calls for a “hybridity that makes us mem­
bers of multiple worlds and citizens of a global world” (Kato 2016, 271). 
No 
So far in this chapter, it looks as though Theology Without Walls is not only 
commendable but perhaps even indispensable if one is going to do cred­
ible theology in this globalized and multiple-religious world. But like most 
things, the issue is far more complicated. Inclusivist theologians recognize 
that their home religion really does take priority. The point of interreli­
gious dialogue from an inclusivist framework is to appreciate and revere 
the religious other and in small ways to allow one’s own tradition to be 
challenged. But here all religions are assuredly not equal. In responding to 
what was considered overreach by some theologians, the Vatican’s Congre­
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith reacted strongly with its publication of 
Dominus Iesus: On the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and 
the Church. Written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, who later became Pope 
Benedict XVI, Dominus Iesus insisted: 
What hinders understanding and acceptance of the revealed truth: the 
conviction of the elusiveness and inexpressibility of divine truth . . . rela­
tivistic attitudes toward truth itself . . . the metaphysical emptying of the 
historical incarnation of the Eternal Logos, reduced to a mere appearing 
of God in history; the eclecticism of those who, in theological research, 
uncritically absorb ideas from a variety of philosophical and theologi­
cal contexts without regard for consistency, systematic connection, or 
compatibility with truth. 
(#4) 
Dominus Iesus concedes that there may be some elements of truth in other 
religions, but “[i]t is also certain that objectively speaking, they are in a 
gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, 






   
   
 
 
Is Theology Without Walls workable? 115 
The great concern that Ratzinger had was a kind of theological free-for­
all that neither recognized the priority of the Christian gospel, nor respected 
the complexity of trying to incorporate insights from other traditions with­
out concern for philosophical or theological consistency. I hope that my 
example of Daoist insights was helpful to see how comparative work can 
yield fruitful results. I am also aware, however, that there are massive com­
plexities in making any theological claims that include Daoism. Daoism has 
its own particular metaphysics that contrasts strongly with Western notions 
of God. Daoism is virtually acosmic, with no sense that there is an abso­
lute, eternal Reality undergirding created reality. The Dao is not God in any 
sense; there is no God exactly, but only the ceaseless flow of life. There is 
no Transcendent Absolute, and thus to draw on its metaphysics is to risk 
violating the principle of noncontradiction – they can’t be both true. And 
where a Daoist concept depends on such a metaphysic, there will be serious 
problems incorporating such a concept into a theistic view. 
This is one of the biggest concerns I have for Theology Without Walls: its 
scope seems to be simply too large. What the most responsible comparative 
theologians do is relatively small and discrete. Francis Clooney, the fore­
most authority in comparative theology, is a good example. He has spent his 
career comparing Hindu insights with Christian ones. In every attempt, his 
scope is highly circumscribed. Clooney writes, 
[T]he opportunities present in the interreligious situation are most fruit­
fully appropriated slowly and by way of small and specific examples 
taken seriously and argued through in their details. . . . Interreligious 
theology is not the domain of generalists but rather of those willing to 
engage in detailed study, tentatively and over time. 
(Clooney 2001, 164) 
Further, his work is intended to both stretch and be faithful to his own 
faith (i.e., Christianity). In commenting on comparative theologians, 
Michael Barnes notes that they favor “experiments, focused micro-studies 
that acknowledge the freedom of the Spirit while at the same time driving 
the faithful thinker deeper into the mystery of the divine encounter as it is 
inscribed in . . . the home tradition” (Barnes 2016, 241). 
Pluralism is not without its own method problems. Critics have observed 
that pluralists tend to home in on what appears similar in different religions 
without taking seriously the differences. They tend to look for evidence 
from an already predetermined pluralist assumption, something of a conclu­
sion looking for supportive data. I noted earlier that witnesses of mystical 
union look very much alike among various religions. But others have argued 
that if you looked carefully, the similarities fade in light of the particularities 
of each religion. A scholar of mysticism, Stephen Katz, has argued that the 
past two decades of research have now rejected the earlier assumptions that 
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are “simplistic and untrue to the data at hand” (Katz 2013, 5). According 
to Katz and others, Muslims have Islamic mystical experiences, Jews have 
Jewish experiences, Buddhists have Buddhist experiences, and so on (Katz 
2013, 5–6). 
Not only have pluralists potentially overshot their mark on any unifying 
qualities in the world’s religions, they can tend to undermine their own home 
religion in striving for universal claims. In a friendly debate between myself 
and Paul Knitter, we discussed whether Buddhism and Christianity were 
commensurable, that is, able to be aligned. I charged Knitter with down­
grading God (from a Christian point of view) and eternalizing creation. 
I also charged him with misappropriating classic Buddhist texts. Whether 
my position succeeded is for the scholarly audience to decide. Regardless, 
the danger lurks large when striving to see a unified religious world that may 
not be so unified after all.4 
This same problem occurs without a theology of religions informing one’s 
assumptions. The quasi–tabla rasa position, discussed earlier, has yet to 
deal in a satisfying way with the problems of uniting insights from various 
religions without recognizing that those very insights are tied to structures 
of thought that can be incommensurable with other structures of thought. 
Many scholars argue that religions simply cannot be well compared or 
mutually drawn on. In George Lindbeck’s influential book, The Nature of 
Doctrine, he argues that religions resemble languages that are intrinsically 
unique and inseparable from their respective cultures. Lindbeck writes, 
Adherents of different religions do not diversely thematize the same 
experience, rather they have different experiences. Buddhist compas­
sion, Christian love and . . . French revolutionary fraternité are not 
diverse modifications of a single human awareness, emotion, attitude, 
or sentiment, but are radically (i.e., from the root) distinct ways of expe­
riencing and being oriented toward self, neighbor, and cosmos. 
(Lindbeck 1984, 40, as cited in
Moyaert 2014, 131) 
Moyaert notes that “according to Lindbeck, there is still a second reason 
why religions are untranslatable. Religions are all-encompassing interpre­
tive schemas.” Thus, citing Lindbeck, “nothing can be translated out of the 
idiom into some supposedly independent communicative system without 
perversion, diminution or incoherence of meaning” (Moyaert 2014, 131). 
In short, trying to incorporate Nirvana into some Christian interpretive 
scheme is certain to undermine what Buddhists really mean by Nirvana, as 
well as to compromise Christianity, which simply has no message regarding 
Nirvana or interest in it. We might call Lindbeck the herald of a new kind 
of theology of religions, that is, the postliberal or postmodern position. In 
short, it proclaims that there can be no meta-narrative, no absolute vision 
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A final potential problem with a Theology Without Walls has to do with 
its readership. I noted earlier that this is the kind of project that would 
appeal particularly to the nones, those who reject particular or exclusive 
claims from religion but are open to larger universal claims. The problem is 
that this is less a community than it is an audience. Centuries ago, the great 
Christian theologian Anselm of Canterbury famously defined theology as 
fides quaerens intellectum – faith seeking understanding. What any theol­
ogy requires, including Theology Without Walls, is a living faith. Faith is the 
condition of possibility for theology to make sense, to be valuable. I won­
der if Theology Without Walls would actually help this audience or if it 
would encourage its readership away from a particular faith. I see religions 
as forums for spiritual transformation. I also see religions as having their 
own particularities and unique expressions of this transformation. Religions 
operate as paradigms or lenses of interpretation of experience. Their respec­
tive dogmas act like fences within which its members live. Such fences could 
be permeable, even climbable, but they seem to be necessary. They give reli­
gion form. Could Theology Without Walls be ultimately formless? 
Conclusion: maybe 
Some scholars, including me, believe that all the earlier positions and those 
of their critics can be overstated. Inclusivism rightly insists that if one thinks 
one’s religion is true – really true – then this has consequences as to what 
one thinks of alternative faiths. But inclusivism cannot account for authen­
tic and very different religious expressions that do not fit well into its own 
religious tradition. If the Catholic Church, for example, takes on the inclu­
sivist model, it does so without consistency. If one can really learn from the 
religious other, then one’s tradition cannot have all the goods. Pluralism 
rightly sees universal tendencies that make interreligious sharing possible. 
I am not at all convinced that other religions are so incommensurable as 
Lindbeck insists. There really are massive similarities that make interreli­
gious sharing possible. On the other hand, pluralism does underestimate 
religious differences. And although the postmodern position is right to warn 
against colonizing the religious other, it overstates its own position. If reli­
gions are different languages, we can learn these languages and see cognates 
in our own. Further, there is no pure religion that has not been influenced 
by forces outside itself. For example, early Christianity was decidedly influ­
enced by Neoplatonism. Thomas Aquinas, the great medieval synthesizer, 
unabashedly drew on Aristotle, Plato, and Islamic and Jewish sources such 
as Avicenna and Maimonides. 
Thus, I see Theology Without Walls as valuable and in some ways already 
being done fruitfully. But I must ask, what would it look like in its most 
robust expression? By what method? Would it have a theological founda­
tion, say, Christianity, and then extend this to include insights from the 









118 Peter Feldmeier 
theory of religion? How would it address philosophical positions that have 
very different and even colliding first principles? These are the questions 
that would have to be answered. If successfully addressed and defended, 
then – maybe! 
Notes 
1 Cited in Chia (2016, 49). 
2 See Gadamer (1975, 274–289). 
3 See Putman and Campbell (2010), passim. 
4 This debate initially took place at the Catholic Theological Society of America in 
2015 and subsequently published as Knitter and Feldmeier (2016). 
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11 Daunting choices in 
transreligious theology 
A case study 
Wesley J. Wildman with Jerry L. Martin
 
The transreligious theologian faces daunting choices. These choices are not 
between religions – because for transreligious theologians the relevant data, 
concepts, and methods are not restricted to those of a single tradition – but 
rather between theological possibilities that cut across the religions. Under­
standing this is a critical part of the answer to the appealingly practical 
question about how we might go about the difficult task of transreligious 
theology. To the end of such understanding, this chapter presents a case 
study to illustrate the way theological options cut across traditions, inviting 
us along a pathway into the territory of transreligious theology oriented 
more by conceptual affinities and tensions than by religious identifications.1 
Consider the category of ultimate reality, which fits postaxial religious 
traditions reasonably comfortably, and even many nonaxial traditions with 
tolerable awkwardness. This is a classic example of a vague comparative 
category: it has been specified with a variety of mutually incompatible mod­
els that exist side by side within traditions and recur in various modalities 
across traditions.2 Three of the most plausible, highly developed models 
of ultimate reality are an agential being (personal theism, or not-less-than­
personal theism, where this divine being is the ultimate reality), the ground 
of being (beyond the categories of existence and nonbeing, and thus not 
a being but a principle that resists comprehensive understanding), and a 
subordinate god (a personal or not-less-than-personal God or gods within 
a more fundamental ultimate reality). Each ultimacy model boasts a long 
heritage, impressive explanatory power, significant cross-cultural visibility, 
and considerable internal diversity. 
The agential being model supposes that, whatever else it may be, ultimate 
reality is a being aware of reality, responsive to events, and active within the 
world. Reality as whole is invested with personality and purpose, meaning 
and intelligibility, goodness and beauty. Every aspect of reality is rendered as 
coherent as the narrative of a focally aware and purposefully active personal 
life. No theory of ultimate reality is better fitted to the human tendency to 
see intentionality in events and to give group identity an authoritative focus. 
Subordinate god models assert that there is at least one God, who is a 
being with determinate characteristics existing within a more fundamental 
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reality. In this two-tiered view, God has the personal characteristics that 
make agential being models so appealing – providing existential meaning 
and a focus for community bonding – but the challenging task of provid­
ing an understanding of reality as a whole is addressed at a more abstract, 
impersonal level. Subordinate god models offer a way to avoid some of the 
conceptual stresses that beset agential being models. 
Ground-of-being models make an ontological shift from God as a being 
to God as the ground or source of reality. This God is typically conceived as 
the source of being and nonbeing, and thus beyond those categories, which 
makes talk of existence or nonexistence unintelligible. To the extent that 
we can identify patterns and fundamental structures within the reality in 
which we live and move and have our being, we generate insights into the 
character of the ground of being but a full understanding always necessar­
ily retreats from the grasping cognition of human beings, or indeed of any 
being whatsoever. This is why ground-of-being models are often expressed 
using apophatic strategies of indirection. 
Consider a couple of examples of diversity internal to traditions. First, in 
the South Asian context, the theology of Rāmānuja (from the dvaita Vedānta 
tradition of Hindu philosophy) expresses personal theism. Rāmānuja’s the­
ology was formulated in explicit opposition to the advaita, or nondual 
Vedānta tradition, which belongs to the ground-of-being class of ultimacy 
models. Here we see a fundamental conflict internalized within the vague 
category of ultimate reality and persistently debated within the rich Vedānta 
tradition. Meanwhile, next door in Persia, Zoroastrianism presented two 
non-ultimate Gods, one good and one evil, who jointly constitute ultimate 
reality. This subordinate-gods cosmological vision eliminates the moral par­
adoxes of a personal ultimate and the moral neutrality of a nonpersonal 
ultimate and with striking clarity calls upon each human being to choose a 
moral side. 
Second, in the Western context, the ancient tradition of the Israelite reli­
gion, as it transformed into Judaism and early Christianity, gave powerful 
articulation to a subordinate-being model of ultimate reality. Here God is 
not ultimate reality, but rather a force for goodness and justice within a 
wider chaotic reality. Creation was understood as this God taming chaos 
to fashion an intelligible moral order. Within three centuries of its origins, 
Christianity had produced a new understanding of creation in which God 
creates from nothing, thereby making a personal being the ultimate reality, 
with all of the attendant theodicy problems. In the same environment, early 
Stoicism was propounding a ground-of-being model that also influenced 
Christianity as it sought to articulate the radical transcendence associated 
with its emerging view of God as ultimate reality itself, rather than as the 
religiously relevant component of ultimate reality. 
These models are live options for the transreligous theologian, once their
cross-cultural character is recognized, but only if the theologian is prepared
to leave the complex beauty of a single familiar religious continent to sail











the oceans seeking conceptual affinities and tensions among the world’s
religious ideas and practices. Even within the domain of comparative theol­
ogy, not all theologians find that journey appealing and would rather root
themselves in one religious continent and learn from one or more other
traditions how to root themselves ever more deeply. Fair enough; there is
room for many theological temperaments within comparative theology.
But transreligious theology takes a different journey, tackling fundamental
theological questions as they arise within the human species, in all of its
cultural and religious diversity and biological and bodily givenness. That
conception of transreligious theology guides this chapter’s exploration of
ultimate-reality models that cut across religious traditions and co-exist
within each tradition. 
Identifying the presence of the three models cutting across religious tradi­
tions helps to shape the choices before the transreligious theologian. Com­
paring those models is a critical component in making rational choices. 
One line of comparative analysis begins with the observation that the three 
models exemplify different approaches to managing the human reality of 
anthropomorphic cognition, whereby we make use of what we think we 
know best (human beings) to understand what we surely know least (ulti­
mate reality). For at least the following three reasons, comparing ultimacy 
models in terms of the ways they embrace or resist anthropomorphism may 
be a good place for the transreligious theologian to focus inquiry. 
First, anthropomorphism is prominent in theological traditions and wide­
spread in popular devotion, so it is difficult to avoid. The world of religious 
symbolism is replete with anthropomorphic imagery that promotes spiritual 
engagement, and there need not be anything naive or excessive about it. 
Moreover, some philosophic models ascribe to ultimate reality character­
istics that are derived from human experience, such as awareness, feelings, 
intentions, plans, and agency. Yet intellectuals also critique anthropomor­
phic conceptions of ultimate reality as profoundly misleading, so there is a 
rich array of material here for the transreligious theologian to engage and 
process. Second, a tradition rich in anthropomorphic images and stories 
may well be the departure point of a theologian raised in or attached to a 
theistic tradition. This makes anthropomorphic models of ultimate reality 
of immediate interest to many comparative and transreligious theologians. 
Third, from cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology, we have learned 
that anthropomorphic cognition appears to be something like a cognitive 
default, in the sense of the most natural, ready-to-hand way of thinking 
available for making sense of the world around us, including difficult-to­
interpret aspects of that world. Unfortunately, cognitive defaults of all 
kinds, including this one, are prone to error. Human beings routinely project 
consciousness, agency, and purpose where there is none. Our tendency to 
misapply anthropomorphic cognition does not refute anthropomorphism, 
but it does raise a red flag that transreligious theologians should evaluate 
carefully. 
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Anthropomorphism isn’t a simple continuum, ranging from extreme 
to none. There are three relatively independent dimensions of theological 
anthropomorphism: intentionality, practicality, and narrativity. Intentional­
ity is the degree to which the model attributes intentional action, conscious­
ness, and purposes to an invisible being such as a deity. Practicality is the 
degree to which a model of ultimate reality has existential grip and rel­
evance to the immediate concerns of people’s lives. Narrativity is the degree 
to which the model supports rich traditions of story, legend, and miracles 
that provide meaning to people’s lives and shared referents for a community. 
Anthropomorphism can be stronger or weaker in relation to each of these 
three dimensions, and theologians have adopted a variety of positions – 
opposing anthropomorphism here, employing it there. The variety of con­
figurations possible seems to offer the theologian considerable freedom, 
but the choice is meaningfully constrained. Each dimension can be tested 
against relevant information from cognitive science, evolutionary psychol­
ogy, comparative religion, and other sources. The theologian may have to 
balance what best reflects the scientific data against what most effectively 
provides existential orientation and a sense of religious community. Then 
a complex theological hypothesis will have to be tested against explana­
tory standards, including applicability, adequacy, coherence, consistency, 
and pragmatic considerations such as ethical consequences, aesthetic qual­
ity, social potency, and spiritual appeal. Framing and ranking the relevant 
criteria are themselves theological choices. 
Because choices that fit well with one criterion may fit poorly with another, 
the theologian should expect difficult decisions and conceptual stresses. For 
example, the ground-of-being model may be appealing to those who give 
great weight to evolutionary psychology and cognitive science, but may be 
found to be spiritually disappointing to those who sense that only a personal 
deity could be spiritually satisfying. The agential-being model may provide 
accessible spiritual understanding but struggle with scientific information 
about the ways human minds work. If the theologian finds the notion of 
providential action compelling, then God simply has to be an agent, but 
then the agential-being model must confront the problem of theodicy – 
which arises from the equation of the personal God, who contains no evil, 
with comprehensive reality, which does. Theodicy can be a problem also 
for those ground-of-being models that regard God as unambiguously good. 
Theodicy is not a problem for subordinate-deity models, such as process 
theology or Zoroastrianism, which can divorce God from the moral flaws of 
reality as a whole and thereby protect God’s moral perfection. 
The theologian will also face anthropomorphically inflected metaphysi­
cal questions about the ultimate conditions for reality. These include the 
problem of the One and the Many, the problem of evil, the problem of onto­
logical dependence, the problem of causal closure, the problem of the intel­
ligibility of reality, and so on. For example, suppose the theologian faces a 
choice between 1) the hypothesis of God as omnipotent creator (this could 






be either an agential-being or a ground-of-being position, depending on the 
details) and 2) the hypothesis of cosmic moral dualism famous from classical 
Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism (this belongs to the class of subordinate-
deity models). How might the theologian reason about such a choice? 
It would be relevant to consider how well each handles such theological 
issues as the problem of evil and the problem of the One and the Many. The 
theologian will find that absolute moral dualisms handle the problem of evil 
spectacularly well, at least in one obvious sense: the origin of both good 
and evil is cosmological, there is no perplexing question of one deriving 
from the other, and there is no possibility of eschatological consummation 
in favor of one or the other. By contrast, omnipotent creator theism offers 
a famously contorted solution to the problem of evil, with evil explained 
either as a mere privation of good in a good world created by a good God, 
or as spontaneously derived from the good and tolerated by a good God for 
a good reason, or as deliberately created by a good God for a good reason 
(which eschatology may reveal), or as rooted in God’s own morally ambiva­
lent nature. 
In regard to the problem of the One and the Many, the strengths and 
weakness of the two models are reversed. Absolute moral dualisms attribute 
everything in reality to two co-primordial creative forces locked in eternal 
battle, but don’t explain why things are determined in that dualistic cos­
mological way, essentially dodging the problem of the One and the Many. 
Meanwhile, omnipotent creator theism traces all of determinate reality to 
the divine nature and its creative act. One famous solution to the problem 
of the One and the Many describes this divine creative act not as a taming of 
chaos or the forming of pre-existent material but as creation from nothing 
(ex nihilo), which implies that everything is ontologically dependent on this 
divine creator. The only limitation to this splendid solution to the problem 
of the One and the Many is explaining the determinate nature of God – 
why should God be that way rather than some other way? Most ex nihilo
creation traditions simply refuse to entertain that question, treating God as 
self-existent, and thus as the metaphysical backstop for all origins questions. 
Thus, the model that solves one problem well does relatively poorly on 
the other. The transreligious theologian must ask: Is it more important to 
have an intelligible solution to the problem of evil or a compelling resolu­
tion of the problem of the One and the Many? Among those who would 
prefer to solve the problem of evil are Zoroaster, Confucius, and Alfred 
North Whitehead. Those who would prefer to solve the problem of the One 
and the Many include Plotinus, Śaṅkara, and Robert Neville. Still others, 
with competing metaphysical intuitions (such as the later Augustine), regard 
the two problems as equally important. 
How does one decide which problem is more pressing? Here the dimen­
sion of anthropomorphism we call practicality – the ready applicability of 
ideas to the immediate concerns of life – becomes a vital consideration. 
Prioritizing a solution to the problem of evil underwrites a way to think 
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about one of the great problems of human life, in which we are often preoc­
cupied with the pain and frustration of finitude and the outrage and needless 
suffering associated with moral evil. The more anthropomorphic position 
does not bother about completeness of rational intelligibility when it is not 
immediately relevant (which it rarely is in ordinary life). The less anthro­
pomorphic position maximizes the completeness of rational intelligibility. 
Agential-being models rate high on the practicality dimension of anthropo­
morphism, responding to existential needs and spiritual yearnings, but they 
do little to resist error-prone cognitive defaults. An overemphasis on stories, 
myths, legends, and miracles may impair theological richness, complexity, 
sophistication, and validity. By contrast, the less anthropomorphic position 
prioritizes the completeness of rational intelligibility even if the result is a 
theological vision of ultimate reality that regular religious people find dif­
ficult to digest. 
Several strategies are available to mitigate anthropomorphism. Consider 
the role of time and change within the life of an agential God. The more 
highly anthropomorphic models take their conceptual clues from narratives 
of God as an agent, which are amply present in the Vedas, the Hebrew Bible, 
the New Testament, and the Qur’an. In these narratives, God is a being who 
communicates, makes decisions, and acts at particular times. These char­
acteristics require the divine version of a temporal consciousness and the 
metaphysical capacity to change, develop, and feel. On the other hand, the 
theologian may come to regard a temporal, changing being as either unsuit­
able for a deity or impossible for an omnipotent creator. These reservations 
struck Aquinas, Avicenna, and Maimonides for Abrahamic theisms, and 
Udayana for South Asian theism. 
The attribution of eternity, immutability, and impassibility to God miti­
gates the intentionality dimension of anthropomorphism and draws the less 
highly anthropomorphic agential-being models close to the ground-of-being 
models. These attributions may help provide a rational account of compre­
hensive reality, but they may weaken the notion of a loving, benign, act­
ing God vital to some religious understandings. Similarly, a God standing 
outside time may imply divine foreknowledge incompatible with human 
freedom and natural divine responsiveness. Here again, subordinate-deity 
models, which do not use God to explain ultimate reality, may be able to 
avoid these difficulties. 
Like theologians rooted within a single tradition, the transreligious theo­
logian may feel forced toward some balancing of the personal aspects of 
divinity and the impersonal aspects of ultimate reality. The medieval syn­
thesis of classical theism combines personal (Biblical) and nonpersonal 
(philosophical) elements to define key doctrines such as the Trinity and the 
hypostatic union (the unity of humanity and divinity in Christ). In these 
formulations, the theologian grants the philosophers’ point that ultimate 
reality is not a being, but construes this as “not a being like created beings,” 
and then continues to insist with the Bible that the divine being is personal, 











intentional, and active. Where some analysts saw only contradictions in this 
synthesis, others saw hard-won harmony. 
The clearest way to save the idea of God as agential being is to dispense 
with the claim that this God is the ultimate reality, which is to shift from 
the agential-being class to the subordinate-deity class. Process theologians 
have made exactly that move. The clearest way to save the idea of God as 
ultimate reality is to drop the claim that ultimate reality is an agential being, 
which is to shift from the agential-being class to the ground-of-being class 
of models. Some theologians, such as Paul Tillich and many Jewish post-
Holocaust thinkers, have done just that. 
The transreligious theologian will also face the question of ontological 
dependence. The problem arises in classical theism when it asks how God 
can be truly omnipotent if there is something external to God with reference 
to which God’s moral or ontological standing can be assessed? The doctrine 
of aseity or self-subsistence asserts that divine reality exists in, of, for, and 
from itself. This implies that all things – even the transcendental ideals of 
goodness, truth, and beauty – are ontologically dependent on God, derive 
from God, and are what they are because of God. The most austere form 
of aseity implies occasionalism, which is influential in Muslim theology: 
nothing occurs that God does not do, nothing is created that God does not 
create, and there is no causal continuity apart from the action of God to 
make causal patterns and regularities appear. Jewish, Christian, and Hindu 
theology tend to affirm aseity in a moderate form. The ex nihilo constraint 
ensures that nothing already exists alongside God when God creates, which 
is the constraint that process models of ultimate reality abandon. Thus, for 
the creation ex nihilo view, everything is ontologically dependent on God, 
and yet God is free to create as God sees fit, perhaps giving creation the 
power to sustain its own causal regularities. 
A question that looms over all theological reasoning is: To what extent is 
ultimate reality to be regarded as generally fitting human modes of under­
standing? To what extent does ultimacy, by its very nature, exceed the grasp 
of finite knowers? If it exceeds too much, no knowledge and perhaps no 
relationship – at least no articulate relationship – to the divine is possible, 
as Aquinas argues in his discussion of analogy. If it fits too closely, the con­
cept of God threatens to shrink to disturbingly human size. These issues are 
closely related to questions about religious language. To what degree are 
characteristics attributed to God literally and univocally? To what extent 
analogically or metaphorically or symbolically? 
Symbolic interpretations shift reference away from the literal sense to
some other meaning. Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy offers an in-between
view: God loves in a way that is analogous to the way human beings
love – similar in respects sufficient to deserve the same word but different
in respects appropriate to the difference between divine being and human
being. Suitably reframed, divine agency can be retained even by ground­
of-being models. Tillich rejects virtually all literal statements about God,









but compensates for the loss of concrete meaning with a vibrant theory
of symbolism. 
Ground-of-being models tend to rank relatively low on all three dimen­
sions of anthropomorphism – significantly lower than the least anthropo­
morphic agential-being models – but versions differ in how they handle 
each of the three dimensions. For example, subordinate-deity models are 
an intriguing combination of high intentionality and high narrativity at the 
level of the depiction of the subordinate deity – higher than many agential­
being models – and low intentionality and low narrativity at the level of ulti­
mate reality as a whole, which is not religiously relevant for these models. 
Of course, what qualities to attribute to the God or gods operating under 
the dome of ultimate reality presents further decisions for the theologian, as 
well as how precisely to conceive the nature and structure of ultimate real­
ity. However, the transreligious theologian may decide to resist all forms of 
anthropomorphism. This choice would lead to religious naturalism, with 
ultimate reality conceived as the relatively characterless God Beyond God. 
Comparative religion gives rise to another criterion the transreligious 
theologian may find useful: deferring to the most sophisticated philosophi­
cal understandings in the various traditions as offering a kind of religious 
“expertise.” Ground-of-being models fit well with the expertise criterion. 
They can accommodate a symbolic account of diverse religious ideas and 
frame a metaphysics in which every viewpoint finds a natural place, even 
if they are not all of equal value. The expertise criterion causes trouble for 
agential-being models, whose insistence on a personal highest being as ulti­
mate reality tends to lock theology into the single religion focused on this 
particular God and to block the rich theological possibilities that take in the 
truths from multiple faiths, including the venerable nontheistic traditions. 
The expertise criterion, giving emphasis to the rich diversity of religious 
ideas and practices, may point the transreligious theologian toward some 
form of pluralism. The presence of plural religious practices and multi­
ple divinities probably inspired the Upaniṣads, with their affirmation that 
Brahman is One – behind, between, and beyond all, both identical with 
the human spirit and utterly transcending it, grounding and uniting every­
thing that is. The same vision powers the perennial philosophy’s attempt to 
coordinate all models of ultimate reality into a hierarchy perfectly suited to 
accommodate the vast range of spiritual personalities and inclinations, with 
each soul driving toward the loftier, transpersonal models as it commutes 
through the saṃsāric cycle of lives.3 A similar sensitivity to the perceived 
limits of religious images and ideas (images in conceptual form) inspires the 
apophatic declaration that ultimate reality is beyond all imagery and best 
met in linguistic indirection or even silence. Apophaticism is a strategy for 
speaking of ultimate reality by turning away from conceptual modeling, 
and indeed away from every kind of ultimacy speech – but all of this in such 
a way as to convey something indirectly about ultimate reality. There is a 





great deal to say, and much theoretical intricacy to negotiate, prior to laps­
ing into silence. 
Whereas classical theism was always subject to conceptual stresses, the 
supposedly personal and nonpersonal elements of ultimate reality were more 
easily combined in past eras than they are now. The natural and social sci­
ences have increased suspicions of the highly anthropomorphic default for 
human cognition. The sciences are most easily reconciled with naturalism, 
which either rejects all theological models as superstitions or invites new 
models based on the overflowing resources of nature itself, within which all 
human strivings, religious and otherwise, arise and find expression. Or, also 
compatible with the sciences, the response can be apophaticism, which finds 
the truest response to the divine, not in models, but in patterns of linguistic 
indirection that yield to a profound silence. 
One of the challenges of transreligious theology is how to think theo­
logically beyond a single tradition. What are one’s materials, concepts, and 
guidelines? Fortunately, comparative religion and comparative theology have 
prepared an array of fruitful cross-cultural concepts, issues to be addressed, 
and theological options to consider. Theologians working beyond the walls 
now have ample resources for moving religious understanding forward. 
Notes 
1 With the help of Martin, this chapter reframes conceptual content from Wildman 
(2017) in a way designed to be helpful to transreligious theologians. 
2 A properly vague comparative category is a key concept within the Cross-Cultural 
Comparative Religious Ideas project, the results of which are presented in three 
volumes edited by Robert Cummings Neville (2001). 
3 For example, see Smith (1992). 
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12 Cognitive science of religion 
and the nature of the divine 




Johan De Smedt and Helen De Cruz 
Introduction 
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that people naturally veer 
toward beliefs that are quite divergent from Anselmian monotheism or 
Christian theism. Some authors (e.g., Shook 2017) have taken this view as 
a starting point for a debunking argument against religion, whereas others 
(e.g., Barrett 2009) have tried to vindicate Christian theism by appealing to 
the noetic effects of sin, or the Fall. 
In this chapter, we use a different approach: we ask what theologians 
can learn from CSR about the nature of the divine by looking at the CSR 
literature and what it identifies as commonalities across religions. We use a 
pluralist, nonconfessional approach to outline properties of the divine with 
reference to the CSR literature. We connect our approach to Hick’s religious 
pluralism, Ramakrishna’s realization of God through multiple spiritual 
paths, and Gellman’s inexhaustible plenitude. 
The origins of religious beliefs and their justification 
What can the origins of religious beliefs tell us about their justification? From 
the eighteenth century onward, philosophers and scientists have considered 
this question by outlining natural histories of religion. These accounts not 
only examine the origins of religious beliefs but also ask whether those 
beliefs could be rationally maintained in light of their origins. Typically, 
eighteenth-century natural histories of religion (e.g., De Fontenelle 1728; 
Hume 1757) emphasized the diversity of religious beliefs and expressed 
skepticism about their rationality. For example, Hume (1757, 2) stated that 
religious beliefs were so diverse that “no two nations, and scarce any two 
men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments.” 
By contrast, other authors since the early modern period, such as John 
Calvin and Pierre Gassendi, emphasized the universality of religion and 
took this as a starting point for the truth of religious claims. For example, 
Calvin (1559/1960, 43–46), following Cicero, made the empirical claim 
that there is “no nation so barbarous, no people so savage, that they have 
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not a deep-seated conviction that there is a God” and concluded “it is not 
a doctrine that must be first learned in school, but one of which each of 
us is master from his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no 
one to forget.” Calvin appealed to an innate sense of the divine, a sensus 
divinitatis, which instills religious beliefs in us. An influential updated ver­
sion of this argument is Plantinga’s (2000) extended Aquinas/Calvin model, 
which argues that Christian belief can have warrant, even in the absence 
of rational argument, because it is produced by a properly working sensus 
divinitatis that God implanted in us. 
However, religious diversity threatens to undermine any straightforward 
claim from universality to truth. If religious belief is universal, why do peo­
ple across religious traditions hold mutually incompatible religious beliefs? 
The Medieval Muslim theologian Al-Ghazālī worried about this question, 
as he mused that children of Muslims tend to turn out Muslims, children 
of Jews tend to grow up as Jews, and children of Christians tend to become 
Christians. He proposed that everyone is born with the fiṭrah, a basic moral 
sense and natural belief in God, which can give rise to authentic religion or 
be perverted into false religions: “Every infant is born endowed with the 
fiṭrah: then his parents make him Jew or Christian or Magian [Zoroastrian]” 
(Al-Ghazālī, 1100/2006, 19–20). In this way, cultural influences can either 
help properly cultivate certain religious beliefs or have a distorting influence 
and give rise to false (in Al-Ghazālī’s view, non-Muslim) ones. Similarly, 
Christian authors such as Calvin (1559/1960) and, more recently, Plantinga 
(2000, 184) appeal to the Fall as an explanation for why people’s “natural 
knowledge of God has been compromised, weakened, reduced, smothered, 
overlaid, or impeded.” As a result of our sinful condition, we are not only 
damaged in our cognitive structures, which hampers our knowledge of God, 
but also in our affection, which fails to orient itself to God. 
Any argument that takes the prevalence of religious beliefs as a starting 
point to make claims about the existence and nature of the divine stum­
bles on the problem of religious diversity. In order to address this problem, 
authors from monotheistic traditions appeal to a sense of the divine com­
bined with auxiliary principles such as the noetic effects of sin (Calvin and 
Plantinga) or to cultural transmission (Al-Ghazālī) to explain why religious 
beliefs are so divergent. For these authors, religious diversity is a problem. 
But, as we will show later, religious pluralism celebrates the diversity of 
religious beliefs, while at the same allowing for something akin to a sense 
of the divine. 
The cognitive science of religion 
CSR can shed new light on why religious beliefs are widespread and diverse. 
CSR is an interdisciplinary research program that uses findings from, 
among others, developmental psychology, cognitive science, and anthro­
pology. A unifying theme throughout this literature is the commitment of 



















CSR authors to the idea that religion is natural. This does not necessarily 
mean religious beliefs are innate (although a few authors, e.g., Bering (2011) 
have made this stronger claim), but that such beliefs come relatively easily, 
with little formal instruction, as part of ordinary human development and 
socialization (McCauley 2011). CSR also holds that religious beliefs are the 
result of several cognitive processes, which are not exceptional but operate 
in everyday life, such as discerning teleology, detecting agency, and think­
ing about other people’s minds. Within different cultures, these cognitive 
building blocks give rise to a wide range of religious beliefs. We will here 
briefly review three lines of research in CSR scholarship: belief in super­
natural agents and its connection to cooperation, teleological thinking, and 
afterlife beliefs. 
Across cultures, people believe in a variety of supernatural agents that 
are concerned with moral or ritual violations. Such agents include powerful 
gods such as Zeus or Kālī, the Hindu goddess who destroys evil, bestows 
liberation, and protects her people. But they also include supernatural 
agents with more limited capacities, such as the ancestors, place spirits, and 
the Chinese Kitchen God, who reports to the Jade Emperor about how fami­
lies behaved during the past year. There is increasing evidence that belief 
in such supernatural agents enhances cooperation among members of the 
same religion by providing a sense of social control: people are less likely to 
behave antisocially (e.g., steal, cheat) if they believe they are being watched. 
Social control is particularly effective if the agents who are watching have 
the capacity to punish transgressions. 
Initially, CSR authors believed that only very powerful creator gods, termed
high gods, could foster cooperation in this way, because only high gods
would care about moral transgressions. For example, Norenzayan (2013)
speculates that belief in high gods decreased antisocial behavior, thereby
enabling people to live in larger groups. However, more recently, there is
increasing evidence that belief in a broader range of supernatural agents can
motivate people to cooperate. For example, Purzycki et al. (2016) investi­
gated whether people who believe in supernatural agents would be more
generous toward others who have the same religion as themselves but who
live far away. They let participants of a variety of supernatural faiths, includ­
ing belief in garden spirits (horticulturalists from Tanna, Vanuatu), ancestor
spirits (Yasawa, Fiji), and spirit masters, local spirits who have dominion
over a small part of the landscape (Tyva, Siberia), play a game where they
could allocate money either to themselves or to a distant or close person
with the same religion. People were more generous to distant co-religionists
if the supernatural beings they believed in were more knowledgeable and
more able to punish moral transgressions. This supports broad supernatural
punishment theory, which holds that a wide range of supernatural beings,
not just supreme creators, can instill cooperation (Watts et al. 2015). 
Cultural evolution, or potentially gene-culture co-evolution, is hypoth­
esized as the driving factor in the cultural spread of the belief in specific 
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supernatural beings. If belief in supernatural agents who are morally con­
cerned and able to punish ritual or moral transgressions increases coop­
eration among people who hold the same beliefs, we can predict that such 
beliefs confer a fitness advantage (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). In groups 
where belief in supernatural punishment by gods, spirits, or other supernat­
ural beings is common, one could thus expect higher degrees of cooperation. 
This would provide selective pressure at a cultural level for the maintenance 
and spread of belief in supernatural punishment, and perhaps also help fos­
ter biological adaptations that make us prone to believing in such agents 
(Bering and Johnson 2005). 
Teleological thinking is intimately tied to religion across cultures. Chil­
dren and adults prefer teleological explanations for the origin of natu­
ral beings, including biological and nonbiological natural kinds, such as 
giraffes, tiger paws, and mountains. In a typical experiment, participants 
are offered the choice between two kinds of explanation for why a given 
object exists. Does it rain so that animals and plants can drink (a teleologi­
cal explanation) or because water condenses into droplets (a mechanistic 
explanation)? There is robust empirical evidence that young children up to 
the age of ten prefer teleological over mechanistic explanations (Kelemen 
1999). Moreover, when adults are put under time pressure, they are also 
more likely to endorse false teleological explanations, for example, “the Sun 
radiates heat because warmth nurtures life” (Kelemen and Rosset 2009). 
PhD holders in the sciences and humanities are also liable to endorse false 
teleological explanations under time pressure, albeit to a lesser extent than 
the general population (Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston 2013). 
There is a link between teleological thinking and religiosity. Kelemen 
(2004) initially argued that children are intuitive theists because they attrib­
ute teleological features of the world to an intelligent designer. But later 
experiments cast doubt on this interpretation and indicate a broader con­
nection between teleological thinking and supernatural beliefs and practices. 
For example, Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2013) found that scientists 
who tend to think of the Earth as having agency and caring for creatures 
(so-called Gaia beliefs), as well as theist scientists, think more teleologically 
than scientists who don’t believe in the Earth as an agent or in God. Simi­
larly, ordinary adults from the United States and Finland who endorse either 
Gaia beliefs or classical theist beliefs are more likely to think that objects 
(e.g., a maple leaf, a mountain) were made purposively by some being 
(Järnefelt, Canfield, and Kelemen 2015). Järnefelt et al. (2019) studied tele­
ological beliefs in China, in a group of participants who mostly self-identify
as atheists. However, all participants engaged at least in some religious prac­
tices, including revering ancestors, feng shui, and using lucky charms. They 
found that the more participants engaged in such religious practices, the 
more likely they were to endorse teleological explanations for nonbiological 
natural kinds. The Finnish and Chinese studies tentatively suggest that tele­
ological thinking might also lie at the basis of nontheistic religious beliefs 
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and practices. Indeed, research on teleology and life events suggests that 
teleological thinking persists in atheists and agnostics (e.g., Heywood and 
Bering 2014): when spontaneously reflecting on significant life events, athe­
ists offer fewer teleological explanations than theists, but still suggest that 
things happen to them for a reason, for example, claiming that the universe 
wanted to give them a sign or send them a message. 
CSR has also shown that afterlife beliefs are robust and cross-culturally 
widespread. Belief in the afterlife probably is rooted in social thinking, in 
our ordinary attributions of mental states to other agents in everyday life. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002, 250) already suggested, it is hard to imagine 
ourselves as no longer existing – it becomes intuitive and plausible to imag­
ine ourselves in an afterlife, and any cultural scripts that propose an after­
life (e.g., reincarnation) can easily spread. Moreover, we find it difficult to 
imagine that others, especially those we interact with frequently, no longer 
exist. We continue to attribute mental states to them, even if they are not in 
physical proximity or if they are dead. Bloom (2004) characterizes humans 
as intuitive dualists: young children already make an intuitive distinction 
between people, using intuitive psychology to reason about them, and phys­
ical objects, using intuitive physics to interact with them. However, Hodge 
(2011) argues that our thinking about dead agents is not easily captured in 
mind/body dualistic terms. Watson-Jones et al. (2017) found that Christians 
in the United States think our psychology (personality, preferences, desires) 
will survive after death, but not necessarily our bodies, whereas Christians 
from Vanuatu (Melanesia) believe that our biological properties (bodies 
and bodily functions) will survive into the afterlife, but not necessarily our 
psychology. This indicates that within cultures and even within the same 
religion, different belief scripts about postmortem survival may develop and 
that Bloom’s (2004) intuitive dualism may be too simplistic. 
What does CSR mean for knowledge of the divine? 
CSR shows that religious beliefs are the result of universal cognitive dis­
positions. Because these dispositions are underdetermined, religious diver­
sity becomes inevitable. As we have seen, humans are naturally inclined 
to believe in supernatural agents, but these are not necessarily monotheis­
tic gods. We are inclined to ascribe teleology, but this is linked to a broad 
notion of supernatural agency, including Mother Earth and ancestral spirits. 
We tend to believe in an afterlife, but that afterlife takes a number of differ­
ent forms. 
What, if any, conclusions about our knowledge of the divine can we 
draw from CSR? Shook (2017) takes CSR to claim that religious beliefs are 
innate, a position most CSR authors do not endorse (but see Bering 2011), 
and then subsequently takes the diversity of religious beliefs to spell bad 
news for their justification. Teehan (2016) argues that CSR puts pressure 
on theological views, such as that God would be omnibenevolent: religions 
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encourage in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, which would 
entail that social evils such as racism and xenophobia would be part of 
God’s plan. This would lower our belief that an omnibenevolent God exists, 
and theodicies that appeal to the Fall do not solve this problem. 
By contrast, Barrett (2009) appeals to the Fall and sinfulness to explain 
religious diversity. If the cognitive dispositions we discussed earlier are God’s 
way of instilling religious beliefs, why would they allow so much diversity? 
One possible answer is that a perfectly adequate concept of God does 
come as part of our biological heritage but that living in a sinful, fallen 
world this concept grows corrupt as we grow. If not for broken relation­
ships, corrupt social structures, flawed religious communities, and the 
suffering that people inflict upon each other, perhaps children would 
inevitably form a perfectly acceptable concept of God. The diversity in 
god concepts we see is a consequence of human error and not divine 
design. 
(Barrett 2009, 97–98) 
This approach, like Calvin’s and Plantinga’s appeal to the noetic effects of 
sin, comes at a cost: on the one hand, there is an inference from religious 
belief to the truth of those beliefs, but on the other hand, any religious 
beliefs that do not fit the preconceptions of these authors are dismissed as 
results of defective cognition. How can Barrett be sure what a “perfectly 
acceptable concept of God” is, and how can he prevent those human errors 
from bleeding out and casting doubt on all religious beliefs? This is a prob­
lem he does not address. 
We want to suggest an alternative approach: the dispositions outlined by 
CSR do give us some insight into the divine, and religious diversity is not 
the result of sinfulness or error. Such a proposal fits within religious plural­
ism, the view that different religious beliefs provide knowledge (of some 
sort) of God or a supernatural reality. Religious pluralism has been defended 
by authors from different religious traditions, for example, the Christian 
John Hick (2006), the Hindu Sri Ramakrishna (Maharaj 2017), and the 
Jew Jerome Gellman (1997). A common starting point for proponents of 
religious pluralism is the parable of the blind men and the elephant, accord­
ing to which several blind men approach the pachyderm. One feels the trunk 
and concludes an elephant is long and soft, another feels the tusks and con­
cludes it is smooth and hard, yet another a leg and surmises it is broad and 
firm. Each blind man captures something of the reality of the elephant, but 
it would be a mistake for each to assume that their testimony is the best 
description of the animal and to ignore the contradictions in the others’ 
depictions. Each blind man mistakes a part for the whole – rashly assuming 
his knowledge of the elephant is the only and whole truth about it. In the 
parable, it does not seem to occur to the blind men to talk to one another 
or to move around the elephant to feel its other body parts in order to gain 




a fuller understanding. Likewise, in real life adherents to different religions 
rarely take each other’s views of the supernatural into consideration. Propo­
nents of pluralism have provided divergent ways to flesh out how we come 
to knowledge of supernatural reality. 
Hick (2006) postulates an ultimate reality that is conceived of in differ­
ent ways within various cultural traditions. This ultimate reality is real (not 
a mere cultural construct), and religious practices and mystical perception 
grasp something genuine about it. At the same time, Hick avers that the 
supernatural remains ultimately unknowable. This Kantian perspective 
draws a distinction between a noumenal transcendent reality and the objects 
of devotion and religious practices that are mere phenomenal manifestations 
that believers construct. Hick’s pluralism is not analogous to the situation 
of the blind men and the elephant: the elephant is not an unknowable nou­
menon, as much about the elephant is known by the individual blind men. 
In the light of CSR, Hick’s account is unsatisfying, as it does not explain the 
common threads across religious traditions, such as belief in supernatural 
agents who care about what we do, belief that things occur for a reason, 
and belief in an afterlife. These commonalities would have to be dismissed 
because ultimate reality is unknowable. In Hick’s Kantian picture, it does 
not matter whether religious beliefs are convergent to some extent (as CSR 
suggests) or diverge without clear bounds, as they grasp at an unknowable 
transcendent reality. 
Ramakrishna was a Bengali Hindu mystic, originally a priest of the god­
dess Kālī (see Maharaj 2017 for a comprehensive overview). After research­
ing and mystically engaging with a host of other traditions, he advocated 
the position that all religions are spiritual paths to the same divine reality, 
which he called God. To explain apparent tensions between religions – for 
example, that some see God as impersonal and others as personal, some see 
God as immanent, and others as transcendent, some see God as having some 
(anthropomorphic) form and others as formless – Ramakrishna argued that 
God is infinite and illimitable: God is both personal and impersonal, God 
is like a mother, but also like a father, a lover, a friend. Divergent paths of 
devotion lead to the same divine reality. As such, Ramakrishna’s view aligns 
closer to the parable of the elephant and the blind men than does Hick’s, as 
it accepts that different religious traditions capture aspects of divine reality. 
A similar concept is employed by Gellman (1997), who sees God as hav­
ing an inexhaustible plenitude. God presents himself to mystics in different 
aspects, including his nonpersonal aspects to nontheistic mystics. There are 
some differences between Gellman’s and Ramakrishna’s proposals: Gellman 
offers this as a speculative hypothesis, rather than as an experienced state 
of affairs, and his account is focused on mystics rather than on religious 
believers more generally. 
CSR does not privilege a specific religion, but indicates that there are 
common threads among religious traditions. This scientific claim is in line 





   
 














with Ramakrishna’s pluralism. Why would God present himself in such var­
ying ways? CSR indicates that religious beliefs arise as the result of an inter­
action between cultural context and ordinary cognitive processes. Because 
these cognitive processes allow for a wide range of religious beliefs, religious 
diversity becomes inevitable. At the same time, CSR also predicts robust 
cross-cultural similarities in religious beliefs and practices. Ramakrishna’s 
views on religious diversity fit well with these predictions, as he saw differ­
ent religions as multiple paths leading to the same supernatural reality. Con­
trary to Christian exclusivist thinkers, he saw religious diversity as a result 
of a deliberate divine plan, and not an unfortunate accident, because people 
from different religious communities have different cultural backgrounds, 
which make some religious views more palatable or plausible given their 
worldview. Ramakrishna used the parable of a mother who prepares several 
dishes to suit the different tastes of her children. 
Suppose a mother has five children and a fish is bought for the family.
She doesn’t cook pilau or kalia for all of them. All have not the same
power of digestion; so she prepares a simple stew for some. But she
loves all her children equally [. . .] God has made different religions
to suit different aspirants, times, and countries. All doctrines are so
many paths; but a path is by no means God Himself. [. . .] Indeed,
one can reach God if one follows any of the paths with whole-hearted
devotion. 
(Ramakrishna, cited in Maharaj 2017, 188) 
Concluding thoughts 
CSR shows that religions have substantial similarities. As we reviewed here,
CSR indicates that people across cultures believe in supernatural agents
who are concerned with what we do. They may be watchful garden spirits,
or ancestors, or powerful gods, but they care about ritual and moral vio­
lations and thus discourage antisocial behavior. Moreover, those religious
agents have goals: they make things happen or create natural kinds for
some purpose or reason. Religious traditions suggest that humans will con­
tinue to exist in some form after death, in a distinctive afterlife as revered
ancestors, souls in Heaven or Hell, or through reincarnation. This recurring
set of beliefs accords better with Ramakrishna’s religious pluralism that
acknowledges such beliefs as different ways of tracking supernatural real­
ity than with Hick’s religious pluralism, which regards ultimate reality as
unknowable. The findings of CSR do not allow one to infer which theologi­
cal position is correct, but they can be put to use by empirically engaged
theologians as they convey relevant information about the supernatural.
This chapter provides initial groundwork for such an empirically informed
natural theology. 
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Wesley J. Wildman 
Introduction 
Love and desire are profound realities of the very greatest importance to 
human beings and are critical to narratives defining the meaning of life for 
our species. Science fiction has imagined self-aware, moral species without 
love or desire, but they leave me cold. I prefer the passion and energy of love 
and desire, even allowing for the accompanying problems. Why are these 
concepts, and the corresponding experiences, so powerful for us, and why 
do we feel they take us so deeply into the nature of the reality we receive, 
create, and inhabit? It’s a fair question. After all, the cosmos doesn’t display 
a lot of desire until biological complexity reaches a high order, and even 
in the biological realm desire is a lot more widespread than love, which is 
as rare in the big scheme of things as it is valuable. Why, therefore, do we 
human beings sense that love and desire tell us something profound about 
reality as a whole, rather than merely something profound about ourselves? 
If there were a divine agent who deliberately created the world out of desire 
and love, then there would be a basis for inferring something about ultimate 
reality from human experiences of love and desire. But that line of thinking 
is for other people to pursue. I’m interested in a transreligious, naturalist
account of love and desire, human and divine. 
The divine part of such a story refers not to the thoughts, feelings, inten­
tions, or actions of a divine being – not a possibility for the religious natu­
ralist – but to the valuational depth structures and dynamic possibilities 
of the natural world. Not all naturalists are interested in the axiological 
(i.e., valuational) depths and flows of natural reality. Yet specifically reli­
gious naturalists see in those depths the very ground of being, which they 
understand to be the correct logical referent of claims that theists make 
about gods (see Wildman 2017). It follows that peering into those depths 
for an account of love and desire makes sense as an activity of transreligious 
theological inquiry. There are touchpoints across the world’s religions for 
such an enterprise, from shamanism of many types to varieties of African 
traditional religion, from the mystical and philosophical strands within the 
large religious traditions with sacred canonical literatures, to the formally 
naturalist or atheist traditions of philosophical reflection. 
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The human part of this story, of this transreligious-naturalist account of 
love and desire, does not refer to the many abstract characterizations of 
the human person and its destiny or purpose offered within the supernatu­
ral worldviews of religions and other wisdom traditions. Rather, the ref­
erence is to fully embodied human beings in social worlds realizing some 
possibilities and foreclosing others in every moment of their fleeting lives, 
driven by potent desire and its equally insistent companion, aversion. The 
one universal language we have for communicating across the differences 
of human bodies, for discussing shared human character under and within 
human individual and cultural differences, is – no, not the language of love, 
but the language of science (see Wildman 2009). That’s where I’ll start this 
brief meditation, eventually working my way down to divine love and desire 
in the depths of nature. 
Human love and desire 
For centuries, love has been the domain of poets, novelists, and musi­
cians, and in many respects it remains the domain of luminaries within the 
humanities. But in the last few decades, scientists have taught us a lot about 
love – not only about the intricacies of the outworkings and failures of 
love in individual lives but also about the brain and behavioral systems that 
support the expression of love in the vast majority of human beings across 
cultures, apparently in much the same way for the last 50,000 years or so 
(Fisher 2004). These neural-behavioral love systems evolved in other species 
first, and we see them active in many primate species, though very differ­
ently than in human life. There are at least four relatively distinct brain and 
behavioral love-and-desire systems, three of which are directly related to 
what we human beings call romantic love (Fisher et al. 2002). Behaviors 
corresponding to these systems have been discerned in all human cultures, in 
some cases, and the vast majority of cultures, in other cases, with the excep­
tions being accounted for by explicit cultural suppression. Never underes­
timate the capacity of culture to fashion something novel from the givens 
of biology! It is fair to assume we are talking about biologically universal 
aspects of human bodies, despite the varied ways that cultures regulate and 
give expression to them (the key anthropological study is Jankowiak and 
Fischer 1992). On top of those powerful love-and-desire systems ride inten­
tions that we employ to guide our behavior in accordance with, or possibly 
in spite of, or even in resistance to, surrounding social norms for regulating 
this intense domain of human life. 
Probably the most fundamental love-and-desire system is maternal love, 
which is nearly universal across half of each mammalian species. It is critical 
for mammalian flourishing and, in human beings especially, it has significant 
overlaps with two of the three types of romantic love and desire to be dis­
cussed in what follows (Zeki 2007). Maternal love and sexual attraction are 
probably the most evolutionarily primal of the four love-and-desire neural-
behavioral love systems – one erotic in nature and the other not. Because 
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maternal love is (obviously) not universal in the human species, and because 
it is fractionated and marshaled by the more romantic and sexual forces of 
love and desire, I’ll set it to one side. In what follows, I focus on the other 
three love-and-desire systems. 
The first of these three love-and-desire systems is sexual attraction. The 
sexual-attraction system is realized through a mesolimbic neural pathway 
for which dopamine is the key neurotransmitter, but the sex hormones tes­
tosterone and estrogen (and others) are key to activating and regulating this 
system (Fisher, Aron, and Brown 2006). Love and desire as sexual attraction 
has no fixed lifespan, but it peaks in late adolescence for males and in the 
mid-30s for females, waxes and wanes during relationships, and gradually 
abates through the aging process after the peak is passed. Testosterone levels 
in human males spike when trying to mate and take a big hit when becom­
ing a father for the first time, so the system reflexively adjusts to some life 
circumstances. Love and desire in this case refer especially to pleasure seek­
ing and pleasure giving through copulation. The opportunity to mate spurs 
competition among males, and also among females when sex seems to be on 
offer, and it spills over into other circumstances as well. In fact, the sexual-
attraction love-and-desire system is a specialized application of a more gen­
eral testosterone system that figures in many parts of life, particularly when 
people are young, and particularly among males, who have less developed 
self-regulation capabilities than females until their mid-to-late 20s. The tes­
tosterone system unleashes a potent set of drives and underwrites a lot of 
human aggression; indeed, the part of it we call the sexual-attraction system 
can also cross the line into violence. Unregulated, the sexual-attraction sys­
tem has the potential to cause social chaos through aggressive rivalries and 
pregnancies for which people are not ready. Unsurprisingly, this love system 
is carefully regulated in all human cultures, though in very diverse ways. 
The second love-and-desire system is infatuation. Although the tapes­
try of mate choice is relevant to all sexually reproducing animal species, 
the infatuation love-and-desire system appears to be a distinctively human 
thread within that tapestry. The neurochemistry of infatuation within human 
beings has several dimensions. The feel-good neurotransmitter dopamine 
plays a critical role, giving us the feeling of intoxication. So does cortisol, 
which produces anxiety and stress, at least for the first year or two, when we 
tend to try hardest in new relationships. Higher dopamine is coupled with 
lower levels of another neurotransmitter, which pushes serotonin down to 
levels associated with people suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and helps to explain why infatuation feels so much like an all-consuming 
obsession. This neurochemical cocktail also deactivates regions in the fron­
tal cortex that are responsible for being critically minded and able to evalu­
ate evidence fairly, which accounts for the fact that “love is blind” very 
often and can lead to poor judgment (Zeki 2007). Love and desire as infatu­
ation, once activated in a relationship, has a lifespan of about seven to ten 
years. A plausible evolutionary explanation for this timeline is that it is just 





long enough to get a couple of children more or less independent and able to 
help their mother gather protein and carbohydrates for survival. At the most 
general level, dopamine neural circuits recruit our capacities for valuation, 
for deciding what is important and directing the focus of our attention. The 
infatuation love-and-desire system involves distorted valuation in a cloud 
of longing, whereby we truly only see what we want and need to see in our 
beloved. A friend could point out our error of judgment, even backed up 
by solid evidence, and often enough we won’t believe it, saying that “you 
don’t know my lover like I do” or some other gloriously and ecstatically 
self-deluded rationalization for ignoring a lover’s well-established patterns 
of behavior. In Western culture, this is what we mean by being in love – 
immersed in feelings so overwhelming that we experience the desire to pos­
sess and to be possessed comprehensively, knowing with certainty that this 
state of bliss will fulfill all our longings. Of course, we are mistaken in this 
intoxicated certainty, yet even the mistake bespeaks the depth of longing 
in life to realize infinite possibilities within the inescapable limitations and 
ambiguity of the finite. 
The third love-and-desire system is bonding. The key neurotransmitters 
in this case are oxytocin, the so-called “cuddle chemical,” and vasopres­
sin; both are powerfully involved in romantic love and maternal love. They 
are released in large quantities in orgasm and during breastfeeding, trig­
gering potent feelings of closeness, and they are also released in roman­
tic love (Zeki 2007). The bonding system has no lifespan and can actually 
strengthen as we age, under the right circumstances. We can also destroy 
progressive bonding with a partner through actions that undermine trust, 
which is a critical element in maintaining close bonds. In application to 
love and desire, the bonding love-and-desire system functions in a special­
ized way to make two, or very few, people extremely tight-knit and loyal. 
The same system has less specialized applications to groups, where crises 
or rituals or other processes trigger intensified belonging and loyalty, while 
underlining the distinction between the in-group, where investment of pre­
cious resources in relationships is appropriate, and the out-group, where 
such investment is inappropriate (Choi 2011; De Dreu et al. 2011). That is, 
in solidifying closeness and loyalty, the bonding love-and-desire system also 
solidifies in-group identification against outsiders and amplifies both sensi­
tivity to betrayal perpetrated by in-group members and suspicion toward 
strangers. 
The fact that we human beings bear in our very bodies three biologically 
distinct love-and-desire systems is extremely important in many domains of 
human life, including the following four. 
First, psychologically, these love-and-desire neurobehavioral systems are 
emotionally powerful and directly relevant to our everyday worlds. For 
example, it is critical to realize that the inevitable waning of infatuation need 
not be the end of romantic love in the other two senses. Plenty of couples 
experience incredibly potent feelings of shattered dreams, unmet longings, 







and associated resentment and grief a few years into a relationship. Indeed, 
across cultures permitting divorce, the peak divorce rate occurs four to five 
years into marriage, which is about seven to nine years into the relationship, 
as the last trace of infatuation evaporates (Fisher 1992). Instead of blaming 
one another for not living up to the ridiculous expectations we built in a 
haze of infatuation, it’d be smarter and kinder to recognize the inevitabil­
ity of this process, to reset expectations, and to focus on strengthening the 
bonding system and nurturing sexual attraction. 
Second, socially, the very same systems that underwrite love also reinforce 
in-group identities and support energetic monitoring of group boundaries to 
protect in-groups from outsiders. That is, the flip side of the biochemistry 
of bonding is xenophobia and racism. Both are biochemically spontaneous 
processes within human social environments. We do not have to be slaves 
to such emotional reactions because we can exercise determination and 
empathy to behave differently. But we certainly are biologically predisposed 
toward tight bonding with conspecifics and suspicion of strangers. 
Third, politically, many of these dynamics operate silently, in nonro­
mantic situations, including just below the surface of political conflict. For
instance, they render us vulnerable to lazy acceptance of the incompre­
hensibility of our political opponents – “we’ll just never understand how
they could think that way, so there’s no point in even talking about it.”
The result can be the collapse of civility in our public discourse and the
damaging of our corporate problem-solving capacities. But some degree
of awareness of how these neurobehavioral systems work could mitigate
such problems. 
Fourth, religiously, there are many ways of regulating or adapting these 
potent biobehavioral forces. For example, some conservative communi­
ties seem terrified of human bodies when it comes to managing the sexual-
attraction love-and-desire system, excoriating young people for making out 
or masturbating, while simultaneously successfully activating the bonding 
love-and-desire system to strengthen suspicion of outsiders and sparking 
the infatuation system to apply to the many invisible beings of religious 
devotion. Meanwhile, some liberal religious communities delusionally 
pronounce their unlimited openness to all people, proclaiming universal 
acceptance, while remaining utterly oblivious to the very real social and 
psychological conditions for bonding and completely failing to see how 
exclusionary their behavior seems to those who are more realistic about the 
conditions for forming group identity, as many conservatives are. I’m pretty 
sure the conservative religious grip on the human love systems does more 
damage, if only because they’re the ones who bring the most people into 
the world of their religious stories through activating bonding and infatu­
ation circuitry for religious ends. Meanwhile, liberal religious communi­
ties are uncomfortable with too much emotionality and rightly suspicious 
of the dangers of in-group–out-group boundaries, so they refuse to avail 
themselves of the biochemical pathways to congregational flourishing that 





conservative communities employ. In our time, those liberal communities 
are withering on the vine. 
Those four applications of the human love-and-desire systems are suffi­
cient to make the point that knowing about our three neurobehavioral love 
systems matters. In particular, we need to understand that they are portable, 
in the sense that they are applicable not only proximally to love but also dis­
tally to out-group suspicion, religious devotion, purchasing patterns, voting 
tendencies, and many other domains of life. They are multiply realizable, in 
the sense that they are differently inflected by varied cultures, which take 
the biologically given constraints and interpret and regulate them in diverse 
ways. They are also socially potent, with huge economic and political impli­
cations – just consider the extent to which the contemporary music industry, 
the fashion and cosmetics industries, commercial films, and politics depend 
on testosterone-powered aggression, dopamine-fueled infatuation, and
oxytocin-driven bonding and suspicion. It is no wonder that religious world-
views have always attempted to regulate love and desire and narrate them 
in pro-social ways. 
When cultural, often religious, narratives of love and desire work well, 
people young and old cultivate virtuous patterns of behavior that support 
group well-being. People internalize ideals that direct their intentions and 
their powers of agency to loving and desiring in specific ways, typically 
ways that match community expectations. To love otherwise than this is 
to embrace pain and confusion and either triggers reversion to the norm or 
else flight in search of a community with more compatible norms. The emo­
tional potency of these love-and-desire systems is such that, when activated, 
they help us detect the socially constructed character of the social norms we 
employ to regulate love and desire. For instance, in a monogamous culture, 
the man who is unfaithful to his wife soon confronts, privately or pub­
licly, the cultural norm that regulates sexual behavior, and he must decide 
whether to reject the norm or return to conformity with it. The woman who 
loves another woman in a social environment inhospitable to homosexual­
ity sees the heterosexual norm as a looming, oppressive reality and will be 
forced to reject the norm secretly, reject the norm and relocate to a differ­
ent community, or conform to the norm and suppress her natural feelings. 
The person with fluid sexual identity senses the binary gender norms of the 
home culture, whereas others may not even see them; the activation of love 
and desire in this person begs for a new type of social order where gender 
binaries are seen as unrealistic oversimplifications of a complex bio-psycho­
social reality. 
This neurobehavioral account of the human being’s biologically embod­
ied and socially embedded experience of love and desire has important 
implications for other classifications of love. Our diverse experiences make 
it obvious that there are many kinds of love and desire, and we human 
beings love to categorize difference in a never-ceasing quest to understand 
ourselves. The biologically grounded classification I offer here is far from 




the only way to look at things. Although it is true that all our experiences 
of love and desire will connect with the bodily realities I have described, 
and equally true that we are better off knowing than not knowing about the 
various love-and-desire systems, the ways we love are socially constructed 
and pull these pieces together in very different ways. Love of a pet, love of 
a friend, love of a child, love of a spouse, love of a sports team, love of a 
country, love of a moral ideal: it makes sense to pursue higher-order clas­
sifications of these wildly diverse realities to reflect the complex ways we 
put the atomic biological elements together in socially constructed patterns 
of love and desire. There is no need for an invidious biological reductionism 
here; biology constrains but does not determine human behavior. Likewise, 
there is no necessity to deny or delegitimate what we have discovered from 
the sciences about love and desire. 
Similarly, there is no reason to think that the deliverances of the pro­
cess of biological evolution in the form of the three (or four, if we include 
maternal love) love-and-desire systems should be normative for us. Social 
construction of reality includes social construction of the norms we rely on 
to catalyze moral consensus, social order, and civilizational stability. We 
can adopt norms that explicitly legislate against the reflexive outworking of 
the three love-and-desire systems. For example, we can articulate a radical 
form of agape love that explicitly resists the intensification of in-group– 
out-group boundaries associated with the bonding love-and-desire system 
(some neuroscientists even argue that unconditional love has not only a 
distinctive neural signature but special neural circuitry; see Beauregard et al. 
2009). We can create a culture that ridicules infatuation as an abandonment 
of rational thought and a betrayal of our higher natures, thereby checking 
the infatuation love-and-desire system while still enjoying the intoxicating 
feelings it engenders in us. Or we can embrace a strictly celibate lifestyle in 
which sexual arousal is transmuted into love of some endorsed religious 
object and into loyalty to a fellowship of like-minded companions but ide­
ally never expressed sexually, either physically or mentally. We establish 
such ideals all the time, pushing back against some of the deliverances of 
evolution and striving to realize imagined ideals that we deem superior to 
nature unchecked, unregulated, and unimproved – and, of course, we use 
what nature produces to refine what nature gives us as cognitive-emotional 
defaults. We must fight hard to push against the grain in this way, but with 
appropriate forms of social support and sufficient inner determination, we 
can often do it. 
Individual differences matter here, as well. Not everyone loves well, 
or can love at all, in one or another sense of love. Men don’t experience 
maternal love, for starters. Biological differences and psychological forma­
tion through traumatic experiences and cultural learning can also limit an 
individual’s ability to engage in some kinds of romantic love or to achieve 
what some group might deem an ideal version of love. Just as personality 
characteristics are distributed normally across a population, so the capacity 





for love of various kinds varies from individual to individual. In relation 
to the sexual-attraction love-and-desire system, some people are essentially 
asexual, and love and desire do not operate in specifically sexual ways for 
them. In relation to the infatuation love-and-desire system, some people are 
too given to self-evaluation and judgment to surrender to the haze of delu­
sional bliss on offer in the delirium of infatuation. In relation to the bonding 
love-and-desire system, some people’s behavior patterns are so haphazard 
and so lacking in self-control that they can never build the trust required 
for bonding to grow. Every statement about human love and desire is a 
generalization, abstracting from the intricate details of human biology and 
psychology, yet rendering a serviceable approximation to messy reality. Just 
as it is foolish to pretend to eschew abstractions, we forget the downside of 
such abstractions at our peril. 
Human beings are bad, often, as well as good, often. This is a serious con­
sideration in love and desire. We desire things outside the boundaries pre­
scribed by the social norms of our cultural worlds, creating internal psychic 
tension and, when self-regulation fails, social chaos. We have it within us 
to steal what we desire, love selfishly, and ruthlessly exploit people’s vulner­
abilities around love and desire. Amazingly, emerging from the swirl of cul­
turally varied norms on our planet are a series of deep insights into love and 
desire that have the standing of widespread and nearly universal moral prin­
ciples of love and desire that guide people away from the bad and toward 
the good, as defined within the scope of these principles. These principles 
show up in multiple wisdom traditions, despite being generated within cul­
tures having distinctive behavioral and moral norms, confirming the depth 
of the corresponding insights. For instance, we know we shouldn’t exempt 
ourselves or some special subset of people from the moral expectations we 
want to articulate. We know we should treat others the way we want to 
be treated. We know we should learn self-regulation to control desire. We 
know we sustain love by behaving in trustworthy ways. Monogamy might 
occur in only about 3 percent of mammalian species (Fisher 1992), but we 
know what behaviors promote happy monogamous relationships and what 
behaviors don’t. 
I employ the phrase “we know” here deliberately: these are forms of 
knowledge accumulated empirically from personal experience and codified 
in vast and long-lived traditions of moral wisdom. Knowledge of human 
behavioral patterns across cultures does not establish the “ought” of moral­
ity unaided – the slippery reasoning of the naturalistic fallacy is always near. 
Additional assumptions lock in the normative “oughts” atop descriptive 
information about human moral and immoral behavior we distill from 
world cultures and life experience. When we notice that we sometimes 
make exceptions – for instance, we exempt soldiers from certain widespread 
moral norms – we become aware of this additional layer of norm-making 
assumptions, which is almost invisible in most circumstances. Thus, neither 
the behavioral patterns made natural for human beings within the process 




of biological evolution within our planetary home, nor the moral princi­
ples we detect emerging within a host of varied human cultures, can deter­
mine moral norms by themselves. We can defer to them, but that deference 
expresses normative assumptions about the moral authority of nature and 
culture. We can resist them, but that resistance expresses normative assump­
tions about the moral authority of the human imagination as it envisions 
new ways of being human. 
Divine love and desire 
We have begun the promised shift downwards into the well of love and 
desire in the depths of nature itself. What shows up for human beings with 
regard to love and desire is one kind of guide to the axiological depth struc­
tures and flows of nature, but scientific inquiry presents us with other kinds 
of guides as well, as does critical theory from sociology and philosophy. Let’s 
begin with critical theory’s formalization of long-standing human insights 
into the social construction of reality. 
Just as it is tempting to derive moral norms from descriptive informa­
tion about nature (the naturalistic fallacy), so it is all too easy to impute to 
the depths of nature what we find emerging in human moral worlds (the 
projection fallacy). These two fallacies of moral reasoning are perpetually 
close at hand because we hesitate to accept full responsibility for adopt­
ing our preferred moral norms – indeed, we go to great lengths to evade 
awareness of this responsibility. This was one of Friedrich Nietzsche’s pas­
sionate points, and the point of several moral philosophers contributing to 
our world’s large philosophical literatures: we feel existentially disoriented 
with head-spinning nausea when we sense that the crystallizing of worldly 
facts into moral norms is the quintessentially human activity – that we alone 
bear responsibility for the moral norms we first create, then impose, and 
ultimately embrace as if they were imposed on us by an Other, be it heaven, 
God, or the spirits of the ancestors. This is the critical spine of the social 
construction of reality, and it doesn’t apply merely to the emergence of traf­
fic conventions; it has everything to do with the moral framing of love and 
desire. 
A central commitment of any naturalistic moral philosophy is to accept 
this fact of human life and to embrace our responsibility for moral norms 
with no convenient deflections of responsibility, no evasions of the meaning 
of acts of norm creation, and no collapsing into either the naturalistic fal­
lacy or the projection fallacy. We build our world, including the norms we 
employ to orient ourselves within it. Norm building is a group activity, so 
it is easy to miss the all-important element of human creation; it just feels 
as though moral norms hit us from outside. And they do hit us from the 
outside, of course, but only because we first externalized them and made 
them objective by imposing them at the group level so that subsequently 
they would be encountered as rules that we need to internalize in order to 
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operate successfully within our group. Critical theory taught us to see the 
social construction of reality and generated irrefutable evidence of its pres­
ence and functions, which both ramifies and surpasses the same insight in its 
previous forms across cultures. 
Do we make norms for love and desire? Yes, we do. We externalize behav­
ioral expectations surrounding love and desire; we objectivate those expecta­
tions in human groups, we internalize the now-objective externalized rules; 
and we narrate the appearance of those norms in our lives as gifts from 
heaven, commandments from God, or wisdom from ancestors. They may 
be those things, in the demythologized, naturalistic sense of the phrases, 
but they are ultimately our creations, our constructions, and signs of our 
creaturely craving for control over anomic chaos. The raw materials for our 
constructions are the three (or four) neurobehavioral love-and-desire sys­
tems, along with the manifold culturally specific explorations of the multi­
dimensional space of possibilities opened up by our biological natures. This 
is the domain of the biocultural, where biology can’t be interpreted without 
culture and culture can’t be understood without biology. 
We are extremely creative in our biocultural constructions, no question. 
But those constructions are never random. For a socially constructed reality 
to survive the scrutiny that human beings reflexively apply to every act of 
self-and-world narration, we are inevitably forced to acknowledge the non­
deterministic constraints of biology, even if we finally decide to contest or 
transcend those constraints. One day we may be able to deploy biotechnol­
ogy to change our very brains and bodies so as to express the moral norms 
we prefer; for now, biology conditions and constraints but does not dictate 
or determine how we love and desire. Likewise, we are smart to respect the 
cross-cultural consensus on wisdom in relation to love and desire, because 
those discoveries were hard won and are probably as close to timeless 
human wisdom as our species possesses, but we are also smart to be suspi­
cious of unstable generalizations masquerading as the wisdom of averages. 
Our journey through the multidimensional space of biocultural possibilities 
related to love and desire shows us that the biocultural is incredibly fecund, 
spawning pathways optimized for the survival and flourishing of groups 
that journey along them. In the patterns of similarity and difference that 
emerge as we compare those pathways, we detect the areas of strongest con­
straint, where there is cross-cultural consensus on moral principles related 
to love and desire, and the areas of weakest constraint, where the cross-
cultural diversity spreads in every direction like a veined network of river 
remnants fanning out over a plain. 
This line of interpretation roots the emergence of human love and desire 
in the biocultural background of our species, going back millions of years. 
A naturalistic account of this emergence requires no postulates of purposeful 
teleologies or primal teleonomies or reflexive entelechies or gaiaic impulses 
that draw the cosmos toward the realization of desire and love, as if the 
process were designed or somehow guaranteed because of an ultimately 




purposeful power at work in the cosmic environment. On the contrary, this 
account of human wrangling with moral norms for love and desire makes 
perfect sense even if the universe is wholly accidental, fundamentally ran­
dom, deterministically fated, or utterly meaningless in some global sense. 
We make meaning where we are, locally, and it is only our narrations of 
meaning that we project into the cosmos in search of plausibility. If we don’t 
check them too carefully, they pass muster and we can carry on, sensing that 
our working norms for love and desire match the cosmos well enough for 
us to feel at home there. This is delusional thinking, however, even when 
it produces wonderful behavioral fruits. It can be challenged only by seek­
ing comprehensive, unrelenting correction from what we discover about the 
world around us. 
Nature is neutral to us, affording us possibilities to exploit and presenting 
dangers to navigate. Eat the wrong berry and we die, with nary a tear from 
Mother Nature. A large asteroid will wipe out most life on Earth, as has 
occurred several times before in the history of our planet, and there is no 
cosmic or divine memorial service – not for the religious naturalist, at least, 
and for the personal theist there is only a monumental, finally intractable 
theodicy problem, as the fantasy of a personal deity smashes to pieces on 
the rocks of reality. Suppose we narrate love and desire all the way into the 
depths of nature, making the ground of being look a lot like our morally 
normed human adventures in love and desire, and risking that appalling 
theodicy problem. In that case, for the religious naturalist, we not only fall 
prey to anthropomorphic wish fulfillment; we also minimize and neglect 
the miracle of nature in which spontaneity mates with law-like regularity 
to yield our planetary home and eventually human love and desire, in all its 
complexity, and we effectively evade responsibility for the social construc­
tion of love and desire in human life. Religious naturalism may be a false 
worldview, I allow – and to repeat, that’s a debate for another place. But 
in rejecting personalist framings of love and desire in the entire cosmos, 
from its divine roots to its biocultural floral showings, the religious natural­
ist is not rejecting the importance of love and desire. On the contrary, the 
religious naturalist treasures love and desire all the more for rightly under­
standing the miracle of their emergence, the miracle of their biocultural 
conditions, and the miracle of our ability to create norms to conform with 
and to confound the default cognitive-emotional-behavioral love-and-desire 
impulses of our species. That kind of realism is all too rare in religion, and 
that kind of resistance to invidious reductionism is all too rare in religious 
and antireligious philosophy. 
But might there be evidence beyond the questionable findings of needful 
human projection for something deep in nature that beckons cosmic real­
ity to manifest love and desire? The pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles 
discerned two fundamental dynamic principles in nature: love and strife. 
Might not he be correct, all these centuries later? Empedocles was right 
about the pair of dynamic principles, which we today would call attraction 






and repulsion, thinking especially of the electromagnetic force, but also of 
the other fundamental forces by analogy. But in naming the two fundamen­
tal forces love (philotes) and strife (neikos), Empedocles directly tied them 
to phenomena in the human sphere, which is misleading. Electromagnetic 
attraction and repulsion are conditions for atoms, molecules, chemistry, and 
biology, and thereby for love and desire–aversion, but it is an instance of the 
projection fallacy to impute to atomic and subatomic forces human-like feel­
ings and motivations. We have had plenty of anthropomorphism in human 
efforts to ground love and desire in the wider cosmos – enough already. 
The micro-level forces that function as conditions for the emergence at the 
biocultural level of complex harmonies, and even of unruly chaos, should be 
appreciated without anthropomorphic distortion. What those fundamental 
forces are, ontologically speaking, is a first-rate mystery, but we get further 
by constructing empirically testable mathematical theories of them and run­
ning experiments to evaluate those theories than we do by giving free rein 
to our imaginative powers, piling trope upon trope in a desperate attempt 
to give cosmic significance to human experiences of human love and desire. 
For the religious naturalist, therefore, love and desire have cosmic signifi­
cance not because they were in some sense always there, within a creator 
God or any kind of natural entelechy, but because they emerge without col­
lusion or design within the biocultural realm as a sign and an instance of 
the potent axiological possibilities in the very depths of nature. In this inter­
pretation, there is no evading responsibility for the all-too-human construc­
tion of norms to manage love and desire. Nor is there any dimming of the 
luminous possibilities that lie before us. We can choose what love and desire 
will mean for us, constrained but never determined by biocultural givens, 
and inspired by pictures of an ever more just and verdant world. 
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Theologizing in a 
multireligious world 
Introduction 
Jerry L. Martin 
We now live in a global village that puts within reach a rich array of religions 
and worldviews. This situation poses a number of challenges: Can we really 
understand people and belief systems quite different from our own? How 
can we manage our religious lives in such a diverse religious landscape? Can 
we appreciate multiple religions and theologize globally without losing our 
own distinctive religious identity? And what about those who have been 
so shaken from their religious moorings that they do not identify with any 
tradition at all, even when they still think of themselves as spiritual? 
In addressing such questions, J. R. Hutwit draws on hermeneutics, with 
close attention to his own “lived experiences” that have led him to several 
theological hypotheses. First, “the sacred, whatever its form(s), is a natural 
presence, equitably available to all communities.” Second, one’s “linguistic­
cultural background” binds one to a community and limits what one
understands. Third, what a person understands can be “enlarged” through 
dialogue. Fourth, “the pursuit of truth is the end, not the beginning, of 
dialogue.” These points suggest that “the only way to do theology is to do 
it transreligiously” and “to follow the truth, even if it takes one beyond the 
limits of her home tradition.” To do so will require dialogue, through which 
we will “appropriate” (in a benign sense) novel ideas and practices. This 
process “smuggles content into my horizon,” while “differences explode its 
boundaries.” Dialogue “traces the boundary that joins human language and 
the prelingusitic sacred.” It proceeds in “the eschatological hope” for “an 
ever more complete model of the world.” 
How are we to live religiously among a plentitude of traditions? In the 
West, which has a tradition of “strong religious borders,” this is a challeng­
ing question. Not so, in the East, according to Paul Hedges. The Chinese, 
for example, engage in what he calls “strategic religious participation” in a 
“shared religious landscape.” “Doing ‘religion’” is not seen as adhering to a 
set of beliefs, but as way of making use of religious traditions, ritual experts, 
and practices to fit the need in a particular situation. Similar patterns may 
be occurring within Western contexts. Transreligious theology “no longer 
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becomes a perilous venture bordering, at best, on illicit syncretism, but 
rather may be seen as a perfectly legitimate employment of resources” in 
a multiply religious setting. Theology “may need to play catch-up with the 
wider world.” 
Can one theologize without walls and simultaneously affiliate with a 
particular religious tradition? Yes, answers Jeanine Diller, because “TWW 
affiliators are expanding their knowledge of the thing that that affiliation 
has put them in touch with (which I will call ‘the Ultimate’).” After clarify­
ing the relation between affiliation and propositional beliefs and between 
affiliating with a tradition and identifying with it, she takes up three chal­
lenges. First, why seek truth outside one’s affiliation in the first place? One 
is “logically required” to look beyond one’s own experiences of the Ultimate 
so as not to commit the fallacy of hasty generalization. Second, what if 
outside beliefs contradict some of one’s home beliefs? Indeed, “if we are all 
meeting the Ultimate,” why do we have “such different things to say about 
it?” Drawing on an analogy with Spinoza, she takes different religionists to 
be “in touch with different attributes of the Ultimate.” She calls this view 
“partialism,” because no one religion grasps all attributes of the Ultimate. 
Third, even if the core ideas of the different religions are consistent, won’t 
they weaken one’s affiliation? When that happens, there is a genuine loss, 
akin to the loss of one’s home or first language, but there is also “a genuine 
gain, a new way to see the Ultimate all over again.” 
What about those who have been so shaken from their religious moorings 
that they do not identify with any tradition at all? Do the spiritual but not 
religious (SBNR) even need to “theologize”? Yes, says Linda Mercadante, 
they, too, “need to understand what they believe, why they believe it, and 
how this functions in their lives.” They are highly diverse, such as Mer­
cadante found in her landmark study, Belief without Borders; they agree 
on what they don’t believe: a self-determining, transcendent, personal God; 
the drama of human resistance to God; human-made religious institutions; 
and an afterlife governed by divine judgment. Nevertheless, SBNRs often 
see themselves “on a spiritual quest, journey, or path, seeking such things as 
spiritual experience, greater understanding of the self, authenticity, ancient 
wisdom predating religion, cosmic energetic transmissions, holism, or 
harmony.” 
Can SBNRs’ faith seek understanding? Yes, concepts they use provide 
starting points for theologizing. For example, rejecting a transcendent deity, 
they see themselves in what Charles Taylor calls “the immanent frame,” yet 
they do propose a kind of “horizontal transcendence,” something larger 
than themselves, perhaps a universal “oneness.” They have beliefs in favor 
of “the authentic self” but against “ego,” and in favor of love and compas­
sion. They regard terms like “good” and “bad” as judgmental and insist 
that “everyone is born good.” SBNRs are exceedingly individualistic and yet 
seek community and even to be of service. These are all issues with concep­










14 Dialogue and transreligious 
understanding 
A hermeneutical approach 
J. R. Hustwit 
There is no common ground from which all theology should be derived. 
Every theologian is thrown into the middle of things – her family, educa­
tion, cultural location – and makes her way from there. Heidegger describes 
this universal condition as having-been-thrown-ness (Geworfenheit). Every 
person comes to consciousness shaped by a world that she did not create. 
The result is that each person is situated differently, with different pressures, 
questions, and projects. For some theologians, beginning with the Gospel 
makes the most sense, because God created humans and their experience.1 
For others, beginning with human experience makes more sense because 
human experience created our narratives about God. I confess that the lat­
ter approach makes more sense to me. The situation into which I have been 
thrown has led me to several theological hypotheses. First, the sacred, what­
ever its form(s), is a natural presence, equitably available to all human com­
munities. Second, a person’s linguistic-cultural background binds them to a 
community and limits the possibilities of what they understand. Third, the 
scope of what a person can understand may be enlarged, especially through 
dialogue. Fourth, the pursuit of truth is the end, not the beginning, of dia­
logue. When these four hypotheses are considered together, they suggest 
that the only way to do theology is to do it transreligiously – to draw on the 
experiences of more than one religion and to follow the truth, even if it takes 
one beyond the limits of her home tradition. 
Hermeneutics is the study of how humans interpret various objects in 
the world: texts, persons, actions, events, nature. Though originally applied 
only to legal or sacred texts, hermeneutics has been promoted to a uni­
versal scheme of human understanding. Everything is always interpreted. 
There is no such thing as an unambiguous and objective meaning. Theology, 
from my situation, appears to be a species of interpretation. At the same 
time, theology is a public and constructive task that aims at the production 
of metaphysical truth claims, salvific practices, and proper virtues. There 
is considerable tension between these two descriptions. As interpretative, 
theology is prone to disagreement. Radically particular backgrounds will 
lead to divergent perceptions of God, nature, and humanity. But as pub­
lic and constructive, theology aims at universality. A person’s theological 
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conclusions are not true only in a personal sense, or for her community, 
but true for all persons – true full stop. In order to reconcile these divergent 
aspects, a theology must acknowledge its private origins and public aspira­
tions. That journey from private to public is accomplished by a never-ending 
process of comparative dialogue with difference. Individuals are only able 
to offer a narrow selection of possible experiences. The way to avoid falling 
into a debilitating relativism is to compare finite human perspectives to see 
if they converge on any commonalities. Through collaboration, theologians 
may strive to combine religious interpretations into an ever more refined 
model of human existence, the ultimate(s), and the world. 
An available God 
In the spirit of the private striving for public legitimacy, I offer a few bio­
graphical anecdotes to illustrate how my own private experience has served 
as evidence supporting theological conclusions. At seven years old, I was liv­
ing in Texas. I spent a lot of time in my head, because I was not athletically 
talented. Two influences competed for my attention: first, the fairly bland 
nondenominational Christianity taught at my new private school and sec­
ond, my love for superheroes. I was not alone. Most of my classmates – it 
was an all-boys school – were interested in comic books, aliens, or anything 
that was strange. I remember there were lots of discussions involving slime, 
blood, claws, and laser swords. 
Say what you will about parochial schools, this one was pretty tolerant of 
diversity. There were Jewish students who sat next to me during the manda­
tory chapel services. However, I ended up crossing a line that startled the 
normally tolerant administration. I was given an assignment. The assign­
ment was to draw what I thought God looked like. I am pretty sure that 
even at seven, I had been asked to do this before. I knew that drawing an old 
man with a beard would be the predictable answer. And I knew that at least 
four other boys would draw a glowing ball of light – almost as predictable 
as the old man. As I racked my brain about what to draw, I suddenly had an 
idea. It wasn’t profound, and I did not take the assignment very seriously, 
but I did love to draw. I put my crayon to work. 
The next day my parents sat me down and told me that Sister Rachel, 
headmistress of the Lower School, had asked to speak with them. She was 
slightly concerned about my drawing of God. The large piece of manila 
paper had been folded into fourths to fit into my desk. They unfolded it and 
asked me to explain what I had drawn. It was a male torso, unreasonably 
muscular, with the head of a stag. I’m not sure if Sister Rachel was more 
concerned with my poor grasp of how many abdominal muscles humans 
possess or if she worried that my family were neo-pagans who honored 
the King of the Hunt. Honestly, if you ask a room full of seven-year-old 
boys to draw something they’ve never seen, I think you should expect some 
weird stuff. But my parents had promised Sister Rachel they would talk to 





















me about it. So they asked me why I drew God that way, like a deer-man. 
I was a little bit afraid of being in trouble, but I also sensed that for my 
parents there would be no wrong answer, and this gave me space to give an 
impromptu explanation for my deer god. 
I said, “If God is the God of all creation, then He is just as much non­
human as he is human.” My parents awkwardly nodded, and the picture
was never mentioned again. Upon reflection, I was surprised to discover
that I meant what I said. An intuition about God’s universality had crystal­
lized into what was probably my first theological conviction. The divine
produces nature, of which human beings are only a small part. Of course
humans would claim that they are in the image of God. My little sister also
claimed to be the center of the universe, but she, I knew, was not a credible
source. At age seven, the propositions “We are made in God’s image” and
“We make God in our image” both made sense. Even deer, in so far as they
are capable, must experience the deity in their own ungulate way. And if
they can imagine God, they probably imagine a being with antlers. Except
for the cheeky deer who shock their parents by describing an anthropomor­
phic God. 
As I learned about other religions, my early intuition about God’s abiding 
presence developed. How could it be moral for God to answer the prayers 
of some communities and not others? If God is just, God would be equally 
available to all humans, or even all creatures. All creatures are equally sub­
ject to the forces of gravity and electromagnetism. All should be equally sub­
ject to the divine as well. A loving and just God would be uniformly present 
to all of creation, so that all have relatively equal chance of experiencing the 
divine relative to their species. I would describe this intuition as something 
like egalitarian religious naturalism. Regardless of how or when God acts in 
history, the presence of God is a permanent feature of the natural world – a 
divine piece of metaphysical furniture. And though God cannot be reliably 
perceived with the five senses, God is able to be experienced with diverse 
mystical and contemplative practices. 
Now I am not sure how firmly I would hold this hypothesis today. Of the 
four propositions in this chapter, I hold this one with the least confidence. 
If pressed, I would probably add a qualification. Despite God’s equitable 
presence to all human communities, individual persons may have clearer or 
more obscured perceptions of God as the result of spiritual practices or dis­
tractions. This qualification, which rejects God being closer or further with 
communities but grants that God may be closer or further for individuals, 
is itself a very modern and liberal intuition. It allows for relationship and 
consequences for individuals, but not for groups. Nevertheless, it seemed 
the most adequate model of God’s presence at age 7, and still does, despite 
my doubts, at age 39. 
If God is natural furniture, this implies a negative corollary: God is 
equally mediated to human beings. That is to say, because humans are inter­
pretation machines, God’s presence is always hidden behind the perceiver’s 









biases and expectations. And this is equally true for all humans. The Aleu­
tian Islander is just as alienated from the true nature of God as the Ibizan. 
Getting God somewhat wrong is part of human nature. Theologians may 
be more or less optimistic about how thickly or thinly human subjectivity 
mediates the presence of the divine, but there are no human communities 
that are a priori excluded from or central to the task of theology. 
Word is bond 
If the divine is uniformly present to all humans, it should be the case that 
nearly all human beings have displayed some sort of religious sensibility. And 
this has more or less been the case historically. But what is really remarkable 
are the patterns of variation in how religious ultimates (e.g., Yahweh, Shiva, 
nirvana, or nirguna Brahman) are described. A survey of human beings 
would show that although there is no universal agreement about religious 
matters, there is a good deal of piecemeal consensus. Agreement concerning 
belief and practices clump together historically and geographically. Scholars 
of religion have attempted to classify these clumps into “religions,” and 
the most common classification is that there are five large clumps: Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. There are also a number of 
smaller clumps: Sikhism, Jainism, Celtic Neo-Paganism, Shinto, Confucian­
ism, etc. This convenient canon of world religions is by no means a perfect 
representation of human religiosity and needs to be continually interrogated 
and revised. Nevertheless, it does reveal an important fact about human 
religious experience. The way that the divine is experienced correlates to 
human communities. Presbyterians are not scattered across the continents 
in a perfectly random distribution. They emerge from a group of people 
who are able to share a way of life. Religious experience clumps together 
because communities clump together. And language is the primary clumping 
agent. Language emerges co-originally with a community of human beings 
who require a common set of signs in order to effectively communicate. But 
language is not just a code humans use to translate thoughts into sounds and 
back into thoughts again. 
Every category of being that I use is language inherited from my family 
and community. When I entertain light, the concept is not speciated, but 
simple. Light is light. I can attribute adjectives to it. The light is bright. The 
light is pink. But I do not distinguish light into distinct kinds. However, I do 
make distinctions between kinds of pastry. A Chelsea roll is not just a swirly 
generic pastry; it is a kind of pastry with a definition that excludes kolaches 
and knish. Chelsea roll, kolache, and knish are completely distinct classes of 
objects in my mental filing system, unlike light, which does not admit any 
kinds. The simplicity of light and speciation of pastry is an arbitrary lin­
guistic convention. Some may argue that sunlight is a different kind of thing 
than fluorescent light. A colleague once told me that my office’s fluorescent 
lights will eventually kill me and I need incandescent bulbs. I don’t think 
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that way – light is light – but I can understand his worldview. Conceptual 
speciation, and language in general, precedes discursive thought, speech, 
and writing. Because it precedes even the will, many hermeneutic philoso­
phers have noted that though human beings create language, the reverse is 
also true. 
The influence of language upon religious experience becomes apparent 
when I reflect upon my early experiences in the church. Like many adoles­
cent Methodists, I was sent to summer church camps, where I would culti­
vate a close relationship with the Almighty. In my experience, church camp 
was a week-long exercise in channeling hormones into a fervent piety. Eve­
rything was emotionally intense: the awkwardness of living with strangers, 
the ritualized behavior at mealtimes, and evening devotionals held at night 
on the top of a hill. One night, at the end of the week, I remember being 
instructed to pray to God – or Jesus. Honestly, it was never entirely clear 
to me to whom I should pray. But pray I did. I asked God, if He2 existed, 
to show me an unmistakable sign. As I prayed, the sky lit up with flashes 
of lightning, right on cue. There were no storms – this would have been 
described as “heat lightning.” But the timing was unmistakable. I prayed, 
and the lightning flashed. God was listening. I was certain. 
Even though this event relied on acts of nature, it was human language 
that made this religious experience possible. What counts as a sign from 
God are culturally transmitted criteria. There is certainly a natural spectacle 
to lightning: it is vast, above, bright, intense, fleeting. But these traits are 
meaningless without a history of association. The shopping mall parking 
lot seems vast, the ceiling fan is above, the sun is bright, vinegar is intense, 
and birthdays are fleeting. None of these objects signify the divine in my 
home clumps. Conversely, it would be absurd for me, given my clumps, 
to find a sign from God in an unusually quiet toilet flush or a surprisingly 
stale donut in an unopened package. Toilets and stale food do not have a 
history of association with God in the texts of Christianity, nor more imme­
diately in the popular culture of my childhood. Scripture, novels, television 
shows, and comic books all repeat certain linguistic signs: the lightning bolt 
is divine, a tool of the sky father, weapon of Zeus and Thor. But it is possible 
to imagine a culture that had a different tradition in which the stories sur­
rounding the divine involved the silencing of troubled waters. For that cul­
ture, a quiet faucet, or even a flush might signify the presence of the sacred. 
My intention is not to reduce all religious experience to cultural projec­
tion. But rather to point out that whatever religious experience humans 
can understand is always clothed in language. I do believe there is a real 
nonhuman component to many types of religious experience, because that 
is the most plausible explanation for the amount of similarity between reli­
gious experiences. But if there are any naked undigested alien epiphanies, 
they do not last for long. Our brains do not work that way. As experience 
comes to consciousness, it is interpreted into linguistic concepts and cat­
egories. Untangling the contributions of the divine from the contributions 










   
 
 
of human culture is tricky business. How much is authentic revelation and 
how much is contributed by my own preunderstanding? Is it 50/50? 20/80? 
I do not think there is an easy or certain way to determine that. Neverthe­
less, I continue to search for the presence of the sacred behind the cliché of 
the lightning. 
I struggle with discerning the purity of religious experience. Our inability
to step outside of our own perspective to see the matter “objectively” is
precisely why interreligious dialogue is necessary. We may be too embedded
in our own experience to judge the authenticity of our own experiences,
but by having authentic dialogue with persons embedded in different tradi­
tions, we may detect patterns amid the interference, signal amid the noise.
But authentic dialogue is not as it easy as some may assume. Communica­
tion within a clump of common meaning encounters fewer incidents of
problematic meaning, but understanding between clumps is problematic.
Because I was raised to look for lightning, I will not notice when the toilet
is quiet. 
In defense of appropriation 
So far, I have given a few experiences that support my own hypotheses for 
the basic theological situation of human beings. First, the sacred is, on the 
whole, equally available to all humans. Second, all persons experience the 
sacred in terms of a finite linguistic community, and this finitude routinely 
causes conflicts of interpretation both in and among communities. These 
first two hypotheses have several implications. If the sacred is equally pre­
sent and equally mediated to all cultures, more than one religious tradition 
may disclose truth (propositional or salvific) despite incompatibilities of 
doctrine and practice among them. This is not to say that all religious tradi­
tions are equally good, or even partially good. It is perfectly possible that an 
entirely bogus religion may arise and perpetuate into an enduring tradition. 
Bogus religions aside, some theological claims are truer than others. Some 
are more fruitful or coherent. Interreligious dialogue is that process that 
allows theologians to make comparative judgments about religions. But in 
order for this to happen, for transreligious theology to get its legs, humans 
must be able to expand the horizons that constrain possible meaning. Every 
person only sees the divine through the lens of her cultural categories, but 
that lens can be polished, enlarged, and bent by talking with others. A third 
hypothesis is necessary: one’s worldview is not set at birth or at some later 
point in childhood. The lens changing occurs through an ongoing process 
called appropriation. This is not a controversial hypothesis. People learn 
new things every day. But some learning simply combines elements of a 
worldview in a new way, and some learning introduces genuine novelty into 
the worldview. Theologians are able to understand new and other religions 
because they are able to appropriate novel ideas and practices and make 
them relevant to their own situations. 












School, ideally, should provide many easy examples of appropriation. 
Having left the private boys’ school for a public high school, I was for­
tunate to participate in a humanities curriculum, which combined history, 
art, literature, and philosophy into a single course that lasted two years 
and covered Europe from the sixth century BCE to the present. During the 
ancient Greek unit, the class was divided into five or six polises, and we 
were encouraged to adopt the culture of the polis and stay in character. Our 
research was fairly shallow, so for us, this meant that the Spartans knocked 
down everyone else’s temples and the Corinthians pretended to drink a lot. 
Because the role playing was immersive, we were not learning history at one 
time, then doing art at a later time. The subjects were all mixed together – 
because life in ancient Greece was all mixed together. It slowly dawned on 
me that the practice of learning subjects in isolation from each other was 
at odds with the natural state of things. Art does not exist in isolation from 
science, and neither is immune to politics. This caused a relatively dras­
tic transformations in my conceptual categories. My worldview had been 
one that had received the school disciplines uncritically (i.e., as unrelated 
skills to facilitate a future career). Suddenly, there was a problem reconciling 
those distinct disciplines with the newly perceived messiness of the world. 
From then on, every course seemed to me like a compromised endeavor – a 
failure to mirror the real world. 
Though this class was not what anyone would typically think of as inter-
religious dialogue, it was structurally the same. I experienced a new way of 
dividing the world of experiences, which was gradually adopted. This was 
not a revelatory bolt, but a process of comparing my new insight, “world 
resists disciplinarity,” with a previous assumption, “world facilitated by dis­
ciplinarity.” I had appropriated something from my teachers, and it had 
caused discomfort, followed by an appropriation of a new idea. Phenome­
nologically, appropriation is an oscillation between my own horizon and the 
alterity of the object of interpretation. Philosopher Paul Ricoeur describes 
it as a three-part cycle of guessing, validation, and then comprehension 
(Ricoeur 1976, 75–88). And the process of guess–validation–comprehen­
sion repeats. Endlessly. A new meaning of the world – “world resists disci­
plinarity” – was guessed, then tested for coherence with the text (i.e., the 
structure of the course I was taking). Once the differences between my own 
worldview and the alterity of the text had been negotiated, I understood the 
text as applicable to my world. I did not assent to “world resists disciplinar­
ity” as a sterile fact, but as a quality of the world in which I make plans and 
love things. In order for something to be understood, it must matter to the 
person. For this reason, Heidegger describes the world of our experience as 
characterized by my-own-most-ness (Jemeinigkeit). We are only aware of a 
thing when it serves a purpose for us. 
And because hermeneutics is cyclical, I was not done with the notion of 
disciplinarity resistance. Later experiences would cause me to re-examine it 
and adjust its application to my own-most world. As a university student, 











I had been assigned the Dao De Jing. I confess to not reading much of it, 
but I did notice its argument against formal education. Take, for example, 
Chapter 32: 
The Way is forever nameless. 
Unhewn wood is insignificant, yet no one in the world can master it . . . 
When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are names. 
Now that there are names, know enough to stop! 
To know when to stop is how to stay out of danger. 
(Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2011,
32, 178–179) 
Unhewn wood, representing the cosmos as it truly is (i.e., uncomplicated by 
distinctions), is here contrasted with human conceptualizations. Such con­
cepts, which formal education reinforces, inevitably chop up the wholeness 
of the Dao. The result is distorted thinking and, the Dao De Jing argues, 
human misery. My own appropriation of this text was based on the previ­
ous understanding of disciplinarity resistance from my earlier humanities 
course. Ah-ha! The Dao De Jing is saying something similar to what I had 
already understood. “Names” are like “disciplines.” “Unhewn wood” is 
like “life outside of the classroom.” There is a similarity-in-difference. In 
that respect, appropriation is thoroughly metaphorical. When we appropri­
ate a term, we use similarities to analogize the foreign to our own experi­
ence, while maintaining a tension with the differences. The goal is to suss 
out the interaction between resemblance and difference. The similarities 
are the vehicle that smuggles content into my horizon, and the differences 
explode its boundaries, enlarging the possibilities I may imagine. 
The word “appropriation” is frequently criticized in discussion of cultural 
appropriation. When a person adopts the fashion or customs of another cul­
ture without sufficient understanding of the meaning, we argue that they do 
violence to the culture by appropriating it. But in these cases, we should say 
that the insensitive person has malappropriated the custom. For all under­
standing is appropriation, and it can be done skillfully or clumsily. The 
term “appropriation” ought to be rehabilitated, much as Gadamer sought 
to rehabilitate the term “prejudice” (Vorurteil; Gadamer 2000, 277–306). 
Appropriation itself is inescapable and only a vice if we fail to validate the 
meaning we have guessed against the structure of the text. We cannot com­
placently assume that we have correctly guessed the meaning of another 
religion when we see the first resemblance. 
It is crucial for me, as a Christian, to note that the Dao De Jing’s idea 
of nature is quite different from what I may imagine. Likewise, the Dao 
De Jing’s claims about human nature and the ability of the mind to per­
ceive the world probably differ from mine. All of these points of difference 
must be maintained along with the similarities. If I neglect the differences 
between religions, I assimilate the other religion into my own. If I neglect the 
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similarities between religions, I am unable to comprehend anything unfa­
miliar. But if we grant that our worldview is changeable, then we have the 
ability to expand it to appropriate other religions. Healthy appropriation 
is always in danger of collapsing into assimilation or exoticization, but if 
the sacred is disclosed in other religions, it is worth our while. Understand­
ing other religions is required to live together in peace, but also required to 
judge truth claims as “better” and “worse” hypotheses. 
Truth deferred 
Not everybody loves to argue. I have been slow to come to this realization. 
I love to argue. I love to be right. I sometimes spend too much time trying 
to poke holes in the arguments of others. There are a couple of cultural-
linguistic facts that could explain why I tend to behave this way. The most 
immediate cause is probably the years studying for a philosophy degree, 
which enculturated me to focus on argumentation and logic. I was taught 
that philosophy is mostly a critical task and rarely constructive. Philosophy 
courses, until the advanced stages of the degree, present a text to the stu­
dent, ask the student to distill an argument from the prose, and then require 
the student to criticize the argument. After so many years, this training leads 
to a particularly critical temperament – a tendency to look for the weak­
nesses of things first. My classmates and I were great at tearing things down, 
but not very good at building things on our own. Although critical analysis 
is an essential skill, it is not the only skill worth developing. 
But why is philosophy taught this way? Without going into an elaborate 
intellectual history, I think Christian theology deserves much of the blame 
for why I am no fun at parties. Christianity has always placed an emphasis 
on orthodoxy, or correct belief. Believing certain propositions to be true 
and others false has the chief criterion for determining Christian identity 
and value. The first seven ecumenical councils of the Christian church are 
striking examples. A tremendous amount of time and mental energy went 
into deciding exactly which propositional truth claims should be endorsed 
and which should be condemned as heresy. It is no coincidence that Chris­
tian theology has historically focused on doctrine much more than practice, 
dialogue, or affect. So, the Christian theology that dominated the medi­
eval university as “queen of the sciences”3 passed on its preoccupation with 
propositional truth claims to the teaching of philosophy, first in Europe and 
then its colonies. So even for those philosophers today who consider them­
selves to be completely divorced from Christian belief and practice, Chris­
tianity has shaped their academic discipline, their cognitive training, and 
thus their temperament. And that is one reason why they – and I – argue 
too much. 
With this temperament as a liability, I took a job teaching religion at 
a small university in the American South, and with encouragement from 
the administration, began an interreligious club for students. This was 




challenging. Though our student population contains a relatively high pro­
portion of international students, our domestic students tend to be fairly 
sheltered and uncurious. The result was a lot of potential for expanded hori­
zons for those who participated and a lot of resistance to those programs 
from those who would not participate. 
My first attempts at getting college students to sit together and talk were 
based on my idealized vision of what interreligious dialogue should be: a 
round table of persons steeped in their own traditions, arguing over meta­
physical claims in good cheer until everyone agreed about the nature of 
reality. I invited a number of students to gather over some pizza and threw 
down some of my most combustible debate kindling: “Is the sacred personal 
or nonpersonal?” “Is the universe infinite or discretely bounded?” Nothing. 
Awkward silence. Polite thanks for the pizza and excuses to be somewhere 
else. 
My vision of interreligious dialogue could not have been further from 
how dialogue – on any topic – actually begins. My students are not steeped 
in their own traditions, much less anyone else’s. They frequently come from 
secular families, and when they do have a background in religious participa­
tion, they are hesitant to speak for their tradition. Even if they were informed 
and willing, they would not be interested in doing so. My own project of 
transreligious theology does not matter to my students. What they do value 
highly (besides food) is relationships. Ultimately, I found that if I organized 
a social event, like a halal potluck during Eid al Adha, attendance was much 
higher. By the end of the school year, after a series of well-attended social 
events, the students had organized their own small interreligious discussion 
group in the evenings. 
I think that in the situation of interreligious dialogue, whether one’s 
dialogue partner is a human, a written text, or some other symbol, care 
precedes knowledge.4 That is to say, human beings cannot understand a 
thing unless it first has a place in their own-most concerns. This is why it 
is a mistake to begin interreligious dialogue with a contest of truth claims. 
Truth-directed inquiry requires concern, which manifests as goodwill, open-
mindedness, and curiosity about other religions. Dialogue does not require 
its participants to agree beforehand, share a worldview, or even like each 
other. But it does require an openness to the legitimacy of the other and an 
interest in the message of the other. Dialogue begins with a mutual recogni­
tion of humanity and only later takes up competing truth claims. 
Of course, we may find ourselves in a contest of truth claims with some­
one we have just met, with no established relationship. But even when we 
argue with strangers about religion, this is not a case of truth questions pre­
ceding relationship. Rather, the stranger is assigned a relationship status as 
the argument commences. This status may have been assigned even before 
the stranger appeared. We may have an imaginary adversary in some matter, 
and we project it on to the person before us. It is precisely because there has 







been so little time for the relationship with the stranger to develop that these 
encounters usually end unhappily. 
My experience with students and student organizations has moderated 
my hard-nosed philosophical instincts and taught me that relationships of 
some kind are necessary before arguments can be entertained. Practically 
speaking, the truth is a concern for advanced stages of dialogue. Philosophi­
cally speaking, the truth should be a heuristic device. It guides and regulates 
the process of dialogue even if it is never permanently achieved. For no 
matter how firm my conviction, there is always another dialogue partner 
around the corner. 
Conclusion 
So, I am left with four theological hypotheses: 1) The Ultimate is equally 
available and equally mediated to all humans. 2) This mediation is largely 
due to the conceptual schemes that emerge from communities of humans. 3) 
Human conceptual schemes are routinely enlarged or transformed through 
the act of appropriation, which is a species of interpretation. Finally, 4) 
the adjudication of truth claims submits to the demands of an existential 
relationship and not vice versa. Taken together, the claims suggest to me an 
infinitely long process for theology. It is almost Hegelian. We should engage 
the other – person or text – in interreligious dialogue. The dialogue is usu­
ally productive. It produces an enlarged horizon, a new synthesis, which 
then is brought into the next dialogue. But unlike Hegel, this process does 
not unfold according to the logic of Absolute Spirit. Instead, it traces the 
boundary that joins human language and the prelinguistic sacred. There is a 
pessimistic interpretation of transreligious dialogue, that while it may foster 
goodwill among religious communities, it is a metaphysical goose chase. 
However, there is an eschatological hope that it is more than that. As we 
perpetually dialogue with otherness, we trace an ever more complete model 
of the world. 
Notes 
1 Experience should be understood widely, not as just experience gained through 
the five sense organs. Theology employs a wider range of experience than just the 
five senses. Ethical intuitions, aesthetic sensibilities, emotive states, and recogni­
tion of authority are also modes of perception, though more susceptible to idio­
syncratic interpretation than the five senses. 
2 In the language of my church community, the masculine pronoun was always 
used to refer to the divine. This set up my own uncritical expectation of God’s 
masculinity. In fact, I remember imagining that God probably looked a lot like my 
grandfather: dark oily hair, olive skin, a large nose, and pale yellow golf shirt with 
a chest pocket. The shirt was by far the most vivid part of the image. 
3 Here, science is defined broadly. It is derived from the German Wissenschaft, 
which is perhaps better translated as a method of production of knowledge. 
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  4 This insight is present throughout the hermeneutic tradition, but is most clearly 
articulated by Heidgger. Care (Sorge) is the fundamental mode of being in the 
world. Metaphysical truth claims are but one species of existential concern. 
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15 Strategic religious 
participation in a shared 
religious landscape 
A model for Westerners? 
Paul Hedges 
Introduction 
Can one person participate in the rituals and beliefs of more than a single 
religion? For most modern Westerners, this seems almost like a non-question.
Of course not! You are either Buddhist, Christian, Sikh, or Muslim. You 
cannot, in any coherent sense, do the rituals of a certain tradition one day 
and then engage in the rites of another the next day. However, this common­
sense Western norm has not been the standard global pattern through most 
of history. People have, and still do, participate in, belong to, and identify 
beyond the boundaries of a single religious tradition – and in many places 
this is perfectly normal and acceptable. 
Moreover, in the West today, many people are engaging in what is often 
termed multiple (or dual) religious belonging (or identity). However, this 
is generally seen – by scholars, religious professionals, and many of the
public – as some form of spiritual dilettantism or illegitimate syncretism. It is 
frequently frowned on or dismissed as lacking seriousness or credibility. The 
argument of this chapter is that we should not so readily dismiss these prac­
tices and that we may simply be looking at a different way of doing religion. 
To this end, we will explore the traditional way in which such boundary 
crossing between religions has occurred in the Chinese context (and beyond), 
which I have elsewhere described as strategic religious participation (SRP) 
in a shared religious landscape (SRL). My argument is not to suggest that 
Westerners should start copying East Asian patterns of religiosity. Rather, 
it is to suggest that patterns of religiosity may now be occurring within 
Western contexts. We are simply doing religion differently. As such, rather 
than dismissing this as illegitimate, some form of spiritual pick’n’mix, or
superficial dabbling it is actually a way of doing religion that is credible, 
serious, and profound. If an individual, family, or community can use one 
tradition for marriage, another for death, a third for meditation, and so 
on, why should we not see this as normal?1 It is certainly increasingly com­
mon and arguably has implications not just for the people doing it but also 
for scholars of religion studying the phenomenon and for Christian (and 
other) theologians and religious professionals who are thinking about what 
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religious identity, belonging, and participation mean. Does it even have 
implications for thinking about a transreligious, or interreligious, theology? 
In this chapter, I will briefly address the way that Western scholars have 
typically thought about multiple religious belonging and the paradigm for 
thinking religion that informs this. I will then describe in general terms the 
East Asian context of SRP in an SRL.2 I will then briefly address some ways 
in which this phenomenon could describe some contemporary Western 
trends found in America, Europe, and elsewhere concerning the way that 
people are engaging with multiple religious traditions. Finally, I will address 
at more length some potential consequences from this about how we may 
come to think about theological issues in light of this. 
The West: the world religions paradigm and  
strong religious borders 
Why do we assume that people cannot belong to more than one religion
at any one time? Nor participate in the rites and rituals of different tra­
ditions? Such activity is often spoken of as a transgression of “natural”
boundaries, or even compared to some form of spiritual adultery.3 It is seen
as something that goes against what religion is or truly should be. All these
attitudes come from a context in which what are often termed the Abra­
hamic monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have been predomi­
nant. Especially in certain forms, including the Protestant strands that have
dominated North Western Europe and North America for the last couple of
centuries, singular and exclusive identity and belonging are affirmed. Strict
creedal confessions of belief demarcate each religion, even each denomi­
nation or sect within each religion, such that seeking to belong to more
than one seems intellectually incoherent. It also violates the strict teachings
and representations of these religions. Given several centuries of Western
colonialism, and over the last couple of centuries a military and economic
dominance that has ensured cultural and intellectual global hegemony, this
has become the predominant model. Without entering into the intricacies,
the models of what religion is within Western Protestant religious imaginar­
ies have been taken by scholars and others as defining and definitive of the
very essence of religion. It has shaped what has come to be called the world
religions paradigm (WRP). 
Within the WRP, each religion is imagined to exist as a clearly demarcated 
monolith. It has distinctive and unique beliefs, as well as its own defining rit­
uals and practices. It claims sole allegiance of its members, who must adhere 
strictly to the confessions set out in the foundational books, which state what 
it says. If you have done any courses in religion, you may well have been 
taught according to this kind of “world religions” model, which presents 
each religion in turn by a set of common criteria: beliefs, scriptures, priests, 
history, rituals, etc. Each religion becomes a distinct and bounded entity of 
belonging and belief. However, although this – to some extent – maps out 
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some dominant trends within the Abrahamic traditions, it is far from nor­
mative or representative of the world’s wider religious landscape. 
In short, the way in which one part of the world does religion has become 
a pattern and map to presume to say how all religion works, or should 
work. It is a deeply colonial, or orientalist, set of presuppositions, which has 
taken a Western model and applied it globally. We shall see, though, that 
this model is far from normative in the East Asian context, where we will 
focus on China but also look broadly. 
The East: strategic religious participation in a 
shared religious landscape 
If you wandered into a traditional Chinese temple across much of Asia, 
you may be surprised that inside you would find statues of such figures 
as the Buddha, the bodhisattva Guanyin, Confucius, figures from Chinese 
folk tradition such as Sun Wu Kong (the Monkey King), and Daoist deities, 
including perhaps the popular Eight Immortals, or maybe the Jade Emperor. 
How to reconcile that one temple (even if nominally Buddhist or Daoist) 
may contain figures from seemingly four different “religions” (Buddhism, 
Daoism, Confucianism, and Chinese folk religion)? 
Our question perhaps only seems strange because of where we are view­
ing it from. In the East Asian Sinitic world (i.e., primarily China but also 
those territories affected by Chinese cultural mores), what we may term SRP 
in a SRL has been the norm. Let us break this down into its two component 
parts to discuss it. First, SRP. This denotes that doing “religion” in East Asia 
has not primarily been about belonging to a particular tradition, nor adher­
ence to a set of doctrines and beliefs (creedal statements) that define what 
it means to be a member of one religion as opposed to any others. Rather, 
one will make use of religious traditions, ritual experts, and ways of doing 
religion as are useful and appropriate. For instance, Buddhists are known 
for doing funerals and so may be called upon for such services, Tianshi Dao 
(Heavenly Master Daoist tradition) Masters were often considered the best 
exorcists and so may be sought out for this, and any passing itinerant monk 
may be asked to do services at the local village temple as and when the need 
arises. Meanwhile, in some rituals, Daoists, Buddhists, and local ritual (folk 
religion) priests may all have a role in some contexts. Religion is therefore 
not about believing and belonging to a single tradition. Rather, one will stra­
tegically employ the services of whichever tradition(s) and its (their) ritual 
experts that are available, suitable, or customarily required for certain acts. 
This is what is meant by SRP. We should also note that in imperial China, 
the three dominant traditions (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism) were 
often seen as complementary, in what was termed the sanjiao (three tradi­
tions) teaching. This was variously understood by different figures at differ­
ent times, but as one way of conceiving it: Buddhism dealt with our eternal 
concerns and certain rituals; Confucianism deals with our outer relationship 
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with family and society; and Daoism concerns our personal bodily/spiritual 
cultivation. 
SRL meanwhile signifies that despite considering several different tradi­
tions, a fairly common cosmological system underlies it all. This, in the Chi­
nese context, may be concerned with the fact that everything is composed of 
qi (often translated as breath, but signifying also psycho-spiritual matter: it 
is the stuff that everything is made of), a belief in the interaction of yin and 
yang and the so-called five agents (or sometimes five elements), and often 
reincarnation. These were taken, to a large degree (even if sometimes con­
tested), as a common ground, such that the different doctrinal teachings of 
the varying traditions could be seen as not significant differences compared 
to what was held in common. As such, mixing traditions or taking bits from 
each was not typically seen as violating core doctrinal systems or some illicit 
form of mixing. 
It may be objected, as has been argued by some, that this context of SRP 
in a SRL may have been a common grassroots viewpoint but was rejected 
by elites, who demanded strict allegiance to only one tradition and fiercely 
rejected the others. However, this does not do justice to the context. First, at 
the most elite level – in some senses – of imperial decrees, the sanjiao teach­
ing was often pronounced and officially taught. Second, although strong 
disputes and even vehement rejection of the other traditions was heard at 
times, it is not the whole story. Confucianism, when it adopted meditational 
teachings (in the Neo-Confucian tradition) borrowed directly from Daoism 
and Buddhism, even while often derogatorily condemning those traditions 
(as it, in some ways, became more like them). Confucian scholars would 
be known in retirement to go live in Buddhist or Daoist temples, without 
any sense that they stopped being a Confucian. Third, in training, Daoist 
masters would often send their disciples to Buddhist monks (and vice versa), 
believing they had particular skills they could learn. All of this is only possi­
ble because of a sense that all lived within a SRL. It even shows elite practice 
and acceptance of SRP. Notably, we could expand examples, and these are 
only mentioned here as indicative. 
Eastern ways in Western landscapes: crossing  
boundaries and multiple belonging 
Arguably, in the contemporary Western context, we are seeing people 
engaging in what looks like SRP in a SRL. In the West, because of the WRP, 
such crossing between traditions has traditionally been viewed as at least 
difficult, if not deeply problematic, and even illegitimate. Certainly, much 
of the literature suggests this. Nevertheless, particularly among millennials 
the sense that what is often termed multiple religious belonging (MRB) is 
neither problematic nor some form of dangerous syncretism. It is consid­
ered perfectly fine to learn or borrow, rituals/techniques from such places 
as Hindu yoga, Buddhist meditation, Christian and Jewish rituals, Native 















American traditions, etc. Scholarship in the study of religion, not to men­
tion Christian theologians, have often condemned this. However, the Chi­
nese and East Asian context suggests that we should not be so troubled. 
Although some ways of doing or thinking about religion make this seem 
illegitimate, other ways of doing or thinking about religion make it seem 
natural and expected. The issue is that engaging in MRB is often misunder­
stood, so the question becomes: How this can be changed in our ways of 
conceiving the religious field? 
Interreligious streams: transgressions and 
interventions in the religious fields 
What implications does this have for the way that we do theology today
and think about spirituality and religious performance? I would argue that
for those exploring what we may term transreligious or interreligious the­
ologies, the implications are immense. First, as should be clear, it to some
extent tears up the rule book. Scholars have argued, for many years, that
doing MRB or engaging in rituals across traditions is not simply theologi­
cally illegitimate (which, arguably, in some traditions it may be) but that it
is also doing “religion” wrong. These, we should realize, are two entirely
separate issues. What regulations cover what religious leaders say is legiti­
mate within their tradition is not coterminous with what religion is or what
it should look like. Indeed, here we should note that the very term and
concept of “religion” itself is one that has a particular Western and colonial
backdrop that has shaped how we envisage it (and, for some, is even why
we envisage such a thing exists);4 as such, we speak of “religion” here not
as a “thing” but as a social reality.5 This is an important caveat, because it
means that we cannot even speak of there being a right or wrong way of
understanding “religion” or regulating the way we see it. Those parts of
society that we see as religious vary due to various social and cultural fac­
tors that have shaped them. 
Second, and following from our first point, we can see the regulation of 
whether religious worldviews permit some form of MRB or SRP in a SRL 
as socially and culturally determined. They are not set in stone. As such, 
the parameters that have made the Abrahamic traditions seem less liable 
to MRB or SRP in a SRL are not prescriptive. Indeed, knowing that worlds 
of religious understanding give different perspectives on this also suggests 
that these different ways are not getting it wrong, but have equal validity. It 
can thus lead to a rethinking of how we think about the “natural” barriers 
between religions, and even whether we should see them as such. Further, 
the notion of the complementary nature of traditions or what disagreements 
may mean can also be seen through different lenses. 
Third, doing what we may term a transreligious or an interreligious theo­
logical task no longer becomes a perilous venture bordering, at best, on 
illicit syncretism. Rather, such ventures may be seen as a perfectly legitimate 











employment of resources in a SRL. Much of the literature not just on MRB,6 
but also on inter-riting (the sharing of rituals across religious boundaries; 
Moyaert and Geldhof (2015)), and on interreligious encounters and theolo­
gies in general,7 has tended to come from Western contexts and is reflective 
of the WRP as normative. However, for those who come from a context 
where SRP in a SRL is normative, this may seem irrelevant. Whether in the 
East Asian context8 or in today’s Western context, doing transreligious or 
interreligious theology is not a marginal or dangerous pursuit, but rather 
arguably the new norm. We are still certainly a long way from this, certainly 
in ecclesial contexts or academic theology and understanding; nevertheless, 
the situation on the ground may be more fluid and changing faster. As is 
often the case, theology may need to play catch-up with the wider world. 
Notes 
1 A recent exploration of such patterns in the US context is found in Bidwell (2018). 
2 The first two parts of this chapter will draw heavily from my paper, Hedges 
(2017). Readers are encouraged to go there for references and further resources 
on the issues discussed. 
3 See Knitter (2009).
 
4 On such debates see King and Hedges (2014, 1–30).
 
5 See Schilbrack (2017, 161–178). This is explored further in Hedges (Forthcoming, 

chapter 1). 
6 See e.g. Cornille (2002, 1–6) and Berthrong (2000). 
7 See Hedges and Race (2008) and Harris, Hedges, and Hettiararchi (2016) as two 
overviews on the typical theology of religions literature, 
8 However, it has been noted that although this has reflected historical practices 
and understandings influenced by Western norms and the hegemonic imposition 
of the WRP standard, we are seeing a change in understanding in East Asia and 
elsewhere to a context where singular belonging and identity in religion is being 
enforced. 
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 16 How to think globally and 
affiliate locally 
Jeanine Diller 
Can one theologize without walls and simultaneously affiliate with a par­
ticular religious tradition? Or, as Jerry L. Martin phrased the question in 
conversation: Can a transreligious theologian take account of spiritual 
truths outside their confession, or would they have to give up or loosen 
their affiliation to do this? 
I will argue that it is not a contradiction in terms to affiliate and do
Theology Without Walls (TWW), both in a serious way. It is possible to
do both. Why? In short, it makes sense to affiliate and do TWW because
through TWW, affiliators are expanding their knowledge of the thing
that their affiliation has put them in touch with (which I will call “the
Ultimate”). That is, despite appearances, they are not undoing what they
have found from affiliation by thinking outside it; they are rather adding
knowledge to it. 
This “expanding knowledge” sentiment is all well and good, you might be 
thinking, until an affiliator tries it and finds their search for more exploding 
into confusing and contradictory news about the Ultimate that challenges 
their affiliation’s view of It. True. The burden of this chapter will be to state 
more carefully this and two other specific challenges that TWW seems to 
present for affiliation and then to identify views on religious diversity that 
address them. 
Preliminaries: TWW, affiliation, and belief 
TWW seeks the truth of ultimate matters by drawing on the resources of 
multiple traditions. Because it is about seeking truth, TWW focuses on the 
propositions associated with religions. To think there is a tension between 
TWW and affiliation thus seems to assume that affiliation is also, at least in 
part, about propositions (i.e., that affiliation entails belief). Though I will be 
assuming for the bulk of the chapter that affiliation does entail belief, I want 
to explain why this is not obvious as we begin. 
By “affiliating with” a religion, I will mean here either belonging to it 
or identifying with it. Belonging to a religion is generally a joint act of the 
person who is presented to belong and leaders within the religion granting 
belonging to them under certain conditions. For example, an individual goes 
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through jukai to enter a Buddhist community, baptism to enter a Christian 
one, etc. These processes may be more or less elaborate, depending on the 
religion or community, but for most religions1 they require a leader. This 
fact makes belonging to most religions an invite-only affair, though most 
religions are very free with the invitations. In contrast, identifying with a 
religion is decided by the individual himself or herself. All identity entails is 
that one considers oneself involved with the tradition enough to call oneself 
a “Daoist,” a “Muslim,” etc. Though this analogy borders on the sacrile­
gious, identifying oneself with a religion is as easy as becoming a fan of a 
sports team. Nobody except me decides that I am a University of Michigan 
football fan, and I can choose to live out my fanhood with as much or as 
little devotion as I please. 
The wide welcome for belonging and even wider welcome for identify­
ing makes affiliation relatively easy. The complex nature of religion makes 
it even easier because one can affiliate by participating in only some of a 
religion’s many dimensions, e.g., creed, code, community, and cult, to use 
Scott Appleby’s gloss. The relevant question here is: Can one affiliate while 
dropping creed in particular? Sometimes no; sometimes yes. I know first­
hand of several Christian communities where a fair number of beliefs are 
required for belonging, and of a Jewish community whose rabbi stated was 
about “deed, not creed.” Still, to guard against setting up a straw man here, 
I will follow Samuel Ruhmkorff in taking religions “to involve a core area 
of doctrine even cluster concepts cannot bypass”2 and focus on communities 
that take belief to be necessary for affiliation. Even there, I will argue, one 
can still affiliate and do TWW. 
Three challenges to affiliating and doing TWW 
But how exactly can one affiliate and do TWW? Doesn’t seeking truth out­
side one’s tradition challenge the beliefs one affirms inside it? 
It does, in at least three ways: 
Challenge 1: Why seek truth outside one’s affiliation in the first place? 
Challenge 2: If I do seek truth outside my affiliation, some outside beliefs 
seem to contradict some of my home beliefs. That risks a denial of the 
home beliefs, thereby wearing away at affiliation. 
Challenge 3: Even for new beliefs that are consistent with home beliefs, 
adding new beliefs shifts one’s focus away from home beliefs. That 
shift weakens one’s affiliation. 
Both Challenges 2 and 3 arise from how beliefs within and outside one’s 
tradition might relate to each other. There are three possible relations, pic­
tured in Figure 16.1: 
The outside beliefs might confirm a home belief: for home beliefs a and 
b, one can rediscover b outside. 
1
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 Figure 16.1 Home and outside beliefs 
2 The outside beliefs might contradict a home belief: for home beliefs a
and b, one finds not a outside. 
3 The outside beliefs might add to the home beliefs: for home beliefs a and 
b, one finds c outside. 
Confirmation of a home belief from the outside as in 1) is all good: it 
suggests anew that what one thought was true is true, at least according 
to the outside tradition too. If anything, such confirmation deepens one’s 
affiliation. For example, imagine I had always believed that the Ultimate 
was good and then found that same belief in another religion. That makes 
me even more sure that I was right about the Ultimate’s goodness all along. 
However, if an outside belief contradicts a home belief as in 2), which 
belief should one take to be true? If one chooses the outside belief and loses 
the home belief, this is a hit to one’s affiliation – a “loosening” of it, as 
Martin says. Say I am a Christian who believes in the Trinity and become 
concerned by a Muslim view that it constitutes polytheism and should be 
dropped. I become less Christian, it seems, if I drop it. Contradiction and its 
attendant risk of possible loss of belief is Challenge 2. 
Finally, even an outside belief that does not require subtracting but merely 
adds to the home beliefs as in 3) still distracts from the home beliefs. This 
loss of focus on, perhaps even loss of love for, the beliefs of one’s affiliation 
is Challenge 3. I had thought for some time that contradiction was the hard­
est challenge TWW presented for affiliation but, oddly, dwelling on outside 
beliefs turns out to be an even deeper threat in the end, as we shall see. 
Challenge 1 and some preliminary reasons to 
step outside one’s affiliation 
One affiliates presumably because, among other things, one is convinced of 
the truth of the core doctrines of one’s religion. So why go elsewhere looking 
for truth? This is a very fundamental question, and I think many affiliators 











   
 
never get past it. I think of one colleague who said: Why not look to another 
religion for truth? Because I might go to hell, that’s why! 
My main reply to this challenge, and my main point of this whole piece
as intimated at the start, can be summed up with what Bilbo writes to
Frodo at the start of the movie version of The Hobbit: “You asked me once
if I had told you everything there was to know about my adventures. And
while I can honestly say I have told you the truth, I may not have told you
all of it.” 
Long-standing affiliators with a religion are like Frodo and the Ultimate 
is like Bilbo in this quote. Their affiliation has brought them in touch with 
something they perceive as Ultimate. Due to the renowned magnetic attrac­
tion of the Ultimate – a “to-be-pursuedness” about it, as J. L. Mackie has 
said about the good – affiliators may have a keen desire to know everything 
there is to know about the Ultimate. As they live out their affiliation, they 
come to know truths about the Ultimate. But in this very process, they also 
may glimpse how vast the Ultimate is, how it transcends human thought. So 
they may come to think that, though they have heard the truth from their 
religion, they may not have heard all of it. So, ironically, it is touching the 
Ultimate through affiliation that can ready someone to go outside it. 
In fact, it is not only natural but also logically required to look beyond 
one’s own experiences of the Ultimate in order to generalize about It, on 
pain of committing the fallacy of hasty generalization. As Toulmin, Rieke, 
and Janik (1984) say well: 
We commit fallacies of hasty generalization when we (1) Draw a con­
clusion from too few specific instances, for example, basing the gen­
eral statement “All Audis are lemons” on a few individual reports from 
friends who have happened to have trouble with their own Audis, or 
alternatively when we: (2) Draw a conclusion from untypical examples, 
for example, concluding that we do not care for Woody Allen movies 
(which are normally comedies) on the basis of our reaction to The Front
(one of [his] rare serious films). . . . Though the relevance of the data 
to the claim being made is beyond question, there simply isn’t enough 
data available for making the sweeping claim that is alleged to follow 
from it. 
(151–153, emphases theirs) 
It is fallacious to generalize from one’s own experience to the way the whole 
world is. So also it is fallacious to generalize from our own personal experi­
ence of the Ultimate to claims about the way It actually is. The move from, 
for example, “I experience the Ultimate as kind” to “the Ultimate is kind” 
commits the fallacy. To avoid the fallacy, we need to look further for 1) 
more examples that will help us 2) determine whether our experiences are 
atypical, as Toulmin says. The more examples we find, the surer we can be 
about the Ultimate in general. 




   
   
 
 
    





Challenge 2: meeting contradiction 
Still, it is genuinely puzzling why, if we are all meeting the Ultimate, we have
such different things to say about it. It is easy to understand how I might hear
from another religion about a belief that is different but adds, as belief c in
Figure 16.1 illustrates. If I know someone and you do too, it is not unusual
that you know things about them that I don’t, so I can learn new things about
them from you. But the beliefs that are different and contradict as belief a
and not a are in Figure 16.1 – especially numerous such beliefs that contra­
dict – are confusing. If I hear from you that this person is not like I thought
and then from several others as well, I start to wonder: Am I wrong? Are you
wrong? Are we all wrong? Should we just call the whole thing off? 
These questions are the stuff of Challenge 2, and I have asked them over 
and over again as I, affiliated with one religion, listen to people from other 
religions talk about the Ultimate. Interestingly, it turns out, there are many 
ways theorists are meeting Challenge 2. 
The landscape of views of religious diversity 
The many ways to understand contradictions between the world’s religions 
are “theologies of religious pluralism” – or what I call “views of religious 
diversity.”3 It will help to talk about these views in the more subtle ways 
that Perry Schmidt Leukel’s view of them allows. He reads views of reli­
gious diversity as answers to the question: How many religions “[medi­
ate] salvific knowledge of ultimate/transcendent reality?”4 Because this is a 
“how-many” question, the answers define the usual range with numbers: 
exclusivists answer “1”; inclusivists answer “1 but others work or help in 
some way”; pluralists answer “more than 1” (n.b. pluralists need not say 
“all”; as Ruhmkorff (2013) says wonderfully, they are allowed to think 
“there are some sketchy religions out there”). To complete the logical range, 
let’s add the answer “0” for those who think that no religions mediate salv­
ific knowledge of the Ultimate – either because no religion is good at that yet 
or because no religion ever can be, say if such knowledge is beyond us or if 
there is no Ultimate to know in the first place. 
The range of views on religious diversity is often displayed with moun­
tains. In Schmidt-Leukel’s phrasing, the top of the mountain is “mediating 
salvific knowledge of the Ultimate” and the arrows represent various reli­
gions’ ability to do that (see Figure 16.2). On the exclusivist mountain, only 
one religion makes it to the top while all the others have false starts. On the 
inclusivist mountain, though only one religion makes it all the way to the 
top, others might help in the foothills, for example, the Dalai Lama’s view 
that even if it turns out that only Buddhism has saving truths, other religions 
have partial truths useful for working toward salvation. On the pluralist’s 
mountain, multiple religions make it to the top, and on the error theorist’s, 
none of them do. 










Error theory Exclusivism  Inclusivism  Pluralism 
0 1 1+ 2+ 
Figure 16.2 Soteriological diversity in Schmidt-Leukel 
Ruhmkorff noticed that we can convert Schmidt-Leukel’s question into a 
form of a “how-many religions x” question and thereby produce different 
diversity questions with different fillings for x. So one can ask Schmidt­
Leukel’s instance of the form (put more simply): “how many religions lead 
to salvation?” (a soteriological question); or other instances, such as “how 
many religions have true claims about the Ultimate?” (an alethic question); 
“how many religions provide experience of the Ultimate?” (an experiential 
question); etc.5 
The key point is that someone might not answer each of these questions 
with the same number. For example, think of Kierkegaard’s lovely saying 
that it is better to pray to a false God truly than a true God falsely. Kierkeg­
aard might hold an alethic exclusivism, that the fundamental claims of only 
one religion can be true (there is a true God and there are false Gods) mixed 
with an experiential pluralism, that nevertheless faithful adherents of many
religions actually experience the divine (God honors their true spirit of 
prayer). If so, it would be misleading to call Kierkegaard “an exclusivist” or 
“a pluralist,” full stop, because which word applies depends on the diversity 
question at issue. So people do not hold a single, all-purpose view of reli­
gious diversity. They hold views on religious diversity. To picture someone’s 
view, you would be obliged to draw the whole range multiple times, once for 
each question with the telos it discusses at the summit. 
As if Ruhmkorff’s insight doesn’t complicate our lives enough, S. Mark 
Heim and John Cobb have expanded the range of options even further by 
noticing that each of the views discussed so far assumes there is just one
mountain with one top – one salvation, one Ultimate, etc. – which none, 
one, or more religions might reach. To lay bare this assumption, Heim and 
Cobb each decided to ask not only the questions of the form “How many 
religions x” but also questions of the form “How many x’s are there in the 
first place?” In particular, to “How many religions lead to salvation?” Heim 
has added “How many salvations are there?” And to “how many religions 
involve veridical experience the Ultimate?” Cobb has added: “how many 
kinds of religious experience are there? And how many Ultimates are there 
to experience?”6 
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As Griffin noted, Heim’s and Cobb’s new questions have the effect of dis­
tinguishing the original views earlier as all “identist” because they assume 
there’s just one mountain top (e.g., one salvation or one kind of religious 
experience or one Ultimate). In contrast, the “differentialist” views assume 
there are irreducibly multiple salvations, religious experiences, Ultimates, 
etc., thus multiple mountain tops. Though Heim and Cobb both seem to 
be differentialist pluralists, it is in principle possible for someone to be an 
error theorist, exclusivist, inclusivist, or pluralist about differentialism just 
as people are about identism. Such views, though possible, might sound 
odd, for example, a differentialist exclusivist would believe there is one very 
handy religion that helps you reach theistic salvation and nirvana and mok­
sha simultaneously! 
Putting the old and new questions together makes the landscape of views 
of religious diversity contain two kinds of mountain ranges, that is, the iden­
tist range that answers “1” to the question “how many x” (where x is sal­
vation, the Ultimate, etc.) and the differentialist range that answers “more 
than 1.” Both ranges display various answers to the “how many religions do 
x” in the usual exclusivist, inclusivist, etc., terms. And both ranges need to 
be redrawn for each diversity question that gets asked. To illustrate the new 
shape of the resulting landscape, I have drawn it in Figure 16.3, just for the 
question Heim asks about salvations. 
Now we can talk more exactly about these theorists’ varying views of reli­
gious diversity. Take Hick (2004). He’s an identist pluralist about salvation: 
he thinks there is one salvation he calls “Reality-centeredness” (identist) and 
Figure 16.3 Example of soteriological diversity after Heim and Cobb 
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that every major religion can help you get from self-centeredness to Reality­
centeredness (pluralist, so first row, last box). But Hick is not an identist 
pluralist about truth. As Ruhmkorff says well, for Hick “claims made by 
different religions about the Real are noumenally false (because they do 
not describe the Real as it is in itself) but phenomenally true” because they 
describe “the Real as mediated by their religious and cultural understand­
ings.” So Hick is an identist error theorist about noumenal truth: no religion 
has true claims about the one Ultimate as it is in itself. He is simultane­
ously an identist pluralist about phenomenal truth: each religion succeeds in 
knowing the one Ultimate (identist) phenomenally, because there is nobody 
better than the perceiver to report their perceptions of It (pluralist). 
Or consider Heim. He is a differentialist pluralist about salvation: he 
thinks there are many salvations, for example, nirvana, moksha, and the­
istic salvation are each different spiritual summits (differentialist), and the 
many religions train you to reach those salvations, for example, vipassana 
helps you reach nirvana; the yogas, moksha; prayer, salvation (pluralist, 
so second row, last box). At the same time, if I read him right, Heim is a 
Christian identist inclusivist about truth: he is a realist who thinks there is 
only one Ultimate to be known (identist) and that only Christianity’s funda­
mental claims are true about It, though other religions know it in part, too 
(inclusivist). 
Finally, consider Cobb and Griffin’s complementary pluralism, which 
focuses on at least two different topics in religious diversity. First, they 
are impressed by how deeply different religious experiences are, expressed 
well by a quote they offer from Steven Katz: “There is no intelligible way 
that anyone can argue that a ‘no-self’ experience of ‘empty’ calm is the 
same experience as the experience of intense, loving, intimate relationship 
between two substantial selves” (Griffin 2005, 46), or the same experience 
as a sacred experience of the cosmos (49). Inspired by Katz, Cobb is a dif­
ferentialist pluralist about religious experience. He looks at the wide sweep 
of human religious experience and sees three durable, radically different, 
irreducible kinds of religious experience that he calls “theistic, acosmic, and 
cosmic” (49, differentialist), and he thinks multiple religions help you reach 
these experiences (pluralist). Specifically, he thinks the theistic religions such 
as the major monotheisms and some forms of Hinduism involve theistic 
experiences; the acosmic ones such as Buddhism and other forms of Hindu­
ism involve acosmic experiences; and the cosmic traditions such as Daoism 
and Native American spiritualities – and the sciences, I would add – involve 
cosmic experiences.7 
Cobb’s second move is even more radical. As Griffin says, Cobb “finds 
it unilluminating to claim . . . that . . . radically different kinds of experi­
ence are experiences of the same ultimate reality. ‘[The] evidence,’ suggests 
Cobb, ‘points to a different hypothesis’” (2005, 47). He believes there are 
three different kinds of religious experience because there are three different 
Ultimates getting experienced. Theistic experiences are experiences of the 








Supreme Being, “in-formed and the source of forms (such as truth, beauty 
and justice),” variously named and understood as God (the monotheistic 
traditions), as Amida Buddha (Buddhism), as Saguna Brahman (Advaita 
Vedanta in Hinduism), etc. (47). Acosmic experiences are of Being Itself, 
a formless ultimate reality, again variously understood as Emptiness (Bud­
dhism), as Nirguna Brahman (Advaita Vedanta) and as the Godhead (Eck­
hart in Christianity) (47). Cosmic experiences are of the Cosmos, variously 
understood as the Dao (Daoism) and other cosmic sacreds in Native Ameri­
can spiritualities and more (49). So in addition to being a differentialist 
pluralist about veridical religious experience, Cobb is a differentialist plu­
ralist about the Ultimate: he thinks there are multiple Ultimates to reach 
(differentialist), and that multiple religions and spiritualities are doing the 
reaching (pluralist). So I read him as a differentialist pluralist about knowl­
edge of Ultimacy: the contact with the three Ultimates in the three kinds of 
religious experiences provides at least some true beliefs about them, though 
it is an open question whether he would take these beliefs to be merely 
phenomenally true (“I know that the acosmic ultimate felt thus to me”) 
or noumenally so (“I know that the acosmic ultimate is thus”). Table 16.1 
summarizes the views relayed in this section. 
How views on religious diversity help meet 
Challenges 1 and 2 
Here I want to show how holding certain combinations of views on reli­
gious diversity can make doing TWW and affiliation natural. I will be using 
my own current combination of views as a case in point. 
About religious experiences: Like Cobb and Katz, I suspect that there are 
truly distinct experiences of the Ultimate by people from various religions 
(differential pluralism). My own forays into Christianity and Buddhism 
and what I know of reports of religious experiences confirm their view that 
there are at least two different kinds of experiences of Ultimacy that are dis­
tinct and possibly irreducibly so, viz., the theistic and “empty calm” kinds. 
It may be that experiences of the cosmos are a distinct third kind. That 
would explain, for instance, why my long-distance experiences of the silent 
expanse of outer space and my actual experiences of the spiritually moving 
places on earth feel so very holy. 
I also gravitate toward Heim’s differentialist pluralism about salvations. 
Heim makes sense of the undeniably advanced spiritual states, which adepts 
in the many religions reach, and does justice to their substantial differences 
in a way that Hick’s identist pluralism famously does not.8 
So let’s assume there are radically different religious experiences and irre­
ducibly multiple salvations. Why do we have this deep diversity of experi­
ences and salvations? My guess is that they are genuine responses to one 
Ultimate as Hick and Heim say, not to multiple Ultimates as Cobb says. The 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































terms, either one or multiple Ultimates could be the “truthmaker” of these 
deeply diverse experiences; both theories explain the data. Still, I gravitate 
toward the one-Ultimate hypothesis for a few reasons. First is an empirical 
reason complicated enough that I am relegating it to a footnote.9 Second 
is Ockham’s razor, an old workhorse in theory choice: all else being equal, 
“entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.” The third reason 
comes from thinking of multiple ultimacy itself. Imagine for a moment that 
the Cosmos, the Supreme Being and Being Itself are distinct Ultimates. They 
might, or perhaps must, bear some relation to each other. If so, whatever 
that totality of Ultimates relating to each other is, why that would be the 
whole truth, and thus the most total Ultimate (singular), perhaps.10 
Though the one-Ultimate view seems right, it actually heightens the prob­
lem of contradiction mentioned in Challenge 2. That is, I cannot say, like 
Cobb, that it is no wonder we make different claims about Ultimacy: we 
are talking about different Ultimates! On the one-Ultimate view, we are all 
talking about the same thing, so why do we contradict each other? To make 
matters worse, Hick managed to find a way to resolve the contradictions 
even with just one Ultimate, but I can’t use his way either, because it trades 
on his idea that no religion involves genuine knowledge of the Ultimate and 
I think multiple religions do (he is an identist error theorist about knowl­
edge and I am an identist pluralist). I agree with how Hick begins: we each 
experience the Ultimate through our religious and cultural traditions. But 
I disagree with how he ends: so none of us are describing the Ultimate as 
it is in Itself. His ending avoids contradiction because all claims including 
contradictory ones are relativized to a religion: “Jesus is God” is true about 
God as Christians experience God, “Jesus is not God” is true of God as Jews 
experience God. I, on the other hand, suspect that, if there is an Ultimate 
and if we are having experiences of It, we sometimes are describing the Ulti­
mate. We almost always fail, because the Ultimate is beyond us in kind and 
in scope, for example, as Leibniz’s cosmological argument shows deeply. 
Still, as Maimonides has helped me see, I think we can know some very lim­
ited truths about It (e.g., about its actions and some disjunctive claims about 
Its nature that those actions entail).11 If so, we are in these limited ways (big 
breath!) really accessing the Ultimate. 
These commitments leave me still saddled with the contradictions that 
Cobb and Hick avoided: How can it be that different religionists say con­
tradictory things about the Ultimate if they are each really accessing It at 
least sometimes? I can think of at least three ways to read such contradic­
tions given all my commitments earlier. First, because it is so hard to say 
true things about the Ultimate, sometimes I may be wrong, or you may be 
wrong, or we may both be wrong, and it may be decades or another lifetime 
until we know which. If at least one of us is wrong, the contradiction is 
defused. 
Second, sometimes our claims about ultimate things may not be literally 
true, but rather, for example, a metaphor for, an allegory for, or an instance 






     










of some universal truth. This is the stuff of myth that Mircea Eliade and 
Joseph Campbell and others have spoken of so eloquently. For example, the 
Christian belief that Jesus rose again from the dead to save us from sin may 
be an instance of a universal truth that, for example, the forces of good are 
stronger than the forces of death. Perhaps a Hindu might deny that story 
about Jesus but affirm the story that Prahlad survived Holika’s fire, and per­
haps the Prahlad story is also an instance of that very same universal truth. 
If so, what is contradiction at the particular level is actually agreement at 
the universal level, so the apparent contradiction is defused in an important 
sense.12 
The third way to defuse contradiction is inspired by Baruch Spinoza’s 
thought about what he calls “God” – an Ultimate that is read sometimes 
monistically, sometimes panentheistically. Though I will not aim to stay true 
to Spinoza here, he has a wonderful idea of the infinite attributes of God. 
He reads each attribute as a different way we can perceive God’s essence,13 
each of which is “complete” in itself and “incommensurate” with the other 
attributes. Roger Scruton explains Spinoza’s attributes with a really helpful 
analogy: 
Imagine two people looking at a picture painted on a board, one an
optician, the other a critic. And suppose you ask them to describe
what they see. The optician arranges the picture on two axes, and
describes it thus: “At x = 4, y = 5.2, there is a patch of chrome yellow;
this continues along the horizontal axis until x = 5.1, when it changes
to Prussian blue.” The critic says: “It is a man in a yellow coat, with
a lowering expression, and steely blue eyes.” You could imagine these
descriptions being complete – so complete that they would enable a
third party to reconstruct the picture by using them as a set of instruc­
tions. But they would have nothing whatever in common [incommen­
surate]. One is about colors arranged on a matrix, the other about the
scene that we see in them. You cannot switch from one narrative to
the other and still make sense: the man is not standing next to a patch
of Prussian blue, but next to the shadow of an oak tree. The Prussian
blue is not situated next to a coat sleeve, but next to a patch of chrome
yellow. 
(9–10, emphases mine) 
Though Spinoza most definitely did not put his attributes to work in this 
way, I take different religionists to be in touch with different attributes of the 
Ultimate, just as the optician and critic are in touch with different attributes 
of the painting. This view captures at once both my differentialist plural­
ism about religious experiences (like Cobb’s) and my identism about ulti­
macy (like Hick’s): some religionists experience the acosmic attribute of the 
Ultimate; others, the cosmic, and still others, the theistic, but these are all 
experiences of the same Ultimate, just different attributes of It. Unlike Hick, 









Figure 16.4 Partialism about knowledge of the Ultimate 
these experiences of the attributes can produce knowledge of the Ultimate 
itself. In the same way that both the optician’s and critic’s accounts of the 
painting are actually true of the painting – it really does have those colors 
in that order and it really does contain that scene – so also each religionist’s 
account of the Ultimate can be actually true of it. Call this Scruton-Spinozistic
inspired view “partialism,” and give it a place between inclusivism and plu­
ralism on the identist mountains in the question about knowledge of the 
Ultimate (the second question in Table 16.1). 
Partialism addresses Challenge 1. Because the Ultimate has multiple 
(maybe infinite) attributes and each religion grasps just one of these, no 
religion has full knowledge of the Ultimate solo. Affiliators must go outside 
their affiliation and pool their knowledge with other affiliators to know the 
Ultimate more fully (see Figure 16.4).14 
Partialism also addresses Challenge 2. Different religionists can seem to 
contradict each other, but that is because they are describing different attrib­
utes of the Ultimate. We can see that the contradiction is merely apparent 
when we relativize the religionists’ claims to their respective attributes, just 
as Hick did when he relativized claims to their respective phenomena. 
Challenge 3: a change of heart 
There remains Challenge 3, the risk of adding new beliefs that, though con­
sistent with the home beliefs, distract a person from the home beliefs and 
thereby weaken affiliation. 
Challenge 3 is embodied in the story of the one-time Henri Le Saux 
turned Swami Abishiktananda. Born in France in 1910, he began his formal 
spiritual journey as a Christian Benedictine monk who eventually felt called 
to India to seek an even deeper contemplative life. Over decades of life in 
India, his attraction to Hindu over Christian forms grew so much that by 
the last year of his life in 1973, he wrote: “The discovery of Christ’s ‘I AM’ 
is the ruin of any Christic ‘theology,’ for all notions are burnt within the fire 
of experience” (said in 1973, see 2019). Swami Abishiktananda seems to 
have failed Challenge 3, for worse or for better. His focus on Hindu truths 
outside his Christianity, though not formally inconsistent with it, eventually 










transformed his focus and spirit enough that he lost his Christian affiliation 
altogether. 
Even though such loss of affiliation can happen in the face of new truths 
from an outside tradition, it also can not happen. In fact, in many of the 
other cases I have read of people who have gone out seriously enough to 
other affiliations that they identify with a hybrid or double belong, the per­
son has kept their home affiliation.15 They are living proof that it is possible 
to affiliate seriously and do TWW seriously. 
Conclusion 
To return to our initial question: “Can a transreligious theologian take 
account of spiritual truths outside their confession, or would they have to 
give up or loosen their affiliation to do this?” There are three good reasons 
to think that one cannot retain affiliation while doing TWW: one’s affilia­
tion should be truth enough; going beyond affiliation risks being persuaded 
by outside beliefs that contradict one’s affiliation; and being distracted by 
them, too. Though the story of Swami Abishiktananda shows us that these 
three challenges are real, we also confirmed that they all can be and some­
times are met. In particular, if one adopts partialism and thinks that one’s 
own religion is a way of coming to know just one of the possibly infinite 
attributes of the Ultimate, and that other religions are too, then an Ultimate-
besotted affiliator may well venture out to other religions to get a fuller 
picture of the Ultimate she loves. With partialism, she also expects contra­
diction on the way: perhaps one of us is wrong, or perhaps there is some 
more universal truth we both believe here, or perhaps we are talking in 
incommensurate ways, you tracing one of the attributes, I another. Finally, 
if in this process of learning she should fall for another religion’s path, and 
though this disaffiliation is a genuine loss – akin to loss of one’s home or first 
language – provided there really is an Ultimate, and provided both religions 
are dwelling in Its attributes, then the genuine loss gives way to a genuine 
gain, a new way to see the Ultimate all over again.16 
Notes 
1 Islam may be an exception, because it requires only saying the Shahadah three 
times earnestly, not necessarily even in the presence of another Muslim, let alone 
an imam or other leader. 
2 I also follow Ruhmkorff in thinking this applies just to “core” propositions, 
however these may get identified, because “it would be absurdly stringent to 
insist that all propositions associated with a religion be true.” That would, for 
example, rule out denominational differences and more. 
3 “Views of religious diversity” drops the etymological reference to God in “the­
ology” and drops the word “pluralism” to make it clear that the views under 
consideration do not all talk about God and are not all species of pluralism – 
whatever exactly that might be (see Griffin (2005, chapter 1) for the ambiguity 
of “pluralism”. 







   






















4 My exposition here is taken from Ruhmkorff (2013). 
5 In the first section, he writes: “We can think of the debate between pluralism, 
exclusivism, and inclusivism at the level of salvation (are only faithful adherents 
to one tradition saved?), rationality (are only faithful adherents to one religious 
tradition rational?), doctrine (are the fundamental claims of only one religion 
true?), religious experience (do members of only one tradition experience the 
divine?), and so on.” 
6 These questions are my paraphrases. Heim’s question is a major point in Salva­
tions. Apparently Cobb had this same idea before Heim, see Griffin (2005, chap­
ter 2). Both have good company in the other. See Cobb’s additional questions 
laid out in Griffin (2005, chapters 1 and 2). 
7 Note that an identist about religious experiences would think that human reli­
gious experience across time and place is really all the same. Such a view may 
sound like a nonstarter, given the differences between individuals, but think of 
it as close to the way many people read the experience of seeing green (to couch 
one vexed topic in the terms of another!). An identist view of seeing green would 
say that the experience of seeing green is the same among humans, given our 
similar biologies and the fact that green things emit light at the same wavelength 
worldwide. That sameness is there, someone might say, even if it expressed in 
different words and reactions across cultures. So also, perhaps, with religious 
experiences, given our similar needs for the Ultimate and the Ultimate’s con­
stancy across space-time. 
8 I wonder if the fact that I am a differentialist pluralist on both counts follows 
from a genus–species relationship between religious experiences and salvations 
respectively, e.g., if salvation necessarily involves a religious experience that 
ushers in a new spiritual way of being, then the salvations would be multiple 
because they involve religious experiences that are. 
9 Cobb’s own description of the experiences indicates that it is not unusual for
a single person to have multiple kinds of religious experience at one go: “The
religious experience of Western mystics seems to be at once of theistic and
acosmic reality – one might say that it is of the theistic as embodying the acos­
mic reality or of the acosmic as qualified by the theistic reality” (Griffin 2005,
50). Although these double experiences could be genuine responses to two
Ultimates that are really there to be experienced (I see the painting while hear­
ing the clock tick), it seems more likely that they come from a single Ultimate
complex enough to produce both at once (I see the hands on the clock and hear
it tick). Otherwise, we need the two Ultimates to coordinate in a way that per­
mits multiple mystics over centuries and across the globe to keep being able to
access them both simultaneously. That sort of relation between the Ultimates
and constant co-access by the mystics is guaranteed if the two Ultimates are
one thing. 
10 There is a deep metaphysical question here: What is the difference really
between three separate Ultimates and a single Ultimate that has three parts?
Perhaps the difference is the kind of unity in the single Ultimate. If it is merely
formal – that all we are doing is drawing a circle around the three Ultimates
and saying their unity consists in being able to be “setted,” as it were – why
then the difference between the One and the Many is not real, at least not
concrete. But if the unity consists in something substantial, e.g. if they bear a
relationship of love to each other as in social Trinitarian views, and if this love
is itself a “thing” they bring forth in the universe, above and beyond the Ulti­
mates themselves, why then there is a real difference between a single Ultimate
and the three distinct Ultimates, and in this example you can even name it. It
is love. 
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11 See Leibniz (2017) in Clark and Maimonides’s The Guide of the Perplexed, as 
well as Diller (2019) for more. 
12 I used to think the move to the abstract level was a last gasp – that if a claim was 
not literally true, it was false in the most important sense. But lately I have been 
thinking that a claim that is universally true is true in the most important sense 
because such claims hold everywhere and everywhen, not just at one point in 
space-time. 
13 Spinoza wrote: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a sub­
stance, as constituting its essence.” (D4 in his Ethics) 
14 All three of these views are echoed in Martin’s (2016) God: An Autobiog­
raphy: “‘One of the things I put into the universe, one of the things I am, is
the natural order . . . There is a frequency . . . and I am it. This is one way
I make myself available to men and animals.’ . . . ‘And the Chinese were
adept at picking up the signal?’ ‘Of course. . . . People cannot take every­
thing in at once. They have to specialize and the Chinese have specialized in
this.’ [Cobb’s cosmic experience]. ‘With little or no sense of a personal God
[Cobb’s theistic experience], didn’t they lose a lot?’ ‘Everybody loses a lot.
No one gets it all [partialism about knowledge]. That is fine. They all help
me realize, express Myself. They are all part of the big story’ ” (chapter 29,
196–197, unpublished manuscript). 
15 Francis Clooney is a good example of someone who maintains his Christian affil­
iation in Hindu-Christian hybridity. Robert Kennedy, SJ, and Paul Knitter are 
both good examples of double-belongers who maintain their Christian affiliation 
while adding a second Buddhist affiliation to it. For explanations of hybrid­
ity and double belonging, see Diller (2016), especially the section on Religious 
Orientations. 
16 My sincere thanks to Jerry Martin and Linda Mercadante for their helpful com­
ments as this chapter took shape. 
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Sheer numbers are enough of a reason to suggest a theology for the “spir­
itual but not religious” (SBNR). The SBNR population now comprises more 
than a quarter of Americans and is slated to keep growing. Already their 
numbers are greater than the total of all types of Protestants in the United 
States.1 There is also a more critical reason. In a globally challenged, polar­
ized, violence-ridden, climate-endangered world, the tasks we face are so 
critical, so massive, and so vital to world survival that some common spir­
itual and social principles are needed to foster cooperation. Yet the common 
principles and networks of relationships that have long helped society func­
tion are dwindling. 
In other words, America is losing much of its social and spiritual “capi­
tal.” Social capital is the fruit of community. It is the links that join us 
together as a society, fostering trust, cooperation, and mutual productivity. 
Traditionally, social capital has been greatly fostered by religion. In fact, it is 
estimated that half of America’s social capital comes from religion (Putnam 
2001, 66). Spiritual capital are those nonmaterial factors that arise from 
religious practices, beliefs, institutions, and relationships. These provide 
behavioral norms; a sense of meaning for life; and even economic, social 
and political effects.2 
This means that the loss of religious attendance, belief, and practices is 
not just a loss for actual religion. This also does not bode well for American 
society in general. It follows that even SBNRs and secularists should under­
stand they benefit from religion. But they also can benefit from practicing a 
form of “theology.” Why is this so, when “theology” seems so deeply linked 
with organized religion? For even the nonreligious need to understand what 
they believe, why they believe it, and how this functions in their lives. This 
could make this rapidly expanding population a force for good in society, 
rather than simply a disjointed societal sea-change with unclear effects. 
The difficulties are real 
The difficulties of suggesting a theology for SBNRs must be acknowledged 
up front. First, SBNRs are hard to characterize and are often maligned, 
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especially by religious people. They are sometimes stereotyped as “salad 
bar spiritualists”; proudly eclectic; “poachers” of other cultures’ spiritual 
practices; New Agers; and shallow, self-serving individuals. Although these 
are often exaggerations, this does not sound like a population that would 
attract the efforts of theologians. 
Second, SBNRs are not really an integrated identifiable group. Instead, 
they are more of a “demographic” or “gerrymandered set.” As philosopher 
Jeanine Diller explains, this means: “It’s not clear that there is anything 
every member of the set has in common; there is no governing principle 
for why they are all in the set.”3 What they have most in common, I would 
add, is what they are “not,” that is, religious. Even many of those who still 
actively participate in organized religion now identify as SBNR.4 
In addition, SBNRs are a self-selected set with a somewhat exclusivist 
quality. Its activities require both time and resources, which many people 
don’t have. Thus, there is an aspect of “spiritual privilege” to the SBNR 
designation. As Stephen T. Asma says: “The dismissal of religion . . . is 
often a luxury position of prosperous and comfortable groups. . . . Perhaps 
they have not suffered much. . . . For the rest of us, religion is vital to our 
well-being.”5 
Third, the definition of the phrase “spiritual but not religious” is far from 
precise. The nutshell description implies that spirituality is personal and 
heart-felt, whereas religion consists of human-created doctrines, institu­
tions, and outward rituals. But in the diverse SBNR population, this sharp 
divide does not always hold. The SBNR set can include secular human­
ists, atheists, and those who simply do not identify with any religion: the 
“nones.” It encompasses people who draw on aspects of “metaphysical reli­
gion,” read popular works on the topic, create rituals, and revive others. 
Alternatively, it includes those who focus primarily on alternative health 
practices, energy work, and self-authenticity, often with a basis in what is 
“natural” or of the earth. Thus, what it means to be SBNR often includes a 
hybrid or syncretic assembly of spiritual practices and beliefs.6 Increasingly, 
it also includes growing numbers who retain some practices, beliefs, and 
even regular participation in organized religion. 
Fourth, as I demonstrated in my book, Belief without Borders: Inside the 
Minds of the Spiritual but not Religious, the most common denominator 
for a majority of SBNRs is not simply that they are not religious. It goes 
further than that. For I found SBNRs, as diverse as they are, to have an 
impressive agreement on the specific concepts in which they don’t believe.7 
The rejected beliefs include such things as a self-determining, transcendent, 
personal God; humans created in God’s image but with a propensity to turn 
their backs on this God; spirit-infused, yet human-created, institutions; and 
some kind of afterlife dependent upon God’s judgment. Not surprisingly, 
because SBNR is more a boundary-setting rhetoric than a clear-cut set of 
positions, many of these beliefs are the hallmarks of religion, in particular, 
Christianity. 




Fifth, although the SBNRs are not without an array of guides, at present 
they are without any agreed-upon texts, leaders, or groups. There are no 
widely recognized programs to promote intellectual and ethical harmony or 
solidarity outside the revolving door of trends and teachers. Although there 
are some widely respected teachers – such as Thich Nhat Hanh, the Dalai 
Lama, and Pema Chodron (who actually represent traditional religions) – 
and a few common principles, such as compassion, tolerance, or goodwill to 
all, these have not yet led to organization. Instead, they have bred a culture 
in which this growing population learns its catechism in yoga studios, fitness 
programs, self-help books, television shows, and internet sites. 
Sixth, the vested interests of theologians and religious leaders would likely 
not be served by this task. As counterintuitive as this may sound to clergy, it 
is probably unrealistic for religions to consider the SBNR population a new 
“mission field.” Perhaps religious leaders would do better to promote the 
positive teachings and values of their respective faiths and correct what has 
led to misinterpretations.8 
Is creating an SBNR theology useful when it might be more effective to 
focus on the fact that “real religion is about human flourishing” (Asma 
2018, 1)? After all, sociologists project that certain characteristics of this 
group – especially their anti-institutional bent – make it unlikely that they 
will lead to a reformation for organized religion or the creation of a new 
religion. 
As Mark Chaves concludes in American Religion: 
This growing segment of the population is unlikely to reenergize exist­
ing religious institutions. Nor will it provide a solid foundation for new 
kinds of religious institutions or new religious movements. The spiritual 
but not religious should not be seen as yearning people ready to be 
won over by a new type of religion specifically targeted to them. They 
may provide a market for certain kinds of religious products, such as 
self-help books with spiritual themes, but they probably will not create 
a stable, socially and politically significant organizational expression. 
The spiritual-but-not-religious phenomenon is too vague, unfocused, 
and anti-institutional for that. 
(Chaves 2017, 40) 
Can we use the word “theology?” 
As hinted earlier, the word “theology” can present another problem if by 
that we mean theos logos, words about God. Most of the hundreds of SBNRs 
I interviewed for my book Belief without Borders scrupulously avoid using 
the word “God.” Although this appears to be happening culture-wide and 
even in some religious settings, it is more explicit and intentional among 
SBNRs.9 Even if they believe there is some primal source, ultimate reality, or 
universal energy, they largely reject the idea that it is a divine personal being 











and transcendent/immanent spirit. Although they may search for some type 
of “bottom line” or ultimacy, they generally do not believe in a God who is 
personally involved with humans, one who creates, acts, relates, controls, 
persuades, sets goals, makes promises, judges, communicates, or works for 
individual growth and continuity. 
The theological focus on normativity, truth, and questions of good and evil
also becomes problematic, because SBNRs protest religious norms, hold back
from declaring things good or evil, and find truth to be relative.10 In addi­
tion to resisting the authority of any religious doctrine, tradition, leadership,
sacred text, or organization, they increasingly identify religion with right-wing
politics and harmful conservative agendas. Religious morality, standards of
behavior, communal mission, and other practical facets of organized religions
hold little import. These many factors are what SBNRs consider retrograde,
backward looking, repressive, and lacking in creativity about organized reli­
gions, even if they grant that religions do some good things now and then. 
Some traction is gained if we define theology more generally as “faith 
seeking understanding.” Oftentimes SBNRs see themselves on a spiritual 
quest, journey, or path, seeking such things as spiritual experience, greater 
understanding of the self, authenticity, ancient wisdom predating religion, 
cosmic energetic transmissions, holism, or harmony. Although this may be a 
place to start, it does not yet provide a sufficient theological basis. It is not 
clear what or whom this faith is in, how to reach understanding, and what 
that would mean. 
But cynicism is not wisdom, and hope takes courage. Lending a hand is 
a hopeful move that people who think for a living can do. Religious intel­
lectuals, in particular theologians, are equipped to suggest cognitive tools, 
historical and philosophical principles, and the wisdom of great mystics and 
theologians. They can promote common ethical standards, organize socially 
helpful projects, and propose missions that take all humanity under those 
umbrellas. They stand on faith traditions that live in hope for the human 
race, the Earth, and the entire universe. Even if the ground of their hope is 
questioned by SBNRs, they bring that hope to the task anyway. 
In fact, the designation “spiritual but not religious” suggests a false 
dichotomy. SBNRs are not without ties to traditions, religious thought, and 
other influences. Although they borrow and adapt at will, this population 
is not totally eclectic and negative. SBNRs do not just disbelieve, disaffili­
ate, and distrust. There are some common affirmative factors in the SBNR 
movement that can give theologians starting places. In my interviews with 
SBNRs, I discovered that there are clusters of beliefs that they hold in com­
mon, especially around the four major concepts I examined: transcendence/ 
immanence, human nature, community, and afterlife. 
Common concepts 
The hundreds of SBNRs I interviewed were not trained in theological 
inquiry. In fact, many had scant exposure to basic religious education. Even 













so, they routinely raised issues ripe for theological engagement. I found that 
an array of common concepts emerges as one talks with SBNRs. 
Transcendence/immanence 
Their near-unanimity on transcendence and immanence was striking. 
Although they rejected a fully transcendent deity who personally interacts – 
thus seeing themselves entirely in what Charles Taylor calls “the immanent 
frame” (Taylor 2007) – they did propose a kind of horizontal transcend­
ence. That is, they felt connected to something larger than themselves, be it 
the human race, the Earth, or an ultimate universal “oneness.” 
They leaned toward “monism” and professed “all is one.” Thus, when 
proposing a connecting principle, many suggested that some kind of “uni­
versal energy source” permeates everything. Sometimes the SBNR inter­
viewees spoke of “the Universe” in a way similar to how others speak of 
God, but more often they saw this as an impersonal, benign, constantly 
flowing source of guidance, help, and empowerment. They leaned toward 
a “re-enchantment” of the world such that more goes on under the surface 
than mere scientific materialism can reveal. 
Human nature 
Most felt confident when I asked them about human nature. In spite
of their implicit monism, most did not see individuality as an illusion.
Although a few echoed their attraction to Eastern religions by insisting
the ultimate problem was “the ego,” most felt individuality was impor­
tant and lasting. Freedom of choice and authority lodged in the self were
sacrosanct principles, as was a belief in unlimited human potential. Some
claimed immanent divinity resided in the depths of the self, with a few
saying, “I am God.” 
Common goals included finding one’s “authentic self” and clearing the 
energy blocks that make self-fulfillment difficult. Many agree that individual 
spiritual experience, unmediated by religious tradition – and especially as 
felt in natural settings – is the key to these things. Yet SBNRs often hope 
to find an ancient, primitive, or more “natural” spiritual tradition that pre­
dates organized religion. SBNRs lean towards a type of “perennialism,” a 
contemporary assumption that each of the world’s religions converge on a 
few common principles, whether that is love, compassion, “brotherhood,” 
or others. They often feel proud to have outgrown the imprisonment of 
these principles in particular religions. 
To them, what is most important are their individual thoughts and 
choices. Many insist they can stay in tune with the universal energy by prac­
ticing “positive thinking,” drawing to themselves what they project from 
their minds. However, many avoid using terms like “good” and “bad,” 
insisting that these are relative and judgmental. Ironically, however, during 
the interview process nearly 100 percent began their comments by saying, 










“Everyone is born good.” They explained that individuals only slip into dys­
function when something has damaged them therapeutically or biologically, 
such as bad parenting or mental illness. 
Community 
As for community, many SBNRs I meet seek it out from time to time, but 
most do not find long-standing commitment essential for spiritual growth.11 
When I asked interviewees who supports them spiritually, many answered, 
“I do.” Some hoped to find a group where everyone could believe and prac­
tice as they chose, without peer pressure. However, the anti-institutional 
bent meant that few had found – or felt they needed – a group of like-
minded people for the long haul.12 
In spite of the individualism, this is not a population of “lone rangers.” 
Many will commit to causes, participate in charitable or political-action 
groups, and be motivated to serve, even if only on a case-by-case basis. 
Rather than the seedbed for a new spiritual organization, however, this is 
a developing subculture without, as yet, an identifiable center. Its ethos is 
passed around through low-cost or no-cost things, such as informal discus­
sion groups, popular books, internet sites, 12-step and therapy groups, and 
alternative spiritualties such as Reiki. It also is disseminated on the back 
of capitalism through such businesses as yoga classes, fitness studios, boot 
camps, and self-improvement programs. These feed on and spread the gos­
pel of individual self-fulfillment, sometimes with other participants encour­
aging each other’s personal spiritual journeys.13 
Afterlife 
When I ask SBNRs about their views on afterlife, the theme of individu­
ality and self-fulfillment usually shows up again. In fact, some insist they 
have access to their “past lives” and/or expect ongoing continuation of 
their individuality after death. Although a few insist that death is the end of 
everything, many others have a general belief in reincarnation. It is a very 
American brand, however, promising endless lives of progress. SBNRs also 
mention karma – the idea that “what goes around, comes around.” It is 
seen as a process that regulates harm, replacing a God who judges or the 
universality of human sin. 
One may hear, in the SBNR ethos, echoes of earlier themes in Ameri­
can religion, such as theosophy, transcendentalism, spiritualism, positive 
thought, romanticism, Swedenborgianism, etc. However, the SBNRs I meet 
are not consciously adopting or are in touch with these traditions. Even so, 
this growing group could be called the new “metaphysicals” or the “limi­
nals” because they sense a fragile place between material and spiritual real­
ity.14 No matter what term is used, however, the SBNR ethos provides some 
footholds for a theology. 






It is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether a systematic 
theology for SBNRs is feasible, much less to develop one. Yet there are a few 
theological starting places, as well as issues needing further development, 
that can provide room for the insights of religious thinkers. 
Spiritual experience 
The focus on spiritual experience gives a likely foothold. Exploring those 
times when a sense of fullness or peace or deep connection happens can 
put words to experience without automatically invoking religious doctrine. 
SBNRs seek a sense of “cosmic consciousness,” seeing it as the location 
of internal divinity. They often equate feelings of awe, wonder, mystery, 
and gratitude with spiritual experience. One connecting point, then, can be 
something like Schleiermacher’s “feeling of absolute dependence” or Til­
lich’s understanding of “ultimate concern.” At least one theologian is try­
ing to bridge this gap by developing the concept of “love beyond belief” 
(Thandeka 2018). 
On the other hand, theologians can explain that unmediated experience 
of any kind is an impossible goal, because everything is filtered through bod­
ies, contexts, and history. After all, we all swim in a sea of culture. The fact 
that many SBNRs – sometimes with puzzlement – claim to feel inspired by 
religious architecture and music is one way to make this point. Theologians 
can contribute by discussing the ideas and beliefs behind these inspiring 
creations – and the sensations they evoke – especially because SBNRs often 
value artistic creativity. 
Moreover, it must be asked whether spiritual experience is an end in itself 
or a route to something greater? One way to explore this question would 
be to examine the recent interest in dramatic bodily practices to see whether 
self-transcendence, self-fulfillment, or sheer stimulation is the experience 
sought. This could include such things as extreme sports (such as free climb­
ing and BASE jumping), ideologically based dietary regimens, self-imposed 
pain or markings (such as tattoos, piercings, or body suspension on hooks), 
or pilgrimage treks (such as the Camino de Santiago in Spain). 
The natural world 
A starting place with wider appeal is the natural world, especially the envi­
ronment and its nonhuman inhabitants. For SBNRs, nature is very often 
revered as a likely site of spiritual experience, with assertions like, “I find 
more spirituality in a sunset (out on a hike, at the ocean, etc.) than I do 
in a religious service.” The increasing focus on domestic pets can some­
times function as spiritual source for SBNRs as well. Although SBNRs are 
unlikely to understand the natural world as God’s creation, they do sense a 




sacredness in the Earth. This links well to their sense of holism and oneness 
and the energy that permeates everything. 
Perhaps because of this, SBNRs are often quite concerned with the degra­
dation humans have caused the Earth. Sometimes their response is restricted 
to dietary and lifestyle changes. But this is limited. Instead, this concern can 
be linked with their often-expressed belief that the common ground of all 
religions is compassion. Having compassion for the Earth and all its inhab­
itants can motivate to action, for there is no expectation that a savior will 
come to rescue humans from their mess. 
Yet the Earth crisis also forces us to realize that we all have erred in some 
way, becoming unconsciously complicit in the Earth’s suffering. This moves 
the discussion beyond a simple assertion that “we are all born good” and 
individual freedom as the highest value. Instead, it raises issues of the real­
ity of evil and human wrongdoing beyond a mere therapeutic explanation. 
It opens the door to exploring the different approaches religions take on 
human finitude, fallibility, and vulnerability. 
Thinking about the Earth’s suffering – and how that affects humans – sug­
gests that we have inherited wrongdoing, catching it like a disease. Often 
without realizing it, we perpetuate it, but at times, we also knowingly coop­
erate with harm or fail to act in the face of it. This would not necessarily 
push SBNRs to a theological idea such as original sin, although it could be 
analogized with the genetic determinism of popular views on alcohol addic­
tion. Instead, connecting the Earth’s suffering with the SBNR focus on indi­
vidual responsibility and the power of positive thought can lessen feelings of 
powerlessness and inspire action. 
The authentic self 
The SBNR focus on the authentic self, rather than socially imposed roles, 
can also link with many religions’ emphases on the false self versus the 
true self. This, too, may help promote responsible activism. Beyond that, 
if SBNRs believe they can connect with cosmic consciousness or allow the 
universal energy to propel action, so much the better. One need not go as far 
as proposing God’s grace or the Holy Spirit as this consciousness or energy, 
but pointing out the similarities might help SBNRs better appreciate religion 
and promote solidarity in action. 
Issues needing work 
Attention must be paid to the important issues needing further develop­
ment. A few key ones can be mentioned here. One is the SBNR paradox 
between control and conformity. Do individual thoughts control reality in 
an interesting twist on “you reap what you sow?” Or must one conform 
to – become one with – the cosmic or universal energy source by removing 
blocks, clearing pathways, and staying attuned? 





Another is the tension between individual and group. If individual author­
ity is primary yet one seeks holism, oneness, and compassion for all, how 
does this tension get resolved in real life? This paradox has not been lost 
on advocates of the SBNR ethos, even if they are secular humanists. One 
leader of a humanist group affirmed the need for life-meaning beyond self-
absorption and mundane goals. He stressed the need to inspire “nones” to 
move toward altruism and community. The problem to be overcome, he 
said, is “relative absence of inspiration, of potent means to climb out of our 
self-centric existences to something greater than ourselves, something more 
edifying than me, here, now.”15 
The perennialist attitude towards world religions also needs more work. 
Although advocating tolerance, this view does not recognize the deep par­
ticularities of each religion. In addition, tolerance is more “live and let live” 
than deep reconciliation or mutuality, factors that could promote solidarity 
and cooperation in the face of current crises. One could even consider the 
random borrowing from practices, rituals, and/or beliefs of other religions – 
without permission, firsthand knowledge, or a legitimate guide from the 
particular religion – to be akin to “poaching” or stealing. SBNRs need to 
reflect more deeply on this practice. Does it reflect hubris, privilege, simple 
tolerance, a colonialist sense of entitlement, or an actual effort to embrace 
the “other?” 
In addition, SBNR alternative spiritualties often pay insufficient atten­
tion to the very hard questions of life, issues such as imposed suffering, 
victimization, cruelty, abuse, and other harms that seem more intentional 
than inadvertent. Affirming that all individuals are born good or that we 
should keep a positive attitude is not an adequate formula that reaches the 
depths of actual or unexplainable evil. As an example, when the internet 
was formed, many assumed it would automatically be a force for connec­
tion and good. Where were the conversations about its unexpected “sor­
cerer’s apprentice” type effects, such as election manipulation, the spreading 
of lies, or its potential to enhance human division? 
Finally, more work needs to be done on ideas of afterlife. Is there a trajec­
tory for this, an endpoint? Do humans endlessly and individually progress, 
or do they ultimately get absorbed into the oneness? If individuals transi­
tion into and out of life and a new body takes the place of the old one, if 
the brain dies with the body, how does reincarnation really work? If karma 
keeps order and restricts random harm – and if its cold justice extends to 
all – where is the place for compassion, love, forgiveness, or mercy, themes 
that SBNRs insist are common wisdom? 
New grounds for dialogue 
It is possible the SBNR movement indicates many are becoming fed up with 
the pervasive cynicism, irony, and suspicion of genuine emotion that per­
meates contemporary culture (Mercadante 2017a). As SBNRs take more 






      
   
  
  
   
 
    
seriously what they are for, rather than simply against, they may be willing 
to reconsider the hope and truth-claims found in religions. By working on 
the hard questions suggested earlier and seriously grappling with human 
frailty, willfulness, and vulnerability, they may realize it is the cracks that let 
the light in.16 But this will not happen automatically. Theological tools are 
needed. Therefore, it is important to recognize the footholds available for 
envisioning a theology for SBNR people. 
It is also critical to include faith communities in this work. Historic reli­
gious traditions, writings, and informed participants contain a wealth of 
millennia-old reflection, showing both meaning and mishaps, offering wis­
dom, cautions, and the long lived experience of putting beliefs into action. 
Rather than eschewing belief and focusing on experience, the starting 
point of an SBNR theology should be, as Philip Sheldrake contends, “to 
actually have the courage and ability to make our implicit beliefs and values 
more explicit and balanced and then to live a principled and harmonious 
life more effectively” (Sheldrake 2012, 120). The first task of theologians, 
then, is to help SBNRs excavate their buried beliefs and recognize that a dis­
harmony here often hinders fulfillment, community, and spiritual growth. 
At this moment, the focus on self-authority, individualism, and distrust 
of institutions stands in the way of creating an SBNR theology that could 
be widely accepted. However, history shows that oftentimes things happen 
that make humans realize they have to organize, agree, and rally to the same 
vision. Hopefully, this will not be some cataclysmic event, but will come 
about organically as we try to save our home the Earth, promote peace 
instead of violence, and increase our respect for “the other.” 
Notes 
1 The Pew Forum is replete with articles and statistics on the rise of SBNRs and 
“nones.” 
2 For more on spiritual capital, see the Spiritual Capital Research Project (2018). 
3 Thanks to Jeanine Diller for pointing out that this is more a “gerrymandered 
set” or “demographic” than an actual cohesive group. Email correspondence 
Dec. 27, 2018. 
4 I found much evidence for this in my qualitative research. See Mercadante 
(2014). 
5 This has been noted before, e.g., see Asma (2018, 3): “The dismissal of reli­
gion . . . is often a luxury position of prosperous and comfortable groups. . . . 
Perhaps they have not suffered much. . . . For the rest of us, religion is vital to 
our well-being. There are many forms of suffering that are beyond the reach of 
any scientific or secular alleviation. Religion is a form of emotional management, 
and its value does not lie in whether it is true or false, but whether it consoles and 
humanizes us.” 
6 See, e.g., Mercadante (2017b), DeGruyter.com 
7 For a full rundown of beliefs rejected and proposed see Mercadante (2014). 
8 Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel said as much: “Religion declined not because
it was refuted, but because it became irrelevant, dull, oppressive, insipid. When
faith is completely replaced by creed, worship by discipline, love by habit . . .






   
   
      
   
  
  
   








when religion speaks only in the name of authority rather than with the voice
of compassion – its message becomes meaningless” Heschel (1976), Kindle
location 325. 
9 I’ve noticed this problem even in seminaries, but as for the wider culture, see e.g., 
Merritt (2018). 
10 This obviates an excellent definition of the work of theology and culture: “the 
process of seeking normative answers to questions of truth, goodness, evil, suf­
fering, redemption, and beauty in the context of particular social and cultural 
situations” Lynch (2005, 36). 
11 Some earlier New Agers are quite harsh in condemning this SBNR feature. See, 
e.g., Brian Wilson’s summary of the change from New Age communal solidar­
ity, such as characterized by the Fetzer Institute, to the current emphasis on the 
self: “From the beginning the Fetzer Institute’s mission was . . . global spiritual 
transformation . . . [but this] has fallen out of step with more recent develop­
ments within the New Age movement. . . . The New Age moved on . . . to the 
point that many contemporary observers see it as a shorthand for spiritual shal­
lowness and reject the label outright. Many prefer instead the label ‘spiritual but 
not religious’ . . . although SBNRs tend to be just as hyper individualistic and 
shallow as the New Agers they decry” Wilson (2018, 211–212). 
12 There are some exceptions, such as the Fetzer Institute, or popular retreat cent­
ers, such as Esalen in Big Sur, California. 
13 See, e.g., the marketing of the fitness studio “System of Strength.” Its website 
proclaims: “The System™ was created and a community of inspiring, like-
minded badasses was built. . . . We’ll sweat together. We’ll struggle together and 
we’ll leave feeling proud, together.” 
14 See, e.g., Parsons (2018) and Bender (2010). A history of this can be found in 
Albanese (2007). Another history traces the foundation of this emerging popula­
tion in liberal religion – see Schmidt (2012). 
15 Krattenmaker (2017); also phone conversation 10/9/18. Krattenmaker is on the 
board of the Yale Humanist Community. 
16 From Cohen’s (1992) lyrics in “Anthem”: “There is a crack in everything. That’s 
how the light gets in.” From the 1992 album The Future. Columbia. 
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Jerry L. Martin 
Even the most open-minded, interreligiously educated theologian may feel 
adrift without the boundaries of a well-defined tradition. Moreover, there 
may be potential, both tapped and untapped, within a confession for accom­
modating experiences and ideas from other traditions. “Without walls” 
means without distorting the insights from the other traditions by forcing 
them to conform to the grids of one’s own confession. In Theology Without 
Walls discussions, expanded confessional theologies have always been rec­
ognized as one of the options. 
No one has done better in accommodating insights from other tradi­
tions – even accepting their diverse “salvations” – while placing them within 
a confessional frame than S. Mark Heim in The Depth of the Riches. In 
the present piece, he poses sharp questions about any attempt to “give full 
credit” to “all religious data” with a “simultaneous, impartial, and com­
parative assessment.” “Who knows what all the data are,” he asks, “and 
what it means to consider them appropriately?” Can one approximate a 
“blank slate” in an “unrestricted field of hypotheses and sources”? Does 
Theology Without Walls (TWW) exclude those already practicing particular 
paths? In seeking “the maximally comprehensive and practicable religious 
understanding,” TWW assumes that “this maximal integration does not 
yet exist.” In fact, openness to the full range of religious data is intrinsic to 
the universal intent in each confession. “The God believed in is the God of 
all.” “The horizon of universality can only be approached by transforming 
engagement with the other religions,” which honors their diversity. This 
activity is “animated by confidence that Christian understanding can expand 
to accommodate and be transformed by insight and truth in other religious 
sources.” “Clear where it is working from,” Heim concludes, “such com­
parative theology has no predetermined limit on where it might go.” 
Francis X. Clooney’s sensitive, nuanced studies of Hindu and Christian 
texts have provided models for comparative theology, virtually defining the 
field. Here he argues forcefully that the Catholic tradition already provides 
“a solid foundation for finding God present in the wide world” precisely 
because of “a distinctive Catholic dynamic: the universal in tension with the 
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particular (the Catholic and the catholic), a hierarchical tradition with set­
tled doctrines, a commitment to rational and systematizing inquiry along­
side openness to the imaginative and intuitive, the freedom of the individual 
amid a strongly ordered community.” Clooney reminds us of the Church’s 
history of “accommodation and engagement with cultures,” rooted in a 
“Logos theology” attesting that God’s wisdom is “everywhere implicit in 
the human reality, which is therefore intelligible and accessible to reasoned 
inquiry.” The Catholic sense of sacramentality suggests that “particular 
things and actions can be sites of the sacred,” inviting us to “recognize God 
in the particulars of other traditions.” Setting aside doctrine does not neces­
sarily make us “more open.” We might just become “directionless, aimless.” 
It would be a mistake to give up on doctrine for the sake of an “idealized 
complete, unlimited openness to everything.” “What is needed,” he con­
cludes, “is a theology with walls, a home with foundations and walls and 
windows and doors, a roof held up by the walls and – why not, a welcome 
mat at the entrance.” 
Christianity is not the only religion with a capacity for teaching beyond 
its walls. Perhaps all religions can. Here Jeffery D. Long argues that the 
Vedanta tradition of Ramakrishna is already a Theology Without Walls. 
The founding figures of multiple traditions – such as Jesus and Buddha – 
might be avatars. Universal in its aspirations, Vedanta remains one tradition 
among others. It affirms universal ideas, such as “a divine reality which 
manifests Itself to human beings” but renders this idea concrete in, for 
example, Ramakrishna as the avatar of our current historical epoch, whose 
mission is “to teach the harmony and the ultimate unity of all religions.” 
The aim of Vedanta is the realization of the divine in every being. Accord­
ing to Sri Aurobindo, the Buddha is a divine incarnation who chooses to 
set aside his divinity in order to show us the path to realizing our inherent 
divinity. Jesus, too, is regarded as divine. Perhaps the Jesus who says, “I am 
the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but through 
me” is the same “I” who, as Krishna, says, “In whatever way living beings 
approach me, thus do I receive them; all paths lead to me.” 
Rethinking a religion through cultural forms different from those in 
which it was originally articulated may create unanticipated possibilities. 
Christian theology developed in part by articulating the Jesus event through 
the categories of Greek and Roman philosophy. As Christianity has settled 
into Asia, it is beginning to articulate itself in different cultural forms. Wit­
ness the remarkable story of Hyo-Dong Lee. Born in South Korea, Lee’s 
spiritual life began in an atmosphere of “diffuse religion” – ancestor venera­
tion and spirit worship alongside Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist prac­
tices. Becoming an evangelical Protestant in his youth, Lee was still attracted 
to Daoism, but saw no way to reconcile the two. Influenced by Rahner and 
Moltmann, his thinking came to have “a decisively pneumatocentric orien­
tation,” which led him to Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and then back again to 
Daoist thought and neo-Confucian metaphysics, with reality as the dynamic 
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interaction of psychophysical energy (qi) and pattern (li). Lee discovered 
the Korean philosophy of qi of Yulgok and Nonmun, which envisioned the 
ultimate as a kind of, using Spinoza’s term, natura naturans, as “the Daode­
jing did.” Incorporating insights from Whitehead, Deleuze, and Catherine 
Keller, he turned to the Korean tradition of Donghak, or Eastern Learning, 
according to which Ultimate Qi is also a personal deity, Lord Heaven, who 
is both within and outside the human self and, when encountered, makes 
one a “bearer of Lord Heaven” with democratic, egalitarian, and liberation­
ist implications. Lee’s chapter, he says, could well be called “My Path to a 
Confucian–Daoist–Donghak–Christian Theology of Qi.” That characteri­














18 More window than wall 
The comparative expansion of 
confessional theology 
S. Mark Heim 
Is it possible to do a “Theology Without Walls” (TWW) in any meaningful 
sense while existentially or conceptually committed to a particular religious 
path? Is it not precisely the limitations of such adherence that free-range 
religious inquiry seeks to escape? Such incompatibility is certainly the case, 
if we conceive of TWW as an omnibus totality, an “all at once” performance 
that somehow combines awareness of and openness to all religious data 
with a simultaneous, impartial, and comparative assessment of it. Stated so 
flatly, this theoretical extreme seems as unrealistic in practice as an extreme 
particularist approach seems uninterested in principle.1 Who knows what 
all the data are and what it means to consider them appropriately? Jerry L. 
Martin says “ideally the theologian without walls gives full credit to all reli­
gious data, to all spiritual epiphanies, whatever their source or auspices.”2 
Does this mean that such a theologian treats all such data ab initio as grist 
for the mill of assessment, all boundaries as only circumstantial artifacts, on 
the way to reaching some specific and located spiritual conclusion? Or does 
it mean that such a theologian must end as well as begin with a perspective 
that resembles or relies upon no existing religious perspective more than 
another? A settled religious conviction can bring a distorting lens to unfa­
miliar sources and perspectives. But the fragile innocence of an intensely 
interested but entirely undecided approach to the complete set of religious 
phenomena is both hard to attain and difficult to preserve. 
If we apply the “full credit” assumption in the candidacy phase of per­
sonal decision making, it describes a necessarily transient phase of spir­
itual and intellectual practice – one that must quickly give way to at least
some working judgements and theories reflecting one’s own experiences
and reasoning. TWW stands apart from strictly descriptive and academic
comparative study by virtue of its frank normative interests and personal
engagement. Its major purpose is to seek to make sense of and give mean­
ing to the data from a specific interpretive stance, one that implies personal
application and commitment. Any emerging TWW would build by selec­
tion and evaluation. Its practitioners end by themselves constituting part
of the “data,” adherent to and participant in some particular religious
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view, TWW is a novelistic religious journey, more about the traveler than
the destination. 
What of those who cannot pretend to approximate a blank slate starting 
point or a dramatically composite one? It would be odd if a search whose 
premise is an unrestricted field of religious hypotheses and sources were in 
some way to exclude those already seriously practicing any of the particular 
paths within that field or those whose quest had led them to some operative 
conclusions. We could take the “full credit” dimension of TWW as pointing 
not so much to a departure point as to a horizon. It is an aspiration to inte­
grate all of the religious data within the most maximally comprehensive and 
practicable religious understanding. What distinguishes TWW from exclu­
sivists in current religions or individuals with a definitive syncretic solution 
to religious diversity is the conviction that this maximal integration does 
not yet exist. It is not evident that it can be had simply by making a choice 
among existing religious options as they stand, nor among academic inter­
pretations as they stand. TWW is energized by the possibility of a new, col­
lective, religious option for thought and practice. It seeks an interpretation 
that sees or elicits something new in the religions, a perspective of under­
standing and practice not fully on offer elsewhere, one that is unrestrictedly 
open for all to adopt. In this sense, it is not only an additional perspective on 
the religious data but a new addition to them. This is TWW as pioneering 
discovery, more about the destination than the traveler. In this respect, it is 
parallel to the origination of certain religions, like Ba’haism or Sikhism or 
(by some historical accounts) Islam, which explicitly understood themselves 
to be an integration of other existing religions (as known in their context).3 
In fact, there is no reason that the horizon point should not turn out to be a 
new version of an existing faith: a revitalized Ba’haism, an inclusive Hindu­
ism, an expanded Christianity or Islam. 
If we consider TWW in this light, it need not preclude participation by 
people as soon as they have drawn any religious conclusions. Some of the 
most developed works of thought prototypical of TWW – the writings of 
Robert Neville, or Keith Ward, or Raimon Panikkar – have a particular­
ist profile (their thought begins from a Christian background) but “come 
down” on many controverted issues among the religions without neces­
sarily conforming to Christian authorities. Such works have a somewhat 
indeterminate constituency, in that their thought does not “belong” to a 
specified religious community or correspond to the practice of any. The key 
emphasis in TWW is not on neutrality, but on the effort to build thicker, 
deeper, and presumably more comprehensive religious perspectives. This 
constructive work can be done from a specific location, because its constant 
effect (and aim) is to produce a more richly specified religious perspective 
from which the process then continues. We need not exclude confessional 
forms of TWW if we think of TWW less in terms of a binary state that is 
on or off and more in terms of incremental approximations.4 No theology 
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membranes. Many theologies may be distinctive and fruitful by virtue of 
their removal of some walls. 
A Theology Without Walls might measure itself by the assumptions that
it removes, dropping exclusive appeal to scriptures from one religion, or
definitive appeal to reason and logic as defined in one cultural tradition
rather than another. But it can also develop through the expansion of hori­
zons. The impetus within a confessional religious perspective that drives
toward consideration of the full range of religious data stems from the
intrinsic universal intent in that faith. On one side, that universal intent
expresses itself in a mode of witness, the missional conviction of Buddhists
or Christians or Muslims that the truth they know is available and relevant
to all people. On another side, that universal intent is expressed as “faith
seeking understanding.” This is less the sharing out from the tradition to
others than the working in of the truth, beauty, and wisdom whose real­
ity “outside” the tradition requires connection with that inside. The God
believed in is the God of all. Understanding of that God through revelation
and reflection extends to all aspects of the world. A living confessional faith
hopes to more fully understand truth that one already partially grasps, to
understand new things that one had not previously grasped, and to discover
coherence across a more and more comprehensive field of human and natu­
ral phenomena. In fact, this hope is part of a larger eschatological imagina­
tion and expectation for what is not yet manifest. An existing life of faith
can throw up barriers of prejudgment. But it is also a powerful instrument
of tacit knowledge in the process of understanding others, a defining part
that suggests an unrealized whole. 
Christian revelation and faith are understood as integral steps in the flour­
ishing and realization of the world meant (in addition to their healing and 
liberating effect) to make the world more intelligible and to be most fully 
intelligible themselves in the most comprehensive context of human experi­
ence. This conviction is often a matter of tension, but theology has largely 
been defined by the universal project it defines, whether the wider context 
was provided by Greek philosophy, historical analysis, or modern science. 
Though people often speak of religious faith “walling itself off” from the 
results of, say, historical study or scientific investigation, theology in prin­
ciple holds there can be no wall between truths in one area and those in 
another. Religion might be thought to be the one exception to this, the one 
area where Christian theology has all the answers and no questions. But the 
matter is quite different if one understands the religious sphere as a realm 
of God’s providential engagement. “In many and various ways God spoke 
of old” and “The Spirit blows where it will.”5 Before the rise of separated 
distinct disciplines of historical or scientific study, what we call religion 
and philosophy were the primary realms in which this search for universal 
breadth and correlation was exercised. To leave the religions aside would be 
to default on the “faith seeking understanding” conviction about the com­
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Plainly, the extension of the theological quest into the religions depends 
in major part on convictions adopted within that part of theology called the 
theology of religions. There are theological teachings that discourage any 
expectation of value in the study of other religions and those that encour­
age or even mandate it. Even theological authorization or encouragement of 
such learning is no substitute for the actual demonstration of it. This vision 
of a permeable framework is what John Cobb called a picture of “mutual 
transformation” between the religions. The horizon of universality can only 
be approached by transforming engagement with the other religions. And if 
“universality” itself is a dangerous ideal without diversity and complexity, 
then the effort to approach it comparatively from various located, confes­
sional spaces has a decided virtue: it works with and honors that diversity. 
Comparative theology is the best current concrete demonstration of 
that learning and the best example of TWW as an expanding confessional 
perspective.6 It might be considered a bilateral Theology Without Walls, a 
“reading together” of sources from two (or more) religious traditions, typi­
cally one from a “home” tradition and one from another tradition in which 
one has some level of learning or participation. A comparative theologian 
embraces their confessional location, seeking to enrich and expand the truth 
found there. One “passes over” into immersion in the study of another and 
returns with enriched perspectives to be shared with the home commu­
nity.7 What distinguishes such activity from TWW is clearer in theory than 
in practice, largely defined by the hypothetical depth of the change that 
may result from comparative study. In its contemporary form, compara­
tive theology practitioners are predominantly Christians, operating from an 
acknowledged Christian confessional or even institutional standpoint, but 
scholars from other traditions increasingly take part as well.8 
A comparative theologian typically identifies with one religious tradition 
and undertakes intensive study of a particular source in their own tradi­
tion and some particular source in another. For a Christian, this work is 
part of a search for the most universal shape of Christianity. It is animated 
by confidence that Christian understanding can expand to accommodate 
and be transformed by insight and truth in other religious sources.9 And 
it is animated equally by humility: the recognition that this fuller under­
standing does not yet exist. God’s nature far exceeds our categories, and the 
religions resist assimilation into our existing forms precisely because they 
contain truth about the divine and the world not sufficiently grasped by our 
operative terms. Such comparative theology is driven less by the apophatic 
conviction that God so exceeds description as to make distinctions between 
religions meaningless and more by the positive impetus suggesting that what 
we have known of God draws us to the expectation of a fuller coherence. 
Comparative theology is a kind of “retail” TWW. It does not address 
walls in general, only in particular. Its most common format is concrete and 
limited. It does not compare Christianity and Hinduism, but reads together 
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Mysteries by the Hindu writer Śrī Vedānta Deśika and the Treatise on the 
Love of God by St. Francis de Sales, to take an example from the work of 
Francis X. Clooney.10 This encounter is impossible without some attention 
to the fact that de Sales is a Catholic, not a Protestant; French and not 
English or Spanish; and that this text is both similar and different to his 
more famous work Introduction to the Devout Life. All these bear upon 
an understanding of the text. Likewise, one must attend to the fact that 
Vedānta Deśika was a Vaishnavite, not a Shaivite; wrote in a variety of 
Indian languages; and was an artist as well as a teacher. In other words, 
there are countless specific things that distinguished each of these writers 
from others of the same “religion” in their time and after, as well as the 
things that united them. And there are elements – images, topics, language – 
that resonate with each other across the two texts, as well as things that 
contrast or that simply fail to connect. These mazes of similarity and differ­
ence disarm our conceptual generalities. 
Rather than erasing an entire border between two entities, “Hinduism” 
and “Christianity,” the theologian has pierced one specific wall: the one 
separating the backyards of these two individuals, the convention that had 
meant the readers of one text were never readers of the other. Despite their 
irreducible specificity, each of the writings is also woven into a wider frame­
work, looking back to earlier texts in their traditions and drawing upon 
prior commentators and practices in forming their own voices. A Christian 
reader who wants to follow Vedānta Deśika’s line of thought must look 
sympathetically with him through the lens of prior Hindu writers toward 
the Vedas and their assumed subjects. In both traditions, reading is itself 
a religious act. To attentively take up the Essence of the Three Auspicious 
Mysteries is in some measure to participate in that act with its writer. Fran­
cis X. Clooney called his early studies “experiments,” whose results could 
be gleaned only after the fact, in assessing how his Christian attitudes and 
insights had been permanently shaped by exposure to the comparative text.11 
A different work of comparative theology, by Clooney or another scholar, 
will lower yet another specific wall and beat a small path of conversation 
and questioning back and forth across that line. And so on. This process 
may or may not be accompanied by an extensive theological statement on 
the principle of treating revered texts of other religious traditions as theo­
logical sources. As liberation theology puts primary emphasis on praxis, so, 
too, does comparative theology in its way. Its practice is focused on repeat­
edly crossing very concrete boundaries, breaching small walls. Clear where 
it is working from, such comparative theology has no predetermined limit 
on where it might go or on how much the theology and faith of the home 
tradition may be transformed. 
Comparative theology will necessarily include work of wider scope than 
I have just described, though more limited than the large-scale projects of 
writers like Neville. An example would be my own recent work drawing 
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the path of Christ and the path of the bodhisattva (Heim 2019b). Such 
“middle-level” discussions are necessary if key learnings are to be incorpo­
rated into the doctrinal source code of a religious tradition and that tradi­
tion transformed into a more universal version of itself by means of the 
TWW dynamic. 
Comparative theology is not, in practice, the omnibus enterprise that 
TWW can appear to be. It is never global, in the sense of addressing “all 
religious data” at once. It addresses that “all” in a slow, cumulative manner. 
It is dialogical and concrete, considering not what all religions, or even two 
traditions, as such have to say about divine–human relationships, but what 
it is like to read particular Christian hymns to Mary in connection to some 
particular Hindu hymns to specific goddesses or what it is like to see the 
work of Christ in light of the path of the bodhisattva.12 This concreteness is 
further specified in that one end of the comparison is always located closer 
to “home,” in one’s own tradition, though not necessarily in what one has 
hitherto taken as its most prominent or central sources. Comparative theol­
ogy is particular theology seeking a steadily greater universality. 
A TWW could be taken to be a theology with no “inside,” no shape 
or structure to frame it or to order a life lived in accordance with it. But 
in truth as TWWs develop – whether in individual scholars or as collec­
tive endeavors – they will necessarily either take on some such structure or 
inherit and maintain it. A comparative Christian theology is a home with 
plentiful windows, and new ones being constantly added. Such an expansive 
confessional theology, one that seeks its newer and more universal form, 
could be taken by those outside to be “walled in,” with no true access to 
the widest religious world. And critics within the confession in question will 
warn that the expansion constitutes a drastic renovation and threatens the 
load-bearing integrity of the entire structure. My hope is that these cautions 
prove to be similar to the assumptions of a pre-gothic architecture, assump­
tions that could be definitively reversed only with the actual realization of 
buildings that are more window than wall. Comparative confessional the­
ologies of this ilk have an important role to play in the TWW discussion. 
Notes 
1 More could be said about this as a reservation or question for TWW as a whole. 
See Heim (2016). 
2 Jerry Martin, in a personal communication, August 10, 2018. 
3 On Islam, see Donner (2010). 
4 In this chapter I focus on the extent to which Christian theologians might par­
ticipate in a Theology Without Walls, but many of the observations may hold for 
other locations as well. 
5 Heb 1:1 and Jn 3:8, respectively. 
6 For a summary, see Heim (2019a). 
7 Some scholars appreciative of comparative theology challenge this paradigm, 
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whether the location might be defined other than by identification with an exist­
ing communion. This is clearly relevant to the TWW discussion, but because 
I want to focus here on the possible role for explicitly confessional theology, 
I limit my discussion in this chapter to comparative theology of that type. For 
more on comparative theology without a “home” tradition, see the Introduction 
in Brecht and Locklin (2016). Also see Corigliano (2016). 
8 See for instance the essays by Muna Tatari and Shoshana Razel Gordon-Guedalia
on Muslim and Jewish examples in Clooney and von Stosch (2018). 
9 That search can be seen to have an implicit apologetic dimension – expressed in 
John Cobb’s hope for a fruitful competition among religions over which could 
prove most adept at honoring and incorporating the truths of others. See Cobb 
(1990). 
10 See Clooney (2008). 
11 See Clooney (1993). 
12 The former example is from Clooney (2005). 
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19 Strong walls for an open faith 
Francis X. Clooney, SJ 
The Catholic tradition throughout history shows us how confessional com­
mitments provide a solid foundation for finding God present in the wide 
world around us. The Church is, briefly put, catholic (global, worldwide) as 
well as Catholic (an institution centered in Rome); but if it is not Catholic, 
it ceases also to be catholic. I admit that the Church’s narrative of itself is 
tainted with self-regard and rarely leaves room for the full self-articulation
of the other. Nevertheless, there is a distinctive Catholic dynamic: the uni­
versal in tension with the particular (the Catholic and the catholic), a hier­
archical tradition with settled doctrines, a commitment to rational and 
systematizing inquiry alongside openness to the imaginative and intuitive, 
the freedom of the individual amid a strongly ordered community. This 
dynamic provided a fertile ground wherein interreligious learning can occur, 
because of the specificity of the Catholic manner of being in the world and 
not despite it. This firm structure – support walls, floors and roofs, doors 
and windows – has a contribution to make in an interreligious context, and 
indeed is arguably preferable to the ideal of an entirely open space. 
A great tradition 
In this short space, the best way to proceed is by hearkening to the great 
story the Church tells about itself, even if this story, like any such fond 
account, is best heard with a touch of skepticism. 
As the Church thinks of itself, its history is a history of accommodation 
and engagement with cultures. The history of Israel combined a strong sense 
of vocation with endless engagement with surrounding cultures and with 
all the virtues and pitfalls of trying to balance openness and fidelity. The 
Church of which I speak is, of course, the Roman Catholic Church, which 
moved from its Jewish roots to an engagement with Greek and Roman cul­
tures. The empire was hostile to the Christian message, but then became 
the vehicle of Christian identity and community. The Church was, from its 
beginnings to its self-realization (for a time), in the context of empire. 
To speak of the development of the field of comparative theology 
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Catholicism’s own narrative of how Catholic tradition has worked from 
the beginnings of the Church until now: that history has always been an 
interreligious history. In a sense, the history of the Church is conducive to 
comparative theology. But we must both hear this self-account and consider 
it with some skepticism. 
But first, a few words are in order with respect to the general background 
in which an open, interreligiously attentive Catholic theology might arise 
and flourish. The Catholic tradition adheres to the view that the world is 
essentially good. Nature speaks of God, and cultures, too, in their essential 
goodness speak of the divine, a truth and beauty that are never entirely 
obscured. The proper disposition is to expect to find the divine everywhere. 
The Catholic tradition is full of examples of how confessional commitments 
provide a solid base for noting the presence of God in the world around 
us, times and places rich in at least implicit epiphanies of Christ. The tradi­
tion of Logos theology attests that God’s word and wisdom are everywhere 
implicit in the human reality, which is therefore intelligible and accessible to 
reasoned inquiry. Seeds of the Word are scattered, nonsystematically, in all 
the world’s traditions. 
The expectation that the Logos is discernible, if not everywhere, never­
theless in places near and far from centers of Christian culture, and thus at 
work and to be discovered amid the cultures of the world, may be taken 
also to highlight the characteristic rational current of Catholic tradition, a 
tendency that encourages both conversation and argument. Cultures and 
religions are intelligible, commensurable, and open to intelligent and spir­
itually meaningful exchange. This openness – instantiated again and again 
throughout history – is in turn accompanied by a more focused and narrow 
confidence that one can sort out the good from the bad, highlighting what is 
productive while refuting what one judges to be inadequate. Broad-ranging 
intellectual inquiry facilitates the maturation of the faith, even as it provides 
the conditions for apologetics, which at times lapse into polemic. Missionar­
ies through the ages have been energized by various forms of the expectation 
that we can, with discernment, find God already present in the other. The 
Church is, briefly put, catholic as well as Catholic in both its dispositions 
and in its metaphysical and epistemological expectations. 
The Catholic sense of sacramentality is also germane here, at least intui­
tively, because the idea that particular things and actions can be sites of the 
sacred opens the way for a deep reverence for reality as a whole. Versed in 
sacrament and liturgy, Catholic tradition fosters the dispositions by which 
one can recognize the presence of God in the particulars of other traditions, 
in the holy manifest in certain times and places. For Catholic tradition is 
thoroughly liturgical: words are never merely words, books never merely 
books. Rather, what we learn is enacted in Church and world, and by anal­
ogy, interreligious learning, even as a form of study, is always more than 
“merely” reading a book. The expectation of finding God in all things has 
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to the Catholic view of the world that, doctrinal and ecclesial restraints 
notwithstanding, has nevertheless allowed the Catholic tradition to learn 
interreligiously over and over again. 
Such dispositions open the way to learning, intended or unintended, in 
which whatever the doctrinal limits may be, but there is also there is fluid 
exchange across cultural and even religious boundaries. But such exchange 
also indicates, on a practical level, the probability of apologetics: we can 
argue the truth with them, showing the rationality of the Christian and the 
irrationality of systems that clash with the Christian. Openness and argu­
ment go together. All of this creates a frame in which comparative theo­
logical learning, as comparative and theological, is possible and religiously 
significant. 
Edifying examples 
The story takes on new life and significance in the Middle Ages, as the 
maturation of the great Catholic theological traditions of the West learn 
to anticipate and experiment in receiving wisdom from traditions outside 
the West. An intensely Catholic commitment to reason and to the Catholic 
faith as universally true and locally realized has quite often been produc­
tive of interreligious learning. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) is one of the 
supreme explicators and defenders of Christian doctrine in the history of 
Christianity, and at times he had hard things to say about non-Christians. 
No surprise. But as David Burrell showed decades ago (e.g., Burrell 1986, 
1993), Aquinas also was an avid reader of Aristotle, as made available to 
the Christian West by Arab Muslim writers. He engaged in thinking through 
and arguing with Aristotle and his Arab interpreters, while likewise engag­
ing and arguing with Jewish thinkers such as Maimonides. Aquinas’s mind 
was capacious, to be sure, but there seems to be little evidence to sustain the 
view that he would have been more intellectually open had he a looser, per­
meable sense of doctrine: his quest for a right understanding of God’s world 
led him to be open to truth wherever it was to be found. Nicholas of Cusa 
(1401–1464), a cardinal of the Church, plumbed deeply the mysteries of 
Christian faith in his brilliant philosophical and theological writings, and in 
works such as De Pace Fidei and Cribratio Alkorani he was also an extraor­
dinary pioneer in imagining the conditions for interreligious learning, and 
how such learning might proceed, by way of the actual study of texts such 
as the Qur’an. Seen from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, this 
medieval learning was modest, fraught with misunderstandings, and less 
open than it might have been. But the thrust of this learning, grounded in 
a Christian commitment to the truth of reality and the truth of the faith, 
models the substantive and tough interconnection of faith and reason for 
which I have been arguing.1 
In early modernity, the Catholic story went global in a new way. The sup­
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structured homes from which the early Jesuit missionaries in Asia (if I may 
stick to examples I know well) into a very creative learning wherein mission 
and intellectual openness fueled one another.2 Francis Xavier (1506–1552) 
was certainly negative toward other religions but nevertheless found himself 
having to learn to deal with cultural differences, precisely to continue the 
missionary work he felt himself obliged to: mission drove him to cultural 
experimentation, as when he re-presented himself for the sake of the learned 
Japanese leaders he wished to influence. Roberto de Nobili (1579–1656) 
re-created himself, as it were, in the course of his mission in south India. He 
changed his dress and customs, mastered the Tamil language, and sought 
ways to express the faith in accord with Tamil ways of moral and religious 
thinking.3 He was steadfastly critical of idolatry and harsh in finding moral 
depravity in Hindu mythology, but he did not abandon his intellectual pro­
ject. Rather, he combined selective openness and selective negativity. 
But not all missionaries are alike. An interesting contrast can be made 
with a Jesuit several centuries later. Constantine Beschi, SJ (1680–1747), 
also working in south India, did not disown Catholic doctrine, but in the 
potent chemistry of missionary fervor and a sense of the need for a new 
way of presenting the faith, he turned out to be a creative writer who could 
freshly re-envision the faith. He mastered the Tamil language and studied 
its literatures, among those a marvelous and unparalleled epic, Tempāvani
(The Unfading Garland), which tells the story of the Incarnation – and 
much of the Bible – in high Tamil poetry, and from the perspective of St. 
Joseph. His turn to the literary provided him ways to re-express the faith 
without hammering it home and without giving it up. Yet he is the same 
Beschi who argued vociferously with the nearby Lutherans. His catecheti­
cal writing – for example, the Manual for Catechists – is primarily about 
habituating people to the faith, rather than attacks on the Hindu. And even 
in the Tempāvani, a negative attitude toward the pagan can be seen. 
The nineteenth century is a sobering caution to my optimism regarding 
the Catholic manner of openness, because it does not give us very good 
examples of Catholic interreligious learning. This may have been due to 
the defensiveness of a Church feeling itself to be threatened by the hostil­
ity of rationalism in a skeptical Europe. Every claim made in the missions 
about non-Christian religions had to be received and restated with a mind­
fulness of how this new knowledge would be used in Europe, where reports 
about the non-Christian world might variously aid or undermine Catholic 
faith. Typical of a defensive Church were the polemical works of scholar/ 
practitioners such as Leo Meurin, SJ (1825–1895) in Bombay (see his lec­
ture, “God and Brahm”). In the West, Catholic writing was marginal to the 
developing fields of comparative religion and comparative theology was and 
primarily resistant to the swiftly changing intellectual cultures of the West. 
In the United States, Augustus Thébaud, SJ (1807–1885) wrote the weighty 
Gentilism and The Church and the Gentile World at the First Promulga­
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their relationship to Christianity, which in retrospect seems more concerned 
about the West’s encroaching rationalism than the pros and cons of actual 
interreligious learning. But more research needs to be done on the little-
studied Catholic attitudes toward interreligious learning in the nineteenth 
century. 
We see the revival of a more nuanced yet still very Catholic view of other 
religions late in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, it was a convert to 
Catholicism who was instrumental in this new venture. William Wallace 
(1863–1922)4 rethought his Christian identity rather dramatically through 
his encounter with Hinduism and, as a result, became a Catholic and then a 
Jesuit. A staunch Catholic resentful of both Anglicanism and empire, Wal­
lace turned out to be a vigorous Catholic defender of Hinduism against 
its detractors. He insisted that the next generation of Jesuits had to study 
Hinduism deeply, with the necessary linguistic tools in place. As a result 
of his efforts, there flourished in Calcutta in the early twentieth century a 
school of Jesuit Indology under the notable leadership of Pierre Johanns 
(1882–1955), Georges Dandoy (1882–1962), Robert Antoine (1914–1981), 
Pierre Fallon (1912–1985), and Richard de Smet (1916–1997). Johanns and 
Dandoy cooperated in the famous “To Christ through the Vedānta” essays, 
published serially in The Light of the East. Here, too, we see formidable 
learning, harnessed for the sake of understanding positively major streams 
of Hindu intellectual thought, yet by the measure of the theology and phi­
losophy of Thomas Aquinas, which provided both narrow restraints and a 
defining focus for new learning. Their commitment to Aquinas provided a 
coherent frame and confidence that progress in an interreligious theologi­
cal understanding could be achieved; perhaps they would have been more 
open-minded without reference to Aquinas and the tight hold of Thomistic 
thinking, but more likely they would not have undertaken such study at all. 
We might continue this exploration by paying attention to still other fig­
ures who can be honored as icons of the prehistory of comparative theology. 
I have in mind figures such as the innovative contemplatives Jules Mon­
chanin (1895–1957) and Henri Le Saux (1910–1973). In the late 1940s, in 
deep south India, they founded the Saccidananda Ashram (Abode of Being, 
Consciousness, and Bliss), which came to be known more popularly as 
Shantivanam. Both took very seriously the truths of the Catholic faith and 
would not discard them. Confident in the adaptability of their Catholicism, 
however, they sought to free it of its Western cultural baggage in order to 
reimagine Christian contemplative life, and deeply root it, as they said, in 
Indian soil. Each in his own way delved deeply into Vedānta and Hindu 
texts, seeking both to find Christ in the mystery of Hindu spirituality and to 
rediscover Christ through Hinduism. Their struggles, intellectual (in finding 
common ground between Hindus and Christians), spiritual (in becoming 
intimate to Hindu learning in its depths while still a Christian), and practical 
(in setting up and maintaining the ashram), characterize them as persons; 
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Monchanin and Le Saux would not have labeled themselves comparative 
theologians; they feature what are virtues necessary to the work of compar­
ative theology: sustained study and doctrinal commitments, yet without let­
ting Christian doctrines turn into the tools of a priori judgments about other 
religions. Here it suffices to say that these figures represent nicely the holistic 
nature of modern Catholic learning, such as that which infuses compara­
tive theology. Of course, similar representations of the roots of comparative 
theology might be set forth with respect to other parts of the world as well. 
We can also think in this regard of Thomas Merton (1915–1968), whose
sustained and deepening interest in other religions remained even to the
end in service to the renewal of Christian contemplative identity. Raimon
Panikkar (1918–2010) deserves attention too, as a figure whose experi­
ence and aspirations are closely aligned with the work of comparative
theology. In his own signal fashion he brings together the riches of Hindu
and Christian traditions, transforming his own religious identity in the
process. His “imparative theology” reflects some of the same confidence
and hope, and commitment to reading practices, that inspires comparative
theology. 
In the twentieth century, we witness more Catholic scholars coming to 
the fore and contributing to comparative study outside the mission fields. 
Here I can mention just a few of the notable figures. The twentieth century 
abounds in figures who exemplify Catholic learning at its best. Louis Mas­
signon (1883–1962) was a seriously committed Catholic even as he became 
one of the greatest scholars of mystical Islam.5 Henri de Lubac (1896– 
1991),6 no theological pluralist, silenced by the Church in mid-career but 
later in life in a position of rejecting the honor of becoming a cardinal of the 
Church, studied Buddhism in some depth. He went far beyond the needs of 
apologetics, determined as he was to find a way of connecting its wisdom 
with Christian revelation, casting it as a highest form of natural questing for 
what had been given to Christians fully as God’s gift. We can also think in 
this regard of Thomas Merton (1915–1968), who sought to deepen Chris­
tian identity in and through bold interreligious openness.7 
And so on. Such examples could be multiplied and must be deepened 
beyond this series of honorable mentions, but my point is precisely to evoke 
an array of witnesses: learned, believing Catholic Christians who also 
crossed boundaries and learned interreligiously. None of these figures was 
doing precisely the work we need to do today, in part because our atti­
tudes and expectations (regarding both Christian and non-Christian) have 
changed, and in part because they, like us, were ever responding to the par­
ticular historical moment wherein their thinking and writing took shape. 
But possessed of very strong religious convictions, they managed to exem­
plify serious interreligious learning and creative engagement across religious 
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On doctrine 
We must now step back and take a closer look at the foundations of this 
tradition of real and persisting openness. The examples in themselves are 
telling: that these figures are all Catholic merits some further consideration 
if the point is to be more than anecdotal and inspirational. All these figures, 
from the early Church up to contemporary Catholic thinkers engaged in 
interreligious learning, worked within a clear doctrinal frame, engaging in 
truths not of their own making. I suggest that if we understand doctrine 
properly, we will not be inclined to think them better off had they left doc­
trine behind. 
The theological texts most worth reading are those written with both seri­
ousness and humility, respectful of the power of words that direct our atten­
tion to truth and urge us to think and judge after our minds have conformed 
to that truth. The combination of faith – its doctrinal formulation clearly 
asserted and stubbornly held so as to be productive of inquiry, not stifling of 
it – remains potent. Doctrinal words can work, provided they do not draw 
attention to themselves and in that way become obstacles. 
The relation of words, learning, and doctrines – and claims of truth – of 
course remains complex, and an adequate assessment of doctrine is well 
beyond the scope of this small chapter. Even if the broad lines of doctrinal 
claims are clear in creed or catechism, new information constantly and prop­
erly upsets settled ways of learning, while explanations that aim at smoother 
understanding inevitably end up complicating things in new ways. Mak­
ing doctrine meaningful and fruitful is never a matter of mere application, 
but rather the discovery of a creative ground. This careful compounding 
of faith and understanding – inquiring faith, humble understanding – has 
its own intensity. It drives a truly open search that brings commitments 
and doctrines, dearly held, into contact with what is true and holy in other 
traditions, precisely because (in many cases) such doctrines are seen to be 
competing for the same space. As a result, there is always new work to be 
done, to make sure that our words, individual and communal, do not drift 
away into side issues near or far. But this ought not distract us from the 
work of study. The solution is not the abandonment of doctrine, but a more 
careful use of doctrine to open up a perspective on the world rather than 
closing it down. 
Wesley Hill’s reflections on the purpose of creeds sheds light on the power
of careful, insistent, yet humble writing with respect to realities beyond words: 
The Creed safeguards the mystery and wild freedom of God; it does 
not box it in and tame it. The point of the Creed isn’t that its words are 
satisfactory. It’s that those words refuse our inveterate preference for 
premature theological satisfaction. 







220 Francis X. Clooney, SJ 
Doctrinal reflection is not so much a matter of making things perfectly clear 
as instead ruling out bad alternatives that drain our words of God’s mystery: 
Approaching Jesus in this way [attentive to doctrine] turns language 
back on itself, exposing our poverty. Confessing what is beyond lan­
guage, the creeds use the words least likely to diminish the mystery
while at the same time gesturing at its depths. To say otherwise, to 
reject the Creed as so much rationalist mystery-refusal, is to get things 
exactly backward. It is the Creed, not the heresies it proscribes, that 
dares to confess God in Christ uncontainable, unclassifiable, and 
incomprehensible. 
(Hill 2016, 16) 
The words I have italicized serve us well interreligiously. The disciplined 
words of creedal statements do not block the path to interreligious learn­
ing, but inculcate virtues of mind and heart that direct us properly toward 
the mystery of our own tradition and, I suggest, the mystery of the other as 
well. Without doctrine, we have no guarantee that we will simply be “more 
open,” because we might just as well become directionless, aimless. 
Truth in its doctrinal form focuses inquiry, helping inquiry to avoid losing 
its way and ceasing to be real interreligious learning. A serious commitment 
to the truths of religious traditions can guide interreligious learning. This is 
so if we do not make too much of our carefully chosen words. We would be 
foolish to reduce the mystery of God to what we can say about it by the best 
words of theologians. But we would not be better off were we to decide that 
our encounter with truth is better fostered by leaving behind even the posi­
tive doctrines of traditions, as if unlimited verbal and mental fluidity would 
be a better base for taking other traditions seriously.8 
These reflections on doctrine are implicitly couched in Christian terms. 
But this disciplined and even austere attitude toward our words and the 
received truths of received faith claims applies also to thinking about the 
truths of the Hindu traditions we encounter in great Hindu theological 
texts. Non-Christian masters of theology also know that words must be 
used skillfully and without inflated importance, crafted so as to disencum­
ber the reader, put aside wrong ways of reading and using words: very spe­
cific and rigorous rules for thinking, reading, and writing at the service of 
formulating a correct view of the world. Hindu thinking, for example, will 
not be driven by a Gospel imperative, but there are pertinent and parallel 
universalizing trajectories in Hindu thought that both drive and constrain 
Hindu views of the religious other.9 
Vatican II’s opening up of a Christ-grounded space 
A Catholic grounding for interreligious learning is not merely a wish, 
detached from the harder realities of the Church. The Catholic attitude 
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I have been presenting thus far is in harmony with the direction of Church 
teachings today.10 Vatican II (1962–1965) in particular opened up new space 
for a Catholic interreligious learning, and in the typically Catholic way 
that combines depth, focus, and a consequent openness.11 Though not all 
the conciliar statements were equally interreligiously open, Nostra Aetate, 
approved in the last session of the Council, turned out to be most capable 
of showing a way to learn from the religious other. Here is the key text from 
n. 2 of the document: 
The Catholic Church rejects none of the things that are true and holy 
in these religions. She regards with sincere attentiveness those ways of 
acting and living, those precepts and doctrines which, though differing 
in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless by 
no means rarely reflect the radiance of that Truth which enlightens all 
people. 
This is a limited openness, a nonrejection of the true and holy, rather a full 
embrace of Hinduism and Buddhism, but it is a deeply founded positive 
regard for other traditions. The images of light refer to John 1.9, which 
presents Christ as light and truth: “The light shines in the darkness, and the 
darkness did not overcome it. . . . The true light, which enlightens every­
one, was coming into the world” (Jn 1:5, 9). This is a matter of the light of 
Christ, not a generic light, and it shines from within the religions, not as a 
harsh light of judgment on them. 
The next statement draws explicitly on John, and it can be read so as to 
serve to undergird and justify, rather than narrow, the deep reverence with 
which Catholics are to approach religious traditions: 
Truly she announces, and ever must announce Christ “the way, the 
truth, and the life” (Jn 14:6), in whom humans may find the fullness of 
religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself. 
(2 Cor 5: 18–19) 
This text may be read as very narrow: only Christ. But I have always found 
it to be rather universal in disposition: wherever there is truth, Christ is 
there; wherever people are on the way to God, Christ is there; where peo­
ple are fully alive, Christ is there, not as an add-on, but as deep within the 
truths, ways, and lives of people of all traditions and none. 
What is notable, too, about Nostra Aetate n. 2 is its lack of a priori judg­
ments and already-settled conclusions about what other religious traditions 
are to mean. Study and inquiry are necessary. It stands exceptionally on a 
middle ground, neither conservative nor liberal, free of many of the theo­
logical constraints and a priori conditions common to the other documents, 
and yet without stepping away from Christian commitments. Written in the 
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it stands open and receptive in the presence of the other, expecting listeners 
and hence conversations rather than monologues, true learning rather than 
confirmations of what we already know. It is the harbinger of a new era of 
the Church and a new Catholic style in the world. 
The authors of Nostra Aetate were not independent operators, unaware 
of or unsympathetic to the cautions posed in other documents of the Coun­
cil, and a Catholic cannot choose merely the parts of documents she or he 
likes. Still, this declaration shifts from talking about to inviting listeners to 
learn something: listen, find, learn. Christian witness remains essential; it is 
possible because Christ is the way, the truth, and the life; it is this witness 
that indicates respect for and openness to all that is true and holy in the 
world’s religious traditions, illumined by the light of Christ shining from 
within. In a sense, Nostra Aetate sets for the entirety of Vatican II docu­
ments their interreligious application: how they are to be used in our era. 
The Council and its forward-looking daring prompted fresh thinking 
interreligiously by Catholic theologians, with many figures daring to chart 
new paths forward. By my judgment, the soundest strand has been that 
of the new, post-conciliar inclusivism, promoted in an incipient fashion by 
Karl Rahner (who did not study other religions)12 and then most famously 
by Jacques Dupuis. This project, not so much as “-ism” as an “including” 
theology, has been dedicated to achieving a balance between fidelity to tradi­
tion and the core revelation of Christian faith – in Christ, in the mystery of 
the Trinity – on the one side and, on the other, a radical openness to God at 
work in the world, in Christ, in the Trinitarian dynamic, particularly that of 
the Spirit.13 The hard edge of such work, of course, lies in a refusal to give 
up on doctrine for the sake of an idealized complete, unlimited openness to 
everything. 
Monsignor John Oesterreicher, a convert to Catholicism from Judaism 
who was a leading figure at the Council and thereafter, reflected as follows 
on Nostra Aetate: 
We must not be satisfied with some general knowledge of them [i.e. 
non-Christian religions]; the Declaration rather demands a deeper 
knowledge of the ways of God and men. The more we penetrate into 
the convictions and religious practices of non-biblical origin, the more 
we shall perceive God’s gentle, almost shy action everywhere. . . . It is 
the greatness of those sections of the Declaration dealing with the vari­
ous non-Christian religions that they praise the omnipresence of grace. 
(Oesterreicher 1967, 93) 
This is the inquiring spirit that motivates much comparative theology
as well. 
Here, too, it would be disingenuous to be ignorant of limitations and 
counterexamples. How doctrine is used is unsurprisingly varied, and not 
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(2000), the document from Rome’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, were determined to rein in Catholic speculations on pluralism, bind­
ing very tightly together Creed, Gospel, Church, and salvation, all in the 
light of Christ, and for this purpose the declaration became a handy litmus 
test for orthodoxy, and unfortunately a set of justifications for not actually 
engaging in interreligious learning and for rejecting insights gained inter­
religiously.14 Still, the Creed remains the bedrock for many, if not most, of 
the constructive Catholic theologians who engage in interreligious learning 
in a faithful and open manner and likewise do comparative studies. That 
there are truths of faith grounded in scripture and tradition, truths regard­
ing God, Christ, the Spirit, the world, and the Church, enables those of us 
committed to interreligious openness to be open and yet maintain and refine 
ever more definitely a frame within which to receive and welcome the reli­
gious other. This delicate balance is deeply indebted to a robust understand­
ing of the Trinitarian God. 
Walls yes, and with door and windows that open 
The paradox of a strong version of Roman Catholic doctrine and practice, 
instantiated always in the lives of Catholics who did learn interreligiously, 
has to do with the rigor and boundaries of the tradition and its simultane­
ously adaptation, over and over again, to new circumstances: the Church 
is in a position of having constantly to modify itself globally because it is 
dedicated to the good news of God’s kingdom; it can be fruitfully open, 
ever on the edge of crossing sanctioned borders, because it has borders and 
limits and works only with a sense that God has already been present in the 
Church, as it has already been. But this focused-open dynamic makes sense. 
Religions are not like properties with boundary markers, fences that keep 
people in or out. They are places in which to dwell, houses, homes. These 
have walls that making dwelling within them possible. One doesn’t remove 
the walls if one wants to dwell there. Rather, we seek to ensure by the use 
of windows that light and fresh air can enter and by the use of doors that 
dwellers in the home can go out and come back. 
I have thus far said nothing about “Theology Without Walls,” even if, 
by contributing to this volume, I am hoping to make evident my respect for 
Jerry L. Martin’s best instincts regarding openness while resisting his way 
of putting it. I am suggesting that we do well to pay closer attention to how 
traditions work and, in this instance, how Christian tradition works. If we 
do, we come to see that walls need not, should not, be torn down, because 
doing so would be in danger of removing the very support walls that make 
religions able to be robustly universal. I therefore distance myself from the 
particular framing of the project as Jerry L. Martin puts it: 
Often theology is defined as the articulation of the beliefs about the 
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experience of finding spiritual insight in other traditions as well, that 
definition seems inappropriately limited. Surely, the aim of theology 
should be to learn all we can about ultimate reality, regardless of the 
source of the insights. Even comparatively theology, when it is regarded 
as finally confessional, limited to asking what light other traditions 
throw on my own, stops short. What is needed is a Theology without 
Walls, without confessional boundaries, without blinders, as it were. 
That does not mean that we do not stand somewhere, but that our sense 
of our goal is not limited to where we stand at the outset. 
I therefore rewrite Jerry’s words like this: 
Often and rightly theology is defined as the articulation of the beliefs 
about the divine reality within one’s own tradition and from there, out­
ward into the world around us. In light of the widespread experience 
of finding spiritual insight in other traditions as well, that definition 
may seem inappropriately limited, because it fails to indicate more 
directly how the articulation of beliefs also reaches out to other tradi­
tions. Surely, we see now that the aim of theology should be to learn 
all we can about the revealed truths of the faith, without confusing the 
insights with any particular cultural framing of them. Even comparative 
theology, which is confessional at the beginning and end, does well to 
explore what light other traditions throw on my own, so as to change 
my relation to my own tradition, without denying the roots of that tra­
dition and without reducing the religious other merely to an instrument 
of self-improvement. It does not stop short for the sake of a hoped-for 
unrestricted openness. What is needed is a theology with walls, a home 
with foundations and walls and windows and doors, a roof held up by 
the walls and – why not, a welcome mat at the entrance. 
Notes 
1 For a thoughtful, though guarded, assessment of Cusa’s approach to pluralism, 
see “Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and the Meta-Exclusivism of Religious 
Pluralism” by Aikin and Aleksander (2013, 219–235). 
2 I choose here simply several of the Jesuit figures I have read in recent years and 
without prejudice against the fact of other Catholic and Christian instances of 
creative interreligious adaptations. 
3 On de Nobili’s real but limited openness, see Clooney (2007, 51–61).
 
4 See my essay, “Alienation, Xenophilia, and Coming Home: William Wallace, SJ’s 

From Evangelical to Catholic by Way of the East” (Clooney 2018a, 280–290). 
5 See Krokus (2017). 
6 See Grumett and Plant (2012, 58–83). 
7 On Merton, see my essay, “Thomas Merton’s Deep Christian Learning Across 
Religious Borders” (Clooney 2017, 49–64). 
8 I have spoken of the use of words in crafting “liberating doctrines.” But the point – 
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also the value of rituals, particular sacramental rites that significantly open up 
perspectives on material and human realities without restriction, and likewise 
the value of strong communities with defined identities that have the resources to 
support venturing forth, learning from the other, and substantive returns home: 
these help ensure openness, rather than thwarting it. 
9 See Clooney (2003). Also guest editor of this thematic issue. 
10 I must, however, leave aside here the many controversies among Catholics today 
about the true legacy of Vatican II. 
11 See my essays, “How Nostra Aetate Opened the Way to the Study of Hindu­
ism” (Clooney 2016, 58–75) and “Nostra Aetate and the Small Things of God” 
(Clooney 2018c, 305–316). 
12 See Rahner (1971, 161–177). 
13 See Dupuis (2002), Heim (2000), and a recent essay of mine explaining how this 
including theology works as the desired alternative to pluralism: “Fractal The­
ory, Fractal Practice: Theology of Religions, Comparative Theology” (Clooney 
2018b). 
14 For a balanced set of assessments of Dominus Iesus, see Pope and Hefling (2002). 
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20 A Hinduism without walls? 
Exploring the concept of the 
avatar interreligiously 
Jeffery D. Long 
Introduction: the universal and the concrete 
Jerry L. Martin has defined a Theology Without Walls as “a theology that 
takes all sources of revelation, enlightenment, and insight into account, 
without (to the extent possible) privileging our own.” He has further char­
acterized this approach as “a cooperative, constructive, trans-religious theo­
logical project,” based on the observation that “[p]eople who engage in 
serious study beyond their own tradition frequently find revelation, enlight­
enment, or insight into ultimate reality in multiple traditions. In light of this 
experience, restricting theology to the articulation of truths within one’s 
own tradition seems unduly restricted” (Martin 2018). 
The Vedanta tradition of Ramakrishna is a Hindu tradition that one 
might expect not only to embrace the idea of a Theology Without Walls 
but also to suggest that this mode of theologizing describes precisely what 
its adherents have been doing all along; for from the inception of this tra­
dition in the multireligious spiritual practices of its founding figure, it has 
been rooted in the idea that ultimate reality and the truths leading to it can­
not be confined to a single tradition. To its adherents, Vedanta is, in short, 
already an example of a Theology Without Walls. In the words of Pravra­
jika Vrajaprana, “Vedanta is the philosophical foundation of Hinduism; but 
while Hinduism includes aspects of Indian culture, Vedanta is universal in 
its application and is equally relevant to all countries, all cultures, and all 
religious backgrounds” (Vrajaprana 1999, 1). 
Even as it aspires to universality, though, Vedanta is also, in practice, one 
tradition among others. The organizations founded by Swami Vivekananda 
and charged with promulgating this tradition – the Ramakrishna Order and 
Mission and the Vedanta Societies – have their own specific practices, obser­
vances, beliefs, and so on. There is a distinctive Vedantic worldview that, 
even as it seeks to integrate the insights of many traditions into its universal 
vision, is nevertheless different from these other traditions in many respects. 
As a scholar-practitioner in this tradition, I can say that it is precisely its 
breadth of vision, its aspiration toward universality, that was one of the 
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make the universal concrete if it is to mediate universal concepts and tran­
scendental realities to living practitioners. In the words of Alfred North 
Whitehead: 
Religion should connect the rational generality of philosophy with the 
emotions and purposes springing out of existence in a particular soci­
ety, in a particular epoch, and conditioned by particular antecedents. 
Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, par­
ticular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of 
stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity. . . . 
Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent particular­
ity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily belongs to 
conceptual thought alone. 
(Whitehead 1978, 15, 16) 
To take Vedanta as an example of this principle, Vedanta as a spiritual prac­
tice tied to a tradition and an institution affirms universal ideas, like the idea 
of a divine reality that manifests Itself to human beings at various points 
in history but also renders this idea concrete in the form of the image of 
Ramakrishna as the avatar, or divine incarnation, of our current histori­
cal epoch, whose primary mission has been to teach the harmony and the 
ultimate unity of all religions. The idea of Sri Ramakrishna as an avatar is, 
of course, distinctive to the Ramakrishna tradition: an affirmation that dif­
ferentiates this tradition not only from other religions but also from other 
forms of Hinduism, for not all Hindu traditions accept the avatar doctrine, 
and not all that do would affirm the idea of Ramakrishna as an avatar. 
But although this doctrine serves to differentiate the Ramakrishna tradition 
as one historical tradition among others, it also serves for its adherents to 
render concrete the far more abstract ideal of divine love: a love willing to 
manifest itself in time and history in order to draw humanity ever nearer
to the realization of its divine potential. 
The concept of the avatar 
The necessity of the concrete manifestation of divinity in a human form is 
affirmed in many places by Swami Vivekananda, according to whom we, as 
human beings, can only relate to a highly abstract reality such as the Infinite 
if we can approach it through the medium of a human form. In one passage, 
using the metaphor of light, he says, 
The vibration of light is everywhere in this room. Why cannot we see 
it everywhere? You have to see it only in that lamp. God is an Omni­
present Principle – everywhere: but we are so constituted at present that 
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these great lights come [that is, avatars, or divine incarnations], then 
man realizes God. 
(Vivekananda 1979b, 122) 
The ideal of the avatar is part of the Vaishnava tradition of Hinduism. 
It is first affirmed in a text that is foundational both for Vaishnavism and 
Vedanta: the Bhagavad Gītā. In the seventh verse of the fourth chapter of 
this text, the Supreme Being, or Bhagavān, Lord Krishna, tells his friend, 
the hero Arjuna: “Whenever dharma declines and when chaos and evil 
[adharma] arise, I manifest myself” (Bhagavad Gītā 4:7, translation mine). 
Interestingly, the word avatāra itself does not actually appear in the Bhaga­
vad Gītā, though it is clear from the subsequent textual tradition that this is 
the idea being expressed. In the Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa, a central Vaishnava text, 
many avatars are listed and described (Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa 1.3). Although 
the avatars are sometimes said to be countless in number, there are several 
lists of these avatars in various Hindu texts. The best-known list includes 10 
avatars, though there is also a list of 24 and another list of 108.2 
Hindu sources describe the attributes of an avatar, thus making it pos­
sible to determine if a particular individual might be one. How has Sri 
Ramakrishna been proclaimed an avatar by his followers? According to 
the accounts of his life – the Bengali Kathāmṛta and Līlaprasaṅga – he was 
filled at a very early age with a deep longing to see God: to perceive divin­
ity directly. This longing intensified after he became a priest at the temple 
of Kali, the Divine Mother, at Dakshineshwar, near Calcutta. After many 
days of intense prayer and profound emotional turmoil, Ramakrishna expe­
rienced the Goddess Kali as a living reality, who manifested to the young 
priest as “a limitless, infinite, effulgent Ocean of Consciousness” (Nikh­
ilananda 1942, 14). In the months that followed, Ramakrishna conceived 
a desire to experience divinity in as many forms as possible, taking up the 
disciplines of various Vaishnava, Shaiva, and Shakta traditions of Hindu 
spiritual practice. It was in the course of these sādhanas, or spiritual disci­
plines, that a woman called the Bhairavi Brahmani became his guide: 
Day after day she watched his ecstasy during the kirtan [singing of 
sacred hymns] and meditation, his samādhi [a profound state of medi­
tative absorption which he was capable of entering spontaneously], his 
mad yearning; and she recognized in him a power to transmit spiritual­
ity to others. She came to the conclusion that such things were not pos­
sible for an ordinary devotee, not even for a highly developed soul. Only 
an incarnation of God was capable of such spiritual manifestations. She 
proclaimed openly that Sri Ramakrishna, like Sri Chaitanya [a medieval 
Vaishnava saint proclaimed an avatar in the Gauḍīya Vaishnava tradi­
tion], was an Incarnation of God. 
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The Bhairavi Brahmani’s faith that Ramakrishna was an incarnation is 
widely held in the tradition based on his life and teachings. But this tradi­
tion has no dogma or creed. Individuals in the Vedanta tradition are thus 
free to express skepticism about this teaching. One such skeptic, in fact, 
was Swami Vivekananda himself, who, in his youth, frequently expressed 
doubts about the idea of his teacher’s divinity (Nikhilananda 1942, 72). 
Although he would later come to believe in his teacher’s divinity very deeply, 
he never insisted that adherents of Vedanta accept this idea, and he discour­
aged others from insisting “too much” on it (Vivekananda 1979c, 81). He 
did not want it to become a bar to people accepting the more fundamental 
teaching of Vedanta, of the inherent divinity within all beings. In contrast 
with mainstream Christianity, Vedanta is not primarily about belief in the 
divinity of a particular teacher, but about the realization and manifestation 
of the divinity within us all. 
Indeed, one can observe that there is some tension between the idea of 
the avatar and the idea that all beings are divine. Again, the ultimate aim of 
Vedanta is the realization of the divine potential in every being. What, then, 
is an avatar, according to this worldview? One could suggest that an avatar 
is simply a person who has fully realized and manifested this divine poten­
tial. We will all someday be avatars from this point of view. 
There is a distinction, though, in Hindu traditions between one who 
ascends to the level of enlightenment and becomes God-realized – literally 
jīvanmukta, or liberated in this lifetime – and a descent, or avatāra, of the 
Supreme Being. The idea of the avatar clearly points to a distinct form of 
divine manifestation in the world that is different from the more general 
inherent divinity of all beings that practitioners of Vedanta are seeking to 
make manifest. 
The avatar is the assumption of a concrete form by the Paramātman, 
or Supreme Self – the Infinite Being, or Supreme Reality – for a specific 
purpose, or mission. The classical avatars of the Vaiṣṇava tradition all 
come to, as Krishna says in the Bhagavad Gītā, destroy evil and restore the 
good. This typically takes the shape of their destroying demonic beings who 
embody āsuric, or negative, qualities that keep us from God-realization:
qualities such as egotism, greed, hatred, and lust. Avatars such as the Varāha, 
or Boar Avatar; the Narasiṃha, or Man-Lion Avatar; Vāmana, the Dwarf 
Avatar; and Rāma, or Rām, destroy demonic beings called, respectively, 
Hiranyaksha, Hiranyakashipu, Mahābāli, and Rāvaṇa. Other avatars, such 
as Paraśurāma and Krishna, destroy human beings who exhibit demonic 
qualities. 
In the interpretation of Sri Aurobindo, the Buddha avatar – the ninth in 
the standard list of ten avatars – is a divine incarnation who chooses to set 
aside his divinity in order to show human beings, by example, the path to 
the realization of their inherent divinity. By setting aside his divine power 
and living as a human seeking freedom from suffering, he shows us the way 
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Significantly, the Buddha avatar is himself a good example of Hindu tra­
ditions operating after the manner of a Theology Without Walls, with an
openness to the sacred figures and teachings of other traditions; for the
Buddha in question is, of course, the historical founder of Buddhism, a tra­
dition with which Hindu traditions were often in a relationship of antago­
nism for much of the history of Buddhism in India. To be sure, the original
concept of the Buddha avatar was not at all friendly to Buddhist traditions;
for the Buddha is represented as deluding ignorant and demonic persons
into not performing Vedic rituals. This negative assessment was not to pre­
vail, however. In Jayadeva’s Gītagovinda, for example, it is said that the
Buddha avatar only taught his followers to avoid those Vedic rituals that
caused harm to living beings: the animal sacrifices that have been enjoined
in certain rituals and in certain regions during certain periods of history.
He thus plays a positive role, from a Vaiṣṇava perspective, in establishing
the central Vaiṣṇava value of ahiṃsā, or nonviolence in thought, word,
and deed. This is seen as the primary mission of this avatar in the Vaiṣṇava
tradition. In the modern period, Swami Vivekananda teaches that there
is nothing in the Buddha’s doctrine contrary to the teachings of Vedanta,
as found in the Upanishads, even as he rejected some aspects of the more
ritualistic practices of the Vedas. According to Swami Vivekananda, “Bud­
dha brought the Vedanta to light, gave it to the people, and saved India”
(1979a, 2.139). 
What is Ramakrishna’s mission as an avatar, according to his tradition? 
This mission is, importantly, closely connected with the idea of the Ram­
akrishna tradition as a Theology Without Walls; for Ramakrishna’s mission 
as an avatar is widely believed to have been the establishment of the idea 
of the harmony and unity of religions on a practical, experiential basis. 
In his pursuit of God-realization through many traditions, Ramakrishna’s 
multireligious disciplines can be seen as an embodied, practical version of 
a Theology Without Walls. Indeed, Ramakrishna sought not only “revela­
tion, enlightenment, or insight into ultimate reality in multiple traditions” 
but also direct realization, a profound inward encounter with divinity, in 
multiple traditions. 
Ramakrishna experienced divinity through varied Hindu systems of prac­
tice – Vaishnavism, Tantra, Advaita Vedanta, and so on. But his quest was 
truly “without walls,” for he engaged in Islamic and Christian practices as 
well. These practices similarly culminated, as his Hindu practices had, in a 
direct realization of God. 
The Hindu avatar and the Christian incarnation 
As a result of Ramakrishna’s explorations of both Islam and Christianity, 
the Ramakrishna tradition sees not only the avatars listed in Vaishnava texts 
and Ramakrishna himself as divine incarnations but also figures from out­
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Jesus, of course, as traditionally understood in Christianity, is a singu­
lar divine incarnation, “the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn 14:6), faith in 
whom is necessary for salvation. 
Ramakrishna never came to believe that Jesus alone was divine. Ram­
akrishna’s sensibility was far closer to that expressed in a Bhagavad Gītā
verse cited by Swami Vivekananda in his famous welcome address at the 
first World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893: “In whatsoever way 
that living beings approach me, thus do I receive them. All paths lead to me” 
(Bhagavad Gītā 4:11). 
Ramakrishna did not deny that Jesus was divine, and indeed accepted the 
possibility that he was, himself, a manifestation of the same divinity that 
had previously walked the Earth not only as Rama, Krishna, and Buddha 
but as Christ as well. Ramakrishna did not proclaim himself to be an incar­
nation of Christ; but there were Christians in Ramakrishna’s time, and sub­
sequently in the Ramakrishna movement, who believed this to be the case, 
and he did not contradict them when they expressed this view (Saradananda 
2003, 910). 
A “test case” of a Theology Without Walls arises if one encounters claims 
made by religious traditions that at least appear to contradict one another. 
The Hindu idea of many avatars, in contrast with that of a singular divine 
incarnation found in Christianity, would appear to be such a case. 
It is significant, too, that this is not a peripheral or trifling issue – at least 
for Christians. If one takes seriously the idea that Jesus is “the way, the 
truth, and the life” and that no one comes to the Father but through him, 
then the conclusion one reaches on the issue of multiple incarnations or only 
one could be a matter on which one’s eternal salvation hinges. 
From a Hindu perspective, this issue seems easily resolvable. The one 
divine being who is the way, the truth, and the life, without whom salvation 
is impossible, has incarnated many times. There is no contest between Jesus 
and Krishna, because both are incarnations of the same divine reality. If the 
“I” who says, “I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the 
Father but through me,” is the same “I” who says, “In whatever way living 
beings approach me, thus do I receive them; all paths lead to me,” then the 
contradiction is resolved. The divine being who has come as Jesus Christ 
is the only way to salvation, and that same divine being has also come as 
Rama, as Krishna, as Buddha, as Chaitanya, as Ramakrishna, and as many 
more such beings. 
One can imagine the verses from John’s gospel and from the Bhagavad 
Gītā that one might normally take to be contrary to one another as two 
halves of a new verse, or navya śāstra: 
I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but 
through me. And in whatever way living beings approach me, thus do 










A Hinduism without walls? 233 
This is not the way Christians would typically address this issue, unless the 
idea were to become available to them that the same divine Word, the same 
cosmic Christ, who walked the Earth as Jesus of Nazareth, also walked the 
Earth as these other figures. One appeal of this idea for Christians might be 
that it helps resolve, in a very elegant way, the question of the salvation of 
non-Christians. The idea that most of humanity is damned for eternity for 
following teachers other than Jesus is difficult to reconcile with the idea of 
the loving God proclaimed in the gospel. 
Conclusion 
The idea of a singular divine being with multiple incarnations – with Chris­
tianity giving greater emphasis to the singularity side of the equation and 
Hindu traditions emphasizing the plurality side – is an example of how a 
Theology Without Walls can draw traditions to appreciate one another’s 
insights, moving toward a more inclusive vision of truth. 
Notes 
1 I was raised in the Roman Catholic tradition of Christianity. 
2 There are at least two versions of the standard list of ten avatars. In the older one, 
the ninth avatar, after Krishna, is listed as Krishna’s brother, Balarama. A some­
what more recent and better-known version replaces Balarama with the Buddha. 
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Hyo-Dong Lee 
The Theology Without Walls (hereafter TWW), as I understand it, is “a the­
ology without confessional restrictions.”1 It is a theology in a mode of trans-
religious inquiry that engages the resources of multiple traditions without 
prioritizing any single one among them. As such, it is a more experimental 
and perhaps daring form of theology, given the widely accepted customary 
definition of theology as “the articulation of religious truths as held by a 
particular tradition” (Martin 2016). Further, precisely as such it diverges 
from comparative theology, which Francis X. Clooney defines as consisting 
in “acts of faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a particular faith 
tradition but which, from that foundation, venture into learning from one 
or more other faith traditions” (Clooney 2010, 10). The prevailing under­
standing of comparative theology – as championed by Clooney and Paul 
Knitter, among others – assumes one’s rootedness in a single home tradition 
from which one undertakes the adventure of passing over to other traditions 
and coming back with a deeper understanding of the home tradition. TWW 
is premised on more complicated patterns of religious affiliation (or nonaf­
filiation), which do not presume one’s rootedness in a single home tradition. 
Whether affiliation is envisaged as belonging in the sense of membership 
in particular religious communities or as participation in certain religious 
practices, the practitioners of TWW in principle do not give more authority 
and weight to one tradition over others with which they affiliate themselves 
(Thatamanil 2016b, 355).2 Hence, the issue of multiple religious belonging 
or multiple religious participation accompanies the theoretical endeavor of 
TWW as its existential and practical horizon. 
As a Christian comparative theologian who grew up in East Asia (South 
Korea), I have found the underlying premise of comparative theology, that 
is, that the comparative theologian is rooted in a single home tradition, most 
challenging to make sense of. I was born into a family without membership 
in an organized religion but committed to Confucian ritual and ethical obli­
gations, particularly the ritual of ancestor veneration. The religious land­
scape was characterized by what is called “diffuse religion” – the ancient 
practices of ancestor veneration and spirit worship that over time became 
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(a Korean form of Daoism), in which it was common for an individual or 
family to participate in religious rituals or practices that suited the occasion 
(Esposito, Fasching, and Lewis 2012, 495). Before Christianity arrived on 
the scene, “religions” in the sense of organized communities with exclusive 
membership did not really exist. Although different people might be respec­
tively more committed overall to the practices of one tradition over the 
others, in most cases they treated one another with respect and in that sense 
can be said to have accepted a loose concept of multiple religious belonging 
(Kim 2016, 79). Regarding the sense of religious identity and religious ethos 
in such a context, Chung Hyun Kyung put it best: 
When people ask what I am religiously, I say, “My bowel is Shaman­
ist. My heart is Buddhist. My right brain, which defines my mood, is 
Confucian and Taoist. My left brain, which defines my public language, 
is Protestant Christian, and overall, my aura is eco-feminist.” . . . As a 
Korean woman, I was raised in the 5,000-year-old Shamanist tradition 
and the 2,000-year-old Taoist-Confucian tradition, with 2,000 years of 
Buddhist tradition, 100 years of Protestant tradition, and twenty years 
of eco-feminist tradition. So, my body is like a religious pantheon. I am 
living with communities of Gods, a continuum of divinity, and a family 
of religions. 
(Kyung 2009, 73–74) 
The fact that I was baptized a Christian – more specifically, an evangelical 
Protestant – in a cultural-religious milieu of “diffuse religion” that assumed 
a loose sense of multiple religious belonging complicated my relationship to 
the other traditions. The evangelical Protestant church of which I became a 
member at the age of 16 demanded an exclusive allegiance to it – I was sup­
posed to regard Christianity as my only “home” and the rest of the religious 
landscape as consisting in “others.” But that was an impossible demand, 
for however much I formally repudiated Confucianism, Buddhism, etc., as 
“pagan” and “heathen,” I could not disown or erase the childhood and 
teenage-year memories of taking part in the house rituals of venerating my 
grandfathers and grandmothers or accompanying my relatives in fun-filled 
Sunday picnics to nearby Buddhist temples where the sound of the monks’ 
chanting was a soothing music to my ears. Those memories formed an indel­
ible part of who I was as a person; and one could even argue that, in the 
language of comparative theology, by being baptized a Christian, I was actu­
ally leaving “home” to embark on the adventurous journey of crossing-over 
into a “foreign” tradition.3 
Such a complex pattern of religious affiliation perhaps explains the sense 
of ease and safety with which I explored Confucian and Daoist philosophies 
in my college years in South Korea, despite my formal consent to the doc­
trinal stance of my church that declared them to be error-filled human crea­
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of the Daodejing (or Laozi), the earliest and foundational scripture of Dao­
ism, although at the time I had no intellectual frame or tools to reconcile, 
if possible at all, its teachings of Dao, “self-so” (自然 ziran) and “non­
self-assertive action” (無爲 wuwei) with my church’s thoroughly Western, 
missionary-brought theology. I started studying the Daodejing in earnest 
during my graduate studies of theology in Canada and the United States, 
when I was preoccupied with the question of how to reduce the distance 
I felt existed between the glorified Trinity and the fallen creation in much of 
classical Christian theology. 
My theological quest then had a decisively pneumatocentric orientation, 
having been influenced by Rahner’s dictum, “the immanent Trinity is the 
economic Trinity and vice versa”; Moltmann’s revamping of Barth’s trini­
tarian history of God as virtually coinciding with the history of creation’s 
redemption, emancipation, and healing; and ultimately, Hegel’s grand vision 
of the consummation of the absolute in the divine–human–cosmic unity of 
the Geist, Spirit. It was an attempt to reconceive God’s transcendence – or 
God’s own being, traditionally captured by the notion of the “immanent” 
Trinity – so as to find it right in the midst of, not apart from, the com­
mon history of God and creation.4 Following Hegel, I wanted to re-envision 
God’s ultimate being as Spirit, understood as the all-encompassing divine– 
human–cosmic unity, which unceasingly worked at the liberation and ulti­
mate consummation of itself.5 
With its paradoxical conception of the Dao (Way) as both the unnamable 
Dao and the Mother of the world, the Daodejing offered me a resonant 
account that located the ultimate squarely at the heart of a divine–human– 
cosmic whole, while retaining a sense of the Dao’s ultimate transcendence 
of that whole as a kind of natura naturans.6 Moreover, the Daodejing pre­
sented a vision of the pre-civilizational undercurrent of nature beneath the 
human world as most perfectly aligned with the movement of the Dao. In 
other words, it proffered a counterthrust to Hegel’s anthropocentrism and 
Eurocentrism, that is, his prioritizing of human culture, especially in its 
modern European Enlightenment version, as the most privileged locus of 
divine–cosmic reconciliation. 
The fact that I turned to classical Daoist thought to find intellectual 
resources for the task had certainly a lot to do with the familiarity and 
comfort with which the ancient Daoist texts spoke to me, as if I was hearing 
my own voice. At the same time, it was also due to the dawning awareness 
on my part that Christian theology had never had its “own” intellectual 
frameworks and conceptual tools that enabled it to safeguard its orthodoxy. 
From its very beginning, Christianity in its theoretical self-articulation relied 
on the intellectual resources of classical Greek and Hellenistic thought, and 
in that sense had always harbored “others” within itself that rendered the 
boundaries of its self-identity permeable. If one is to apply the previously 
mentioned logic of comparative theology for a Christian convert whose 
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early on was as much the Greek-speaking gentiles leaving their home base 
to cross over into a foreign Jewish tradition and returning, having been 
transformed in the process, as Christianity leaving its Jewish home to pass 
over into the alien world of Greek thought and coming back changed. This 
bidirectional logic of comparative theology indicates that if there is to be 
double religious belonging as a version of multiple religious belonging, such 
a belonging should be understood as symmetrical, not asymmetrical.7 Fur­
ther, it also implies that the long-running debate in ecumenism and missiol­
ogy about contextualization of theology should expand its understanding of 
the “inculturation” of theology to include the so-called “grafting” model, 
according to which the Christian gospel is the shoot (guest) and the local 
culture the stock (host) onto which the gospel is grafted.8 
After my first comparative (Christian–Daoist or Daoist–Christian) theo­
logical project culminated in a PhD dissertation on Hegel and the Daode­
jing, my attention turned to the resources of Confucianism, particularly 
allured by the conceptual rigor and the grandeur of the vision of Neo-
Confucian metaphysics. What drew my attention to it was the way the most 
historically influential school of Neo-Confucian metaphysics,9 following its 
founder Zhu Xi, dynamically structures all of reality in terms of the relation­
ship between psychophysical energy (氣 qi) and pattern (理 li). Psychophysi­
cal energy is the primordial energy of the universe that constitutes whatever 
exists, whereas pattern is the ultimate ideal principle of coherence and order 
which is logically, ontologically, and normatively prior to psychophysical 
energy and upon which the cosmic creativity of the latter is dependent. In 
other words, the dominant school of Neo-Confucian metaphysics places the 
very energy and “stuff” of the universe within an ontologically hierarchical, 
binary relationship with its raison d’être, its ground of being, its suoyiran
(所以然). At the same time, in contrast to the substantialistic portrayals 
of the metaphysical ultimate as unchanging divine substance found in the 
dominant strains of classical Western theism and the Indic tradition, the 
Neo-Confucian metaphysics treats li as a dynamic ontological creativity – 
that is, as an incessant activity of patterning, structuring, and harmonizing 
at the very root of the cosmos.10 
Given my continued theological quest to find a better intellectual frame­
work to articulate God’s transcendence as God’s deepest immanence in 
creation, I was attracted to the subtle manner in which the Neo-Confucian 
metaphysics positioned the metaphysical ultimate – li – as a dynamic and 
creative “force” at the root of the universe itself. At the same time, I was 
both intrigued and flummoxed by the somewhat incongruous idea of the 
ultimate ideal principle of coherence and order – a kind of lure, guideline, 
or in some instances, schematic – seemingly functioning as the “agent” of 
ontological creation. Shouldn’t li as dynamic ontological creativity be con­
strued also as a kind of energy rather than strictly as an ideal principle if it is 
to serve as the “cause” of ontological causation in the least restrictive sense 
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of the dominant Neo-Confucian position drew my attention to the Korean 
philosophy of qi, represented by Yulgok and Nongmun, a sixteenth- and 
an eighteenth-century Neo-Confucian figure, respectively. What arrested my 
interest was their move outside the orbit of the “orthodox” school of Zhu 
Xi that interpreted qi quasi-dualistically as the dynamic material principle 
subordinate to li. Especially in Nongmun’s conception of it, qi can be said to 
designate none other than ultimate reality itself, because it has two modes: 
1) the cosmic energy that coalesces to become the material and ideal “stuff” 
of every concrete entity and 2) the original qi that permeates the world of 
concrete entities to make them creative and living by providing them with a 
fundamental inclination toward order and value (which is the source of nov­
elty in the universe). This “layering” of qi provides a sense of ontological 
depth and radically immanent transcendence to the primordial energy of the 
universe. For Nongmun, li is merely a name for the original qi to designate 
specifically the latter’s ordering and governing of creative processes.11 
Yulgok and Nongmun’s philosophy of qi suggested to me a way to envi­
sion the ultimate as a kind of natura naturans like the Daodejing did, but 
with a more conceptually robust articulation of the relationship between 
its world-immanence and world-transcendence. I was inspired to articulate 
my theological thesis, that the trinitarian God is first and foremost Spirit, 
as meaning that God is first and foremost the primordial Energy of the uni­
verse, without simultaneously being forced to make a distinction between 
God’s unknowable essence (ousia) and God’s experienced energy (energeia) –
like some Eastern Orthodox theologians had done – in order to safeguard 
divine independence and freedom from creation.12 This theological develop­
ment spurred my transition from a chiefly Hegelian standpoint to one that 
incorporated insights from Whiteheadian and Deleuzean thoughts. My view 
of God as some kind of primordial yet all-pervasive creative energy reso­
nated with Whitehead’s definition of the ultimate metaphysical ground as 
the very cosmic process of creative advance into novelty, on the one hand, 
and Deleuze’s notion of chaosmos (i.e., the orders of the universe “bub­
bling up” from the chaotic background of virtuality), on the other. Cath­
erine Keller’s work of creatively blending the two intellectual giants also 
gently nudged this God as the primordial Energy into the heterogeneous 
beginning and tehomic depth of the universe and in so doing enabled me 
to complete the identification of divine radical transcendence with divine 
radical immanence.13 
I cannot end this chapter without mentioning Donghak, or Eastern
Learning (today called Choendogyo). Donghak is another “home” tra­
dition of mine whose intellectual resources inspired and enriched my
theological journey. Donghak is the first indigenous organized religion
of Korea born of the crucible of late nineteenth-century Korea in which
the traditional teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, Seondo, and sha­
manistic folk religion clashed and wrestled with the new arrival, namely,
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reality has two poles. The ultimate is first jigi, or Ultimate Energy (that is,
Ultimate Qi). At the same time, Ultimate Energy is a personal deity called
haneullim (Lord Heaven), who is both within and outside the human self,
identified with the human heart–mind yet coming to meet it from out­
side as the larger cosmic heart–mind to which the individual heart–mind
is called to be attuned. The experience of the personal encounter with
Ultimate Qi as Lord Heaven makes one a “bearer of Lord Heaven” who
has become one with the rest of the universe and whose entire psycho­
physical being shares in the cosmic creative-transformative agency of Ulti­
mate Energy. By conferring a clear sense of divine subject agency to the
spontaneous and pluriform creativity of the cosmic qi whose harmoniz­
ing power is not predicated on some kind of transcendent metaphysical
unity, Donghak developed a view of the divine that is both one and many,
divine and creaturely, and impersonal and personal. At the same time, as a
social movement it worked toward the creation of a free, egalitarian, and
inclusive society of “the bearers of Lord Heaven,” eventually culminating
in the first attempt at democratic revolution in Korean history in the late
nineteenth century.14 
Donghak teachings have helped me overcome a major obstacle in con­
structing a theology of Spirit while drawing on my East Asian religious and 
intellectual heritages – that is, the fact that, largely speaking, Confucian­
ism and Daoism are philosophically nontheistic. The polar conception of 
the ultimate as both Ultimate Energy and Lord Heaven has enabled me to 
think of God as Spiritual Energy – that is, both the energy of my existence 
and the object of my prayer and worship. If the spirits of my ancestors who 
responded to my family’s invitation to take a seat at the altar of ancestor 
veneration to bless us consisted of the same qi of which I was also made, 
God as Spiritual Energy also responds to my call for help from the cha­
otic depth of my being and provides succor by “energizing” my qi, that is, 
by strengthening my sinews and bones and stirring in my mind and heart 
visions of liberation and healing. 
Furthermore, Donghak is an East Asian theological source that, however 
compromised and diluted by sociopolitically dominant traditions, still rep­
resents the voice “from the underside of history.” Hence, my engagement 
of it answers the liberationist impulses that have always been present in 
my theological quest, while helping me respond to the demand of the new 
generation of comparative theologians that we attune ourselves more to 
the marginalized voices within the major religious traditions or “outsid­
ers within.”15 Donghak’s ecological and political ideas, as the product of 
what may be called subversive subaltern reinterpretations of the historically 
dominant Neo-Confucian ideas, practices, and institutions, have provided 
suggestive pointers for developing my pneumatocentric reconstruction of 
the doctrine of the Trinity into a full-blown ecopolitical theology – one that 
is attuned to the cries of the oppressed, exploited, and marginalized, both 
human and nonhuman. 











   
 
  





As I mentioned earlier, I have come to reject the universal applicability of 
the idea of asymmetric belonging so as to allow for a bidirectional concep­
tion of the operational logic of comparative theology. Does this mean that 
I have come to embrace TWW in earnest insofar as it eschews the idea of the 
primary religion to which one belongs? Perhaps. Yet if the account I have 
presented here of my path to a theology of qi is any indication, my theolo­
gian self does not escape being encumbered and propelled forward by the 
weight of the historical layers of traditions accumulated and embedded in 
my body. This explains why, although a chance glance at Augustine’s City 
of God or Nongmun’s Miscellaneous Writings from the Deer Hut can get 
my theological mind and heart all worked up and beating, it is only with an 
intentional effort that I pick up Sankara’s Brahma Sutra Bhasya to receive 
a fresh insight about God. Hence, the version of TWW that I can accept is 
one that allows room for a theological thinking spontaneously – and even 
confessionally – tethered to, but not arbitrarily restricted by, a certain num­
ber of concrete teachings and practices as a result of one’s existential and 
historical embeddedness in particular traditions. Such a TWW would raise 
no objection if I renamed my chapter My Path to a Confucian–Daoist– 
Donghak–Christian Theology of Qi, except for the unwieldly nature of the 
new title. 
Notes 
1 This phrase was taken from Jerry Martin’s initial proposal for this volume. He 
articulates the definition and ethos of transreligious theology more fully in his 
programmatic statement to a section of Open Theology dedicated to the topic 
(Martin 2016). 
2 Whether religious affiliation is to be understood as (identity-shaping) belong­
ing in the sense of membership in religious communities or as participation in 
certain religious practices is an important distinction drawn by John Thatamanil 
(Thatamanil 2016a, 9–15). 
3 I put the word in quotation marks because Christianity was already a well-
established part of the religious landscape of Korea, though with a much shorter 
history and, most importantly, an intellectual – theological – foreignness. 
4 Peter Hodgson has very helpfully coined the term “pre-worldly Trinity” for the 
immanent Trinity and “worldly Trinity” for the economic Trinity to clarify the 
distinction between the two (Hodgson 1994, 151). 
5 For this I am deeply indebted to Peter Hodgson’s Hegelian interpretation of the 
Trinity. See his Winds of the Spirit (Hodgson 1994, 151–172). 
6 I am referring to the famous distinction made by Spinoza between natura natur­
ans (nature naturing or active nature) and natura naturata (nature natured or 
passive nature). Natura naturans is nature taken as the free cause of itself – that 
is, as God – whereas natura naturata is the same nature seen as contingent, 
dependent on, and existing in God. (Spinoza 1993, 25). In the Daoist interpreta­
tion suggested here, the unnamable Dao as natura naturans implies that natura 
naturans transcends any unity or order, including the divine-human-cosmic 
whole (natura naturata) to which it has given birth. 
7 According to Heup Young Kim, the notion of asymmetrical belonging advanced 
by Catherine Cornille, which makes a distinction between the primary religion 
















to which one belongs and others with which one identifies, is suspected of har­
boring the religious, cultural, and philosophical imperialism of the West, espe­
cially if the primary religion happens to be Christianity Kim (2016, 82). 
8 The “grafting model” is suggested by Kyoung Jae Kim in his Christianity and the 
Encounter of Asian Religions: Method of Correlation, Fusion of Horizons and 
Paradigm Shifts in the Korean Grafting Process (1994, 135–141). Here Kim is 
relying on the ideas of Ryu Dong-sik, one of the pioneers of Korean tochakhwa
theology. In the “grafting” model both the Christian tradition and the local func­
tion as theological subjects taking part in the creative process of theological 
indigenization or inculturation. 
9 I am here referring to the “orthodox” lineage of the so-called Cheng-Zhu School, 
whose founding figure is Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200 CE) of the Chinese Southern 
Song Dynasty. 
10 I have presented this account more fully in my book, Spirit, Qi, and the Multitude:
A Comparative Theology for the Democracy of Creation (Lee 2014, 62–82). 
11 For a fuller account see Spirit, Qi, and the Multitude (Lee 2014, 142–173). 
12 For the Eastern Orthodox distinction between divine essence and divine energy, 
especially that of Gregory Palamos, see Lossky (1974, 52–56). Mary-Jane Ruben-
stein convincingly argues that the distinction ultimately collapses, because of the 
intrinsically self-revelatory – that is, relational – nature of divine life (Rubenstein 
2011, 38–41). 
13 See Spirit, Qi, and the Multitude (Lee 2014, 174–210). 
14 See Spirit, Qi, and the Multitude (Lee 2014, 211–243). 
15 See Roberts (2010) and Tiemeier (2010). 
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